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ABSTRACT
The springboard for my investigation is John Hick’s theology of death or “pareschatology” in Death and Eternal Life (1976), a postmortem soteriology rooted in
Irenaeus’ teleological framework of person-making. I organize my project around the two
constitutive aspects of human existence: time and space, or temporality and embodiment.
Regarding postmortem temporality, I present: 1) new scholarships in the New
Testament, early Christianity, and Reformation studies, and 2) recent developments in
ecumenical dialogues and the Justification-Sanctification Debate. Through this, I
demonstrate a widely emerging emphasis–the centrality of sanctification in the Christian
understanding of salvation. I argue that this crystalizing consensus lends logical support
for Hick’s insistence on the non-finality of death in the grand temporal process of
salvation.
Regarding postmortem embodiment (and embodiment in general), I introduce
George Berkeley’s sacramental Idealism as a better alternative to Hick’s conception of
the body under Dualism. I show how philosophical and theological difficulties in both the
Physicalists’ and the Dualists’ explications of “resurrection” are resolved within
Berkeley’s framework. Moreover, Berkeley’s version of embodiment not only does not
contradict relevant Christian orthodoxies, it in fact better conveys their theological
underpinnings. Lastly, I highlight the unique strength of Berkeley’s Idealism for
understanding embodiment by describing: 1) how it helps overcome the current impasse
vii

between Dualism and Physicalism in the Mind-Brain Debate in philosophical
anthropology, and 2) metaphysical writings of many founders of Quantum Physics which
cast sympathetic votes for Berkeley.
In the constructive portion of my dissertation, I lift from the Scripture a biblical
theology of death which consistently underscores the causal connection between sin and
death, holiness and life, and sanctification and resurrection. I then clarify that these wellknown biblical themes are not metaphorical but metaphysical: the causalities are
immanent. My effort here is to explicate a Metaphysic of Sanctification based on
Aquinas’ teleological ontology originated from Augustine’s earlier notion of evil as
“non-being.” Overall, my dissertation is an attempt to respond to the continuous call for
Christians to give a coherent and credible account of the Resurrection Hope (1 Pt 3:1516) that is faithful to the Gospel and relevant for our time.

viii

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The Question of Death and Its Importance for Christian Theology
Some say that, death, being a timeless topic for us mortals, is always also a timely
topic for us. In Peter Kreeft’s words, “Death puts life into question. ... The question of the
meaning of death is also the question of the meaning of life, the greatest of all
questions. … Because life ends in death, life is either startlingly more meaningful or
startlingly less meaningful than we usually think.” 1
A significant cultural phenomenon in our day is the so-called “death awareness
movement,” which emerged after the publication of American psychologist Herman
Feifel’s anthology The Meaning of Death (1959). 2 As Lucy Bregman describes, thanks
to the “death awareness movement,” the era of the 1950s when death was borne in sheer
silence and total denial is behind us. 3 In contrast to the previous mentality which thought
of “death” as an obscene word, 4 the “death awareness movement” is marked by its
explicit admission of death as part and parcel of being human, as well as its conscientious
effort to manage death scientifically. The movement emphasizes the personal and the

1

Peter Kreeft, Love is Stronger than Death (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1992), xvi.

2

Herman Feifel, ed., The Meaning of Death (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1959).

3

Lucy Bregman, Beyond Silence and Denial (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1999).

4

Phillippe Aries, Western Attitudes toward Death: From the Middle Ages to the Present, trans. Patricia M.
Ranum (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 1974).

1

2
subjective dimensions of death long ignored under the orthodox model of western
medicine. The best representation of the movement may be the newly established field
known as “thanatology.” It was developed as a systematic and interdisciplinary approach
for scientific studies of the bodily mechanisms and the psychological, forensic, and social
aspects of death. In addition, it promotes death awareness among the public through
professional seminars, training and certification programs, college education courses, etc.
As the result, a large quantity of “death and dying” literature has been generated to assist
the dying, their family, and professional caretakers.
What’s more, scientific efforts have been made under the objective of eliminating
death all together. For example, some gerontologists (i.e., specialists on aging) tried to
understand why we age in order to discover why we are mortal; other researchers
embarked on a “mission for immortalization” through cryonic technologies. Kevin Keith
describes this war against death as the “life extension movement.” 5 According to
Jonathan Weiner, “the study of longevity is now in an almost feverish state.” 6 However,
Lucy Bregman notes that, despite of all these heroic attempts, a very important element is
still missing from the “death awareness movement”: namely, the discussion of what lies
beyond death. Bregman concludes that, on the final account, such “eclipse of
eschatology” results in a limitation of its ammunitions against death.

5

Kevin T. Keith, “Life Extension: Proponents, Opponents, and the Social Impact of the Defeat of Death,”
in Speaking of Death: America’s New Sense of Mortality, ed. Michael Bartalos (Westport, CT: Praeger
Publishers, 2009), 102-151.

6

Jonathan Weiner, Long for This World (New York, NY: HaperCollins Publishers, 2010), 13.

3
The inadequacy of a this-worldly focus on death can be detected through the
public’s ever intensifying interest in that which lies beyond. The most remarkable
indication of that may be the best-selling records set time and again by the so-called
“light” books. These books contain fascinating stories brought back by people who
returned from the brink of death, known as Near Death Experience (NDE). Even though
written accounts of NDE go as far back as Plato’s Phaedo, they exploded during the past
century, likely the result of the invention of modern resuscitation techniques. Popular
interest in the NDE started to take off after Raymond Moody’s Life after Life (1975),
which is a report on a qualitative study in which Moody interviewed 150 people who had
undergone NDEs. 7 Today, in addition to numerous books written by near death
experiencers, medical practitioners, and researchers worldwide, we have international
research centers devoted to the study of NDE, a peer-reviewed scholarly journal since
1987, online websites for collecting NDE data globally, annual conferences on NDE,
regional chapters formed by near death experiencers, and even counseling services
specialized to help them readapt to the life after NDE.
Considering this high degree of attention death draws from our culture, it is
lamentable that sustained theological engagements with the topic of death are currently
lacking. Lucy Bregman comments that “contemporary Christian treatment of various
death-related themes drops some ideas totally, employs others sparingly, and disagrees on
what in the past went unquestioned. Much of this re-visioning has happened rather

7

Raymond Moody, Life after Life (Atlanta, GA: Mockingbird, 1975).

4
silently. [And] It seems to cross theological boundaries;” 8 “forgotten choices, hidden
shifts of language, and deliberate substitution of new images for old, fill our story. ... Yet,
as a resource for contemporary person in their requests for meaning and community in
the face of dying, death, and grief, Christianity has proved an ambiguous and frequently
disappointing source.” 9 As the result, death is rarely preached about at the pulpit, and is
usually handled in a make-shift fashion on the practical side of church ministry.
Why such reticence? The following statement from The Encyclopedia of
Christianity published in 1999 may reveal the key rationale behind it.
It is theologically advisable, then, not to try to say too much about death or the
state after death. Christian comfort in face of death can be neither explanation nor
doctrine, but only reiteration of the promise that “neither death, nor life … will be
able to separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord.” 10
Undoubtedly, I think it is extremely important to remember that God’s faithful promise is
the sole and the ultimate foundation for the Christian Hope beyond death. And yet, I
think it is also important for Christian theology–the academic discipline commonly
defined as “faith seeking understanding”–to heed the call for Christians to always be
prepared to give an account of the Christian hope to whomever asks (1 Pt 3:15-16).
Furthermore, as clearly manifested through the unprecedentedly high occurrences of
depression, drug abuse, and suicide, this day of ours is afflicted more than ever by
despair. Therefore, my dissertation is an endeavor to respond to the call to give an

8

Bregman, Beyond Silence, 8.

9

Ibid, 9.

10

Wolfgang Schoberth, “Death,” in The Encyclopedia of Christianity, ed. Erwin Fahlbusch and G. W.
Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1999), 783.

5
account of the Resurrection Hope in our time–with all our heart, all our mind, and all our
might.
Research Methodology
Even though much took place since its first publication in 1976, John Hick’s
massive work Death and Eternal Life still offers us a rare platform today for conducting a
multi-disciplinary, inter-disciplinary, and inter-religious investigation of death. In the
book, Hick diligently carries out a wide-spectrum conversation with various thinkers
from historical anthropology, theological anthropology, modern culture, philosophy,
parapsychology, secular humanism, Hinduism, Buddhism, the New Testament, medieval
Christianity, and contemporary Catholicism and Protestantism. Correspondingly, my
dissertation adheres to Hick’s “principle of openness to all data,” which is necessitated by
the universal nature of the phenomenon of death itself. Such openness is based on the
conviction that all truths– insofar as they are truths– originate from God and so are
inherently harmonious with one another and mutually illuminating when properly
understood. Moreover, my dissertation follows Hick’s “principle of spelling out
possibilities” rather than claiming certainties. Such caution is necessitated by the
profoundly obscure nature of all eschatological topics including “death.” Nevertheless,
our investigative exercise helps ensure the rigor of our thinking, to the extent possible.
In addition, to enhance the quality of my study, I adopt the theological approach
by David Tracy, particularly his “criterion of adequacy” for analyzing human experience
and his “criterion of appropriateness” for retrieving the Christian tradition. 11 Specifically,

11

David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology (Chicago, IL: The University of
Chicago Press, 1975).

6
I understand “adequacy” to mean validly taking stock of significant developments in
contemporary culture and rendering an explication of them that is intelligible, persuasive,
and life-transforming. I understand “appropriateness” to mean evermore deeply reaching
into the deposit of the Christian faith and accurately translating the Gospel message for
our time. Overall, I aspire that my theological investigation may be both faithful to the
Christian witness and relevant to our experiential context.
Thesis Statement
There are three questions commonly addressed in the theology of death: what
happens at death, what happens after death, and what causes death. Through critical and
constructive engagements with John Hick’s theology of death, my dissertation generates
the following response to these questions: 1) death does not mark the end of our
sanctification process which–as necessitated by our finite nature–has to be gradual and
which alone leads to the salvation understood in the Christian soteriology; 2) postmortem
embodiment (as well as embodiment in general) may be best envisioned within George
Berkeley’s sacramental Idealism; 3) while the Scripture consistently points to “sin” or
moral evil as the cause of death, it is important to be clear that the kind of “death” caused
by sin is first and foremost death in the spirit rather than in the body. More importantly,
the lethal connection between moral evil and existential privation and annihilation of
being is immanent rather than external or haphazard because, for human beings, the
moral law is the preordained operative principle for ontological perfection and
fulfillment.

7
Roughly speaking, my dissertation may be seen as being organized around the
two constitutive aspects of human existence: namely, time and space. I begin by
reviewing the recent theology of death literature (Chapter Two) and John Hick’s
Theology of Death (Chapter Three). After this descriptive portion is the critical portion of
my dissertation. Here, I present various supports for John Hick’s “minority report”
against the claim of the “finality” of death (Chapter Four). But I submit George
Berkeley’s sacramental Idealism as the better alternative to Hick’s dualistic conception of
postmortem embodiment (Chapter Five). Finally, with the necessity of time and the
mechanism of embodiment proposed in the previous chapters for postmortem salvation, I
finish my dissertation on a constructive note by attempting a “metaphysic of
sanctification,” which is an explication of the biblical theology of death through Thomas
Aquinas’ teleological ontology (Chapter Six).

CHAPTER TWO
A REVIEW OF CURRENT LITERATURES IN THE THEOLOGY OF DEATH
In this chapter, I review contemporary theologies of death since 1930s, and I
supplement this review with related advancements in eschatology since 1980s. Due to the
limitation of scope, my review includes only sustained works on the topic and it does not
include pastoral, contemplative, textbook, and anthological pieces. Overall, the literatures
I cover may be schematized as revolving around two themes: the postmortem question of
time, and the postmortem question of body. Accordingly, I devote the first two sections of
this chapter to describe theologies clustered along these two lines. Notably, given the
intrinsic connection between space and time, or body and temporality, this
schematization is approximate rather than exact; works using one of the two themes as
their focal point often in various degrees also touch upon the other theme as well. In the
third section, I describe the most recent theology of death by Henry Novello. His 2012
book is a conscientious effort to integrate major works in the past to build a theology of
death for the 21st century. In the next section, I introduce related developments in
eschatology, which includes both critiques of the theologies of death we reviewed and
new advancements in eschatology. In the last section, I present a more synthesized
summary of the three key findings related to postmortem time, postmortem body, and the
ontological connection between sin and death and holiness and life, with the aim of
transitioning into open questions to be explored further in the following chapters.
8

9
The Question of Postmortem Time
Overview
In this section, I review works by six authors, whose theologies of death hinge
one way or the other on the notions of time and eternity. Karl Rahner’s On the Theology
of Death (1961), Roger Troisfontaines’ I Do Not Die (1963), and Ladislaus Boros’ The
Mystery of Death (1965) accentuate the finality of death and so the significance of the
moment of death, albeit each in its own ways. Eberhard Jungel’s Death: The Riddle and
the Mystery (1971), on the other hand, is a critique of the worrisome framework beneath
the previous three authors’ theologies. Michael Simpson’s The Theology of Death and
Eternal Life (1971) is an attempt to explicate central eschatological concepts like time,
eternity, death, and resurrection in a way that is intelligible to and relatable for people
today. Finally, Russell Foster Aldwinckle’s Death in the Secular City: Life after Death in
Contemporary Theology and Philosophy (1974) argues against the finality of death by
invoking God’s divine attribute of holy Love.
Karl Rahner, On the Theology of Death (1958) 1
To avoid any methodological misunderstanding of his theology of death, Karl
Rahner opens his short treatise with the following words: “Theology … is the methodical
attempt to secure an explicit understanding of what has been heard and accepted as the
word of God … from the mouth of the Church.” 2 As a Catholic theologian, Rahner
clearly states that the “unquestionable foundation” and the “point of departure” for
1

Karl Rahner, On the Theology of Death (New York: Herder and Herder, 1961).

2

Ibid, 7.

10
Catholic theological reflections should always be the clearly determined doctrines taught
by the magisterium of the church. And this is exactly how his work is to proceed: it
gathers a few officially established doctrines on death, sets them alongside other types of
knowledge, and then attempts to parse out more fully what these doctrines entail.
Moreover, Rahner considers this theological work of his to be speculative rather than
dogmatic, as the result of inevitable methodological constraints.
Rahner is known for the anthropological framework that binds all his theologies.
The theology of death he puts out here is no different, especially in terms of the
anthropological theme of human freedom and its fulfillment. Specifically, Rahner
perceives the human person as a combination of freedom and constraints, a freedom
under constraints. In his own words:
Man is a union of nature and person. He is a being who possesses, on the one
hand, antecedent to his own personal and free decision and independent of it, a
specific kind of existence with definitive laws proper to it and, consequently, a
necessary mode of development; on the other hand, he disposes freely of himself
and is, in the last analysis, what he himself, through the exercise of his liberty,
wills himself to be. 3
Within this anthropological framework of human freedom, Rahner understands death as
an event which affects the whole person. He elaborates it through five themes: 1) the soul
becomes pan-cosmic upon its separation from the body, 2) death is the consummation
and the fulfillment of human freedom, 3) physical disintegration in death is a
manifestation of the original sin, 4) among all of his acts Jesus’ death carries unrivaled
significance for our salvation, and 5) the hiddenness of the nature of death makes death
an event of our condemnation or salvation–depending on our attitude towards it.

3

Ibid, 13.

11
Death is the Separation of the Soul from the Physical Body, upon Which the Soul
Becomes Not A-cosmic but Pan-cosmic toward the Physical Universe
The first doctrine Rahner works from is that which defines death as the separation
of body and soul. Rahner thinks that it is a reasonable description. For the term
“separation” effectively conveys an article of faith that, although in death the body lives
no more, there is an element in the human person, the spiritual element, which lives on
beyond death. However, to Rahner, this definition is still theologically unsatisfactory,
because it does not say enough about what death brings to the soul. Specifically, since the
soul has a substantial connection with the body as the form of the body, the soul “must
also have some relationship to that whole of which the body is a part, that is, to the
totality which constitutes the unity of the material universe.” 4 Consequently, besides its
separation from the body, how is the soul affected by death in its relation to the totality of
the material universe?
To this end, Rahner hypothesizes that, after severing its bond in death with a
particular body, the soul becomes not a-cosmic, but “pan-cosmic,” i.e., it enters into a
more open, more extensive, more intimate relation to the universe, “to that ground of the
unity of the universe … in which all things in the world are interrelated and
communicated anteriorly to any mutual influence upon each other.” 5 Notably, the soul’s
pan-cosmic relation to the universe does not mean that the entire world becomes the body
for that particular soul; neither does it mean that the soul suddenly becomes omnipresent
in the universe. What it really signifies is that, in death the soul becomes “a co4

Ibid, 18.

5

Ibid, 19.

12
determining factor of the universe precisely in the latter’s character as the ground of the
personal life of other spiritual corporeal beings.” 6
To support this hypothesis, from an ontological perspective, Rahner points to the
scholastic understanding which considers the soul’s informing the body to be “a
substantial ‘act’” of the soul, something that could absolutely cease only if the soul itself
ceased to exist. As the result, the soul carries a “transcendental relationship to matter”
even after death, a relationship “posited by the very essence of the soul.” 7 Through the
substantial union of body and soul in the human being, the soul is always in
communication with the material reality; only that, in death, the soul’s deep connection
with the material dimension is rendered more open. From a theological perspective,
Rahner argues that if death were a complete release from the body and a total departure
from the physical realm, it would be difficult to understand why resurrection of the body
is considered such a crucial component anticipated at the eschaton.
Death is the Consummation of Human Freedom Which Concludes the State of
Pilgrimage
The second doctrine Rahner works on is that which defines death as the end of
human pilgrimage. From this doctrinal stipulation, he spells out its implication from
human freedom, i.e., death is the consummation of human freedom. As Rahner puts it,
“Death brings man, as a moral and spiritual person, a kind of finality and consummation

6

Ibid, 22.

7

Ibid, 32.

13
which renders his decision for or against God, reached during the time of his bodily life,
final and unalterable.” 8
A main reason for death to be the consummation of human freedom comes from
what he calls a “truly historical and Christian conception of the temporal character of the
universe,” of which the earthly life of each individual is an integral part. 9 Specifically,
this conception understands temporality as directional and teleological, rather than
circular or indefinite. The flow of time is preordained by God to carry creatures towards
their eventual perfection and fulfillment; “it moves in a definitive way… towards a
perfectly determined, final and irrevocable end.” 10 Given that the doctrine marks the
finish line of our pilgrimage at death, and that this pilgrimage to realize human freedom
must arrive at its consummating destination, death naturally is where Rahner situates this
fulfilling consummation.
Equally importantly, Rahner emphasizes the consummating nature of death as the
result of the utter seriousness of free choices made during the pilgrimage life. Human
freedom is “unique, unrepeatable, of inalienable and irrevocable significance,” not
“something provisional that can be superseded or changed into something indefinite or
into its opposite.” 11 For human freedom to really count, it must at a certain point generate
something definitive and unalterable. Given that the doctrine announces death to be the
end of pilgrimage, death has to be the end place where choices are no longer available for
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the choosing, and so also the consummating place where all the serious choices that have
been made get completely settled; no further.
Notably, Rahner’s talk about death as a consummating event is based on an
anthropological understanding that the human being is a composite of inert matter and
free spirit. Consequently, human death has two sides: while death as the end of biological
life is endured passively, death “as the end of man as a spiritual person must be an active
consummation from within, brought about by the person himself, a maturing selfrealization which embodies the result of what man has made of himself during life.” 12
Furthermore, Rahner does not want to give the impression that the consummating nature
of death has to do only with an isolated point at the end of life. Rather, death
consummates because the state a person is in at death is the very fruit brought forth by
that person’s own life, his entire life. In other words, the consummating nature of death is
the result of death being that which concludes a person’s pilgrimage existence. There,
one necessarily reaps what one has been sowing.
That said, Rahner is quick to clarify that, such consummating “finality” of death
does not mean no further development after death or a static future life with God; rather,
the doctrines of purgatory, resurrection, and consummation all indicate a progress,
“never-ending movement of the finite spirit into the life of God.” 13
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Death as a Consummating Event Which Involves Disintegration of the Body is the Result
of the Original Sin
Assuming that the human being is by nature a union of spirit and body, Rahner
explicates the destructive liaison between death and sin, given that disassociation and
physical disintegration of the body occur in death. To Rahner, that death is somehow
related to sin does not imply that, had the first human beings not sinned, they would have
had an endless bodily life on earth, since that would entail an earthly life without
definitive fulfillment. Rather, that death results from sin means that, had the first humans
not sinned, they would have experienced a “‘death’ without dying,” which is “a pure
apparent and active consummation of the whole man from within, without death in the
proper sense, that is, without suffering from without any violent dissolution of the actual
bodily constitution.” 14 Through such a death, they would have attained “a perfection of
an embodied kind, … the perfection we now look for as the final result of the redemption
and as the eschatological miracle of the resurrection of the body.” 15 In other words, had
there not been sin, human death would have been a consummating event both for the
body and for the spirit, rather than leaving the physical body behind.
Thus, Rahner calls bodily death a punishment for sin, a contradiction to the total
constitution of human being as a union of spirit and body, since it shows that human
being’s bodily reality is presently apart from God’s transforming grace. However, there is
an ontological orientation implanted by God in each person towards the final end of
complete fulfillment–body and soul. Interestingly, Rahner speculates that the transfigured
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corporeality of the glorified body in resurrection would have “a perfect plasticity in
relation to the spirit,” and may also have localization in more than one place, being “open
for maintaining or entering into free and unhampered relations with everything … [as]
the perfect expression of the enduring relation of the glorified person to the cosmos as a
whole.” 16
Among All of Jesus’ Acts, His Death is the Most Important for Our Salvation
Leveraging on the first two themes above, Rahner articulates a distinct soteriology
which accredits Jesus’ death with the biggest import among all of his saving acts.
Specifically, Rahner interprets the creedal confession of Jesus’ descent into hell as a
descent into the lower world, the center of the world, “establishing contact with the
intrinsic, radically unified, ultimate and deepest level of the reality of the world.” 17 This
descent, by the way, is an essential element of human death. For Rahner, it is precisely
Jesus’ death thus understood which represents our redemption, because Jesus’ strongest
redeeming act was carried out “precisely under the characteristics which are proper to
death alone and not to any other moral act.” 18
One such characteristic unique to death is its being a final consummating act, as
described above. Since Christ took on human nature, he lived a human life which reached
its fulfillment only by passing through death. What’s unique in Jesus’ case is that, his
death is a consummating act of total loving obedience in absolute freedom. Thus, “in so
far as any moral act of man is to be considered as a disposing over his entire person with
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regard to his interior destiny, and in so far as such a disposition receives its final
character only in death, it is clear (on the supposition that Christ assumed the flesh of sin
and death) that we cannot really say that Christ could have redeemed us through any
other moral act than his death.” 19
Death not only consummates a human being’s personal reality lived out in the
pilgrimage state, it also renders the human being’s relationship to the whole pan-cosmic;
only then is his total reality achieved in life and in death integrated as a determining
factor of the entire cosmos. In other words, it is through death that a human being
introduces the result of his earthly life as his contribution to the ground of the unity of the
world. It follows that “through Chris’s death, his spiritual reality … becomes open to the
whole world and is inserted into this whole world in its ground as a permanent
determination of a real ontological kind.” 20 This means that, the world has become
ontologically different as the result of none other than Jesus’ death, because through
Jesus’ death his spiritual reality has become “a feature and intrinsic principle of it [the
world], and a prior framework and factor of all person life in this world.” 21
To justify his understanding of Jesus’ death as the singular event which
established his pan-cosmic relationship to the whole world, Rahner argues that this
hypothesis helps explain the claim that Jesus’ death ushered in “a definite situation in
regard to salvation for all spiritual beings belonging to this universe in virtue of their
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bodily constitution.” 22 It also sheds light on the claim that “Christ’s humanity can enter
into an effective active relationship with all men.” 23 Using words reminiscent of
Teilhard’s notion of the “cosmic Christ,” Rahner describes it as the following: “When the
vessel of his body was shattered in death, Christ was poured out over all the cosmos; he
became actually, in his very humanity, what he had always been by his dignity, the heart
of the universe, the innermost center of creation.” 24
Notably, for Rahner, the world does not equal to “the handful of crude and
superficial data gathered from everyday sense-experience,” but is “profound, mysterious
and filled with spiritual realities.” 25
The Obscurity of the Nature of Death, though a Consequence of Sin, Avails the Occasion
for Choice Which Leads to Either Damnation or Salvation
On Rahner’s account, the original sin caused death to be destructive to the
physical body, and so the consummating event of death became a “veiled ending” whose
inner character of active consummation cannot be tangibly experienced with certainty
from this side of death. 26 However, the obscurity of death makes it possible for death, as
an act of human being, to be “an event of salvation or of damnation, according to whether
it is endured in faith or in godlessness.” 27 Mortal sin in death consists in the will to die
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under one’s own control, a refusal to consentingly give oneself up to God. In contrast, the
human being “ought to understand the concrete existential situation of death, in so far as
it is his own deed, as the culmination of that anticipatory attitude (a prefiguration of faith)
in which man surrenders himself and what he is in unconditional openness to the
disposition of the incomprehensible God.” 28
Rahner calls death undergone in such trusting attitude “the twilight in which alone
the faith is possible by which man appropriates the salvation effected by Christ.” 29 As to
exactly how this salvation is effectuated by Christ, Rahner describes that: “The real
miracle of Christ’s death resides precisely in this: death … now, through being embraced
by the obedient ‘yes’ of the Son, while losing nothing of the horror of the divine
abandonment that belongs to it, is transformed into something completely different, into
the advent of God in the midst of that empty loneliness.” 30
But how did Christ turn death into the advent of God? Rahner elaborates that,
when Christ obediently surrendered himself to the innermost part of the world “his death,
as an act of grace, helped to offer to God the ‘flesh of sin’–which death really is–
transforming it into a flesh of grace; so that we now can, through his grace, belong to
God and to Christ in death.” 31
Notably, Rahner emphasizes that death as transformed by Christ as the advent of
God is only available for Christians who die in the state of grace. And how does it come
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through for the Christians? Rahner explains that, insofar as love, faith, and hope of the
Christian become constituents of his death, which is the consummating act of a human
being, these fundamental acts of love, faith, and hope transform death itself into “the
highest act of believing, hoping, and loving.” 32 As the result, “the dreadful falling into the
hands of the living God, becomes in reality: ‘Into thy hands I commend my spirit.’” 33
This is what the Christian obtains in death thanks to the saving grace of Christ’s death.
At this point, I have to acknowledge that, I find Rahner’s soteriology quite
puzzling. One of my questions has to do with the way Rahner articulates how Christ
effectuates his salvific work. With spatial phrases like the shattered body of Christ being
poured out in death over the cosmos, Christ’s humanity being in active relationship with
all people, him offering the flesh of sin to God and transforming it into the flesh of grace,
etc., it seems that Rahner intends his articulation to be taken literally, in the physical
sense. This is particularly counterintuitive for me, given that physicality is innately
deterministic, while human freedom is the central motif of Rahner’s theology.
The other question I have is related to the way Rahner articulates how death for
Christians is a salvific event. Rahner seems to want to highlight the incomparableness of
death as an event for faith, hope, and love, a singular occasion for exercising the
culminating act of freedom. According to Rahner, such acts of faith, hope, and love turn
the death of a Christian into the advent of God. But, of course, this “advent” is not in
physical terms, since God is not physical. Then, how is this transformation of death the
result of Christ’s universal saving death, as described in Rahner’s terms?
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Summary: Death Consummates Human Freedom and Opens the Soul to a Pan-cosmic
Relation to the Material World.
Rahner’s well-known depiction of death as the consummation of human freedom
is the logical result of situating his understanding of human freedom within the doctrine
of death as the end of the state of pilgrimage: since freedom is destined for fulfillment,
and death is the end of this process, freedom’s fulfillment must occur at this end point.
The other well-known theme in Rahner’s theology of death, i.e., the pan-cosmic status of
the soul after death, is constructed from the Thomistic notion of the soul as having an
essential inclination towards matter. On the basis of these two themes, Rahner assigns
death an unsurpassable significance in both human death and the death of Christ.
Roger Troisfontaines, I Do Not Die (1963) 34
Similar like Rahner’s, Roger Troisfontaines’ theology of death is also articulated
within a teleological framework. Only that, here, Troisfontaines adopts the language of
“growth” rather than “freedom.” Specifically, he portrays our earthly existence as a
process that follows the “law of personal growth”: during this growing process of the
human being, “his action comes more and more from within him; the environment that
once held him so tightly now widens; his self-consciousness is deepening; he realizes
more and more his capacity for personally determining the type of relationship he desires
to maintain with his own given situation.” 35 Troisfontaines especially emphasizes that,
this process unfolds on a series of successive levels of increasing activeness vis-à-vis
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one’s environment, with full activeness possible only at death when material constraints
limiting one’s existence are no longer there.
I identify three key themes in the book: 1) immortality deduced from God’s love,
2) death is the result of the body having served its functional purpose for the growth of
the soul, and 3) death is the first and the final moment for a genuinely free choice for
God.
Human Immortality Is Entailed by God’s Love for Us
Among all the contemporary theologies of death I came across during my
investigation, Troisfontaines’ book makes the most explicit argument for human
immortality on the basis of God’s love for us. He quotes Gabriel Marcel’s hero’s words
in declaring: “Loving a person means saying to him: ‘you will never die.’” And so,
Troisfontaines lays out a three-part “syllogism of faith” in human immortality as follows:
every true love wishes to cling to its object forever; God loves me; therefore, God wishes
me to be with Him forever. In his words, “Creating us out of love and for the sake of
love, He also creates us immortal.” 36 Notably, Troisfontaines wants to be clear that,
conviction of this argument will only grow from actual experience of ongoing
communion of love with others, most of all with God. This is because our immortal life is
willed by God to be lived out in loving fellowship, not in isolation.
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Death is the Result of the Earthly Body Running Its Course as the Means for
the Growth of the Soul Which in Resurrection at Death is to Take on a New
Body Willed by Itself
On the one hand, human consciousness is incarnate, in that it is tied to the world
through the earthly body. On the other hand, consciousness follows a law of growth
proscribing “man’s forever-binding obligation to tear himself away, willingly or
reluctantly, from an environment where his equilibrium was more passive, or external,
and to enter into a more vast, more complex new situation.” 37 Consequently, the earthly
body, “this placenta of the spiritual person,” 38 is beneficial only for a while, and must be
relinquished when the growth of the soul has reached a stage where the body has run its
course and become now an impediment to the growth. In other words, the soul’s relation
to the earthly body is extrinsic, temporary, and merely functional. Troisfontaines
describes the functional relation of the body to the soul by drawing analogies between the
physical body and scaffolding, props of a building, cocoon, and mother’s womb. Hence,
the moment of death, in a genuine sense, is a moment of birth–into eternal life; in fact,
our entire embodied existence on earth is meant to be a preparation like pregnancy for
this moment of real birth.
Furthermore, based on Teilhard de Chardin’s theory, Troisfontaines predicts that
if the law of growth prevails in the process of becoming, “consciousness will detach itself
from its existential relationship with the body and with the world sufficiently enough to
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give them both on the ontological level a new true structure.” 39 Specifically, it means that
the soul will find that its relationship with the world becomes easier and more universal;
in addition, given that the human spirit is by nature an incarnate spirit, this entails that in
the resurrection state, the spirit will acquire a new body fashioned after its own will.
Notably, this prediction is in line with how he conceives the human growth, i.e., as a
process of “progressive independence of the various forms of hereditary, familial, and
social determinism,” of being “able to place my own self and determine personally my
own manner of … being.” 40 In other words, he understands human growth to be gaining
more self-determination and more control of one’s own existence against external
compulsions.
Death is the First and also the Final Moment for Making a Genuinely Free Choice of
Eternity
On Troisfontaines’ account, death is the first moment for making a truly free
choice. This is because, even though the body is indispensable for the soul’s growth on
earth, “it also darkens the light of the mind.” 41 Death is the first moment when, released
from such darkening constraints of the body, a sudden revelation occurs to the person, so
that “man will then discover all of his constitutive relationships with the world, with
other men and especially with God as the Creator and Final End;” and this “new gifts of
knowledge and consciousness make him capable of that one act of perfect freedom upon
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which everything depends.” 42 Hence, death is the first instant when a fully informed and
so also fully free choice is to be made, the choice between “whether it is to enter a
personal communion with everything that exists, or remain forever opposed to its own
self.” 43 Notably, Troisfontaines thinks that his theory of special revelation in death helps
reconcile God’s “universal salvific will, the necessity of an explicit act of faith, with the
data of experience,” 44 especially in the cases of the mentally handicapped, the unbaptized
infants, and the heathens who have never heard the gospel. Specifically, under this
theory, death is the event which all people are placed on an equal footing; despite of
disparities of fortune during their earthly lives, for each person at death, “the only thing
that counts is the soul’s fundamental orientation toward communion or isolation … by
personal choice” in death. 45
Death is also the final moment for making a genuinely free choice that bears
eternal significance. This is because our mortal earthly life has already provided us the
chance to train ourselves for making such an extremely important choice for communion
with God. As Troisfontaines puts it, “In a thousand and one ways, at every conscious
instant of his life, he learns that good and happiness are never found in the direction of
selfishness and pride. Armed with this experience he will, at the moment of death, give
his answer to the divine proposal.” 46 The choice made in death is eternal also because, at
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death, “the choice is made in perfect consciousness, there will be no reason or any
possibility to restate the question later.” 47
To further support the eternal finality of the choice made at death, Troisfontaines
presents several theological arguments. For example, the scripture indicates that “It is
appointed unto men to die once, and after this comes the judgment.” (Heb 9:27) This
shows the seriousness of death, after which the person’s fate is irrevocably sealed.
Troisfontaines does not see any need for extending the earthly time of trial, since each of
such extensions can only be finite and imperfect, and “Finite added to finite yields
nothing but finite;” whereas the supposed “switch from becoming to being [at death]
supposes a change of axis” completely. 48 Moreover, the case of the “good thief” indicates
for Troisfontaines that, entering the Kingdom of God is not a “having,” which takes time,
but a “being-with” which as “communion is a matter of a single act, a matter of
qualitative intensity, and not of quantity. Two persons can become friends within one
hour just as well as in twelve hours. … The all-important thing is to meet Jesus Christ,
and answer His calling, even if it is truly heard in the last minute only.” 49
Objections arise here. Troisfontaines underscores death as the paramount moment
of final choice. In his words, “although the whole adventure has been subject to countless
vicissitudes, it will be a success if my last act is successful.” 50 But such privileging the
moment of death, even as that which levels the playing field for all, seems to be in
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contradiction to his previous theme of the earthly life as a training ground for making this
eternity-defining choice. Nevertheless, Troisfontaines thinks that “it does not diminish
the importance of the successive choices on which my final attitude is progressively
built.” 51 In my view, however, a disharmony remains, especially in cases of people, such
as the unbaptized infants, who do not have a fair chance in life to train themselves: if all
ends at death, either these people are offered a fair chance at death that comes with
special revelations, which seems to void the value of earthly life; or, the final choice is
decisively influenced by the series of decisions before that, and so they are dealt an unfair
hand by not having opportunities of such practice. In other words, if death is the final
cutoff point, either the earthly journey matters, but ends unfulfilled; or, its fulfillment
comes with the price of devaluing the earthly life it claims to fulfill. In my view, the
dilemma between the significance of earthly life and the efficacy as well as the
universality of God’s saving will is caused ultimately by the doctrine which declares the
finality of death.
Summary: Death as the Ontological Promotion at the End of Earthly Growth.
Troisfontaines’ conception of death may be captured with his phrase “an
ontological promotion,” 52 when the person relieved from the limited “training wheel” of
earthly body is now bestowed with an unprecedented wealth of knowledge about the self,
the world, and God, which enables him to choose consciously and freely for the first and
also the final time whether to exist with or without the loving communion with God and
with others. Death is the graduation from one’s earthly education, the whole purpose of
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which is for this eternal crossing, “the crossing, whereby life is finally able to blossom
out in full.” 53 Death is the spiritual birth from the second pregnancy of earthly existence,
the true birth which leads the person to life everlasting.
Ladislaus Boros, The Mystery of Death (1965) 54
Similar to Troisfontaines, Ladislaus Boros also depicts death as the moment
which carries matchless import for eternity. What is different here is that Boros’
investigation utilizes the so-called “transcendental method” from Martin Heidegger’s
existential philosophy, which detects death to be “essentially present in the structure of
every living existence, and can, therefore, be grasped in the existent being itself at the
point of intersection of the various pointers to death.” 55 Specifically, Boros focuses on
those quintessential aspects of human consciousness and, starting from these concrete
experiences of life, traces them back to the a priori reality which makes them possible.
In the first half of the book, Boros captures this a priori reality to be death’s
culminating role toward which all the key aspects of human consciousness point. And he
describes it in the “hypothesis of a final decision” (HFD), something very similar to but
fuller than the way Troisfontaines describes of death. Specifically, based on Rahner’s
theme of death as a descent into the center of it all, Boros conceives death for all people,
including infants and the mentally challenged, to be a full encounter at this center with
oneself, a total presence to the world, and a face-to-face meeting with the Creator of all
for the first time. There, equipped with utter clarity of understanding, complete freedom
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from bodily constraints, and full awakening of consciousness, the person is perfectly
enabled to make a final decision to be or not to be with God, which will last for eternity.
In the second half of the book, Boros tries to demonstrate the validity of this
hypothesis by showing how it helps to clarify and reconcile some challenging doctrines
in theology. For example, like Troisfontaines, Boros thinks that the HFD presents
justification for the doctrine which declares death to be the end of our pilgrimage. Also
like Troisfontaines, Boros thinks his hypothesis helps reconcile the universality of God’s
salvific will for all people, with the unconditional necessity of an explicit attitude for
Christ in order to receive salvation. Again, like Troisfontaines, Boros does not think his
privileging the moment of death in any way devalues decisions made during life. Because
“life is a training for conversion” at death; 56 the final decision is “the fruit of the
decisions that have prepared it, though it does stand above them by giving its final,
conclusive judgment on them.” 57
Besides these points, similar to those in Rahner’s and Troisfontaines’ works, there
are also three themes that are unique in Boros’ theology of death: 1) essential aspects of
human consciousness all point to death as their moment of fulfillment, 2) Jesus’ bodily
reality as the physical instrumental cause of grace, and 3) death is a temporal process in a
non-temporal transition.
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Essential Aspects of Human Consciousness All Point toward Death as that All-Decisive
Moment for Their Fulfillment
Using the transcendental method, Boros singles out several essential aspects of
being human, and argues that the trend of the earthly unfolding of their realization all
points toward death as the moment for their eventual fulfillment. As Boros explains it in a
summarized fashion in a later article: “Only in the moment when it is impossible to go
further into the same, fragmented future, can he fully realize his nature. … But this
moment can occur only in the moment of death. For only in death can there simply be no
more ‘further’ in the same direction.” 58
It may be worth pointing out here, in my view, Boros arguments are all based on
the theological doctrine that, death is the end of the pilgrimage state; also, they are based
on the teleological presupposition that, these essential aspects of being human will be
fulfilled in the end. Specifically, here are several aspects of human consciousness Boros
uses to make his argument for the HFD. First, using Maurice Blondel’s discussion of
human will, Boros spotlights an unquenchable thirst in our volitional drive for an end,
which infinitely exceeds what can be accomplished through conscious, concrete, and
individual actualizations of it in the world. This unreflective thirst is our innate dynamism
toward God, which cannot be satisfied except in death. Second, Boros invokes Joseph
Marechal’s theory of knowing, which describes total self-reflection as being clogged by
the material principle until “the moment of death when the spirit frees itself from material
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concretion.” 59 Third, Boros refers to Henri Bergson’s work on perception and
remembrance, which explains how the mind’s mastery of daily life in the vast world is
only made possible at the price of sharp selectivity of human perceptions; such inhibiting
circumscriptions in our activity of perception are lifted only at death. Fourth, Boros
brings up Gabriel Marcel’s analysis of love, which is defined as “trusting readiness to
surrender itself and be at another’s disposal.” 60 According to this analysis, since our
embodied existence revolves around our body, we never reach the good in itself “but only
the good that stands in a concrete relation to ourselves.” 61 Because the body is our
absolute possession, corporeity immerses us in “the spheres of having.” 62 This results in
“a self-seeking of our [bodily] existence” which makes impossible the total surrender of
self until death, when our body departs and our soul is exposed without reserve. 63 Fifth,
Boros himself puts out a theory of the human person as a composite of the physical
“outer man” and the spiritual “inner man.” Very similar like Troisfontaines, Boros posits
the human existence as a progressive development of “an independent center of being,
the widening of ones’ sphere of existence and the positing of one’s own liberty.” 64
Human being “experiences an urge to posit himself and, by this means, to become
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completely free.” 65 But this urge to completely posit itself free from corporeal constraints
and circumstantial contingencies cannot be realized until death, “a farewell to the ‘outer
man.’” 66 Death is the place of total freedom, because “Only then can he really posit
himself fully when he can call into existence, out of the bases of his own being, a body
(no less), and a relationship with his surroundings and his neighbors.” 67
Christ’s Bodily Reality as the Physical Instrumental Cause Required for Our
Salvation
Extending Rahner’s brief reference to Teilhard de Chardin’s notion of the
“cosmic Christ,” Boros lays out the “Christological basis” for the hypothesis of a final
decision, i.e., it is a decision made in the realm fully enveloped by the “cosmic Christ.”
Specifically, first, like Rahner, Boros crowns Jesus’ death with the primary importance
among all of his salvific works. This is because, as the hypothesis of a final decision
suggests, nothing human arrives at its full reality until it does so in death. Hence,
“Christ’s human reality, the instrumental cause of our redemption, reaches the perfection
of its instrumentality only in death.” 68 Second, following Rahner’s theme of the soul’s
pan-cosmic relation to the universe after death, Boros presents a theory regarding how
Christ’s bodily reality can be the instrumental cause of God’s salvific grace for people of
all places and all ages. To him, without the HFD, such universal instrumentality of
Christ’s physical body would be inconceivable, since physicality by nature is limited by
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time and space; and yet, the universal access to Christ’s physical reality is absolutely
essential, because every human being is under the grace of Christ. As Boros explains: “If
Christ’s bodily reality is the physical instrumental cause of grace, and if every grace is
Christological, then in the production of every grace, we must include its physical
communication through Christ’s body.” 69
Boros thinks that, unlike his HFD, Aquinas’ distinction between spiritual and
bodily contact does not fulfill the requirement of universal access to Christ’s physicality.
Specifically, Aquinas argues that, Christ’ bodily reality possesses a spiritual power which
works not through the physical but the spiritual contact. Against this, Boros argues that
the spiritual contact cannot do away with the requirement of the bodily contact. He thinks
that the healing miracle in Capernaum shows plainly that “the spiritual contact is the
intensity of faith with which the physical contact is made;” and so, “the spiritual contact
should rather be seen as a mode of the bodily contact.” 70 If so, how is universal physical
contact with Christ made possible–according to Boros? His answer is the soul’s pancosmic relation to the universe after death. As described in the HFD, since in death Christ
descended into the center of the universe, “at that moment in his bodily humanity he
became the real ontological ground of a new universal scheme of salvation embracing the
whole human race;” “all men without exception can enter into bodily contact with Christ,
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and precisely by means of the [corporeal] cosmic reality which each man is so intimately
connected.” 71
More specifically, Boros describes the crucial impact of Jesus’ descent into the
center of the universe as bringing in “a cosmic spring, the harvest of which will be the remaking of our universe in newness and splendor at the end of time.” 72 On Boros’
account, Jesus’ triumphant descent to the root of the world has created a brand new
situation in the scheme of salvation, in that it ushers in the dawn of the “ultimate finality
of a [material] world permeated and transformed by the spirit.” 73 Boros sees this impact
being expressed particularly in Jesus’ resurrection, which to him is the other side of
descent, and both belong to the same salvific event of Jesus’ death. What is accomplished
ontologically through Jesus’ death is both “Descent into the interior of all visible
creation, and resurrection as an entry into the pneumatic openness of the corporeal,” 74
thus introducing the whole corporeal world into the dimension of the pneumatic. The
universal transfiguration has been initiated through it, albeit invisibly, and the great sign
of this is Christ’s risen body, which has been “removed from the domain of cramped,
transitory, impermanent things, sealed off into particular compartments and present
through being tied to conditions of time and space” and has now been permeated by the
spirit. 75 Christ’s transfigured body in resurrection is the eschatological archetype of the
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human race and of the universe as a whole. In Jesus’ descent: “Free of all the ‘fleshly’
constraints of time and space, Christ is able to reach the men of all times and places and
make them members of his transfigured body, i.e., enable them to participate in his
‘pneumatic’ corporeity. Any man who, by reason of a personally realized donation has
entered, through Christ’s body, into union with the Godhead, is one of the redeemed.” 76
Notably, similar questions related to Rahner’s soteriology arise in Boros’ case
here as well. Specifically, what does he mean by “corporeality permeated and
transformed by the spirit”? How would it manifest in the corporeal? And why is bringing
such permeation of the corporeal a central part of Jesus’ salvific work? Moreover, what
does it mean to enter into God (the Spirit) through Christ’s body? What is “a personally
realized donation” which effectuates such entrance? And how?
Death is a Temporal Process in a Non-Temporal Transition
To be precise about his HFD, Boros emphasizes that “The final decision …
occurs neither before nor after death, but in death.” 77 Logically speaking, the final
decision cannot occur before death because, so long as there is still time left on earth, the
decision is not yet final. But it cannot occur after death either, because “Apart from the
fact that such an assumption misconceives the metaphysical constitution of the
completely personal act, it would also be contrary to the Church’s teaching on the
inalterability of the state a man reaches through his death.” 78
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But, is there really such a thing as “in death”? According to a major objection
raised against the HFD, the answer is “no.” This objection points out that, decision is a
temporal concept, since time is required for decision making; but death is a break
between the state of life and the state of death, and so is non-temporal, and can offer no
possibility for deciding. How can a temporal event, i.e., the final decision, take place in
something which is not temporal, i.e., death? Boros’ reply is that “death is a non-temporal
transition whose very non-temporality, nevertheless, procures a passage in time from one
state to another.” 79 This means that
the last moment before the break and the first after it merge into one another. …
Therefore, the moment of death, the transition itself, is–when looked at from the
subsequent condition–the last moment of the proceeding condition, and–when
viewed from the preceding condition–the first moment of the succeeding
condition. … So then, although the transition in death must be regarded as
something non-temporal, i.e., outside of time, the passing and what occurs in the
passing are temporal. Because of this, the moment of death offers an opportunity
for decision. 80
Ironically, Boros’ defense here of the timing of the final decision in death shows
me, instead, the logical infeasibility of all the “final decision” theories. This is because, as
pinpointed by Boros’ critics, death really is a not temporal event–a person is ether alive
or dead, there is no moment in between. Therefore, decision can only be made either in
life or after life; there is any state between the two. If we adhere to the doctrine of the
finality of death, like all the “final decision” theorists happen to do, decisions can only be
made during life; and yet, this stipulation would miss out on the very reason why the
theory of “final decision” was developed in the first place, i.e., all the things left badly
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wanting during the earthly life, a sorrowful fact these final decision theorists have so ably
reminded us.
Summary; The Final Decision for Eternity is Made at Death under the Fullness
of Being
Even though, similar to Troisfontaines, Boros foregrounds death as the decisive
moment for eternity, he makes his argument not so much from the laws of growth like
Troisfontaines, but directs our attention to the essential aspects of human existence which
he argues would be left wanting, if such a decisive moment is not offered to us at death.
That said, the gist of his theology of death is the same as Troisfontaines’: “There is in
death a fullness of being which life does not possess,” 81 such that a final decision for
one’s eternal destiny is made under full capacities of the person.
Eberhard Jungel, Death: The Riddle and the Mystery (1971) 82
Eberhard Jungel’s theology of death aims to correct a wrong turn made in varying
degrees in all three theologians’ works above. In the preface of the book, Jungel stresses
the necessity for Christian theology of death to explicitly and primarily rely on revelation
as its main source, saying that: “We cannot apprehend death in its own terms. Death is
mute. And it renders us speechless. If we are to speak about death at all, then a word must
come from ‘beyond’ death. Christian faith makes the claim that it has heard such a word.
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It has earned the title ‘Word of God.’ It is with the help of this word that it embarks on its
enquiry about death.” 83
As Jungel sees it, there is a great danger that “edifying speeches” on death may
divert our attention away from the reality of bitterness and pain associated with death.
Christian theology must resist this danger, and yet provide a credible answer to the
question of death, because “There is a sense in which Christian faith as a whole amounts
to an answer to the question of death.” 84 Specifically, Jungel concentrates his theology of
death upon the fact that “The divine attitude which was final and decisive for Jesus
himself was the expression of God’s relationship to a dead man,” 85 and so God’s
faithfulness has been best revealed in His raising Jesus from the dead. For Jungel, God’s
faithful working unambiguously shown in Jesus’ resurrection is the basis of the believers’
participation in what took place in Jesus’ death.
Two themes are distinct in Jungel’s theology: 1) death is enigmatic seen from
human experience alone; 2) seeing death as the “true liberator” derives from a noeticcentered anthropology rather than Christian anthropology.
Death is Enigmatic When Seen only from the Human Experience
Seen from human experiences alone, death is indefinable. This is because to
define something presupposes a certain control over; but all men die, and so are no
masters of death. Also, as depicted in Leo Tolstoy’s novel on the death of Ivan Ilyich,
death is a foreign concept for human beings to apply to themselves. Death seems strange
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and so is hard to believe, because “Although it is of man’s essential being to find a way
and to take that way, when it comes to death he discovers that there is no way out. …
Death remains alien to him.” 86 At the same time, however, death is also “an inalienable
part of us,” since “Everything can be taken from us, even life itself. But no-one can take
death from us.” 87 Matter of fact, death is part of this mortal life of ours since the very
beginning of it–albeit as its “infinite offence,” its “absolute opposite.” “As an essential
part of us it remains most alien to us. And it is this which makes death so enigmatic.” 88
We can know that death is; but as to what death is, we know it only peripherally through
experience of life. Specifically, we learn from our experience of life’s temporality that,
“with every fragment of life experienced, as lived in its immediate after-effect, there is
the feeling that this broad prospect of life-to-be-experienced has contracted ... which may
also be called the experience of life’s directedness toward death.” 89
Conceptualizing Death as the “True Liberation” is Based on a Noetic-centered
Anthropology Contradictory to the Christian Faith
In the book, Jungel especially protests against an anthropology upon which
certain theologies of death are built, because he observes that anthropology to be alien
and threatening to the Christian faith. It is an anthropology which defines the human
person primarily as a being destined for knowledge, and defines life and death according
to this concept of the human being. More specifically, the true end of the soul is to
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possess knowledge regarding that which is truly real, and not their transient appearances;
the soul’s final aim is to know “the things themselves” which never pass away.
Unfortunately, the body with its senses mediates a kind of “knowledge” which is
misleading, and so, it is a hindrance to the soul’s essential pursuit for truth. Consequently,
due to its embodiedness, earthly life is seen primarily as an imposed existence in bondage
to that which is subject to transience and decay, even though it does serve as a training
ground for attaining pure knowledge apart from the body. Correspondingly, death is
hailed to be the real liberation which is anticipated with joy.
Upon death, the soul is released from the body; “the body perishes because it
attaches itself to that which is perishable, the soul is immortal because it attends to that
which is imperishable and indestructible.” 90 Now, freed from the constraints of the body,
the soul is finally able to fulfill its proper function, which is to know truth, to know the
real. Death “demonstrates what true knowledge is, for once set free from the body the
soul is permitted to come to itself.” 91 In other words, “Death is regarded as the one event
which can effect knowledge itself;” 92 death is “a promise which is fulfilled in terms of
the increase in knowledge which men can experience in their lives. … death is an event
which itself augments knowledge. Death thus casts no shadow, but rather light.” 93
Jungel points out that “That death is not only the object of knowledge but also
influences knowing itself is one of the acknowledged facts of the Platonic interpretation
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of the death of Socrates.” 94 Notably, there are indeed many alarming resemblances
between this noetic-centered anthropology Jungel describes and the anthropological
outlooks adopted in the previous three authors’ works. In contrast, the nature of death
disclosed in and through the death of Jesus is division and devastation, rather than all
sunny and positive. As the result, Jungel advocates the necessary theological task of “dePlatonizing” a “Platonized Christianity,” especially manifested in the theory of the final
decision “which is impressively put forward in Catholic theology” like Boros’. 95 Jungel
thinks that interpreting death as the moment for a final decision is untenable from a
biblical point of view, mainly because “Here, self-knowledge and knowledge of death are
mediated by Another,” 96 and not by death per se. In Jungel’s opinion, in Christian
theology, death should be explicated in such a way that its true mystery is seen and
appreciated to be accessible only through biblical revelation, through Jesus the Word of
God.
Summary: The Enigma of Death should be Deciphered in such a Way that Its True
Mystery May Appear Knowable only through the Mediation by Another
Through his theology of death, Jungel wants to guard against those trends of
thoughts about death which may potentially cloud the fact that, death actually is
incomprehensible from the solely human perspective and experiences. More importantly,
Jungel offers incisive critiques regarding the alien anthropology behind some theologies
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of death which portrait embodied life as mainly an existence in bondage, conceive our
ultimate destination as pursuit of knowledge, and so look to death per se as our first and
final liberation.
Michael Simpson, The Theology of Death and Eternal Life (1971) 97
Michael Simpson’s theology of death was strongly motivated by the urgent need
he felt to expound Christian hope in such way that Christianity can continue to be a lively
saving force in today’s world of conflicting ideologies. Specifically, Simpson thinks that
it must be a hope that can morally inspire and transform people’s lives. To this end,
Christianity needs to be cleansed of concepts that do not resonate with our moral
sensitivity. For example, Simpson thinks that many people can no longer genuinely
respond to the usual articulations of “heaven” and “hell” in classic eschatology. One
reason is that ultimate human destiny is “made out [in traditional eschatology] to depend
upon the observance or failure of observance of a certain code of behavior, which many
feel does not accord with their own most deep-felt moral instinct.” 98 Another reason is
that, under traditional articulation, the ultimate destiny of humanity is forever split into
the “good” and the “wicked,” the eternally blessed and the forever damned, while in fact
there exists an un-severable connection among all people in terms of mutual
responsibilities and emotional bonds. In Simpson’s account, our moral conscience calls
for a hope with universal relevance; otherwise, it would not be a real hope, but “an
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abdication of responsibility, a failure of hope.” 99 In addition, Christian hope must be one
which people can relate to without sacrificing their intellectual honesty. To this end,
Christian eschatology needs to discard mythological concepts of the Last Things which
can no longer be reconciled with the modern scientific worldview. Consequently, a
responsible renewal of Christian eschatological expressions is vital; so that Christian
hope may be proclaimed in such a way that, it is both true to the inspiration from Christ
and also responsive to our deepest moral instinct.
I identify three unique themes in Simpson’s theology: 1) the eternal self develops
through temporality, 2) death and resurrection are different aspects of the same
transformation, and 3) heaven, hell, and purgatory denote concepts of transformation at
death.
The Eternal Element of the Self is the True Self Which Grounds Its Flow of Actions in
Temporality and Develops Itself through Them
Simpson attempts to make the difficult concept of “eternity”–the core notion
regarding our eschatological destiny–more intelligible by linking it with our familiar
experiences of time, which to him is “the absolute datum” of human life. 100 Simpson
states that “Time is a condition of material existence,” 101 and so human beings as
embodied existence can never escape time. However, the fact that we humans are
conscious of temporal duration implies that there is a level of consciousness which arises
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above temporality. Thus, human beings cannot be understood entirely as “a temporally
extended succession of moments.” 102 In other words, there is an element in the human
being that transcends time, and this is the element of the “eternal.” Notably, on
Simpson’s account, the eternal is not endless duration in the future, but “that element of
human existence whereby man is identified with what is prior to temporal duration, as its
‘ground’ and condition.” 103 The eternal self of the human being is immanently present
within each of his actions in the temporal world, and this gives every temporal action its
eternal significance. To illuminate this point, Simpson suggests that our experiences of
deep personal involvement offers the best model for understanding what is meant by the
eternal being present in the temporal human experience.
More importantly, Simpson says that human actions in temporality “are the very
means by which that destiny is built up;” what is achieved in the temporal “becomes a
part of ones’ true eternal self and helps to constitute one’s eternal destiny.” 104 As
Simpson sees it, people who live in the day-to-day should not ignore the eternal, because
“It is through the world of time and objects that the true eternal self of man comes to
expression and enriches and develops itself.” 105 Notably, Simpson emphasizes that it is
the eternal element in the human being that is most closely identified with his true self.
Although the human being in the earthly life has no access to his true self except through
his participation in the temporal world, and his true self can only be expressed and
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developed through involvement in the objective world, actions per se in the temporal as
well as the objective conditions under which these actions are expressed have no eternal
significance, and cannot be identified with the eternal in the human being. In Simpson’s
view, “To attribute an absolute significance to some finite and objective expression is
idolatry.” 106
Death and Resurrection Are Different Sides of the Same Transformation from the
Temporal to the Eternal Mode of Existence
On Simpson’s account, human life in the temporal has the eternal immanently
within it, and so the eschatological notion of “resurrection” can only be made meaningful
and relevant to people by referring to their experience of the eternal in their temporal life.
Specifically, Simpson states that “resurrection” conveys the Christian faith inspired by
Jesus’ resurrection that, even though death destroys the temporal existence of the human
person, the eternal element of his existence “will be taken up into a new mode of
existence in which his true personal and eternal identity is preserved;” “whatever is of
value in man’s life, whatever has been achieved … has an eternal value and
significance.” 107 Hence, while “death” underscores the destruction of the temporal,
“resurrection” spotlights the entry into the eternal; the two concepts describe
complementary aspects of the same transformation, which is “the transformation of life
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under present temporal conditions into life in which the eternal is immediately
present.” 108
As far as the transformed existence is concerned, Simpson does not think it
necessary to completely rule out temporality there, for even in this life the eternal
grounds the temporal in the human being. He only insists that the same conditions in this
temporal world of objects will no longer obtain. Furthermore, he thinks that, in the
“risen” life, alienations from God, from others and from oneself experienced in this world
will at least to some extent be overcome, since time and objects of the world, which are
the condition of human growth and development, are also the very root of their
alienation.
Another important point of Simpson’s is that “resurrection” does not take place
only in the future; rather, this entry from the temporal into the eternal occurs at every
moment in life, even though, during our existence in the temporal, this transition does not
seem to be a present and continuous event. Notably, Simpson does indicate that “the
possibility of further creative achievement ends with death,” 109 because an endless
temporal existence with no end of fulfillment is unsatisfactory and gives no hope. The
human person is formed and developed through his embodied existence during his life in
the objective world of temporality, upon which his eternal destiny at death depends. The
finality of death means there is no more possibility of creating one’s identity beyond
death.
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Heaven, Hell, and Purgatory Symbolize Concepts of Transformation at the Moment of
Death
On Simpson’s account, the transformation from the temporal to the eternal is of
varying degrees of success among people at death. To the degree that a human being has
come to participate in the eternal life of God through his temporal actions in earthly life,
he has acquired an eternal personhood which is indestructible by death. But all that is not
grounded in the eternal life of God is subject to the spatio-temporal conditions, and so are
destroyed at death–this is “eternal death.” “Heaven” symbolizes eternal life and ultimate
success in finding fulfillment; “hell” symbolized eternal death and ultimate failure to find
fulfillment. These two opposing possibilities for eternity are present in each temporal
moment, in each action of our earthly lives; they are the opposite poles in between which
a person’s ultimate destiny finds its place. “Hell” is an eternal reality only in the sense of
the person’s “eternal awareness of non-fulfillment,” 110 which is related to those false and
illusory values inappropriately attached to during earthly life, and so must be destroyed at
death. “Purgatory” is not a place alongside “heaven” and “hell” for the purpose of
temporary purgation, but an excruciating process of purging the false self away from the
person’s true eternal self; “Purgatory is the separation of heaven (the eternal) from hell
(the non-eternal) in man’s personal existence.” 111
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Summary: Building the Eternal-Self through the Temporal Existence on Earth
Simpson’s theology of death is an effort to shed lights upon crucial eschatological
concepts, so that talk about the eternal can be more intelligible for and relatable to
people’s everyday life. More importantly, it is to inspire people to live out each moment
with an eye on their ultimate destiny. His work especially strives to bring out the moral
significance of every action for the working out of one’s eternal destiny, a significance
which he sees as resonating strongly with people’s deepest moral instinct. Simpson wants
people to understand from his theology of death that the Christian faith proclaims the
human being as being preordained to participation in the eternal life of God, and that is
the profound meaning and lofty aim of our temporal existence. As Simpson perceives it,
his symbolic interpretation of eschatological concepts like heaven and hell helps bring
out this ethical message. In contrast, the non-symbolic interpretations of them are morally
minimalistic, and they obscure the fact that constructive and moral actions in every aspect
of one’s life are “the actual means through which man constitutes his destiny.” 112
Russell Foster Aldwinckle, Death in the Secular City: Life after Death
in Contemporary Theology and Philosophy (1974) 113
In the Preface of the book, Russell Aldwinckle observes concernedly that
discussions of personal survival of death no long occupy a central position in
contemporary Christian thinking. And he thinks that this led to the worrisome neglect of
an essential aspect of Christian faith. His book is intended to remind people that the
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Christian hope is not confined to this world. Specifically, Aldwinckle points out that both
the resurrection event of Jesus and the Pauline epistles clearly affirm personal survival
after death, in more than symbolic sense, as a new mode of continuous existence. In
addition, the rejection of a literalistic understanding of resurrection in physical terms does
not necessitate the rejection of some type of “embodied” existence after death. More
importantly, in agreement with Thielicke, Aldwinckle emphasizes the doctrine of God as
the indispensable basis for any talk about a life after death.
There are two unique themes in Aldwinckle’s theology of death: 1) an interim
period of further human growth is necessitated by God’s divine attribute as Love, and 2)
the conceivability of postmortem continuity of personal identity depends on a proper
conceptualization of the “body”.
Vindicating God’s Just Love for Us Requires an Interim Period for us for Further
Spiritual Growth
To argue for the necessity of an interim period, Aldwinckle reminds the reader of
the realistic state of the human beings when they die, saying that “We are not yet perfect
and we have not yet attained. To make death the end is to leave us spiritually immature
and incomplete, even if we are believers, and condemns many, whose present lives have
been mainly frustration and disappointment, to an annihilation which denies them selffulfillment or realization of their God-given potentialities.” 114
But the force of his argument ultimately comes from the Christian doctrine of
God as just and loving towards all people. As Aldwinckle describes, people die at all
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points during a human life span; some have enjoyed longevity, others are still in their
prime, and still others have merely lived. Given such huge difference among people
during their lives in terms of opportunities they have for coming to repentance and faith,
and also that “Most of us at death are simply not yet fit for the rarefied air of the heavenly
Himalayas,” 115 it seems quite unjust for God to have people’s eternal destiny be
determined conclusively at the arbitrary moment of their physical death. Here,
Aldwinckle approvingly quotes J. A. T. Robinson’s sharp criticism, saying that to be
content with such excessive emphasis on the finality of death “is to betray a sub-Christian
view of the Fatherhood of God” 116–above all, the view of God as holy love. Aldwinckle
also wants to be very clear that, regarding the finality of death, “The Christian does not
reject this latter alternative because he does not like it. He rejects it primarily because he
believes that God has made Himself known in such a way that we are justified in looking
to a future not only in this world, but beyond death and the end of history as we know
it.” 117
Therefore, Aldwinckle exhorts Christians to “have the courage of our
convictions” 118 and acknowledge an interim period between death and the final
consummation of all God’s creation. It is important that God’s saving grace continues to
operate during this period, which allows for “spiritual growth, for deeper repentance and
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faith, for a first acceptance of the gospel by those who have never heard it.” 119 On
Aldwinckle’s account, this does not mean that people do not experience judgments of
God during the interim; it only means that, God’s irrevocable decision on each person
genuinely remains open until the ultimate End in future. As Aldwinckle puts it, “before
the End, all men will still have their chance to respond to God in Christ. This would be
true for all the pre-Christian generations of men, for non-Christians in the Christian era
and those who have heard the gospel and for whatever reason have rejected it, and even
for backsliding Christians.” 120
To the objection that knowledge of further chances after death will reduce the
sense of urgency for the fundamental decision for God, and also encourage a careless
attitude during earthly life, Aldwinckle responds by again emphasizing that “our line of
argument depends on the acceptance of the Christian view of God and His purpose for
men,” 121 which for him is the primary basis for theologizing eschatologically. And,
regarding the alternative speculation which conceives moral transformation taking place
at death, Aldwinckle does not want to make any dogmatic statements about the effects of
death, especially in terms of how it impacts a person’s knowledge of divine love and his
response to that love. However, Aldwinckle does admit that he finds it difficult to
understand “why the mere event of dying, which has nothing to do with the essential
values of personality, should miraculously turn sinners into saints.” 122
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Postmortem Continuity of the Personal Identity and the Concept of the
“Body”
Aldwinckle’s argument for the interim period is made as a matter of principle. As
to the details, he chooses to mainly be agnostic. However, one thing he does repeatedly
insist is that, for Christians, the interim has to be a reality of “full personal existence in
communion with the Lord.” 123 Aldwinckle attributes modern people unbelief in the
survival of death to a materialistic worldview, under which the only permanent and
eternal reality is matter–whether it is defined in the classic fashion after the model of
billiard-ball, or in a more refined sense as some kind of energy. According to this
worldview, “persons are simply temporary ripples upon the surface of an ever-changing
energy which is defined as non-mental, non-conscious and non-intelligent.” 124
In contrast, Aldwinckle proposes “a ‘substantialist’ view of the self” which
considers the self to be “an enduring entity of some kind which is more than the sum of
the experiences which occur in it and to it;” also, “the ‘I’ of personal identity cannot be
reduced to or explained solely by changes in the physical body, however closely it is
linked to that body in our present existence.” 125 To support his position philosophically,
Aldwinckle points to spontaneous, universal and persistent awareness of selfhood which
undergirds all coherent experiences and the adverse practical implications denying it may
have on moral responsibilities. In his view, even if we suppose that the self cannot exist
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with some kind of a body, it does not entail that the self can be reduced to the “body”
without any remainder. In other words, the idea of a non-material element in the human
makeup is not intrinsically absurd.
To state anything more than that, again, Aldwinckle thinks that it has to be based
on revelations regarding God’s character and God’s purpose for us. And so, to him, the
key to the debate of immortality and resurrection is religious rather than scientific,
because it is concerned “not only about the continuance of that self in being, but about
the quality of that existence in moral and spiritual terms;” particularly for Christians, “He
is concerned with that spiritual transformation of the self into conformity with the image
of Christ which alone gives full meaning to human existence, whether here or beyond
death.” 126
As to the resurrected state, Aldwinckle denies both that it is a purely disembodied
kind and that it is in the same earthly body. Moreover, he thinks that to be a real person in
communion with Christ entails that the Christian enters a new embodied existence at
death, and does not wait for that to happen in the End, because “The idea of being in
Christ as only half a person does not make sense.” 127 To reconcile his theory with the
doctrine of a general resurrection of the body in the End, Aldwinckle quotes biblical
scholar, Dr. James Robinson, which understands the word “body” in the bible as “a
symbol for human solidarity and, therefore, for the final communion of persons … in the
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corporate reality of the kingdom.” 128 Hence, “body” represents not that which separates
people, but that which mediates and unites them.
Notably, Aldwinckle thinks that in order to maintain the core content of the
postmortem reality–that is, a genuine personal existence in the Lord–both concepts of
“immortality” and “resurrection” can be defined in a way that are equally effective for
that purpose. In his account, biblical studies do not support a stark dichotomy between
these two concepts as one being Greek and so objectionable versus the other being
Hebrew and so binding for Christians. To Aldwinckle, the fundamental discernment to be
made is not between Greek versus Hebrew thoughts, but “What view of the after-life is
most consonant with the biblical view of God, the teaching of Jesus and our present
knowledge of the nature of man and the mind-body relationship?” 129 So long as
“resurrection” does not mean the persistence of the physical body in its earthly form, and
“immortality” does not represent an intrinsic human quality or dissolution of the
individual’s personal existence into the divine, Aldwinckle is indifferent as to which
concept to use.
Summary: God as Holy Love Entails an Open Horizon of Human Growth
after Death
Aldwinckle’s theology of death mainly points to the centrality of a meaningful
Beyond for Christian eschatology to be consistent with its doctrine of God as just and
compassionate love for all people. It also tries to broaden people eschatological
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imagination outside materialistic thinking by demonstrating the reasonableness of a
postmortem reality.
Summary and Reflections
Several important insights are generated from this set of theologies of death
which, in one way or another, revolve around the concepts of time and eternity. The most
salient feature in the three Catholic theologians’ works is the teleological theme of
growth and becoming, which is understood to be both an innate dynamic within the
human nature and the God-given purpose of the temporal flow of time. Their similar
accent on the final import of death is the corollary of simultaneously upholding both the
doctrine which declares death to be the end of the pilgrimage state, and a strong belief in
the efficacy of God’s will to accomplish its purpose in time. Troisfontaines and Boros’
arguments also demonstrate a keen sense of the universal scope of God’s saving will,
which is especially valuable under our pluralistic cultural context today. Moreover, their
works reflect an astute awareness of the necessity of clear knowledge and understanding
for making a decision of eternal significance, and of the reality that such knowledge and
understand are unattainable on earth. Simpson spotlights for his contemporaries the
intrinsic relation between the temporal and the eternal. Aldwinckle underlines the logical
connection between theology of death and the doctrine of God, and the consequent need
for an interim period of further growth based on the divine attribute of holy love.
Admittedly, the most salient feature this set of works is known for, i.e., the
hypothesis of a final decision, is also its most controversial point. Troisfontaines and
Boros, the two best-known proponents of this theory, seem to be aware of this, since they
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both try to strike a balance between the importance of the final moment and the
significance of the earthly life before that. However, whether their efforts are successful
is questionable. For example, Boros’ solution to the problem of unbaptized infants, i.e.,
they receive at death the full faculties of an adult, is marked as “a bit of theological
sleight-of-hand.” 130 Others criticize them for putting too much weight on Jesus’ death
itself, whereas the scripture and the doctrines assign this role to Jesus’ resurrection; it is
suggested that, Jesus “did not reach the root of the world by his descent into hell, but
rather by his exaltation at the right hand of his Father.” 131 The validity of this criticism
may be seen from the fact that Boros tries to combine Jesus’ death, resurrection and
ascension as one single salvific occurrence. Furthermore, as discussed above, it seems
that upon closer look the “moment” of death played up so much here may not even exist.
Anthropologically speaking, as Jungle points out, the hypothesis of a final
decision with its emphasis on the moment death often carries a derogative attitude
towards the embodied life of human beings, and this is fundamentally at odds with how
Christianity understands the fundamental goodness of the material creation. Moreover, as
Jungel points out, the frame of reference in these theologies is noetic rather than moral,
whereas the Christian faith lodges its struggle squarely within the moral drama of sin and
salvation. In addition, even though gaining knowledge and understanding are an
indispensable part of the process of salvation, religious epistemologies (e.g., by John
Newman, Maurice Blondel, etc.) have made clear that, knowledge and understanding in
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matters of faith are of a unique nature and so must be obtained differently. In my view,
this epistemological point helps uncover the inappropriateness of the framework beneath
notions such as “freedom,” “decision,” “choice,” etc., commonly found in the theories of
a final decision, even though they may be effective at one time under their context of
freedom and liberation in 1960s and 70s. Such language seems to explicate salvation
more around the dynamism of “conversion,” whereas the Christian understanding of
salvation centers on a gradual “transformation” of disposition which entails a
significantly different dynamic than portrayed in the hypothesis.
The Question of Postmortem Body
Overview
I present four theologies of death in this section, all of them are related somehow
to the body-soul debate. Helmut Thielicke’s Death and Life (1946) appears to be the
official inauguration of contemporary discourse on death, and it is often quoted as the
first prominent work which advocates a “total death” of the human person. Oscar
Cullmann’s Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead? The Witness of the New
Testament (1959) is widely known for the heated polemic its title sets up. But, in fact,
Hans Kung’s book titled Eternal Life? Life after Death as a Medical, Philosophical, and
Theological Problem (1984) is one that intentionally rejects the body-soul dualism. Last
but not the least, Joseph Ratzinger’s Eschatology, Death and Eternal Life (1977) is a
comprehensive defense for the usage of the term “soul.”
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Helmut Thielicke, Death and Life (1946) 132
The book was written during WWII when Helmut Thielicke was removed from
his teaching position at the University of Heidelberg by the state and sent to the deep
south of Germany in an enforced solitude. The main concern for Thielicke, as stated in
his “letter to a soldier about death” at the beginning of the book, is that despite
“genuinely apocalyptic encounters with death” 133 at this horrific time of war, two
misrepresentations of death anesthetized people from much-needed spiritual awakening
as the result of such encounters. Thielicke calls these misrepresentations the “two cudgels
at hand for jamming into the screaming throat of death.” 134 One of them depicts human
death as merely part of the rhythm of nature, and so ought to be accepted without fuss;
the other portrays human being as “an interchangeable specimen of his species,” 135 as in
Nazi’s biological worldview, and so “the most celebrated ideal for the shape of death
today is ‘to go down fighting for a cause.’” 136 With these “two stopgap solutions,” death
no longer seems provoking, severe, and objectionable, but is instead “rendered impotent,
null, and trivial.” 137
For Thielicke, these death-despising attempts wrongly conceal “the message that
death holds in its bony fingers: that here man, who is forever out of bounds, is finally put
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back in his limits, that here the wall separating man from God’s eternity is being erected,
that wall which the rebel in us does not want to acknowledge, and which in frenetic
titanic defiance we tear down again and again.” 138 As an effort out of a sense of
responsibility to correct the misunderstandings, Thielicke’s book is written to fulfill the
theologian’s duty “to listen to the command of the hour” from God in the midst of the
chaos of the War, and so to help people “‘interpret’ the rustling of God’s cloak in our
time.” 139
There are four key themes in the book: 1) the true gravity of human death, 2)
biological death as the “medium” (not the cause) of human dying, 3) human life is a
present-tense bestowal from God, 4) the interim period is a foggy state best described as
“being with Christ.”
The Gravity of Human Death
In his “letter to a soldier” at the beginning of the book, Thielicke expresses his
overarching concern behind the book to be the ridiculously easy attitude people seemed
to have toward death during that hazardous juncture of war, which is a stark contrast to
the “massive earnestness” with which the scripture treats it. 140 As made too painfully
clear by the many soldiers whose young lives were too quickly buried with their broken
dreams and unfulfilled ambitions, death to Thielicke is in fact an unnatural disorder, is
that which interrupts the rhythm of life, is something that ought not to be. Moreover, each
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human being is more than just a member of a group; s/he is also a unique individual
whose life, with its distinct cares and guilt and its unique freedom and responsibility, is
nontransferable to others, and so in whose death something real and irreplaceable passes
away. As Thielicke vividly puts it, “what dies in me is not an ‘it’ but an ‘I,’ an ‘I’ for
which there is no substitute among all the comrades who march over my grave.” 141
Most importantly, the catastrophic nature of human death is truly recognized
based on the understanding that, human beings are preordained by God to a life of
fellowship with God, and “the more we are aware of the true destiny to which we have
been called, the more we know of the dignity and uniqueness of our person, which death
strikes down.” 142 On Thielicke’s account, this is the highest reason why death is so
unnatural and objectionable: “that we, these royal people, should die. ... Never has man
been so highly spoken of as in the bible. And nowhere else is death–for this very reason–
such a serious thing, a matter of supreme and un-attenuated gravity.” 143
Sin is not the Cause of Biological Death but Biological Death is the Physical “Medium”
of God’s Answer to Human’s Rebellious Urge
Even though Thielicke considers death a disorder, a “fall” from order, he thinks
that labeling death as the consequence of the fall into sin is a “distorted doctrine,” a
“terribly short-circuited connection.” 144 This is because, such connection turns the
biblical view on the relation between sin and death into some type of pseudoscientific
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worldview, with natural science as its opponent, and so improperly depicts the human
being “in a fatalistic subjugation (reminiscent of natural law) to some given that has
occurred outside of him.” 145 In contrast, under the biblical view, the human person is
always free and responsible. Even though there is a biological side of human death, it is
not the only side of it; rather, “Human death transcends biological death … to the same
degree that man as a creature of personhood transcends his own quality as … a mammal
… in the dimension of man’s history with God.” 146
As to how biological death relates to sin, Thielicke attempts a nuanced
articulation, saying that “God uses the medium of the biological to give his answer to
man’s rebellious urge.” 147 To illustrate what is meant by the biological being the
“medium” used by God, Thielicke uses the example of people giving thanks on
Thanksgiving Day, where the farmer’s labor is inseparable from and a medium in which
God’s blessing occurs. That said, Thielicke acknowledges the near impossibility to grasp
the perplexing relation between sin and biological death, because “every attempt to get
behind it necessarily involves … an assumed causal relationship.” 148 As to biological
death in general in the cosmos, Thielicke only cautiously points to how the same natural
law of mortality may be experienced differently by humans versus other creatures, and he
opts to refrain from any dogmatic statements about it beyond that.
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Eternal Life as a Conquest of Human Death is a Present-tense Bestowal from
God
Human death is the boundary that God imposes upon the human being, who is out
of bounds against God by committing the sin of hubris. The removal of this barrier
between God and human equates the conquest of human death, which brings a living
relationship with God. And that leads to eternal life, which is distinct from mere
biological vitality. Eternal life is a life lived exclusively under the command of God with
obedience and love. Here, Thielicke particularly wants to emphasize that, what carries the
human being through death is not some intrinsic quality or substance within the human
person, nor some supernatural extension or elevation of human nature, but an on-going
fellowship which leads to participation in God’s “alien life.” 149 As Thielicke describes,
“such donated life … is like the breathing process in that the breath is either flowing or
can be interrupted;” 150 it is “the creative breath of God who alone controls life, while the
creatures apart from this present-tense bestowal possess no independent life at all.” 151
Thielicke also clarifies that, the Christian doctrine of resurrection is not simply
another form of the secular theories of immortality and survival after death, because the
victory won over death is a historical event of Christ rather than a substantive fact of
human beings. Moreover, using the Protestant doctrine of justification as an analogy,
Thielicke stresses that a substantive transferal, where the divine quality of eternal life
would be passed over to the possession of the human being, never occurs. Because, to
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him, this “sets God in analogy to human” and so “is the ultimate refinement of
blasphemy.” 152 In Thielicke’s account, eternal life remains exclusively at God’s disposal;
human beings participate in this life, only to the extent of their participation in the ongoing fellowship with God through Christ. As he sharply puts it, “I stand with empty
hands before God, and remain standing.” 153 Notably, it is under the intense vigilance
against taking death lightly–on account of some “death-proof substance” within the
human person which bypasses death naturally–that Thielicke pens the following passage,
which is frequently quoted by later authors as advocating a “total” death of the human
person: “No, all of me goes down into death. … but as a Christian I go down into this
death with the complete confidence that I cannot remain therein, since I am one whom
God has called by name and therefore I shall be called anew on God’s day. I am under
the protection of the Resurrected One, I am not immortal, but await my own
resurrection.” 154
The “Dotted Lines” of the Interim State Are Best Described as “Being with
Christ”
Perhaps contrary to the popular impressions about his viewpoint, Thielicke’s
stand on the interim state can in fact be described as cautiously agnostic. The most
obvious indication of this may be the fact that, Thielicke does not take up any discussion
on the interim period until several-page appendix at the end of his book. In the appendix,
on the one hand, he acknowledges that his denial of anything intrinsic to human nature
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itself which survives death implies that, there is neither a “separation of body and soul”
upon death, nor an “interim state” between death and resurrection when God raises
people from the dead. And this would mean “a complete extinction of the somaticpsychic I in the nothingness of the night of death. Resurrection then would be a new
creation ex nihilo on Judgment Day.” 155 On the other hand, he alerts readers of the danger
of absolutizing any theologically airtight arguments like that, because it would obscure
our view of many other rich revelations in the bible, such as eschatology. Especially
regarding the interim period, he thinks that “the relatively frequent recurrence of these
dotted lines [in the scripture leading to the interim period] is a sure warning that the
reality here indicated cannot just be flatly denied.” 156 In this case, Thielicke admits to be
quite willing to “let our thesis be criticized and loosened up by the richer fullness of
biblical thought.” 157
Furthermore, after considering all the relevant scripture references to the interim
state, Thielicke thinks that they do seem to testify to a certain postmortem state like
“being-at-home with Christ,” in contrast to being-far-away from Him (e.g., Phil 1:23). So
long as this state is not understood as a form of “immortality based on some energy
potential in the soul,” Thielicke thinks that this state can be described as “a state of
divesting and waiting,” “best characterized with the words ‘being with Christ,’” which
conveys “the notion of an indissoluble communion with Christ.” 158 But, to Thielicke, the

155

Ibid, 213.

156

Ibid, 215.

157

Ibid, 214.

158

Ibid, 215.

65
form and the psychological state of the “I” being with Christ are not a valid object for
theological investigation. And he is well aware of the need for “even greater reservation”
when considering the state of “those who are separated from Christ.” 159
Summary: Alien Dignity, Alien Life
From the above, it is clear that Thielicke’s chief concern for writing the book is
human hubris that manifested itself in horrendous ways during those epic days of IIWW.
To help tame such out-of-bound behaviors of sin, Thielicke articulates a theology of
death which can be summarized as “alien dignity, alien life”–on the one hand, the
seriousness of human death is best seen from the precious dignity bestowed upon humans
by God; on the other hand, the conquest of human death depends completely upon a
continuous fellowship with God. And he accents his theology of death, above all, by
vehemently denying prideful human beings the possession of any intrinsically immortal
element, e.g., the “soul,” which may embolden their bumptious attempts. In other words,
even though Thielicke does coin the famed expression that “all of me goes into death,” he
is not extremely insistent on denying the “soul,” as long as it is not a term used for
something intrinsic to the human being which survives death independent from God.
What is at stake for Thielicke is the seriousness of human death, and the sole sovereignty
of God in bestowing life to humans through on-going fellowship with Him.
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Oscar Cullmann, Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead?
The Witness of the New Testament (1955) 160
Given that Cullmann’s book is only fifty-pages long, it may be surprising to read
his description of the stormy reactions to his book, saying that “No other publication of
mine has provoked such enthusiasm or such violent hostility.” 161 The polemic stirred up
by the book, which has lasted till today, derives to a large extent from its combative title,
which positions immortality as the opposite to resurrection. In a sense, such blunt
contrast is intended by Cullmann, because he detects a “widespread … mistake of
attributing to primitive Christianity the Greek belief in the immortality of the soul” 162
while, to him, their fundamental inspirations completely different. What is more
disconcerting to Cullmann is that, linking the Christian belief in the resurrection of the
dead with the Platonic claim of the immortality of the soul is “not in fact a link at all, but
renunciation of one in favor of the other. 1 Corinthians 15 has been sacrificed for the
Phaedo.” 163
There are four themes in the book: 1) the historical Christ event is the anchor for
the Christian belief in resurrection, 2) death is the Last Enemy and not the Liberator, 3)
the body’s positive role for the soul, and 4) those dead in Christ are in closer proximity to
God through the Holy Spirit even though without a body.
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Anchoring the Christian Belief in Resurrection in the Historical Christ
Event
For Cullmann, what forms the unbridgeable chasm between the early Christian
view and the Greek view is the fact that, the Greek belief in immortality claims
something intrinsic to the soul. In contrast, the Christian concept of resurrection is
anchored entirely in the revolutionary event of Christ which took place in salvation
history; it is rooted “in a real occurrence, in real events which took place in time.” 164 The
human soul is not intrinsically immortal; rather, the whole human person dies and then
“is recalled to life by a new act of creation by God.” 165 It is Jesus’ resurrection which
inaugurated the new “resurrection age” when the power of death has been broken. 166
Death is the Last Enemy Not a Friendly Liberator
Cullmann thinks that the fundamental difference between the Platonic claim of
immortality and the Christian belief in resurrection can be best seen from how Socrates
and Jesus faced death. For Socrates,
Our body is only an outer garment which, as long as we live, prevents our soul
from moving freely and from living in conformity to its proper eternal essence. It
imposes upon the soul a law which is not appropriate to it. The soul, confined
within the body, belongs to the eternal world. As long as we live, our soul finds
itself in a prison, that is, in a body essentially alien to it. Death, in fact, is the great
liberator. 167
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Because of this, Socrates requested his death to be commemorated with a ritual
which celebrates healing. Since body and soul are radically different from one another,
destruction of the body does not destroy the soul, but sets it free. In direct contrast to
Socrates’ serene attitude toward death, Jesus was in severe agony when facing his own
death. Death for Jesus is not intrinsically friendly but something dreadful, because “it is
God’s enemy, it separates us from God, who is Life and the Creator of all life.” 168 The
“sting” of death is removed only as the result of Jesus going through his own excruciating
death. And so, for Cullmann, “Whoever paints a pretty death can paint no
resurrection.” 169
The Complementary rather than Antagonistic Role of the Body for the Soul
According to Cullmann, the Christian belief in resurrection is based on an
anthropology which does not consider the body per se to be intrinsically bad or debasing,
as it is in Platonism, but a creation of God who finds all of His creation “good.” The body
is not a prison of the soul, but is meant to be the temple of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, it is
death, rather than the body, which is to be conquered by the Resurrection. Furthermore,
as far as its relation to the soul is concerned, the Christian belief in resurrection is based
on an anthropology which does not consider the body a hindrance to the soul, as it is in
Platonism, but something complementary to it. Body and soul are created by God to
belong together. Without the body, the soul does not achieve its full development, as
claimed by the Greek, but is in a shadowy existence improper to its nature. The full,
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genuine life to be attained through resurrection cannot be without body, the new
“spiritual body” with which the dead will be clothed.
In addition, New Testament anthropology sees both the body and the soul, or “the
outer man” and the “inner man,” as objects of influence by the power of sin and death as
well as by the power of the Spirit of Resurrection. According to Cullmann, these two
opposing powers of influence affect the outer man and the inner man, albeit the power of
sin and death is more closely linked with the body than with the soul; and both forces are
actively at work. Hence, Christian anthropology conceives deliverance not as a release of
the soul from the body, like in Greek anthropology, but a release of both body and soul
from the power of sin and death. The soul is the starting-point of the resurrection; but
both body and soul can and must be raised by the quickening power of the Holy Spirit.
The resurrection of the body takes place in the End, when the whole creation will be
recreated anew by the Holy Spirit, who transforms matter by delivering it from death and
corruptibility.
Those Dead in Christ Are in Closer Proximity to God through the Holy Spirit
As to the interim state between death and resurrection for those dead in Christ,
Cullmann describes it as “sleeping;” they “are still in time; they, too are waiting.” 170
Despite the scarcity of detailed speculation in the New Testament, Cullmann nevertheless
thinks that the scripture images for the interim state of those dead in Christ present it to
be a state of special proximity to God, hence the apostle Paul prefers to depart from the
body so as to be “at home with Christ.”
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How can the dead, who are asleep and without a body, be nearer to God?
Cullmann explains it with the scripture passage, where the Apostle Paul gives the notion
of “the Spirit as a deposit” put in the believers by God, “guaranteeing what is to come” (2
Cor 5:5). More specifically, their closer proximity to God comes from their relationship
to the Holy Spirit beginning when they are alive. As Cullmann puts it: “If He [the Holy
Spirit] is actually within us [when we are alive], He has already transformed our inner
man. But … the Holy Spirit is the power of life. Death can do Him no harm. Therefore,
something is indeed changed … for those who really die in Christ, i.e., in possession of
the Holy Spirit.” 171
During the earthly life, the inner man is adversely affected by the outer man
because of the outer man’s higher vulnerability to the influence of the power of sin and
death, “which is throughout our life the hindrance to the Holy Spirit’s full development.
Death delivers us from this hindrance,” and so allows the previous deposit of Holy Spirit
to have fuller control of the inner man. 172
Notably, Cullmann does acknowledge that, regarding his articulation of the
interim state, “There is a sense in which a kind of approximation to the Greek teaching
does actually take place, to the extent that the inner man, who has already been
transformed by the Spirit (Rom 6:3), and consequently made alive, continues to live with
Christ in this transformed state, in the condition of sleep.” 173 Nonetheless, in his view, the
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difference between the Christian belief in resurrection and the Greek claim of immortality
remains radical, in that the interim state of disembodied existence is imperfect rather than
ideal, death continues to be the enemy albeit in defeat, and the continuous existence of
those dead in Christ is not the result of the natural essence of the soul, but the result of
divine intervention from outside the human person, i.e., through the Holy Spirit.
Summary: Distinguishing Courageous Christian Hope from Serine Philosophic
Expectation.
So, perhaps Cullmann is correct when lamenting in the Preface of his book that, if
people are patient enough to read through the book till the end, the impassioned
controversy it has provoked would not have occurred. This is because, as we see from the
above, Cullmann does not really deny the existence of “soul” as that which continues to
exist during the interim state–that, in fact, is a notion he uses interchangeably with the
term the “inner man,” who enjoys a closer proximity to God during the interim period
than the earthly life. For Cullmann, the real point of contention is to distinguish between
“the courageous and joyful primitive Christian hope of the resurrection of the dead and
the serene philosophic expectation of the survival of the immortal soul,” because the
former is grounded in God’s act of salvation for us in the concrete time of history,
whereas the latter has the eye only for the timeless substance of the beyond. 174
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Hans Kung, Eternal Life? Life after Death
as a Medical, Philosophical, and Theological Problem (1984) 175
To properly situate his book for the reader, Hans Kung states that “I did not want
to produce a long-winded theological treatise on eschatology, but … to answer the
pressing questions of our contemporaries on the basis of present-day theological
studies.” 176 These pressing questions of the day have to do with the topic of death and
eternal life. And Kung makes it clear that, such questions are most properly investigated
via the existential lens. The questions of death and eternal life are existential questions
because, here, “the ultimate, the eschaton of man, the absolutely final meaning of his
dying and living is at stake.” 177 Therefore, these questions go beyond the narrow domain
of mere reason, and lay claim to the whole person who, so long as he exists, is thereby
confronted with the existential decision of whether or not to “say yes to a primordial
ground and primordial goal of human life and of the whole cosmic process.” 178 Each
person inevitably has to answer, by the overall manner of his existence, the question of
whether to trust or not to trust the fundamental meaningfulness of his existence.
In addition, Kung stresses that, even though eternal life at its deepest level is a
matter of trust, the trust is not blind, but is “an absolutely reasonable trust.” 179 On the one
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hand, it is true that, regarding these ultimate questions of reality, the human person as a
finite being “has a similarly restricted capacity of perception as the louse, the goose, and
the cock or the anthropoid ape have in regard to their transcendental dimensions;” 180 thus,
the dimensions of the beyond cannot be deduced or “proven” by human reason. On the
other hand, though, belief in eternal life can certainly be justified by reason if it is well
founded in human experiences that are accessible to everyone; they function as signs that
“point to the advent of a kind of eternal life after all this is over.” 181 Therefore, Kung sees
his task in the book as conveying critical information to assist this kind of decisionmaking. More specifically, in his theology of death, concrete experiences of the world are
gathered and then “elucidated in their ultimate meaning and at the deepest level in the
light of the scriptural history of experience compressed as a message of hope for human
beings.” 182
I identify two key themes in the book: 1) death is a dying into God who assumes
the person in death into His eternal life, and 2) “bodily” resurrection conveys the idea that
at death our entire personal history is consummated into God.
Death is a Dying into God Who Assumes the Person in Death into His Eternal
Now
Kung thinks that for people today to truly believe some sort of resurrection, it
must be clarified that Jesus’ resurrection is an act of God beyond our space and time, and
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so “a transcendent happening emerging out of human death into the all-embracing
dimension of God. Resurrection is related to a wholly new mode of existence in the
wholly different dimension of the eternal.” 183 Moreover, Jesus’ resurrection reveals some
important things about the “eternal life” he entered into upon death: negatively put, it is
neither a return to nor a continuation of our life in space and time, but a radical
transformation into something entirely different from what we experience here now;
positively put, it is “a passing into God” offered to the person in death, a passing into the
eternal God who is beyond the dimension of the temporal. 184
Given that Kung conceives our death as a dying into God who assumes the person
into His eternal Now, he thinks the temporal distance between death and the Last
Judgment becomes irrelevant for the dead, and “the question of an intermediate ‘time’
becomes a priori pointless.” 185 The core truth of the Catholic notion of purgatory during
the interim period, i.e., purification and cleansing of the person, takes place not after
death but in death itself, because the consummation at death into God purifies, cleanses,
heals, and completes the person. As to the creedal confession of Jesus’ resurrection “on
the third day,” Kung interprets “three” as a sacred number rather than a number of
calendar day. Similarly, he explains the gospels’ account of Jesus’ ascension “forty days”
after the resurrection to be “like the figure three, also a symbolic figure for a time of
grace.” 186 In addition, Kung discounts the Apostle’s Creed which talks about Jesus’
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“descent into hell” in death, because it cannot really be traced back to the apostles
themselves.
What Survives Death is not the “Soul” but the Whole Person; “Bodily” Resurrection
Conveys the Belief that the Identical Personal Reality with Its Entire History is
Consummated into God
Similar like Cullmann, Kung distinguishes the Christian belief of resurrection
from the Greek notion of the “immortality of the soul.” He quotes Protestant theologian
Paul Althaus’ words that, the Christian faith speaks of immortality not of the soul, but of
the relationship, of the “indissolubility of personal relationship with God,” and this
“affects man in the totality of his mentally-bodily existence” as a psychosomatic unity. 187
In Kung’s view, body and soul are always simultaneously present, even in dreams. And
Kung thinks that “biblical and modern anthropological thinking converse in their
conception of man as a body-soul unity.” 188
On Kung’s account, the Christian notion of “resurrection” denotes a total
transformation of the entire person by the life-giving Spirit of God. As he puts it, “Man is
not released then–platonically–from his corporality. He is release with and in his–now
glorified, spiritualized–corporality: a new creation, a new man.” 189 As to the doctrine of
“resurrection of the body,” Kung thinks that “body” does not denote the corpse or the
physical remains; because what is at stake here is not the continuation of my body as a
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physical entity, and so puzzling questions like the whereabouts of the molecules of my
body for resurrection do not arise. In Kung’s view, the term “body” is meant to represent
“the identical personal reality, the same self with its entire history;” 190 the doctrine is to
convey the belief that all the concrete things that help shaped a person’s unique identity
are not lost to God.
Summary: Death Leads to an Immediate and Total Consummation of the Entire Person
into God’s Eternity
On my reading of it, a significant factor in Kung’s theology of death is the
“danger of falling short of the standard now attained in philosophical, theological and
scientific thinking.” 191 Here, Kung is particularly mindful about the modern
anthropological understanding of the human person as a psychosomatic unity, a concept
which he takes as an established fact for theological articulations of death to catch up
with. Hence, instead of picturing death as a separation of the two elements within the
human being, which also entails an interim period for the soul before the final
consummation, Kung presents death as an immediate consummation of the entire person
into God’s eternal life.
Joseph Ratzinger, Eschatology, Death and Eternal Life (1977) 192
Ratzinger’s book offers a comprehensive delivery of the view which deems the
concept of “soul” indispensable for the very coherence of the Christian account of the

190

Ibid, 111.

191

Ibid, 138.

192

Joseph Ratzinger, Eschatology, Death and Eternal Life (Washington, DC: Catholic University of
America Press, 1980, c1977).

77
postmortem state. As he points out in the Preface of the book, one of the problems in
Christian eschatology his book is designed to address is what he calls “the crisis of
tradition.” It is a belief which holds that “faith came strictly speaking from the Bible and
that tradition could be set aside.” 193 Ratzinger traces this belief to Martin Luther, who
viewed tradition in opposition to authentic Christianity at its origin, and sought to unearth
the correct understanding of Christianity solely from the Bible. In Ratzinger’s opinion,
this inevitably results in “a fixation on biblical terminology,” a “pure Biblicism” which,
without adequate hermeneutics and rational rethinking of the biblical data, cannot get us
very far. 194 This is because the Bible utilizes diverse rather than definitive
anthropological models, with Christology as the foundation. And this foundation confers
on theology the right and the duty to go beyond Biblical language and “draw on its own
potential in order to illuminate the anthropological presuppositions and implications
contained in the foundation itself.” 195
Another problem that concerns Ratzinger is what he calls “a more virulent
reappearance of the anti-Hellenic syndrome.” It is a suspicious attitude towards anything
Greek, especially “the fear, reaching almost panic proportions, of any accusation of
dualism … [which is] like a betrayal of the biblical and modern recognition of the unity
of man.” 196 To him, the most salient manifestation of this problematic syndrome is the
vehement rejection of the notion of the “immortality of the soul” as inconsistent with the
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Bible and obscuring the sole biblical belief in the resurrection. Ratzinger strives to show
that, the Christian concept of soul is a “development thoroughly in line with the precepts
of Biblical anthropology.” 197 More importantly, as clarified by the Congregation for the
Doctrine of Faith on May 17, 1979 in a “Letter on Certain Questions in Eschatology,” the
term “soul” is an indispensable instrument for retaining and conveying a fundamental
aspect of the Christian faith, namely, “the continuity and independent existence of the
spiritual element in man after death, an element which is ‘endowed with consciousness
and will,’ so that the ‘human I’ continues in being.” 198
To establish his theology of death on a solid ground, Ratzinger frames his book as
“a strictly theological interpretation (in the sense of what Jesus taught) of our life beyond
death.” 199 Here, Ratzinger refers particularly to Jesus’ response to the Sadducees’ denial
of resurrection, saying of God “He is God not of the dead, but of the living.” (Mk 12:26)
To sum up his point: beyond death “we are alive, in a full sense of life” because of
God. 200 There are three themes I identity in his book: 1) “soul” signifies the God-given
capacity for human beings to relate to Him, 2) resurrection occurs not at death but in the
final consummation, and 3) salvation includes the physical body and the rest of the
corporeal creation.
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The Christian Concept of “Soul” is Developed thoroughly in Line with Biblical
Anthropology, and It Denotes the Foothold in Us for Our God-given Capacity to Relate
to God
Regarding the Christian concept of “soul,” first, Ratzinger shows via historical
philosophy that the central insight of Platonic anthropology, which posits the authentic
human nature as transcending its biology, is that which makes it possible for the
philosophical unfolding of Christianity to seize upon it and transform it into novel
expressions based on the logic of faith. Moreover, Ratzinger argues that, throughout the
gradual process of developing a Christian articulation of the human subject with
postmortem continuity, Thomas Aquinas achieves the most success in his formulation of
the soul as the form of the body. Aquinas understands the soul as belonging to the body
as its form, and yet remains a spirit. Aquinas’ success comes from the fact that, his
conceptualization effectively expresses the church’s belief, on the one hand, in the
certainty of a continuous life with Christ which is indestructible by death and, on the
other hand, the incompleteness of that interim life before its final resurrection. It not only
affirms the unified totality of body and soul in the human person as created by God, but
also makes the necessary distinction within the person between that which abides and that
which perishes, while holding open the pathway toward the eventual reunification of the
human person.
Ratzinger diagnoses the growing denial of “soul” as originating from a believed
“parallel between, on the one hand, the allegedly biblical idea of the absolute
indivisibility of man and, on the other hand, a modern anthropology, worked out on the
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basis of natural science and identifying the human being with his or her body, without
any reminder that might admit a soul distinct from that body.” 201 First, Ratzinger invokes
biblical exegeses to show that, as exemplified in the Pauline epistles, resurrection and
intermediate state are not mutually exclusive concepts. In addition, to challenge modern
anthropology’s claim of the absolute indivisibility of the human being, Ratzinger speaks
about neurophysiologist I. Eccles and philosopher K. Popper. The two thinkers are united
in their rejection of a neurophysiological monism and materialism, and they propose a
dualistic position instead, which supports “the relative independence of consciousness
and its corporeal instrument … as its physiological substrate” only. 202
In Ratzinger’s view, the broad stroke conclusion that all notions of “a
substantively immortal soul” are a quick path to delusionary human self-sufficiency and
hubris self-centeredness is unwarranted. This is because, even though Thomas Aquinas
understands the soul’s immortality to be substantive, Aquinas sees it as a gift from God;
although “it is given to man to be his very own possession,” this creaturely “nature is
only possible by virtue of a communication of the Creator’s.” 203 Most importantly, the
deepest foundation of the Christian notion of immortality is the doctrine of God, who is
the God of the living and calls His creature by name; consequently, this creature cannot
be annihilated. As Ratzinger succinctly puts it, “relation makes immortal.” 204 And he
defines “soul” in Christian anthropology as “that in us which offers a foothold for this
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relation [with God]. Soul is nothing other than man’s capacity for relatedness with truth,
with love eternal.” 205
In addition, Ratzinger interrogates the very coherence of the soul-denying view.
When discussing the state of the dead during the interim period, he asks those who, like
Luther, posit the hypothesis of dormancy but avoid mentioning “soul,” if soul does not
exist, who is it that is asleep and what is the subject of resurrection, given that the body is
rotting away in death? Why should that not be called the “soul”? Some may respond by
saying that, “sleep” means a temporary suspension of the existence of the person; but that
does not solve the problem because, in that case “that human being in his self-identity
simply exists no longer. The reawakening of resurrection would be for him a new
creation. The man who rises at the resurrection may be like the man who died but he
cannot be the same as he–since it necessarily follows that with death the man who was
has reached his definitive end.” 206
Admittedly, the theory of resurrection at death is a new attempt to better rectify
this logical incoherence rising from denying the soul and yet believing the resurrection.
However, as described in the next two themes, Ratzinger thinks that this theory still does
not solve the problem, because it is based on objectionable concepts of the body and of
time.
Salvation Must Include the Body and the Rest of the Corporeal Creation
Ratzinger points out that, the proposal of resurrection at death, which is thought to
bypass the soul and the interim period, is based on a hidden and troubling assumption
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regarding the physical body. Specifically, given that the physical body goes into
corruption at death and does not rise, this theory necessarily entails leaving the body
behind, as for example in Kung’s work discussed above–and yet, the indispensable role
of the physical body to the psychosomatic unity of the person is the very reason for the
development of the theory. And so, Ratzinger asks: “The indivisibility of man and his
boundness to the [physical] body, even when dead, suddenly seems to play no further
role, even though it was the point of departure of this whole construction. … is this not
merely a camouflaged return to the doctrine of immortality on philosophically somewhat
more adventurous presuppositions?” 207
According to Ratzinger’s assessment, quite ironically, the theory which aims to
stay clear of Platonic notions like the soul ends up in fact being “a case of aggravated
Platonism,” 208 because it excludes the body from the hope of salvation and it hypostatizes
history. It dematerializes resurrection, but “a ‘resurrection’ which concerns neither matter
nor the concrete historical world is no resurrection at all” in the proper sense of the
term. 209 Ratzinger perceives this theory as leaving no room for history or for the material
reality in God’s promise of salvation, and this leads to the great danger of “a new
Docetism.” 210
Furthermore, from a purely logical point, Ratzinger raises the question that, if the
human person cannot be separated from the body, what good does the postmortem
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abolition of time do, given that the physical body disintegrates at death? And, “how can
there really be no dualism if one postulates a post-mortem second body (which one surely
must, on this hypothesis), whose origin and mode of existence remain obscure?” 211 As
Ratzinger sees it, there is an implied assumption here of continuous authentic reality of
the person apart from the body, and that is exactly what “soul” is intended to convey.
On Ratzinger’s account, the Christian faith treats the physical body and the rest of
the corporeal reality much more seriously. This is best evinced from “the bodiliness of
Christ, who retains a body in eternity;” more specifically, “Since we belong to the body
of Christ, we are united to the flesh of the resurrected one, … and are in this sense
already attached to our future.” 212 That Christianity takes matter seriously is also shown
by the Thomistic anthropology, which understands the soul as having an essential
ordination to the material world, even after death. In Ratzinger’s words, “the soul itself,
in its continuing existence, retain within itself the matter of its life, and therefore tends
impatiently towards the risen Christ, towards the new unity of spirit and matter which in
him has been opened for it.” 213
What’s more, Ratzinger sees the inclusion of the body in God’s salvific plan as
being necessitated by the integral nature of the Christian hope, which anticipates nothing
less than God to be “all in all” in the end. Here, Ratzinger particularly refers to Teilhard
de Chardin, who depicts the material universe as in a process of becoming “ever more
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complex unities,” 214 with the end goal being “a situation in which matter and spirit will
belong to each other in a new and definitive fashion.” 215 According to Teilhard’s theory,
the appearance of individual spirits in the material world is a part of this directional
process in which “the exigence for unity found in matter is fulfilled precisely by the nonmaterial, by spirit;” 216 more precisely, by the soul of the human person in the
resurrection. Corporeality in the risen state is achieved by “the transfiguration of the
transient” into “the abiding.” 217 When the search of being for unity thus reaches its goal,
“matter belongs to spirit in a wholly new and different way, and spirit is utterly one with
matter;” only then can it be said that God is all is all. 218
Resurrection Occurs Not in Death but in the Final Consummation
Ratzinger also points out that, the theory of resurrection at death presupposes a
new concept of time (again exemplified in Kung’s work discussed above). Briefly
speaking, the theory considers death a crossing from human temporality into God’s
eternal timelessness, given the assumption that time is a bodily form of existence and
death rids the person of the body. Since death is a departure from time and so outside of
time, death is said to be of equal distance to all times, and so “the problem of the
‘intermediate state’ between death and resurrection turns out to be a problem only in the
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seeming.” 219 Consequently, there is no need of “soul” as the bearer of human identity
during the interim period, because in reality there is no interim period–the person at death
enters directly into the Last Day, the Parousia, and also the resurrection of the dead.
Ratzinger critiques this notion of time from three different angles.
His first critique has to do with the concepts of time and eternity. In Ratzinger’s
view, it is overly simplistic to assume that exit from earthly time can be directly
identified with entrance into sheer eternity. First of all, an “eternity” with a beginning
does not seem to be “eternity” in the proper sense of the term. Moreover, strictly
speaking, we can speak of “eternity” only in relation to God. As to the human creature,
he is preordained to be temporal in terms of the body, but also in terms of the soul–albeit
this in a different and deeper way. In order to become “capable of Christ, capable of God
and thus capable of unity with the whole communion of saints,” it is inwardly necessary
that human “existence is achieved decisively in the temporal.” 220 Put it in another way:
“Time is not just a physical quality ascribed to man but wholly external to him. Time
characterizes man in his humanity, which itself is temporal inasmuch as it is human. Man
is temporal as a traveler along the way of knowing and loving, of decaying and
maturing.” 221
Second, looking at this from the point of history, because the final consummation
the person supposedly enters at death represents the fulfillment of entire history, claiming
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resurrection at death not only renders the procession of history superfluous, it generates a
baffling conundrum that
History is viewed as simultaneously completed and still continuing. What remains
unexplained is the relationship between, on the one hand, the ever new beginnings
of human life in history, both present and future, and, on the other, the state of
fulfillment not only of the individual but of the historical process itself, a state
said to be already realized in the world beyond death. 222
Third, Ratzinger challenges the theory of resurrection at death based on the
essential character of relatedness in human nature. Specifically, the Christian idea of
immortality is not only grounded in relationship with God, but also mediated by
relationship with other human beings. The person “becomes himself only in being with
others and being towards others;” 223 and this inherent interrelatedness of humanity results
in “a fabric of shared temporality.” 224 For example, Ratzinger asks if we can really say a
person has reached his fulfillments, so long as others on earth are still suffering because
of him. In his view, “The guilt which goes on because of me is a part of me. Reaching as
it does deep into me, it is part of my permanent abandonment to time.” 225 Looking at it
from the opposite perspective, love keeps us open to time just as guilt does, because
“Love cannot … close itself against others or be without them so long as time, and with it
suffering, is real. … a heaven above an earth which is hell would be no heaven at all.” 226
Thus, the Last Day is not something extrinsic and irrelevant to the dead; rather, “‘The
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body of Christ’ means that all human beings are one organism, the destiny of the whole
the proper destiny of each.” 227 Even though the decisive outcome of each person’s life is
settled at end of their earthly existence, their final place in the whole, which affects
everyone in the most intrinsic way, cannot be exhaustively determined until the entire
history is complete.
Summary: “Relation Makes Immortal”
Ratzinger’s work attempts to clarify that, there is a proper way of conceptualizing
immortality of the soul, which is rooted in relationship with God as the eternal God of the
living. Moreover, some sort of duality such as the body and the soul must be posited for a
coherent and intelligible articulation of the Christian belief in the afterlife. Notably,
Ratzinger’s understanding of the soul’s innate ordination towards matter also leads to his
insistence on the soul’s reunion with the physical body at the final resurrection.
Summary and Reflections
Our investigation of the branch of theologies of death which centers on the bodysoul relationship generates some important insights. Thielicke’s notion of “total death,”
though in fact agnostic on the actual ontological debate of body and soul, commands
theology of death to place its primacy upon divine action, and to hear out God’s message
given through human death. Cullmann’s supposedly controversial treatise, in fact, can
quite easily accommodate the notion of an immortal “soul,” and is intended to underscore
the cardinal role of history as the realm for the deployment of God’s salvific plan. The
recent renunciation of “soul,” as typified in Kung’s book, may be taken as a receptive
reaction to the modern understanding of the unity and wholeness of the human person.
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However, as Ratzinger’ work makes amply clear, some type of duality like the “body”
and the “soul” which sets the enduring apart from the transient in the make-up of the
human person, must be posited for a coherent articulation of the Christian belief in the
afterlife, and such duality can be posited without a dualistic disdain towards the
corporeal.
That said, the nature of this duality needs to be further investigated. In my view,
the main controversy still needs to be resolved here is the proper place of the physical
body in the divine scheme of salvation. Specifically, in contrast to Ratzinger’s insistence
on the inclusion of matter in God’s salvation, the view voiced, for example, by G.
Greshake and the Dutch Catechism at one time considers that “Matter as such (as atom,
molecule, organism …) cannot be perfected. Matter’s only meaning and goal are to be the
ecstatic aspect of man’s free action. Accordingly, it reaches perfection only as what
makes that action concrete.” 228 In other words, the goodness and importance of the
material world and its history distinctively upheld in the Christian faith are reflected not
in their being “resurrected” or transfigured in the consummating End, but in their
instrumental purpose being fulfilled in the definitive state that is reached through them.
Against this view, Ratzinger protests that, it divides God’s creation by a definitive
dualism, removes the material sphere from the goal of creation, and thus reduces it to the
level of “a secondary reality.” 229 And he remarks that, it is unfitting that Christians who
confess the resurrection of the flesh should lag behind Marxist thinkers, “who certainly
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do expect from a new world a new condition of matter … from the insight that historical
alienation can only be overcome in such a way.” 230
To me, though, the proximity of Ratzinger’s view to the Marxists’ materialism
regarding how historical alienation ought to be overcome is precisely an indication of its
problem. Specifically, even though I agree with Ratzinger that “it is in the life of the body
that God’s creature grows in maturity,” 231 I think it is far from clear that this necessarily
entails that matter as such can and needs to be “saved” through eventual unification with
the nonmaterial. Here, it suffices to point out that, Aquinas’ teleological ontology posits a
hierarchy of beings, and assigns different forms of beings, such as the corporeal versus
the incorporeal, with different kinds of “fulfillment”–a view in principle consistent with
Greshake’s. Furthermore, even though Ratzinger is correct in saying that, Aquinas’
conceives the “soul” as the form of body and so its inner ordination to matter, Aquinas
also holds a more basic assumption that, the human soul’s need of the body is
pedagogical, i.e., for the purpose of understanding God and understanding itself. He
states that “The end of man … is to arrive at the contemplation of truth. It is for this
purpose, then, that the soul is united to the body, … it is not union with the body that
causes the soul to lose knowledge which it had possessed; on the contrary, the soul is
united to the body, so that it may acquire knowledge.” 232
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Similarly, before Aquinas, St. Augustine in De Doctrina talks about the functional
role of the visible world as the path leading to the invisible world of the spiritual. After
Aquinas, we have Karl Rahner who, in his Foundations of the Christian faith, explains
the concrete world of the material functional as the context through which human
freedom actualizes itself. In my opinion, the view which insists on the resurrection of the
flesh and the salvation of the corporeal derives from an unwitting mixture of
characteristics of the corporeal with the incorporeal, which is criticized by some as the
“new materialism,” 233 and so it needs to be further disentangled for a more coherent
conceptualization of embodiment.
A Recent Integrative Attempt
Henry Novello, Death as Transformation: A Contemporary Theology of Death (2011) 234
In the Preface of the book, Henry Novello attributes his younger brother’s death
due to leukemia at an early age with motivating significance for his comprehensive
attempt at a contemporary theology of death:
The theology of death formulated in the present book has its earliest beginnings,
then, in Jason’s untimely death which prompted in me the need to reflect ever
more deeply on the mystery of Christ’s death, and how the death of each and
every human being is assumed into his saving death, so that God will be
worshiped by all as Creator precisely because God is the One who brings new life
out of the midst of death. 235
If Novello’s brother’s untimely death adds a personal relevance to his theological
reflection, the current cultural context of postmodern pluralism and religious dialogue
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adds for him an extra urgency to much more effectively proclaim the fundamental
Christian tenet regarding the universal significance of Jesus as the Christ for all people.
Novello appeals to the Second Vatican Council’s document titled “Pastoral Constitution
on the Church in the Modern World” as his support, which states that “since Christ died
for all and since all are in fact called to one and the same destiny, which is divine, we
must hold that the Holy Spirit offers to all the possibility of being made partners, in a
way known to God, in the paschal mystery” (Gaudium et Spes 22). As Novello sees it, a
narrowly conceived hope which leaves out “the realm of nature and excludes the majority
of the (non-baptized) human race from the ‘good news’ of final salvation in the person of
Jesus Christ is a bogus hope.” 236
Given that the Vatican document has pronounced that all are offered the
possibility of being made partners of God through the paschal mystery, Novello thinks
that contemporary theology of death is charged with the task of reflecting on and
articulating how this might happen, in terms of attaining “personal identity, real freedom,
and ontological perfection.” 237 Furthermore, Novello thinks that the lofty goal of
“ontological” perfection especially requires a brand new line of inquire, particularly
given the facts that during the earthly life such perfection eludes Christians and that the
majority of human population are not even Christians. As to Novello’s own attempt at
this new line of inquiry: “[It] hinges on the key principle that not only life, but also death
in a special and privileged way, is the location of relationship to God through Christ the
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Savior. … It is contended that the saving significance of the life, death and resurrection
of Christ is communicated to all at death by virtue of our humanity being ontologically
joined to the humanity of the Son.” 238
There are four distinct themes in Novello’s theology of death: 1) God’s decision
for the human being carries primacy over human’s decision for God, 2) grounding
theology of death in an “Assumption Christology” which emphasizes God’s action on
our behalf, 3) human death as a participation in Christ’s death is the privileged moment of
receiving the wondrous exchange of natures, and 4) the “integral salvation” received at
death includes regeneration, justification, and sanctification.
God’s Decision Regarding the Human Being Carries Primacy over Human’s Decision
Regarding God, and This is Intrinsically Compatible with Human Freewill
Above all, Novello situates his theology of death within the intricate dynamic
between divine omnipotence and human freewill. He observes that, regarding the relation
between providence and freewill, there is a common perception of “a fundamental
tension constituted by the definitive conquest of sin and death in the person of Christ–
objective redemption–on the one hand, and the need for sinners to willingly receive the
gracious offer of eschatological salvation in Christ–subjective redemption–on the
other.” 239 This fundamental tension appears to be a conundrum, a puzzling bind: for,
without the requirement of free consent, salvation has no object, which is none other than
human freewill; but, if human consent is a must, hell appears to be a real possibility,
which flies in the face of the definitive victory of Christ’s saving work. On this topic,
238

Ibid, 1.

239

Ibid, 2.

93
Novello observes a considerable difference between Catholic and Protestant theologies of
death: whereas the former tends to stress the subjective side of salvation and so the role
of human freedom to consciously accept God’s grace, the latter tends to stress the object
side of salvation and so God’s sovereign freedom to make or declare sinners to be
righteous according to God’s superabundant grace. Novello thinks that, since the
objective and the subject sides of salvation are intrinsically related to each other, in that
God’s objective salvation is offered to the human subject as the recipient of divine grace,
the crucial question here is how to properly conceive the relation between them.
Novello’s own wrestling with this seeming “impasse at the heart of the Christian
faith” makes him realize what is most important for resolving this tension–that is, a clear
recognition of “the qualitative difference between God’s decision for us in the crucified
and risen Christ and human decision for faith or disbelief.” 240 More specifically, Novello
wants his theology of death to be built upon the efficaciousness of God’s grace for all
people. Looking at the question this way, Novello considers insufficient those theologies
which make the person’s eternal destiny dependent upon “a final choice” that person
makes regarding God. This is because “the human freedom is presented as the truly ‘last
thing’, not God the Father’s unfathomable gift of the Son and the Spirit.” 241 In Novello’s
view, such absolutizing human freedom can only “restrict Christian hope and render the
outlook for universal salvation grim.” 242 Instead, Novello thinks that “since Jesus Christ

240

Ibid, 2.

241

Ibid, 5.

242

Ibid, 230.

94
risen is the eschaton in person, then he is the truly last thing;” 243 and so we truly can have
“exceedingly abundant hope” (Rom 15:13) of being raised up to the blessed union with
God based on the Lord’s resurrection.
That said, Novello wants to be clear that this does not imply God’s grace
overpowering human freedom, if we can properly understand the nature, possibilities, and
limits of human freedom. Specifically, by its God-given nature, human freedom is
“essentially the capacity for God;” 244 thus, to be truly free for human beings is to become
adopted sons and daughters of God. As the result of this extremely dignified destiny in
store for us, human freedom cannot become definitive until the human subject says “yes”
to God’s objective grace; “as long as God is rejected freedom fails to attain that finality
for which it is destined and toward which it is directed (imago trinitatis).” 245 In other
words, according to its preordained nature by God, human freedom is meant to choose
God and it cannot settle into a final equilibrium until it chooses God. In light of all this,
Novello proposes a theology of death which underscores “what God in his sovereign
freedom has done for us, in order that we might enjoy true freedom as sons and daughters
of God in the Son of God.” 246 Specifically, he suggests that, in death “all the dead attain
true freedom as a dynamic ‘moment’ intrinsic to their being drawn up into the admirable
exchange of natures in the person of Christ and divinized.” 247
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Grounding Theology of Death in an “Assumption Christology” Which Emphasizes God’s
Action on Our Behalf
Consistent with his emphasis on the efficacy of God’s saving grace, Novello maps
out a so-called “Assumption Christology” which elucidates what God has done for us on
our behalf in Jesus’ death. “Assumption” here refers to the “assumption of humanity in
the person of Jesus Christ,” or Jesus’ representation of humanity before God “as a matter
of sustained relationship to his rejecters.” 248 Specifically, because Jesus willingly accepts
the rejection of his opponents, he becomes their Representative before God, representing
humanity’s true relational identity before God. This notion of “representation” is based
on the model of relatedness by Martin Buber, Frans Jozef van Beeck, etc., according to
which being-relatedness is an essential mode of being for human existence. In Novello’s
account, Jesus became the Representative of humanity, which is sinful and hostile to him,
by the logic that
When I cannot reach the other with my gifts, I can still present myself, excluded
as I am, to the other, and in this way I become the representative of the other’s
relational identity. … representation is based on being-related as such, quite apart
from any demonstrable effects upon the other. To remain faithful to an encounter
in which the other refuses to respond means that I freely undertake to suffer
vicariously as the representative of the other’s true relational identity. 249
Furthermore, the “Assumption Christology” is based on a progressive view which sees
Jesus’ salvific identity as gradually unfolding throughout concrete historical contexts he
encountered, reaching its highest point on Calvary. There are two sides of this acme of
Jesus’ earthly life: in his relation to God, it is “the Son’s perfect obedience to the Father
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as a decisive manifestation of personal unity with the Father in unfathomable love;” in his
relation to humanity, Jesus “has completely assumed in his person the human condition of
estrangement or separation from God,” 250 as evinced by Jesus’ cry on the cross. In other
words, Jesus’ death on the cross is a uniquely salvific event because, on the one hand,
Jesus ‘learned’ perfect obedience as the Son, which brought the union of his humanity
with the Father into perfection; on the other hand, by enduring death on the cross, Jesus
“has completely assumed the human condition of estrangement from the living God.” 251
Putting the two sides together, Novello argues that Jesus’ death is uniquely
salvific because “our humanity, by virtue of being conjoined to Jesus’ humanity,” which
reached its perfect union with God in Jesus’ death, “is now redeemed and comes home to
God.” 252 Thus, Jesus redeems humanity “conclusively by setting it in relation to the
Father in his very own person.” 253 Again, Novello writes: “since the Son is in solidarity
with the concrete human condition and the Father identifies with the Crucified One, the
sphere of suffering and estranged humanity now appears as the very locus for being
addressed by God and ‘beholding’ God.” 254
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Death is the Privileged Moment of Being Given the “Wondrous Exchange of Natures”
Which Took Place in the Person of Jesus
In Novello’s account, “the essence of the Christian faith … should be portrayed as
[our] participation in Christ’s divine identity” 255–no less than this, and it happens in our
death. First, to establish the theme of “exchange of natures” on a solid ground, Novello
calls notes to the Second Vatican Council’s statement about all people being called to the
same divine destiny “is primarily ontological language,” signaling “a significant move of
the Council away from excessively juridical and forensic language used in the past.” 256
As the Council’s “Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation” indicates, God’s will for
us is nothing less than to “become sharers in the divine nature’ (Dei Verbum 2).
Furthermore, Novello defines the “natures” of God and of human in a dynamic and open
sense, saying: “[We should understand] the divine as the ‘event’ of inner-Trinitarian love
and pure self-giving that encompasses temporality and mutability, and the human as the
‘event’ of God’s self-bestowal in grace and thus as an emerging reality that is destined to
partake of the glory of Christ’s resurrection from the dead.” 257
Accordingly, it is very much in line with the nature of God as the Giver of Life
and the nature of humans as the recipient of divine life that such exchange of natures
should occur, albeit “in a way which safeguards the distinctiveness of the two
realities.” 258 Moreover, Novello argues that God’s first self-bestowal in the event of
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creation already “presupposes a capacity and openness towards the divine on the part of
evolving nature.” 259 Hence, Christ’s saving work goes far beyond the judicial aspect of
forgiving sins; it also encompasses God’s constructive operation upon humanity’s Godgiven capacity of participating in the divine life, so that human beings are elevated
ontologically onto a “higher nature.”
On Novello’s account, such elevation of human nature takes place for all people
at death. And it happens as the result of the “exchange of deaths”–that is, Jesus “has
made our death his by taking our humanity as his very own, so that by making his death
ours we will share in his glorious resurrection from the death in the power of the
Spirit.” 260 Putting it in another way, “the divine participates in the human in order that the
human might participate in the divine as its final destiny.” 261 Therefore, by Jesus’ having
“assumed our death into his saving death,” 262 death has been definitively conquered, in
that, Jesus’ genuinely “unique death, which takes the place of all sinful deaths, gives the
death of all sinners ‘a changed value’, it gives a ‘totally new value to their dying.’” 263
Human death, an otherwise emptying of life, has now been made “a dying into Christ
who is in complete solidarity with the human condition,” 264 and so death has become the
privileged locus for all people to receive the plentitude of divine life.
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Novello especially wants to emphasize that, thanks to what happened
ontologically in Jesus’ death, i.e., humanity being perfectly united to God, human death
has now become an ontologically transformative event, i.e., it is “our being ontologically
transferred from the kingdom of death to the kingdom of eternal life.” 265 Notably,
Novello sees his point regarding the ontological impact of Jesus’ death to be a very
crucial counterbalance to theologies of death, such as Rahner’s, which focus on that
which comes through as the result of human freedom. This is because, what happens
ontologically is entirely the result of God’s freedom, something “objective” to human
freedom, something human freedom is not capable and thus is only the passive recipient
of it. Here, heavily referencing Von Balthazar’s theology of the Holy Saturday, Novello
argues that given the utterly unparalleled uniqueness of the death of the Son, it is not at
all sufficient to interpret the significance of Jesus’ death in merely legal, symbolic or
psychological terms. Rather, “the wondrous exchange of places” (commercium) of Jesus
with us sinners takes place on the ontological level; because of it, “we are ontologically
transferred (cf. Col 1:13) and expropriated (1 Cor 6:19; 2 Cor 5:15; Rom 14:7).” 266
In addition, Novello indicates that, since the change of value in human death–
from an event of emptying to receiving life abundantly–took place objectively by God’s
action through Jesus’ death, the thus-determined “soteriological significance of our death
as a dying into the Dead One is not dependent upon our condition at death.” 267 Here,
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Novello especially appeals to Jungel’s strong insistence on God’s “inalienable
determination of human being in the person of Christ.” 268 As Novello puts it,
The upshot of this for Jungel is that the humanity of Christ is ontologically
definitive for all humans. Even if the ontic actuality of human works [human
actions] does not provide much empirical evidence of the fruits of justification,
nonetheless the ‘truth of personhood’ is ontologically defined in the event of the
justification in the cross of Christ. The reality of sin, while it has ontological
status in Jungel’s anthropology, is not seen as entering into the definition of the
human being, for ultimately we cannot not be what God has determined us to be
in the person of Christ. … the truth of human existence is located at a deeper level
than that of human. 269
The “Integral Salvation” We Receive through Death Consists of Physical
“Regeneration,” Relational “Justification,” and Moral “Sanctification”
In Novello’s account, the “exchange of natures” taking place at death is in essence
an integral salvation, affecting the whole person in the physical, relational, and freedom
dimensions. First, the physical aspect of our “integral salvation” in Christ entails God’s
gift of regeneration of the dead, “which conveys the sense of a transformed bodily
existence or ‘spiritual body’… that is incorruptible and imperishable.” 270 Here, Novello’s
presumption is that “all human activity is grounded in ‘bodiliness’ which is the common
matrix in and through which individual persons are related to humanity and the cosmos as
a whole.” 271 With the death of the earthly body, activity of the human is forced into a halt
unless there will be “the creation of a newly embodied self that is fitted for the new
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conditions of life in the hereafter.” 272 This may be called our “physical redemption,”
which refers to “a new mode-of-being-in-the-world,” an incorruptible nature. 273
Second, on Novello’s account, there is also a relational aspect of the integral
salvation. Death takes the person out of the old web of relations with God, humanity and
the world, and elevates the person into a new one. As far as relation to humanity and to
the world is concerned, death removes the person from ambiguities, sin, suffering, and all
the other limitations in this pilgrim life, “all of which wreak havoc in respect of continual
development of the self towards complete personal integrity.” 274 More importantly, as far
as relation to God is concerned, death is the gateway through which the full benefit of
“justification” is received, whereby the sinner is declared righteous and set in the right
relationship to God. Why and how is the full reality of what justification entails
established only in our death? To explain it, Novello simultaneously invokes two
fundamental Christian tenets, i.e., humans suffer death as the “wages of sin,” and the
forgiveness of sins is through the death of Jesus. That is to say, on the one hand, since
death is the wages of sin, when it actually takes place, it means the wages have now been
paid out in full; on the other hand, “Christ shed his blood for the forgiveness of sins, then
in death as a dying into Christ our personal sins are unconditionally forgiven and we
receive the gift of an original identity [of the image of God]” before God. 275

272

Ibid, 202.

273

Ibid, 204.

274

Ibid, 211.

275

Ibid, 210.

102
Third, the integral salvation we receive in death includes a new mode of freedom
with its basic orientation pointed definitively toward God. Novello defines “true
freedom” of human beings as “to become what we humans ought to be” by the will of
God, with the help of God’s grace. 276 More precisely, as mentioned before, it is a Godgiven capacity to enter into communion and fellowship with Him. Therefore, we are “to
think of real freedom as having personal identity in the crucified and risen Christ as its
determinate content.” 277 In death, what happens to human freedom is that “God himself
creates the final conditions wherein the original identity of the human person [as the
image of God] is definitively established as pure gift.” 278 On Novello’s account, the
reason why death can be such a deeply salvific event is because it is an unmediated
encounter with Christ, where the person’s original identity as being created in the image
and likeness of God is immanently unveiled to the person. To him, this is “tantamount to
asserting that death is the privilege locus for the definitive conversion of the old, sinful
self.” 279 Hence, what happens at death to human freedom is not a receipt of the capacity
to totally dispose of ourselves in a final decision regarding God which, as the final
decision theorists assert, can be a decision either for or against God; what happens in
death is a transformation of the person into a brand new mode of being, and so freedom
receives its definite orientation for God.
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Notably, on Novello’s account, there is no possibility of saying “no” to God when
a person goes through the portal of death onto a higher ontological plain, because “The
saying ‘yes’ to God’s salvation in Christ … is to be thought of as intrinsic or internal to
the qualitatively new ontological reality that presents itself when the dead person is
drawn up into the wondrous exchange of natures in the person of Christ, and Christ’s
freedom becomes the freedom of the newly embodied person.” 280
In Novell’s view, that in death human freedom cannot say “no” to God does not
mean that it is inoperative in this salvific event, but only that it operates correctly–now
having its orientation anchored in God as Jesus’ freedom does. He argues that, for the
state beyond death, “we are required to think of human freedom as having personal
identity in the crucified, buried and risen Son as its determinate content.” 281 To him, our
death as a dying into the death of Jesus entails for us the “establishment of real freedom
in being drawn up into Christ’s perfect self-surrender to the Father.” 282
Neither is this to claim that all the dead enjoy exactly the same degree of
beatitude. For Novello, “it is possible to conceive of the risen ones as displaying different
degrees of beatitude depending on their intellectual, moral, emotional and spiritual state
at death.” 283 Specifically, he draws a distinction between the “essential beatitude” which
is enjoyed by all the risen ones during the interim state, and the “accidental beatitude”
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which shows that the risen ones are still “ever more perfectible in heaven.” 284 Notably,
even though Novello endorses the theory of resurrection at death, he does insist that the
reality of heaven should be conceived “as not only dynamic … in the sense that the risen
ones continue to make progress in their love for God, but also as in ‘process’ inasmuch
as the space of heaven is progressively transforming this cosmic world into the ‘new
creation.’” 285 And so Novello agrees with Rahner, who rejects resurrection at death, that
because of the interrelatedness of all God’s creations, the risen ones during the interim
period “cannot attain the perfection of personal integrity of being until cosmic time enters
into Christ’s time” in the final consummation. 286
Summary: Death is the Privileged Moment for Receiving Our Integral Salvation in
Jesus Christ
Taken together, Novello’s theology of death appears to be a comprehensive effort
under today’s pluralistic context to explicate how Jesus is the Savoir of all people.
According to this theology of death, the universal human event, i.e., death, is where the
impact of salvation in Jesus becomes universally available to all people. Thanks to Jesus’
saving death, all human deaths are now the privileged moment of transformation where
we receive fully God’s integral salvation for us in Christ.
Summary and Reflections
Needless to say, as the latest extensive attempt to build a contemporary theology
of death on the basis of previous works, to the extent that Novello’s book adopts themes
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from previous works, such as resurrection at death, the universal scope of salvation in
Christ, etc., the same comments on earlier works apply to his theology of death as well.
But there are also some unique features here, for example, in terms of his repeated
emphasis on the qualitative primacy of divine providence, his explicit clarification on the
intrinsic compatibility between divine providence and human freewill, and his keen
insight on the necessity of raising soteriological discourses onto the ontological plane.
Based on my reading of the book, the most important point Novello wants to get
across seems to be the “unstableness” of the state of damnation, and so the
efficaciousness of God’s universal salvific will for all people through Christ. However, I
think the “Assumption Christology” and the “integral salvation” he so painstakingly lays
out are a bit too heavy-handed in assigning human death such an instantaneous and
conclusive significance. What’s more, these concepts seem to overstate the case he really
wants to make after all because, as shown from his description of the “progressive” and
“processive” character of the postmortem state, Novello does not really claim that the
human person achieves full perfection through death, but stakes his theology on the
possibility of salvation after death.
Related Developments in Eschatology
In this section, I introduce related works from eschatology literature generated
since 1980s when sustained investigations in the theology of death, for whatever reason,
seem to have come to a halt until Henry Novello’s work in 2012. I shall begin with two
lines of criticism brought directly against themes in the theologies of death reviewed: the
hypothesis of a final decision, and the denial of an interim period. After that, I report five
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distinct developments in eschatology which help shed lights on the future direction for
constructing theology of death. They are: 1) reconciliations of the concepts of “time” and
“eternity,” 2) further protests to the finality of death, 3) fresh explications of the interim
period, 4) reconceptualization of the resurrection, and 5) the hermeneutics of love as the
lens for theology of the Last Things.
Direct Comments from Eschatology on the Theology of Death Literature
One group of direct comments has to do with the thesis of a final decision. When
discussing individual eschatology, Zachary Hayes realizes that “the thesis appears as an
attempt to deal with the traditional conviction that death is the irreversible end of each
individual, personal history.” 287 But he thinks that the thesis needs to be revised,
particularly with regard to its claim of unbaptized infants being given adult faculties at
death. Hayes argues that “By treating the death of an infant in essentially the same way as
it treats the death of an adult, this theory runs the risk of denying any real significance to
the human existence of growing to maturity through the experience of history.” 288 In
other words, it seems unattainable to keep both the prime spot for death and the
indispensable role of life, “for it seems to claim that a mature, human decision is possible
in the absence of any historical experience.” 289 Hayes comments that,
If this is, indeed, the case, what is the point of undergoing a human history with
all the ambiguity, pain and agony that is the common lot of human beings? Would
not the fate of infant-death be far preferable to a long life? … One cannot escape
the feeling that, after all that has been said concerning the religion of life and
287
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death, …[t]he intrinsic relation of life to death on which the major premise of the
theory stands has been relativized in a disastrous way. 290
Regarding this hypothesis, Dermot Lane also reminds the reader that, even though
Boros was a student of Rahner and sees his own work as an extension of Rahner’s work,
Rahner expressed dissatisfaction with Boros’ theory as “neither probable nor necessary,”
and Rahner himself prefers to focus on the “fundamental option” in life rather than the
“final option” at death. 291 Similarly, Paul O’Callaghan expresses his discontent with the
hypothesis’ crushing the entire eschatological horizon into the moment of death. 292 To
him, this not only betrays a somewhat Pelegian view of salvation as well as a Platonic
rendering of anthropology vis-à-vis the corporeal, it also severs the critical link between
the temporal and the eternal life. As he puts it, “After all, eternity is not gained or lost in a
single moment, no matter how lucid and important it may be, but on the basis of a
lifetime of repeated actions, for we die as we have lived.” 293 In addition, on
O’Callaghan’s account, the coincidence of distinct events, such as death and resurrection,
is only possible for God for whom time is not relevant; for finite humans, their acts
necessarily succeed one after another. What’s more, he thinks that it is inappropriate to
draw a parallel between the death of Jesus and our own, given that Jesus after all is the
Christ.
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Another group of comments has to do with the denial of an interim period,
together with the claim that death is an immediate entrance to eternity. For example,
Candido Pozo remarks that
If we take seriously the notion of eternity such as it has been understood
since the time of Boethius, that is, that it includes not only the idea of
interminable life (in the fullest sense of the term, that is, without beginning
and end), but also that of a fully simultaneous and perfect possession of
life, then it is impossible to think that a being that does not have infinite
perfection, or what is the same thing, a created being, would be capable of
such an absolute possession. 294
In Pozo’s view, even though beyond death the earthly frame of time no long
applies, some notion of time is still unavoidable, because “a created being can possess its
life, including at the level of consciousness, only by means of a succession of acts; but
wherever there is a succession of acts, one can point to a before and an after, which is
equivalent to introducing a certain notion of time.” 295 To Pozo, a purely psychological
sense of instantaneity on the part of the dead is unacceptable also, since the scripture
clearly indicates a state of eager waiting by the dead for the arrival of the final
consummation (cf. Rv 6:9-10). Instead, Pozo demands a more balanced view which both
values the moment of death and the further significance of the eventual consummation.
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Five Related Advancements in the Eschatology Literature
Drawing Closer the Concepts of “Time” and “Eternity”
Walter Kasper (1994): Eternity does not abolish time but elevates it 296
Walter Kasper disapproves two frequent tendencies when thinking about the
relationship between time and eternity: one is a denial of any distinction between time
and eternity; the other is a denial of any congruency between them. The latter is
particularly seen in popular thinking, where “eternity is commonly conceived of as
timelessness, as an abolition, rejection or interruption of time.” 297 Kasper points out that,
both understandings are incompatible with the Christian faith. From the Christian point of
view, since the eternal God created the temporal world, “The relationship between time
and eternity is that of an analogy; … Eternity does not simply abolish time, but it elevates
and consummates it.” 298 To Kasper, the implication of this understanding for the
postmortem state is that, such state cannot be conceived of as being “eternal” in the sense
of timelessness, not the least because time is a constituent element of human existence.
Moreover, if the dead have entered into a state which excludes time, the Christian beliefs
in the “communion of saints,” praying for the dead, and requesting their intersession for
us do not make sense.
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Brian Hebblethwaite (2010): Thinking of the “eternity” of God and the “eternal” life we
are called to in essentially temporal terms 299
Brian Hebblethwaite begins his investigation of this topic with an analysis of Karl
Rahner’s notions of time and eternity. Hebblethwaite writes that Rahner understands
“eternal life” to be completely beyond time; this is because, to Rahner, only a total
discontinuity with time would make “eternal life” the definitive fulfillment and validation
of the temporal life, and not an endless repetition of what had gone on before. And he
points out regarding Rahner’s view that “Not only is it a question of the classical
restriction of temporality to this world in its present state; it is also one of a conviction of
the lasting significance of this life, the finality of death, and the impossibility of further
cycles of failure, repentance, or renewal in the consummated beyond.” 300 Hebblethwaite
observes that, intriguingly, Rahner himself seems to have second thoughts on this in his
short article on “Purgatory.” There, Rahner muses about the idea of “a post-mortal
history of freedom” for Christians and non-Christians alike, and suggests that such
“history,” even though not a further phase of earthly time, may be thought of as
something analogous to it.
However, Hebblethwaite argues that, theologically speaking, “it is both
unnecessary and unintelligible to locate God wholly outside time, … [because] a living,
purposive, and active God of love must be thought of, at least analogously, in temporal
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terms.” 301 He recounts that, even in philosophy, there is an increasing conviction among
analytical philosophers who are sympathetic to theism that the concept of God can no
longer be coherently presented in purely non-temporal terms. If so, Hebblethwaite thinks
that it encourages us to reconsider the traditional stand of the “finality” of death as the
stopping of time; moreover, we should think of the “eternity” of God and the “eternal”
life to which creatures are called in essentially temporal terms. To Hebblethwaite, not
only is temporality an essential part of the life after death, even the final consummation
of all things cannot be thought of in entirely non-temporal terms–in his own words, “That
state of ultimate perfection must itself involve an endlessly dynamic movement of
experience, ecstasy, exploration, and activity (although one hopes for some rest as
well!).” 302
Anthony Thiselton (2012): Physical time is a small part of the ontologically real time we
call “eternity” 303
Perhaps a farther step in this discourse, Brian Thiselton proposes an intriguing
definition of “eternity” as a multi-dimensional reality including different “planes” of
time. As he puts it, “time is not one thing” but “depends decisively upon the context.” 304
Correspondingly, “‘eternity’ denotes neither endless duration, nor timelessness, and not
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even simultaneity, but time as this may be experienced in a new dimension.” 305
Moreover, Thiselton refers to David Wilkinson in saying that “God has both eternal and
temporal poles to his nature … We need to see time as a fundamental part of eternity.” 306
To illustrate his fascinating vision about the multiple dimensions of time and how God in
“eternity” interacts with us in “time,” Thiselton gives an example of multiple dimensions
of space. He says,
It is easy to imagine a two-dimensional world in spatial terms, like Flatland, in
which a visitor arrives from a three-dimensional world, unlimited in the way that
two-dimensional creatures have been limited. He sees and understands more than
they do. … If we now extend the analogy, we can think of a one-dimensional
world in time, with an irreversible and one-directional flow. Now let us imagine a
world in which a visitor from a reality with two or more dimensions in time enters
the one-dimensional temporal world. The visitor’s interaction with that world
‘could be both describable but inexplicable to the inhabitants. … Our experience
of time in the physical universe is a small and limited part of an ontologically real
time that we might call eternity.’ God, Wilkinson asserts, inhabits these higher
dimensions of time. 307
Thiselton thinks that, the fact that certain models for quantum gravity require ten or even
more dimensions for the physical universe provides support for his theory.
Further Challenging the “Finality” of Death
Donald Bloesch (2014): “A theology of divine perseverance” 308
In addition to the typical protests against the finality of death, such as those based
on the vastly unfinished state of our earthly life and on the divine attributes of justice and
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love, Donald Bloesch proposes what he calls “a theology of divine perseverance,” 309
which holds that our existence after death is not beyond the reach of God’s saving grace.
Bloesch explores the possibility of postmortem salvation based on the conviction that the
grave cannot limit God, who perseveres in His pursuit to save fallen humanity until the
victorious End.
Brian Hebblethwaite (2010): Developing “par-eschatology” within the doctrine of
sanctification 310
Along the same line, Brian Hebblethwaite points to the important bearing of the
notion of “reincarnation” on twentieth-century Christian eschatology under the context of
religious pluralism, the reason being that
Indian belief in reincarnation is closely bound up with a way of dealing with the
whole problem of evil that presents such a stumbling block to traditional Christian
faith. It rests on the profound religious conviction that a single human life on
earth, liable to being thwarted or cut short at any moment, cannot be the one and
only opportunity for a human being to find salvation and eternal blessedness. 311
Hebblethwaite strongly agrees with John Hick’s view in Death and Eternal Life (1976)
that “a single life span on earth cannot possess the absolute significance that the
mainstream Christian tradition has accorded it.” 312 Hebblethwaite also introduces
theologians like Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, Schleiermacher, H. B. Wilson, F. W. Farrar,
Nicolas Berdyaev, etc., as supporters for the view that God does present people further
chances after death for repentance and further spiritual growth. And he calls to attention
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the fact that, even Karl Rahner, who is known for his belief in the “finality” of death in
his early theology, admits later in his major work that the Indian belief in reincarnation
has substantive similarities with the Christian doctrine of purgatory. 313
Hebblethwaite himself welcomes the contemporary development of “pareschatology,” or discussion of the “next to last things,” as in John Hick’s Death and
Eternal Life (1976), which extends the traditional concern with purgatory “to include the
whole next phase of the creative process.” 314 To Hebblethwaite, positing such a
postmortem period of growth is not at all in conflict with the doctrine of “justification,”
because this period has to do with the doctrine of “sanctification” something which
“takes effect gradually through experience and growth in spirituality, both this side of the
grave and beyond it.” 315 Hebblethwaite also thinks that it is reasonable to not limit the
opportunity of further growth and sanctification to Christians only, but to extend it to all
people.
Jürgen Moltmann (1996): Allowing each person to become what God intended them to
be 316
Jürgen Moltmann presents some passionate pleas for the possibility of
postmortem growth. As he puts it,
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We die with the unanswered question which we ourselves have been, our whole
life long. However we imagine eternal life, it cannot be the externalization of our
beginnings, our attempts at life and life’s abrupt endings, experienced or willed.
Can resurrection into the life of the future world really already take place at death,
as Luther and the modern Catholic theologians we have cited believe? It would
then seem as if with death this earthly, fragmentary life would be broken off, and
would be absorbed into a different, divine life. But we should then still not have
coped successfully with this life. 317
In Moltmann’s view, because of the countless dissatisfactions and unfinished
businesses life leaves us, we cannot help but ruminate about an on-going history after
death, so that our lives as we have lived them may be properly dealt with, such that by
God’s power and grace we may be able to “put right what has gone awry, finish what was
begun, pick up what was neglected, forgive the trespasses, heal the hurts, and be
permitted to gather up the moments of happiness and to transform mourning into joy.” 318
In Moltmann’s view, this is not some karmatic return or endless repetition, neither is it to
finish up the “tasks” left uncompleted, but “is being given the chance to become the
persons God meant us to be,” because “If everyone is a unique idea on God’s part, as we
like to say, then God will think it important for this idea to find its own proper realization,
and its successful and completed form.” 319 Here, Moltmann is particularly mindful about
the huge number of people whose lives are cut short. And he asks “if their life has no
meaning, has ours?” Moltmann laments that the notion of “natural death” is too rosy a
concept from “the life-insured denizens of the affluent society” for an eschatology of
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genuine hope to be based upon. 320 Looking expectantly into the future, Moltmann writes
that
I would think that eternal life gives the broken and the impaired and those whose
lives have been destroyed space and time and strength to live the life which they
were intended for, and for which they were born. I think this, not for selfish
reasons, for the sake of my personal completion, and not morally, for the sake of
some kind of purification; I think it for the sake of the justice which I believe is
God’s concern and his first option. 321
Further Explicating the Intermediate State
Jürgen Moltmann (1996): “Time” of fellowship with Christ and “space” of growth in the
Spirit 322
Jürgen Moltmann advocates a theology of the afterlife, or “the eschatological
proviso,” which takes Jesus “the Way” as its point of departure. According to it, Christ is
“the Way;” moreover, “Christ is on the way to God’s kingdom.” 323 The “provisional”
element in Moltmann’s theology of the interim has to do the fact that, even though Christ
has been raised from the dead, the final consummation is yet to come. Thus, even though
a Protestant theologian, Moltmann fully endorses the “interim time,” which to him is “the
time between Christ’s resurrection and the general resurrection of the dead … filled by
the lordship of Christ over the dead and the living, and by the experience of the Spirit,
who is the life-giver.” 324

320

Ibid, 118.

321

Ibid, 118.

322

Moltmann, The Coming of God.

323

Ibid, 104.

324

Ibid, 104.

117
Specifically, during this interim “the dead are dead and not yet risen, but they are
already ‘in Christ’ and are with him on the way to his future;” Christ the Risen One
“takes them with him on his way to the consummation of God’s kingdom.” 325 Moltmann
terms this postmortem “being with Christ” a “time” with Christ. Here, “time” is to be
understood relationally, “as God’s time for creation and as Christ’s time for human
beings, … the dead too have ‘time’ in Christ, because Christ ‘has time’ for them.” 326
Based on the First Epistle of Peter (4.6), Moltmann envisions Christ preaching the gospel
to the dead in his descent to the hell, and “through his solidarity with the dead, Christ
avails himself of his salvific possibilities for them, and thus brings the dead hope. In that
world, the gospel also has retrospective power. Those who died earlier can also arrive at
faith, because Christ has come to them.” 327
In Moltmann’s view, death can impose no limit to the Risen Lord who makes
divine possibilities available to the dead. Moltmann calls the postmortem “time” with
Christ “the fellowship of Christ;” it is “Christ’s time, and that is the time of love, the
accepting, the transfiguring, the rectifying love that leads to eternal life.” 328 This, to him,
is the element of truth contained in the doctrine of purgatory.
Furthermore, on Moltmann’s account, there is also postmortem “space.” First,
“space” conveys the sense of community of the living and the dead, both of which are in
the fellowship with Christ. It is an enduring and indestructible communion of hope and
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love, under Christ’s lordship, which embraces the living and the dead. Second, “space”
refers to “the Spirit of eternal life” who “is first of all a further space for living.” 329 Even
during our restricted earthly existence, the eternal Spirit is experienced as “the well of
life” bestowing people with new life and filling it again and again with fresh energies.
Beyond death, the Spirit will further enliven human lives impaired, cut short, or even
destroyed during their earthly span, so that they can develop fully in the end. Moltmann
writes,
To every space for living which is an invitation to an unfolding and to movement,
there belongs a time for living which allows growth and completion. Even before
death we experience the Spirit of life as the power of the divine hope which
leaves us time, because it gives us future. And how much more will this be so
after the end of this restricted time, however short or long it may be. 330
Donald Bloesch (2004): The four worlds beyond 331
Donald Bloesch firmly believes in an interim state for both the saved and the
unsaved. He thinks that “The gulf between heaven and hell (the final destiny of the saved
and the lost respectively) is irrevocable and final only from the human side.” 332
Specifically, Bloesch proposes the “four worlds beyond,” which include “hell,” “heaven,”
“hades,” and “paradise.” “Hell” and “heaven” denote, respectively, the future states of the
dammed and the saved in the final consummation. “Hades” and “paradise,” on the other
hand, are present realities during the interim, which are provisional rather than
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everlasting. They are, in a sense, “interim hell” and “interim heaven,” and they will be
merged into hell and heaven eventually.
Paradise is the interim state of the blessed. Paradise is blessed, in that it is a place
of newly embodied life of resurrection, “a spiritual corporeality.” 333 It is where the
beatific vision begins. And yet, “paradise” is only an interim place, in that the saints there
will be further clothed and will have perfect beatitude at Christ’s Second Coming.
Bloesch approves the notion of continuous progress in paradise, for “[e]ven in a state of
perfect sanctification one is still able to grow ‘in wisdom and in stature,’ as did Jesus
himself (Lk 2:52). Scripture speaks of degrees of glory (1 Cor 3:18), the lowest levels
beginning in this life (cf. Heb 12:23).” 334 Words like “sleep” or “rest” in the scripture for
describing the dead convey the meaning of rest only from worldly labors, analogous to
the Sabbath rest; in fact, the saints “are now engaged in the new world of intercession in
which they rest neither day nor night (Rv 4:8).” Furthermore, in paradise, their fellowship
with all the children of God is not yet perfect, because the church militant is still fighting
the good fight on earth. Therefore, the saints in paradise are in a state of expectancy for
the eschaton like us on earth, for “Apart from us they shall not be made perfect (Heb
11:40). Their happiness is dependent upon our redemption.” 335
Hades, in comparison, is the interim state for the great majority of people who are
not saved when they die, and it will be cast into the lake of fire after giving up its dead in
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the final consummation (Rv 20:13-14). Here, Bloesch alludes to the fact that, a fair
number of church fathers in the early period held out the possibility of redemption in
hades, and he thinks that they are on solid scriptural ground.
Bloesch contends that, change of heart can still happen after death, as in the
parable of Lazarus and the rich man where the latter shows some change of heart.
Furthermore, even though a great chasm exists between the saved and the unsaved in the
world beyond, God can bridge this chasm, as indicated in Ephesians 4:8-9, “This is why
it says: ‘When he ascended on high, he took many captives and gave gifts to his people.’
What does ‘he ascended’ mean except that he also descended to the lower, earthly
regions?” Nothing can separate us from God’s saving love. Bloesch states that “I believe
it is more in keeping with the tradition of the church catholic to view the descent as
opening the door to the salvation of those who are not yet in the family of God.” 336 He
argues that the risen Lord himself tells us that he has the keys to death and to hades (Rv
1:18), and he assured Peter that the gates of hell cannot prevail against the advance of
God’s saving power (Mt 16:18).
Therefore, Bloesch believes that the final condemnation is not yet pronounced
upon those who are not saved at death, the final and irrevocable separation of the blessed
and the damned has not occurred–both for the living and for the dead. He agrees with
Luther that “‘God forbid that I should limit the acquiring faith to the present life. In the
depth of divine mercy there may be opportunity to win it in the future.’” And he quotes
Peter T. Forsyth in saying that, there may be more conversions on the other side of death
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than on this side. Bloesch thinks that, he is not claiming here a “doctrine of a second
chance,” but rather “the universality of opportunity for salvation. In this context, it is best
not to speak of chance but of universal Providence.” 337
Re-conceptualizing “Resurrection”
When discussing resurrection and the interim state, Zachary Hayes insightfully
points out that, recent discourse on these topics “re-opens issues on the nature of material
reality and its relation to spirit, as well as the issue of time and its relation to eternity.” 338
Notably, the five authors’ works I review below all wrestle, in one way or another, with
these two central motifs regarding the afterlife.
Jürgen Moltmann (1996): Resurrection as healing the lived life 339
Jürgen Moltmann envisages resurrection as “gathering” and “healing” the lived
life on earth, which is always fragmentary, transient, and isolated in nature. Notably, the
lived life in its entirety is how Moltmann understands contemporary emphasis on the
“wholeness” of a human being–in life, in death and in resurrection. As he defines it, “The
whole is the form in which the different parts of an organism coalesce and cooperate. …
a new quality compared with the quantifiable sum of the parts.” 340 Even though the sum
of the parts disintegrates in death, the person’s total configuration or Gestalt as the
outcome of a lived life remains what it is before God–because of God. Furthermore,
death is not the separation of the soul from the body; what really happens through death
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is the whole person’s lived Gestalt being transformed from the restricted earthly life into
a form of existence that is no longer temporally or spatially restricted. Resurrection
“means that a person finds healing, reconciliation and completion,” while the
particularity of each life as actually lived is also maintained. 341 Moltmann thinks that
“‘The resurrection of the body’ means the metamorphosis of this transient creation into
the eternal kingdom of God, and of this mortal life into eternal life.” 342 Nothings will be
lost through the transfiguration; all the marks left on the mortal life will be carried into
the eternal life, albeit as reconciled, rectified, healed, and completed. Otherwise, we will
not be able to recognize ourselves in eternal life.
Dermot Lane (1996): A synthesized theory of resurrection in stages 343
Dermot Lane proposes a synthesized view of resurrection which has three stages.
It is “synthesized,” in that Lane situates resurrection as the “focal point” of the entire
divine drama of creation, redemption, and consummation. In his words,
The God who created the human out of love is the same God who recreates the
human in death into a New Creation. The first creation is a creatio ex nihilo. The
second creation is a multilayered process of recreation influenced by the grace of
historical existence, shaped by the second grace of the gift of redemption in
Christ, and completed by the third grace of the love of God’s creativity expressed
paradoxically in death itself. 344
It is “staged,” in that Lane sets out three degrees of resurrection: during life, at death, and
in the final consummation. Lane argues that, his theory of resurrection in degrees is an
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effective way for avoiding, on the one hand, the metaphysical dualism of spirit and matter
in classical eschatology, which locates resurrection at the final consummation and, on the
other hand, the neglect of the crucial import of the Parousia by the alternative theory,
which locates resurrection at the death. In Lane’s view, what is at stake here is both to
maintain a sound anthropology in terms of the body-soul relation, and to be attentive to
the collective aspect of eschatology as captured in the concept of general resurrection.
And he asks, “Is there any way around … which offers a meaningful account of
individual salvation after death and at the same time safeguards the social significance of
the second coming of Christ?” 345 To this end, Lane himself suggests that “individual
resurrection–as distinct from general resurrection–takes place after death, and that this
individual resurrection is finally completed and perfected at the end of time in the general
resurrection symbolized in the doctrine of the second coming of Christ.” 346
To support his theory, Lane appeals to both the scripture and documents issued by
the Second Vatican Council. Specifically, Lane’s scriptural evidence comes from the
Pauline corpus. For example, he argues that that “According to Paul, resurrection for the
individual begins in the present life and comes to some kind of climax in death” when
individual resurrection takes place. 347 For Lane, the clearest evidence of Paul’s belief in
individual resurrection in death is found in his Second Letter to the Corinthians, where he
says, “For we know that if the earthly tent we live in is destroyed, we have a building
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from God, an eternal house in heaven.”(2 Cor 5:1) Regarding this verse, Lane relates that,
“Most commentators suggest that in this text the earthly tent symbolizes the physical
body and the heavenly dwelling represents the new risen body given by God to the
individual in death.” 348 Another favorite piece of evidence Lane uses is the Pauline
imagery of a seed, which “does not come to life unless it dies.” Lane explains that “Here,
Paul is appealing to the analogy of the seed, also used by Jesus, to explain what happens
in death. The seed falls into the ground and dies, and what comes up is a transformed
stalk of wheat. For Paul something similar happens to the Christian in death: ‘So will it
be with the resurrection of the dead. (1 Cor 15: 42-44).” 349
In Lane’s view, the image of a seed is a particularly effective symbol of the
individual resurrection which takes place in death, because it well captures both the
element of continuity and the element of transformation and fulfillment in the
resurrection. Notably, we recall that Lane sees the individual resurrection at death as still
incomplete, in the sense that a part in isolation from the whole is incomplete. “The
Christian who undergoes individual resurrection in death continues to retain a
relationship with the pilgrimage people of God on earth and indeed with creation itself. It
is this underlying relationship which is completed and transformed in the general
resurrection of the dead at the end of time in the Parousia.” 350
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Donald Bloesch (2004): “Resurrection of the spirit” in death and “resurrection of the
body” in the Parousia 351
Similarly, Donald Bloesch also makes the distinction between the individual and
the general resurrection, which begins with faith and repentance during earthly life. But
for Bloesch, the accent falls more upon the distinction between “resurrection of the spirit”
which occurs in death and “resurrection of the body” which occurs in the Parousia. More
specifically, Bloesch differentiates the “flesh” from the “body” and, quoting C. H.
Dodd’s biblical scholarship, he defines the “body” as the following: “Paul does not mean
by ‘body’ anything material, but ‘the organic principle which makes a man a selfidentical individual, persisting through all changes in the ‘substance’ through which he
realizes himself, whether material or non-material.’” 352
On Bloesch’s account, resurrection has to do with the “body” and not the “flesh,”
which is destroyed at death. Even though, during earthly life, the new birth of the person
brings renewal to the fleshly physical body, the renewal is temporary, for the physical
body only serves as a vehicle for the new, spiritual body. Thus, the inner person which
persists after death has both the bodily and the spiritual elements. Bloesch sees the
“body,” which is the organic principle, being linked to the “soul” in such a way that “the
soul always seeks and needs some kind of bodily form. Soul and body are therefore
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inseparable. The body is necessary for a restored humanity as a means of fellowship,
communication and identification.” 353
As to the new body we receive in resurrection at death, Bloesch observes in Jesus’
case that, the resurrection body is not only spiritual, but also “steadily became more
spiritualized in his postmortem encounters with his disciples,” 354 for it manifested more
and more characteristics that the fleshly physical body does not have. He thinks that
only Christ has the perfectly developed spiritual body. After our deaths as sinful
mortals, the soul is not in nakedness, but there is a lack of completeness of
wholeness in the spiritual body as it exists. For a perfect and complete spiritual
corporeality, we must wait for the eschatological fulfillment of all things in the
risen and ascended Christ who will then be all in all. 355
On Bloesch’s account, the resurrection body we receive at death does not have a material
identity, but a formal identity with the earthly body. To offer more details about the
resurrection body, Bloesch speculates further that “at death the soma (body) of the
believer is changed from sarx (flesh), which by is very essence decays, into doxa (glory)–
the divine element. The new body will be characterized by solidity, denseness and
substantiality.” 356
Bloesch identifies two resurrections: “The first resurrection is the spiritual
resurrection [in death] of the dead through faith [which begins in this life]. The second is
the physical or bodily resurrection at the consummation of world history.” 357 Comparing
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our resurrection in death with the final resurrection in the End, Bloesch states that “At the
moment of death, we are clothed with an incorruptible body. When Christ comes again,
we will be re-clothed with a glorified body that is eternal.” Moreover, “The general
resurrection involves a transformation of matter itself. … We look forward not only to a
heavenly eternity but to a new heavenly earth in which the material will be taken up into
the spiritual.” 358 In addition, “We can say that in the general resurrection what is now
hidden will be made public. There will be a materialization or making visible of what is
now invisible.” 359
Brian Hebblethwaite (2010): Resurrection as dematerialization 360
Brian Hebblethwaite discusses resurrection in a way to try to retain the
theological intuitions behind both “immortality of the soul” and “resurrection of the
body.” According to Hebblethwaite’s understanding, “immortality of the soul” conveys
the insight that, if a person survives death, there must be an element within the person to
ensure continuity of the same individual before and after death, and this element is not the
physical body which disintegrates upon death. As he puts it, “Continuity must rather be
ensured by means of the person who has come into existence, admittedly in and through a
particular physical organism, but who already transcends that material base on virtue of
his or her rational, spiritual, capacities.” 361 “Resurrection of the body,” on the other hand,
focuses on the role of the “body” as the indispensable means of human individuation,
358

Ibid, 131.

359

Ibid, 131.

360

Hebblethwaite, Christian Hope.

361

Ibid, 210.

128
relation, and action. But he wants to clarify that resurrection should not be understood as
a transformation of the physical body into something permanent and incorruptible. He
defends his view by saying that
It is really a question of intelligibility in the light of modern scientific
understanding of matter. A physical body is a particular, complex, configuration
of atoms and molecules in continual exchange with an ever-changing physical
environment. Although the particles or quanta of energy and the forces that
constitute the basic stuff of the world out of which all material objects are made
do not themselves appear to be perishable, nevertheless all organized matter is
inherently perishable, and it is not clear what could possibly be meant by saying
that matter will be raised and transformed into something incorruptible in
heaven. 362
According to Hebblethwaite, the material medium and environment are replaced
by non-material ones in the postmortem existence. Moreover, “the material creation is a
temporary phase and destined to be left behind, presumably annihilated (perhaps after the
heat-death of the universe), when its function in the whole creative process is complete
and the last new creaturely person has been taken up and transformed into the conditions
of eternity.” 363 So, he thinks that it is more accurate to compare the material creation to
the chrysalis than to the caterpillar vis-à-vis the butterfly. Notably, Hebblethwaite
endorses the theory of individual resurrection immediately after death; he thinks that
“general resurrection” should be used only as a symbol to convey that all will be raised
and there will be a final consummation. And he agrees that there is a temporal gap
between individual resurrection and final consummation: “For one thing, the history of
the world goes on and new generations continue to be born and to die. For another thing,
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there must be time for the love of God to work upon the risen soul, perhaps even to win
it, purify it, and enhance it, time for the risen person to repent, to grow and change, and to
mature.” 364
Anthony Thiselton (2012): The “spiritual” body is that type of body animated by the
Holy Spirit 365
Anthony Thiselton explicates the “spiritual body” upon resurrection by its relation
to the Holy Spirit. Specifically, Thiselton argues that in the scripture “the adjective
spiritual (Greek, pneumatikos) nearly always denotes the quality of being animated, led,
and sanctified by the Holy Spirit.” 366 And so, he questions the usual translation “It is
sown a physical body; it is raised a spiritual body.” This is because, here, the ideal model
to be contrasted with is not the immaterial, but that which is animated and motivated by
the Holy Spirit. To him, “the notion of a ‘spiritual body,’ or better, ‘Spiritual body’ …
may or may not be ‘immaterial’.” 367 As to the nature of the spiritual body, Thiselton
thinks that we should try to understand it through the nature of the Holy Spirit, who is the
animating power of the resurrection. Specifically, quoting Ernst Kasemann’s work,
Thiselton defines the earthly “body” as a person’s “ability to communicate … the reality
of our being in the world.’ Hence, the earthly body provides ‘visible expression’ and
‘personal shape to the Christian’s living out of obedience to Christ as Lord.” 368
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Correspondingly, the “spiritual body” is a transformed counterpart of that after
resurrection, and it “constitutes a mode of existence characterized by the Holy Spirit …
ongoing, moving ahead, dynamic, and on-the-move. It will be more like a flowing stream
or river than a lake or a canal.” 369
Love as the Hermeneutical Lens for Eschatology
Gerald O’Collins encourages an eschatology which is developed through the
hermeneutical lens of love. 370 He recalls Pope John Paul II’s theme in his first encyclical,
Redemptor hominis of 1979, which spotlights the unique insights God’s love alone can
furnish for our understanding of the human being. Extending this theme to the study of
death and life after death, O’Collins states that “As they move toward their end, human
beings cannot live without love. As they travel toward their own individual deaths and
the consummation of all things, they remain incomprehensible to themselves and their
world remains senseless unless that love is revealed which can illuminate their personal
end and the end of the universe.” 371
And so, O’Collins conducts a tentative exercise of “love seeking eschatological
understanding.” 372 Looking at the eschaton through the eyes of love, O’Collins tries to
find out how the theme of love may help us better comprehend and interpret the Last
Things, just as it did for Dante, where love allowed him “to explore imaginatively the last
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things–right through to the end and his vision of the divine love which ‘moves the sun
and the other stars.’” 373
O’Collins begins by describing some of the major characteristics of love, based
on general as well as Christian faith experiences. These characteristics include: love is
creative; love transcends mere logical reasoning; love accepts and affirms the existence
of the beloved; love heals, redeems, sets free, and transforms; love means self-revelation
orientated toward the other; love unites; love brings joy; and love has intrinsic connection
with beauty. Based on these characteristics of love, O’Collins then speculates on how
they may manifest eschatologically. For example, love as the key to the New Creation of
all things in the End; God’s affirmative love bestows us creatures with eternal life; God’s
salvific self-disclosure will reach its completion at the end, etc.
O’Collins acknowledges that, much work remains to be done in spelling out what
the hermeneutics of love may entail for particular topics of individual eschatology, such
as death, purgatory, and bodily resurrection. Thought-provokingly, he also remarks that
given the amazing discoveries made nowadays about the material reality, cosmology,
etc., “it is at our peril that we bypass the questions arising at the interface between
science and theology.” 374 O’Collins even eagerly suggest that, since God the Creator is
best characterized by love, “love just might provide the answer to the grand unified
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theory or GUT, the holy grail for which many contemporary scientists search,” the key to
unlock the most fundamental mystery of all created realities. 375
Summary and Reflections
Even though the topic of death occupies only a portion of the eschatological
probing, and so discussions of it in the eschatology literature are in a sporadic fashion,
exciting breakthroughs have been made as the result of these efforts, all of which
contribute to better understandings of the pivotal concepts of temporality, body, and
postmortem growth for furthering theology of death.
First, we see the stringent dichotomy between time and eternity according to the
Greek philosophy being loosened based on Christian understandings of God and on
modern discoveries about time and space. Moreover, the so-called “finality” of death is
furthered challenged based on beliefs in the efficacy of divine perseverance and universal
providence. Along this line, investigation of the “next to last things,” or “pareschatology,” has been taken up by some within the doctrine of sanctification. Also,
deliberations over the interim state give rise to intriguing par-eschatological notions such
as fellowship “time” with Christ in the “space” of the Holy Spirit, and the “four worlds
beyond.” All of them express the intuition of the progressive, processive, rather than
static or dormant nature of the postmortem existence.
Furthermore, we see new articulations of the doctrine of resurrection: some
particularly want to make explicit its relation to the life lived on earth, others parse it out
in gradual stages, still others try to elucidate it via its connections with the corporeal or
the Holy Spirit. Again, we hear an increasingly salient expression of the intuition of
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gradual growth and development in the afterlife coming through. There are also further
thoughts on the nature of the “body” and the role it serves in the life of the spirit. Last but
not the least, the theme of love is attracting more and more attention in eschatological
explications, for example, related to the divine purpose for postmortem purgation or
person-making. Here, we reviewed the most enthusiastic proposal on it, which calls for a
hermeneutic of love for revealing unique insights about our eschatological future.
Main Findings and Open Questions
Regarding Postmortem Time
One major result of these studies is a crystalizing appreciation of temporality as a
constitutive element of human existence, both for life on earth and for life beyond. More
importantly, there stands out the Christian understanding of time as a teleological process
of becoming the Image of God. As Brian Hebblethwaite points out, “it is probably the
case that, of all scientific notions, evolutionary theory has had the most pervasive effect
in making Christian theology rethink its fundamental conception of God’s world.” 376 The
evolutionary picture has been found to hold true from the small world of microbiology to
the vast domain of cosmology. That is to say, the successive process of becoming seems
to be such a universal feature which characterizes the underlying mechanism of our
reality “that Christian theology had now to think in terms of a more or less gradual
process from small beginnings right up to a perfected consummation in the future is
beyond question or doubt.” 377
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In addition, time is understood to be part and parcel for playing out the drama of
salvation. For example, Donald Bloesch underscores that, to the extent that the Christian
faith is thoroughly soteriological, soteriology carries an overriding significance for
eschatology, and so eschatological explorations should be housed within soteriology. 378
This soteriology may be expressed as the following:
Christians believe primarily that through his Son Jesus Christ God has offered
humanity salvation: salvation from sin, salvation leading toward eternal, loving
communion with the Trinity. But salvation from sin is a gradual, laborious,
lifelong process. And perfect, conscious union with God, though entirely
dependent on grace, involves a drawn-out, arduous purification. 379
Time’s indispensable role in our salvation can be appreciated from the Christian
anthropology which considers the human being a being of history, of becoming through
concrete enfolding over time. That is why Christian faith is a “historical” faith, believing
in a God who saves through history. Joseph Ratzinger tries to make evident the crucial
role of time in salvation by saying that:
salvation cannot simply be given to people in an external way, as one might hand
over a sum of money. Rather does it claim the entire personal subject who
receives it. … the interval between midpoint and end [in salvation history]
becomes intelligible when seen from this angle. Man with his ambiguous story of
acceptance and rejection of grace is an acting subject in God’s saving plan, and it
is on this basis that he inhabits time. 380
Considering temporality from the perspectives of Christian anthropology and soteriology,
one cannot help but hesitating to call death, the end of our earthly time, “final.” For, what
is “three scores and ten” compared to eternity? It may be telling that, among the eleven
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theologians reviewed above, six of them hold a certain version of a progressive and
processive view of human existence after death; and it is the majority viewpoint in related
eschatology literatures we reviewed. Among those who claim “instantaneous” holiness at
death, they often hold other eschatological beliefs, such as multiple “perfections” defined
according to stages, or heaven with “space” for further growth, which betray that their
claim of “instantaneous holiness” is in fact in substantive agreement with the non-finality
of death. In Chapter Four, I present recent soteriological literatures to argue for the
processive nature of postmortem existence.
Regarding Postmortem Body
Given that death is nothing if not bodily, numerous thoughts have been given to
the role of “body” in death and the beyond. However, as we know from the above,
viewpoints here are not nearly as homogenous as in the discourse on time. Some insists
on resurrecting the earthly body (e.g., Ratzinger); other thinks the physical body has no
part in the eternal, and it is idolatrous to treat such things as absolute (e.g., Simpson); still
other understands the body through its functional role as the medium and the context of
human interaction (e.g., Aldwinckle). In my opinion, the diversity of opinions regarding
the body is a direct consequence of the heavy fog that surrounds “matter” itself.
A major manifestation of this difficulty is the frequent mixing of the material and
the spiritual in the theologies of death reviewed. Recall, on the one hand, we see things
related to the spirit being portrayed as if they were literally physical, the most striking
examples of which may be found in Rahner and Boros’ Christologies, even though all the
authors we viewed would probably reject a physicalist’s conception of the essence of the
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human being. Boros even goes so far as claiming that “One of the most important results
we owe to Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s efforts in the world of thought is the opening up
for Christian spirituality of the Christo-logical dimension of our essential belonging to
the [physical] world.” 381
On the other hand, we see theological discussions based on features given to
material things that they do not actually possess. As Russell Aldwinckle points out in
length,
the word “matter” is sometimes very loosely used. If such language is used as that
matter has in it the potential to become mind, the result often is to attribute to
matter so-called qualities and capacities which we only know as belonging to selfconscious mental activity. This, however, is cheating, since matter does not now
mean that which is defined as non-mental, nor is it the matter which physics is
concerned. Matter then becomes a mysterious source or process from which
emerge ever-increasingly complex levels of existence, including mind. … It is
doubtful whether this should be called a consistent materialism, for it allows for
the emergence of new levels of activity, such as the mental, which are not
reducible to the physical factors investigated by the physics today. 382
Various notions of “salvation” of matter, for example, from transience, from
corruption, or to “elasticity” to the spirit, are particularly hazy. In my view, even though
the matter-inclusive impulse behind these notions is quite laudable, the notions
themselves lack intelligibility, and so they render the Christian hope less than credible.
What’s more, they seem to treat matter as something it is not, and so assign it a salvation
it needs not, while obscuring the salvation we really need. For example, in what sense is
it better for matter to be permanent rather than transient, except from the human point of
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view? Also, does the root of the disharmony between matter and spirit reside in the
matter, or in the spirit?
The most telling example of our jumbled understanding of “matter” may be the
interpretation of the doctrine of resurrection in terms of the “flesh.” Besides those
awkward maneuvers required to make sense of the cannibalism situation with the flesh,
the most fundamental problem here, as Candido Pozo came to realize, is the need to
“explain exactly how the material body can contribute to a more intense possession of
God”–given that God in essence is Spirit. 383 To this end, I agree with Hebblethwaite’s
comment when discussing the context for twentieth century theology that “Twentiethcentury cosmology and elementary particle physics also compelled theologians to reexamine what they said about the basic material creation and its potentialities for future
transformation.” 384
Notably, all the theologians we encountered above likely hold a substantive
dualism view of matter versus spirit. However, as Charles Taliaferro acknowledges, the
main challenge to substantive dualism is the “problem of interaction,” given that
interaction seems to require that the interacting parties are in the same category or
kind. 385 The common theological defense of dualism by referring to the immaterial God
creating and interacting with the material world seems to beg the question. The fact that
the concept of the “psychosomatic unity” of the person drew much sympathy from
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contemporary authors may be indicative of the deeper intuition of the substantive oneness
of reality as a whole. In Chapter Five, I propose George Berkeley’s Idealism which takes
the material reality seriously, as emphasized by the Christian faith, but also properly,
according to its ontological nature.
Regarding the Ontological Connection
between Sin and Death and Righteousness and Life
A third important finding from previous works comes from various efforts to
understand the exact nature of the connection between sin and death. As discussed in
previous sections, not upholding the Christian claim of sin being the most fundamental
human peril can lead to tacit Gnosticism, where salvation comes from gaining knowledge
of the objective reality rather than gaining a holy disposition, and so death is hailed as
enlightenment; it can also lead to tacit Platonism, where the physical world is where
human beings need to be saved from rather than saved through, and so death is welcomed
as liberation.
As Oscar Cullmann points out, the deepest contrast between Christianity and
Platonism is Christianity’s insistence on the causal connection between sin and death.
Cullmann observes that “The belief in the resurrection presupposes the Jewish connection
between death and sin. … Death can be conquered only to the extent that sin is
removed.” 386 He recalls the saying of Jesus in Matthew 10:28: “Do not be afraid of those
who kill the body but cannot kill the soul. Rather, be afraid of the One who can destroy
both soul and body in hell.” Therefore, in a sense, the soul can be killed and destroyed by
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sin–albeit not in a physical way. Along the same line, Troisfontaines sees the deadly
destruction associated with sin as its “immanent sanction;” just like the burn suffered
from touching a hot iron, it has a natural connection with the offense, since “this
particular act implies its own punishment.” 387 Similarly, based on some New Testament
scriptures, Bloesch comments about the connection between sin and death, righteousness
and life, saying that “We need to gain a victory over sin before we gain assurance of life
beyond the grave. ‘From sin to righteousness’ proceeds ‘from death to life’.” 388 Notably,
as seen from our review above, discussions on the relation between sin and death in
theologies of death have increasingly steered away from a simplistic interpretation of the
original sin as the cause of physical death.
In Chapter Six, following Henry Novello’s suggestion of conducting theology of
death on the ontological level, I will study the ontological relation between sin and death,
righteousness and life, in terms of the formation of human being, the attainment of a
higher nature. The gist of that chapter may be captured by this verse, “We know that we
have passed from death to life, because we love each other. Anyone who does not love
remains in death.” (1 Jn 3:14).
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CHAPTER THREE
JOHN HICK’S THEOLOGY OF DEATH IN DEATH AND ETERNAL LIFE (1976) 1
An Overview of John Hick’s Method
In the previous chapter, I reviewed contemporary theologies of death as well as
some recent literatures in eschatology. In this chapter, I first introduce the theological
method and the main contents of John Hick’s Death and Eternal Life (1976). This is to
gain a broad glance at Hick’s overall project in the book. After that, I focus on his
theology of death, which I capture with four questions: the why of human temporality, the
how of human temporality, the why of human embodiment, and the how of human
embodiment. In the last part of this chapter, I report comments and critiques regarding
Hick’s theology of death, Hick and his supporters’ clarifications and responses, and my
own comments and reflections on Hick’s theology of death.
Before describing the method Hick adopts, it is helpful to introduce a distinction
Hick makes when explicating his theology of death, namely, between eschatology and
“par-eschatology.” According to Hick’s definition, eschatology has to do with the
Doctrines of the Last Things, the ultimate state of humanity, whereas par-eschatology has
to do with what happens between death and that ultimate state. In other words, par-
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eschatology is concerned with “the doctrine of the next to last things, and thus of the
human future between the present life and man’s ultimate state.” 2 Notably, Hick’s main
focus in the book is par-eschatology, even though he does go into eschatology in the last
chapter. Relatedly, Hick defines “par-eschaton” as “the sphere or spheres, life or lives
through which humankind moves toward that end.” 3 Therefore, to the extent that pareschaton is conceived primarily as the state(s) of existence instrumental for arriving at the
final eschaton, it is better for us to understand Hick’s theology of death under the
category of soteriology rather than eschatology.
Due to the profound obscurity of the topic, the first principle of method Hick
stipulates for his theology of death is “to spell out possibilities rather than to deal in
alleged certainties.” 4 Hick wants to be clear that his discussion is intended to be
exploratory rather than dogmatic; it is a probe into different possibilities under varying
degrees of certainty. Despite this explicit acknowledgement of uncertainty, Hick thinks
that this speculative endeavor is worthwhile, because without it we would have to live
with vagueness, which is either an empty form of words or a covert adoption of crucial
assumptions with little examination. Moreover, he thinks that this effort of sorting out
rival theories is not a mere shot in the dark but feasible, because personal survival
presupposes certain continuity between the earthly life and the afterlife, and so significant
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analogies must hold between the two, especially for those more immediate postmortem
phases, and that supplies an approximate basis for appraisal. As Hick envisions it, the
first stage of the investigative process would be “a preliminary winnowing of theories”
by evaluating their consistency, coherence, extensiveness, and success for making sense
of all the relevant and accepted data we have. 5 The next stage would be a drawing out of
the religious and metaphysical implications of the theories that stood the first round of
tests, and then use these implications as factors for further assessing these theories from
the standpoint of wider systems of belief.
The second principle of method Hick lays down is “the principle of openness to
all data,” again necessitated by the obscurity and also the importance of the topic. In
Hick’s view, the universality of the phenomenon of death warrants that we do not restrict
our investigation of it to sources of insights of our own cultural heritage, but consult
experiences and reflections of all faiths and cultures on the topic mortality. For this
reason, Hick names his theology of death “a global theology” of death. It is developed
out of a comparison of theological affirmations of different religions, which are taken as
“partial accounts, from different angles, of the more complex ultimate reality or
process.” 6 It is a synthesizing attempt at a religious theory regarding the nature of the
Ultimate Reality which utilizes attestations from all religions as its data. Notably, such a
“global” attempt presupposes a view of human religiosity which, as far as Hick can see,
is as paradigm-shifting as the Copernican Revolution. Specifically, it shifts from the old
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perspective that sees human religious life as centering upon and culminating in one’s own
religion, to the new perspective that sees various religions as varyingly conditioned
responses to the same Ultimate Reality. Each religion points beyond its own official
dogmas and converges with others upon some common themes.
An Outline of Key Contents of the Book
The core of Death and Eternal Life (1976) is unmistakably processive and
teleological. The gist of it may be best told with Hick’s own words:
[I]t seems to me that the claim of the religions that this life is part of the much
larger existence that transcends our lifespan as animal organisms, whether
through the continuation of individual consciousness or through participation in
the greater transpersonal life, is very likely to be true. I shall argue that this is not
ruled out by established scientific findings or by any agreed philosophical
agreements. Both the survival of the mind without a body, and also the
reconstitution or “resurrection” of the psychophysical person in another spatial
environment are–I shall argue–realistically conceivable. … Human survival is
thus not impossible; and I shall further demonstrate that any religious
understanding of human existence–not merely of one's own existence but of the
life of humanity as a whole–positively requires some kind of immortality belief
and would be radically incoherent without it. 7
In other words, what Hick attempts to establish through the book is two-layered:
first, the considerable possibility of survival beyond death, albeit under a number of very
different conceptions which, to Hick, are somewhat equally viable in theory; second, the
indispensability of some kind of belief in human survival in order to have a cogent
religious understanding of human existence. Notably, this second theme–the necessity of
belief in survival–is known as the Irenaean argument in Theodicy, and is expounded in
great detail in Hick’s other works, especially Evil and the God of Love (1978). 8 My
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overview here of Death and Eternal Life (1976) will focus instead on the first theme–the
very possibility of survival, since it is more germane to my investigation. Also, my
overview of the book will be very brief when it comes to those points that will be
analyzed in depth in later sections of this chapter where I specifically look into Hick’s
theology of death.
Section I: Introductory
There are three chapters in Section I of his book to set the stage up for Hick’s
entire project. Chapter One presents Hick’s theological method. Chapter Two makes
known Hick’s theological anthropology, which conceptualizes the human being as an
embodied consciousness in the making. Chapter Three introduces historical studies of the
origin of human beliefs in immortality and the afterlife. Hick wants to show that, contrary
to the popular Freudian notion which claims wishful-thinking to be the origin of these
beliefs, research discovers that: on the one hand, some kind of afterlife belief was
universal and taken for granted in ancient times; on the other hand, the idea of a positive
and desirable immortality did not arise until the emergence of the sense of the self, and
“as a correlate of faith in a higher reality which was the source of value.” 9
Section II: The Contemporary Situation
Section II depicts the main features of the contemporary terrain against which
Hick’s theology of death is to be deployed. There are five chapters in this section.
Chapter Four describes the wide array of attitudes towards death in today’s society. At
the end of the chapter, Hick voices his discontent about how Christian theologians have
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thus far failed to raise to the occasion, responding to the question of death with either
stern dogmatism, or outdated clichés, or even compromising suppressions. His theology
of death is an effort to fill this void. Chapter Five reviews the topic of death in
contemporary philosophy and it focuses on works by Martin Heidegger, Jean Paul Sartre,
and D. Z. Philips. A common naturalistic slant among these thinkers is noted. Chapter Six
goes through the Mind-Brain Debate to argue for mind-brain Dualism. This obviously is
a crucial topic for considering survival after bodily death, and I will discuss it in detail
later. Chapter Seven introduces studies of parapsychology, especially trance mediumship,
as the evidence for afterlife, but it ends with an open and uncertain conclusion. Chapter
Eight presents criticisms against the naturalist’s claim of bodily death as the end of
human existence, a logical implication of the naturalist’s conception of the human person
as entirely physical. Hick’s arguments here include the innate human pursuit of meaning
and purpose as well as the rampant occurrences of evil and suffering during our earthly
existence. It is in this chapter where Hick presents the “basic religious argument for
immortality” from the point of Theodicy, i.e., the theological question of why evil exists
given that God is both loving and powerful.
Section III: Christian Approaches
Section III discusses various Christian views of life after death. There are again
five chapters in this section. Chapter Nine reviews afterlife beliefs in the New Testament
and among the early Christians. It argues that Jesus’ resurrection is not the very first
source for the Christian belief in life after death; rather, it is likely that Jesus’ postmortem
manifestation to his disciples came to be known as resurrection because the notion was
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already an accepted category of religious thinking at that time. For the same reason, the
topic of afterlife came up in Jesus’ own teaching only sporadically and usually in
connection with other more urgent matters; consequently, the recorded teachings of Jesus
in and of themselves do not supply us enough information to form any definitive
impression of the afterlife. In Hick’s view, all that we can say with certainty is that Jesus
affirmed the individual’s continuous existence after death, the future resurrection, and the
judgment of the dead. After these important clarifications, the chapter spotlights a
fundamental tension among diverse views of the afterlife held by early Christians–that is,
between a more earthly and physical conception versus a more heavenly and spiritual
conception of the resurrection body and of the resurrection world.
While Chapter Nine focuses on the Christian views regarding human physicality
in the afterlife, Chapter Ten discusses the historical contours of Christian thought on
human temporality before and after death. Hick raises several theological objections to
the conception of hell as “eternal” torment. More importantly, Hick affirms the
theological insight behind the Doctrine of Purgatory, i.e., the necessity of a further
growth period between this life and the ultimate state so that the dispositional gap
between the individual’s imperfection at the end of this life and the perfect heavenly state
in which he is to participate in the eschaton may be adequately bridged. However, Hick
suggests that “this function of purgatory is frustrated in official Catholic thought by the
accompanying dogma of the final decision at the moment of death, and needs to be
expanded into the idea of a continued person-making process in other spheres beyond this
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world.” 10 Here, Hick traces the unfortunate change of tempo in theology over the history
where, as concerns for the Last Day faded into the distant future, worries about the “hour
of death” carried increasingly decisive weight in the Christian imagination of the destiny
of the individual–so much so that, as evinced by “the art of dying” in medieval times, the
focus of attention was no longer upon living rightly but upon “dying well.”
Chapter Eleven critiques contemporary Protestant views on death, as expressed in
the works by Jurgen Moltmann, Paul Tillich, Charles Hartshorne, and Wolfhart
Pannenberg. Hick names their views “recapitulation theories,” which basically
understand human immortality as “the eternal presence of his earthly life within the
divine memory.” 11 In Hick’s opinion, this concept of immorality is not really an
expression of the Doctrine of Eternal Life, because
to live in any ordinary sense of the word is not only to be remembered, but also to
be capable of remembering, and of creating fresh and different material for
memory. … the fact that the divine mind contains a full record of your life or
mine no more involves your or my immortality than the population records in the
national computer bank give life to the millions of people in the past to whom
these records refer. 12
By denying continued active existence of the living human personality after bodily death,
this type of views holds a pale eschatological vision, because it foresees only “a static,
frozen immortality” in which “[t]he last page of the book of life has been filled and all
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that happens subsequently is that the completed volume is preserved forever unchanged
and unchangeable.” 13
Chapter Twelve critiques contemporary Catholic views on death, as expressed in
the works by Karl Rahner and Ladislaus Boros. Notably, I have reviewed both Catholic
theologians’ works in Chapter Two of my dissertation, and so it might be helpful for the
reader to revisit related sections in that chapter to be reminded of the details. Hick’s
comment on Rahner’s work focuses on Rahner’s claim of the soul becoming pan-cosmic
upon death vis-à-vis the entire physical universe. Hick thinks that if the afterlife is
continuous of the earthly life, Rahner’s notion of the postmortem soul being a “pancosmic” consciousness is incompatible with our understanding of human beings as finite
consciousness whose very identities are established by boundaries. Hick also thinks that
Rahner’s speculation on the pan-cosmic soul’s causal influence upon the corporeal
universe, especially in the pinnacle case of Jesus’ soul, is too vague to either convey the
precise nature of such influence or avail itself for empirical verification.
Hick’s direct remark on Boros’ work is brief, and it focuses on Boros’ unusual
definition of death as a non-temporal moment in which a decision–a human action which
takes time–nevertheless occurs. Hick questions whether Boros’ elaboration of this
puzzling concept has at all succeeded in securing a coherent and intelligible starting point
for his theory of the “final decision.” Notably, my own analyses in the previous chapter
of Rahner’s and Boros’ works overlap significantly with Hick’s comments. Lastly,
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Chapter Thirteen argues for universal salvation on the basis of the omnipotent will of
God to save all people.
Section IV: Western and Eastern Par-eschatologies
Section IV recounts major par-eschatologies from the East and the West. Chapter
Fourteen describes H. H. Price’s theory of the survival of the disembodied mind, and
raises a theological objection against it based on the “person-making” purpose of human
existence (which I will discuss more later). Chapter Fifteen offers Hick’s “replica”
theory. It is a contested attempt to make the Christian Doctrine of Resurrection
intelligible within the modern physicalistic conceptualization of the human person as a
psychosomatic unity (which I will discuss more later). Chapter Sixteen presents the basic
concept of reincarnation. Chapters Seventeen and Eighteen put forward, respectively, the
Vedantic theory of reincarnation and the Buddhist concept of rebirths.
Chapter Nineteen provides Hick’s overall assessment of the concepts of
reincarnation he presented in the previous chapters. Hick concludes that the Vedantist
teaching may be true that “an eternal ‘soul’ or ‘higher self’ lies behind a long serious of
incarnations, and that in the consciousness of that ‘real self’ all these incarnations are
linked together in a way which is not evident to any of the temporary persons who form
the series–one of whom I now am;” alternatively, the Buddhist teaching may be true that
“units or ‘packages’ of karma (as distinguished from ‘higher selves’) produce a series of
persons, one of whom is me.” 14 In contrast, Hick thinks that the more popular pictures of
reincarnation “according to which I–the conscious self now writing these sentences–have
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lived before and shall live again and am in the course of my present life, reaping what I
have sown in the past and sowing what I shall reap in the future” lack sufficient empirical
evidence to convince those outside the eastern culture and those with a modern frame of
mind. 15
Section V: A Possible Human Destiny
Section V speculates on human destiny. Chapter Twenty presents John Hick’s
own trademark par-eschatology, described as “many lives in many worlds” (which I will
discuss more later). Chapter Twenty-one lays out side by side the Hindu understanding of
Moksha, the Buddhist understanding of nirvana, and the Christian mysticism
understanding of the unitive state. It is meant to show that these eschatologies from three
different world religions are essentially open-ended pointers; what’s more, they each
seem to point beyond the present human experience and toward the same direction.
Finally, Chapter Twenty-two offers Hick’s tentative eschatology, which ventures to
describe that ultimate human destiny toward which these converging arrows point. In the
most general terms, the ultimate human state is one which the self-centered “egohood is
finally transcended in the state of human unity which can be characterized, on the
Trinitarian model, as one in many and many in one.” 16
In the following four sections, I will sketch out in detail John Hick’s theology of
death by tracing the shape of his thought on the “why” and the “how” questions of human
temporality and the “why” and the “how” questions of human embodiedness. Given that
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temporality and embodiedness are the two constitutive features of human existence, I
think that these two motifs together not only form a facilitative meeting place for
dialogues between Hick’s theology of death and the theologies of death I reviewed in the
previous chapter, they also offer two revealing windows for a complete capture of Hick’s
view on the topic.
The “Why” Question of Human Temporality
The Broad Picture: “Man in the Making”
According to John Hick’s anthropological outlook, temporal existence “is a soul
making process” 17 and “our life in time … a movement towards a goal.” 18 Notably, this
teleological take on the human existence has its root running from the early Hellenistic
Fathers, to strands of Eastern Christianity, to thinkers like Friedrich Schleiermacher in the
Enlightenment Era. In comparison with the anthropology behind the Genesis story of
Adam and Eve, the focal point of this type of theological anthropology is not the first
origin but the final end of human beings. Instead of reading the Genesis story literally, it
holds that humanity did not commit a historically disastrous “fall” from a perfect state
into our current state of sin and guilt, with bodily death as its punishment, “but was
initially brought to being as an immature creature who was only at the beginning of a
long process of growth and development.” 19 Accordingly, “our present mortal embodied
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earthly life is not a penal condition, but a time of soul making.” 20 Hick explains the
purpose for human existence in time as follows:
[T]he proper function of our earthly existence, with its baffling mixture of good
and evil, is to be an environment in which moral and spiritual responses are called
for, and in which men and women are being formed in relationship to one another
within a common world. This theology prompts an understanding of the meaning
of life as a divinely intended opportunity, given to us both individually and as a
race, to grow towards the realization of the potentialities of our own nature and so
to become fully human. 21
Notably, under this processive and teleological account of temporal existence, bodily
death is understood not as punitive but “as the end of one stage of that pilgrimage and …
a passing on to another stage,” 22 as the person’s arduous journey of growth and
development extends far beyond the earthly existence.
But why? Why does human development have to occur through such a gradual
process over time? Hick’s answer seems to be that it is necessitated by the perfection of a
freedom which is finite. Specifically, in order for the finite human beings to reach their
creaturely perfection, it takes many trials and errors to learn to freely make the right
choice, hence we need time. The fact that temporal existence offers the human being with
opportunities for genuinely free interactions and genuinely free decisions–in short,
opportunities suitable for the finite human being to grow and develop–is alluded to by
Hick when discussing the reason behind human embeddedness in an evolving world:
[M]an’s existence as part of the natural [evolutionary] order ensures his status as a
relatively free being over against the infinite Creator. … to know and worship
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God because his embeddedness in [an evolving world of] nature has initially set
him at an epistemic distance from the divine being. Thus the processes by which
men and women are formed may be understood, theologically, as an aspect of the
self-governing natural order on which depends man’s cognitive freedom in
relation to his Creator. God wills to exist an autonomous physical universe,
structured towards the production of rational and personal life. … A
[evolutionary] law governing realm which however includes randomness and
unpredictability in its details; and as such it constitutes an environment within
which we may grow as free beings towards that fullness of personal life, in
conscious relationship to God, which represents the divine purpose for us. 23
More Specifically: Growing from Collective Unconsciousness to
Collective Consciousness of the Atman
Before describing the specific route Hick draws for the grand process of “personmaking,” it helps to introduce some key terms he uses to mark the key milestones in this
journey. Specifically, it is a threefold vocabulary
which in its Western version is body-soul-spirit and its eastern version bodymind-Atman. Each body is an individual physical organism occupying a separate
volume of space. The mind or soul is closely related to the body, been known to
us as embodied mind, an aspect of a psychophysical individual. But the mind is
also related to spirit or Atman, which is super-individual, the presently
unconscious unity of humanity or perhaps even of created life as a whole. 24
Furthermore, Hick depicts two polar aspects of the embodied mind: while “ego” refers to
“the embodied mind as the self-enclosed individual over against others in seeking its own
preservation and enhancement,” “person” refers to “the embodied mind in its relationship
to other embodied minds and interacting with them in a society of persons.” 25 Defined as
such, the “ego” represents the inherently self-centeredness of the human being, with a
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distorted sense of reality and values according to its egocentric perspective. In contrast,
the “personal” aspect of the human being is “inherently self-giving … and inherently
loving,” given that it is essentially relational and interpersonal and “seeks its full
realization in a society of selves each wholly open to the others in a perfect mutuality in
which egoity has been transcended.” 26 In addition, Hick borrows the Hindu term “atman”
and defines it differently to mean the deeper dimension of individual consciousness as a
part of humanity as a whole. As Hick specifies,
‘atman’ refers to the ideal state of human consciousness which waits to be
realized through negating of individual egoity. … the atman is an eschatological
concept. ... I shall later be using the word ‘atman’ in this sense, a sense which
leaves open the issue between the view that the atman is an undifferentiated unity
and the view of it as a many-in-one and one-in-many. This use of the term
likewise leaves open the more ultimate theological question of the relation
between the atman, as eschatological humanity, and God. 27
Taken all these together, Hick draws a grand picture of human Odyssey through
temporality “in which mental life emerges in the increasing complexification of the
evolutionary process, and develops through semi-individuality within a collective
consciousness such as we glimpse in the close-knit communal life of primitive tribes, into
the plurality of fully differentiated selves which we now experience.” 28 Notably,
according to this picture, the current stage of human development is for the ego selves–
now awakened to its freedom as well as its responsibility–to voluntarily transcend egoity,
and so achieve the goal of returning to unity at a higher level. It is “a movement from
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pre-individualized unity through separate egoity to a supra individual unity. … a
movement from the collective unconscious, through the self-negating of the ego … to the
fully realized collective consciousness of the atman.” 29
Objections against the “Finality” of Death
Hick’s critique of Ladislaus Boros’ “final decision” hypothesis laid out in Chapter
Twelve of his book further reveals his understanding of the purpose for human existence
in time. On the one hand, Hick acknowledges an important element of truth in Boros’
theory, and this is the insight that “it must be possible for man eventually to arrive at a
final, permanent and irreversible state in which he has confronted reality and found his
eternal home within it. … We have to posit an arrival as well as a journey–or else the
journey is not a genuine journey.” 30 On the other hand, though, Hick finds Boros’ “final
decision” theory severely undermining the significance of earthly life, in spite of Boros’
original intention to give import to it. This is because, despite of Boros’ repeatedly
emphasizing the value of decisions made during life as a preparation for the “final
decision,” in the end, these decisions made during life do not add up to the “final
decision” in death, which is assigned such weight by Boros that death-bed repentance or
lapse overturns a whole lifetime of evil or good. Hick detects the essential insignificance
of the earthly life implied by Boros’ theory especially from Boros’ delineation of the case
of unbaptized infants–who are said to enjoy in death the same opportunity of choice for
God as adults do. Hick finds fault in Boros’ theory, because

29

Ibid, 53.

30

Ibid, 236.

156
The pilgrimage of decades is concentrated into a single metaphysical “moment”
of spiritual decision. In by-passing existence in via, the pilgrimage of responsible
life in time, the unborn or newly born infant thus misses nothing in his
relationship to God. But surely such a doctrine empties the present life of its
religious significance. Indeed, it even suggests that those who die in the womb are
more fortunate than those who survive to face the trials and temptations of life–an
implication which surely generates far greater problem than it solves. We cannot
be content with a theory which gives meaning to death by depriving this life of its
meaning. 31
Consequently, Hick thinks that “the notion of a final decision at the moment of death
determining the individual’s eternal destiny must be emphatically rejected.” 32 This, to
Hick, will help draw proper attention to par-eschatology, which avails Christian theology
the much needed possibility of dealing with the important topic of universal salvation.
Extending from his criticisms of Boros’ theory, Hick advocates further that we
reject “any doctrine which freezes our relationship with God at the point of bodily death,
… the doctrine that there can be no ‘second chance’ of salvation beyond this life, no new
and different moral decisions, and no further personal growth or development in response
to further experiences.” 33 Why? Because, considering the great disparity in life
circumstances which hugely impact the outcome of this life, it would be injustice “at an
intolerable maximum” if a person’s enteral fate were to depend entirely on the state he
reached through a single earthly life. 34 Furthermore, moral reality around us clearly
shows that much more time beyond the earthly sojourn needs to be granted “if a divine
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purpose of person-making through the human being’s free responses is to continue to its
completion.” 35 Notably, Hick is aware of the hypothesis of “instantaneous
transformation” of the person in death into moral perfection, something like what Henry
Novello proposes in Death as Transformation (2011) I reviewed in Chapter Two. 36 But
Hick objects that, by such sudden change of the person X in death,
God would have de-created X and created a new and very different person in his
place. And if he can do this consistently with his creative purpose, he can
presumably do it equally in the case of individuals who die in old age, in middle
age, in youth, in infancy, at birth, or in the womb. But in that case the experience
of temporal existence serves no necessary purpose, and this life loses its
significance as a sphere in which the divine intention is at work. 37
The “How” Question of Human Temporality
A Two-Stage Conception of God’s Creation of Human Beings
The first way Hick describes the “how” aspect of our temporal existence is a twostage process of creation. Here, he adopts the classic distinction made by St. Irenaeus
between “the image of God” and “the likeness of God.” As Hick stipulates, “the image of
God is man’s nature as rational, personal and moral animal;” 38 it is the end product of the
long process of biological evolution, the first stage of creation. Using the “raw material”
from the first stage, the second stage of creation is to generate “the likeness of God,”
which “represents the fulfillment of the potentialities of our human nature, the completed

35

Ibid, 239.

36

Henry Novello, Death as Transformation: A Contemporary Theology of Death (Burlington, VT:
Ashgate, 2011).
37

Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 240.

38

Ibid, 47.

158
humanization of man in a society of mutual love.” 39 Notably, Hick underscores a crucial
difference between the first and the second stage of creation, namely, the role human
freedom plays:
Whereas the first stage of creation is an exercise of divine power, the second stage
is of a different kind; for the creatures who have been brought into existence in
God’s image are endowed with a real though limited freedom, and their further
growth into the finite divine likeness has to take place through their own free
responses within the world in which they find themselves. 40
The second stage of human creation–primarily through exercising human freedom–is
currently under way through the earthly existence. But this stage stretches far beyond the
earthly time in order to arrive at its eventual completion. It encompasses a long afterlife
that is structurally dynamic and progressive
in which the person continues as a living center of consciousness, receiving new
impressions, making fresh choices and decisions, interacting with a new
environment and continuing to move, as a free creature in a divinely ruled
universe, towards the perfect fulfillment of his own nature in the kingdom of
God. 41
Temporal Existence as “a Spiritual Project” with a Series of Phases
The second way Hick describes the “how” of human existence in time is “a
spiritual project” unfolding in phases. We find this in Chapter Twenty of Death and
Eternal Life (1976) where Hick offers his tentative par-eschatology. Notably, even
though Hick’s speculation there specifically has to do with time after death, the rationale
behind it shall apply also to our earthly time, which is understood as the beginning of this
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grand Project. The bases of Hick’s speculation include materials produced by trance
mediumship and The Tibetan Book of the Dead; they are critiqued according to certain
philosophical and theological understandings of human nature that Hick holds true.
Before going into the details, it helps to introduce first the important distinction
Hick makes between “objective identity” and “subjective identity”: “objective” or
“metaphysical identity” is “from the point of view of a hypothetical external observer,” in
terms of which we are able to conceive of a person in the postmortem state retaining the
same bodily form or even the same “spiritual substance” throughout eternity; in contrast,
“subjective identity” is “from the point of view of the consciousness in question.” 42 Just
to be clear, Hick’s depiction of the “spiritual project” relates primarily to the identity
from the subjective viewpoint, which is a consciousness constrained by cognitive
finitude.
The “spiritual project” Hick refers to comes from the Hindu religion. Hick thinks
that “the human being fits rather well the Vedantic conception of him as a basic spiritual
project.” More specifically, it is “the religious project of liberation from sin and illusion
into a perfect relationship with or within the Ultimate Reality.” 43 This grand project of
ours transcends any particular phases of the world; and yet, it has to be accomplished by
our living through a series of limited phases of the world, since we ourselves are finite
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and limited. 44 Just as the ways of learning math are as numerous as math exercises are,
“the ways of becoming and being human are as numerous as man’s cultures.” 45
And so, Hick sees the entire panorama of a human being’s temporal existence as
consisting of a series of limited existence, each lived out within finite situations, under
which manageably concrete goals are possible. Hick’s rationale here is this. Personal
growth occurs through purpose-driven existence. Given that humans have only limited
mental capacities (e.g., memory, cognition, etc.), meaningfully concrete purposes are
formable only under finite settings. An infinite existential setting would be too
overwhelming for the human mind to comprehend and operate effectively. Therefore,
actual human growth seems to be better accommodated under this episodic outlook than
the one with a single and endlessly prolonged subjective identity.
“Many Lives in Many Worlds”
In other words, Hick envisions a person’s postmortem existence in terms of many
lives in many worlds. It is an existence divided by periodic death, just like the earthly
existence is divided by periodic sleep. However, rather than repeated rebirths in this
world, which Hick calls “horizontal reincarnation,” it will be repeated rebirths in ever
higher spheres beyond this world, which he calls “vertical reincarnation.” 46 Hick explains
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his own vision as follows by comparing it to those typically known in the East and the
West:
I have argued for yet a third possibility, other than eternal-heaven-or-hell or
repeated earthly incarnations, namely that a series of lives, each bounded by
something analogous to birth and death, lived in other worlds in spaces other than
that in which we now are. This hypothesis accepts both the insistence upon the
need for life to be lived within temporal limits and the conviction that the soul can
only make progress in the incarnate state towards its final goal. But it differs from
the western tradition in postulating many lives instead of only one, and from the
eastern tradition in postulating many spheres of incarnate existence instead of
earthly one. 47
According to Hick’s theory, it is possible for a person to achieve self-transcending
perfection by the time the person dies. However, that will not be the case for the great
majority of people, who then continue on as individual egos and go into the immediate
postmortem existence in a disembodied subjective state, similar like H. H. Price has
theorized (which I will discuss more later). This immediate postmortem state is primarily
a revelatory experience during which one finds out what one has become through choices
made in life. It is only a transitional phase. The person sooner or later feels the need for
something more active and fulfilling. This is when a further transition occurs from the
disembodied subjective state into another embodiment in another world. Regarding the
next world, Hick deliberates in principle that
it will be a real spatiotemporal environment, functioning in accordance with its
own laws, within which there will be real personal life-world with its own
concrete character, its own history, its own absorbing and urgent concerns, its
own crises, perils, achievements, sacrifices, and its own terminus giving shape
and meaning to existence within it. For moral and spiritual growth as we know it
depends upon interaction with other people within a common environment. 48
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And then, in due course, there shall presumably be another death, another
subjective state immediately after, and then another transition into yet another
embodiment in yet another world. The number and the nature of these successive
embodiments arguably should depend on what is needed for the person in order to
eventually attain the ultimate state of human perfection. The overall picture of human
temporal existence under the purpose of person-making would then be “a plurality of
lives in a plurality of worlds; … each stage will have the relative autonomy which makes
it a real life, with its own exigencies and tasks and its own possibilities of success and
failure.” 49
The “Why” Question of Human Embodiedness
To see how John Hick understands the purpose for human embodiedness, we may
take a look at how he evaluates the imaginative scenario of the survival of the
disembodied mind in Chapter Fourteen of the book. Specifically, in the first part of that
chapter, Hick presents H. H. Price’s novel theory on the survival of the disembodied
mind. 50 According to Hick’s reading of Price’s article, “Survival and the Idea of Another
World,” 51 there are three key elements in Price’s theory. First, postmortem perceptions
are mind-dependent, similar like those in dreams, formed out of images acquired during
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one’s earthly life. From the experiencer’s viewpoint, though, these images (which include
one’s own body as well as a surrounding environment) “will be the conception of a ‘real’
and solid world in which he exists as a bodily being.” 52 Second, there may be real
communication and interaction between minds in the postmortem world by means of
“extra sensory perception” such as telepathy, despite the mind-dependent nature of this
world. As the result, in that realm, “There may in fact be a coherent three dimensional
world which we inhabit jointly with other persons.” 53 Third, the postmortem world will
be fashioned by human desires, albeit not necessarily always pleasant ones, since the
fashioning is according to the real character of our desires some of which are repugnant
to our better nature. Furthermore, it is conceivable that more than one such world may
exist, formed by different communities of minds with common memories as well as
similar desires and interests; and these multiple worlds can be described as “higher” or
“lower” from moral and aesthetic points of view. Sooner or later, one may be drawn by
desire to move onto other and better worlds.
Hick’s criticisms of Price’s theory all have to do with the “wish fulfillment
principle” for the postmortem world. For example, when assessing the extreme scenario
where the whole postmortem reality is constituted by private mental worlds, each created
by the individual’s own desires, Hick questions whether its inhabitants “would indeed in
a significant sense be alive,” given that each of them exists merely as “a windowless
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monad” without genuine interaction with realities external to his mind. 54 Tellingly, the
key criterion Hick uses here for “being alive” is whether a certain state of existence
permits continuous growth and development of the self. Only if there are possibilities of
genuinely free moral choices and so also the possibility of moral growth may that state be
counted as “survival” in a real sense. John Hick’s own understanding of the “why”
question for human embodiment is centrally disclosed when he lays down a theological
consideration against envisaging the postmortem world as being malleable by human
desires–either individual or corporate. Specifically, Hick reasons from our earthly life of
embodiedness that
the purpose of our earthly existence is that man should develop morally and
spiritually from the state of intelligent social animals towards a quality of being
which represents the perfecting of our human nature; and this world is intended to
be an environment in which such growth can take place. Now, it is essential to
this person-making process that the world should not be plastic to our human
wishes but should constitute a given natural order with its own stable character
and “laws” in terms of which we must learn to live. For it is by grappling with the
demands of an objective environment of which we are ourselves a part, presenting
us with works to be done, problems to be solved, difficulties to be met and
hardships to be endured, that human intelligence and character have developed.
Again, it is through man’s needs and claims in relation to one another as they face
the disciplines and hazards of their natural environment that morality has
developed. 55
In other words, embodiment in the corporeal world places the human being under the
external context required for the person-making process to take place, since valuable
human qualities are developed only through wrestling with a set of fixed externalities.
Hick reasons further that, in order for this person-making process to accomplish its goal,
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it must continue beyond the earthly life, which entails that human existence after death
ought to continuously be a formative process similar to the earthly existence. And this
entails that the postmortem world also has its own established laws and structures
independent from human wishes and desires and to which humans have to learn to adapt
themselves.
At the end of the chapter, by way of conclusion, Hick spells out even more plainly
the necessity of embodiedness for human existence. In commenting on Price’s theory,
Hick observes that embodiment seems inevitable after all, since in Price’s conception of a
disembodied survival, the disembodied mind nevertheless conjures up a “dream” body in
a “dream” world that is as real to the experiencer as the physical body in the physical
world. And so, Price’s idea of the survival of the disembodied mind is not really a
radically different alternative to the idea of an embodied postmortem existence, but a
special form of the latter. To Hick, the unintelligibility of Rahner’s notion of a “pancosmic” soul made it clear that genuine existence of finite human beings under the
purpose of person-making must be embodied–it has to be delimited rather than “pan,” and
this is done through embodiment. As Hick explains it, “continued personal identity would
seem to require the continuation of the finite consciousness, aware of the environment
from a particular perspective within it, and able to exercise volition in relation to that
environment.” 56 Furthermore, the fact that human growth occurs only through wrestling
within concrete settings seems to demand space as well as space-filling objects, or
“bodies.” As Hick puts it, “The very notion of an environment seems to presuppose

56

Ibid, 276.

166
space, filled with a variety of objects, and interaction with the environment seems to
presuppose that we are embodied as one of the space-filling objects.” 57
Interestingly, even though Hick prefers to conceive the postmortem world as
embodied, he acknowledges that a disembodied, mind-dependent postmortem existence
can nevertheless be compatible with the “person-making” purpose of human existence, as
long as it is conceived “in a way which allows the phenomenal world to be objective in
relation to the minds which are conscious of it.” 58 In other words, Hick thinks that a
“mind-dependent” world can nevertheless be a formative existential context, so long as
this world is objective to the finite minds living in it and not a subjective product of these
minds, as they are in Price’s imaginary scenario.
How can a world be both “mind-dependent” and mind-forming? A good example
of this kind of world is depicted by George Berkeley’s sacramental Idealism, according to
which the material world we perceive are in fact collections of ideas created for our finite
minds and presented to us by God. This world made by ideas is “mind-dependent,”
because it is especially created for the mind, not because it is created by the mind.
Consequently, Hick considers it to be an advantage of Berkeley’s Idealism that, unlike H.
H. Price’s theory, it does not restrict the formative principle and the content of the
postmortem world merely to images and desires of the earthly life, but locates the Divine
consciousness as their source. Under Berkeley’s conception, our existential possibilities
postmortem would be a lot more open-ended than the earthly parameters, which “can
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then accommodate the religious sense that there are vast depths of reality totally beyond
our present range of experience.” 59
Just to be clear, Hick does not want to press Berkeley’s Idealism for the present
world. What Hick does want to argue is for at least a prima facie case to expect the
metaphysical status of the present world and the next to be alike–Berkeley’s version or
not. Moreover, regarding the functional status of the present world and the next, Hick
thinks that since both worlds exist through the same creative will of God, “If God has
created our present world to be … a place of soul-making, perhaps he also creates another
world or worlds for the continuation of the same process.” 60
The “How” Question of Human Embodiment
Hick’s Own View: Mind-Body Dualism
Based on the clarifications Hick made in the Preface of Death and Eternal Life
(1976), we know that Chapter Six of the book titled “Mind and body” offers the closest
representation of his own philosophical stand on the ontological nature of human
embodiedness, namely, mind-brain Dualism. Specifically, in Chapter Six, Hick builds his
entire case for mind-brain Dualism gradually, one step at a time. First, he pulls apart the
mind-brain identity theory, which claims “mind” and “brain” to be two concepts referring
to the same entity. In Hick’s view, the mind-brain identity theory has the least a priori
plausibility among rival theories, because
prima facie, thoughts on the one hand, and electrical chemical events in the
physical brain on the other, seem to be realities of quite different kinds. … The
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theory that my consciousness … is identically a set of physical changes in grey
matter is thus paradoxical in the extreme. … The prima facie state of affairs
remains one of distinction, and indeed radical distinction, rather than of identity. 61
Consequently, in order for the mind-brain identity theorists to establish their claim that
these two apparently very different things in kind are in fact one and the same,
exclusively and without remainder, they need to present positive arguments for it.
Identity theorists’ favorite argument–namely, brain mappings in neurological research
link specific brain activities with certain mental activities–merely supplies evidence of
mind-brain correlation; it is not a positive evidence for mind-brain identity. What’s more,
it seems doubtful that positive evidence for mind-brain identity can ever be found. As
Hick points out,
how could we possibly locate a mental event in space, other than by simply
begging the question at issue and assuming that in locating the brain event we
have thereby located a mental event? … Not only is there no such evidence, but it
seems impossible to conceive what such evidence might consist of. … No one has
any notion of what it would mean to test the occurrence of the thoughts inside my
skull independently of testing for brain process. The idea of such a test is not
intelligible. 62
Hick observes that the fact that there is no and there can be no empirical evidence for
mind-brain identity is often unrecognized, likely the result of how mind-brain identity
theorists defend their case. Usually, they would point to brain mapping experiments in
neurology and claim that our mental perceptions of, say, seeing the stars or hearing the
music are nothing but brain waves moving in certain patterns. And yet, their
“explanations” by way of these scenarios “are, inevitably, examples of the physical entity
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or process being identified by two different names [one physical, the other nonphysical],” and so these “explanations” tacitly assume what has yet to be proven, namely,
brain activities and mental events are in fact identical. 63
If there is no and there can be no possible evidence for the theory that the brain
and the mind are identical, as Hick argues, how are the two different? Next, Hick moves
on to dualistic accounts of the mind-body relationship–all of which describe the mind and
the brain as fundamentally distinct entities, but account for their differences differently.
Hick argues particularly against the dualistic account of “epiphenomenalism,” which is
“the view that while consciousness is different from the physical activity of the brain it is
nevertheless generated by the activity and has no independent existence of causality.
According to this theory consciousness is the mere epiphenomenon, mirroring in the
mysteriously different medium what goes on in the brain.” 64
Notably, while Hick’s argument against the mind-brain identity theory above is
that there is and there can be no positive evidence for it, his argument against
epiphenomenalism is that it cannot be rationally argued for. Specifically, Hick locates the
“Achilles heel” of the epiphenomenalism in its entailment of determinism. He argues that
if the mind is a mere phenomenon of the brain, it has to be completely determined by the
physical brain, which in turn is an integral part of the physical world. Given our
understanding that the entire physical world is a nexus of temporal continuum of cause
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and effect, like domino chains, the physical world is causally determined completely, and
so also the mind is causally determined completely through the physical brain. As a mere
epiphenomenon of the physical brain completely determined by the brain, the mind
would not be able to exercise any causal power of its own.
The point Hick tries to make here is “not that total determinism may not be true,
nor that there may not be sound arguments or even proofs of its truth, but that if it is true
we can never rationally believe that it is true. Therefore, in discussing the matter we can
only assume that we’re not wholly determined; and hence that our thought processes are
not mere epiphenomena of the physical brain.” 65 Why not? Hick explains that any
argument for total determinism as a rational belief is logically contradictory and selfrefuting. This is because the notion of rational belief presupposes intellectual freedom, a
mind capable of “freely judging, recognizing logical relations, assessing relevance and
considering reasons;” 66 but a mind which is completely determined cannot be said to
rationally believe in anything, because its “belief” does not arise from the rationality and
the soundness of the argument, but from being causally determined to “believe” so.
Putting it another way, “Rational argumentation cannot conclude that there is no such
thing as rational argumentation.” 67
As a recent update, David Cheetham refined Hick’s argument against
epiphenomenalism, which was based on the outdated Laplacian/Newtonian model of a
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completely determined physical universe. 68 Cheetham points out that even though
discoveries of modern physics at the quantum level may seem to have changed the
picture of total determinism into one of indeterminism, Hick’s disfavor of
epiphenomenalism on the basis of meaning and rationality still holds true. This is because
it is far from clear that the ambiguous and indeterministic model of quantum
physics provides an attractive alternative [to determinism]. … That is, if physical
events were wholly erratic and unpredictable we would have no control over our
actions. … Finding myself unable to control actions due to indeterminism means
that my ‘choices’ are meaningless and inconsequential. 69
Finally, following this process of elimination, Hick presents his positive argument
for another dualistic view, i.e., mind-brain Dualism. It is a view which sees the mind and
the brain as two substantively different and ontologically independent entities with
(admittedly mysterious) reciprocal causality between them. As far as Hick can see,
evidences for the mind’s independence from the brain are overwhelming. They have been
routinely generated from studies of extrasensory perception (ESP), a phenomenon well
validated through experimental data. Evidences are particularly abundant with regard to
“telepathy,” defined as “the occasional influence of mind upon mind, without any normal
means of communication between them;” and also “clairvoyance,” defined as “the
occasional awareness of physical states of affairs at a distance, in the absence of sense
perception of them.” 70 The third type of experimental evidence Hick evokes to show the
mind’s independence from the brain relates to pre-cognition. After going through a few
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classic instances of ESP, Hick remarks that even if there is only one instance that is true
among the hundreds of thousands collected, it is sufficient to disapprove any theory
which completely rules out the possibility for one mind to influence another without
going through any chain of physical cause and effect. Hick concludes that it is extremely
probable that ESP is not physically based, and so it delivers a strong support for the mind
being an independent reality from the brain, and so also for mind-brain Dualism.
Hick’s Reconciling Attempt with Physicalism:
The “Replica” Theory of Resurrection
The “replica” theory proposed in Chapter Fifteen, “The resurrection of the
person,” is Hick’s controversial attempt to explicate a well-known Christian doctrine on
survival, i.e., the Doctrine of Resurrection, within the framework of Physicalism, which
conceives the human being as “an indissoluble psycho-physical unity” rather than a
dualistic body-soul composite. 71 Notably, Hick’s endeavor here is motivated by his
inclusive impulse to reach out to all parties on different or even opposing sides of an
issue. Thus, strictly speaking, the theory does not represent Hick’s own stand on the
nature of postmortem embodiment. Nonetheless, I decide to conduct close analyses of
Hick’s “replica” theory, not only because it has attracted the most protests regarding
Hick’s theology of death, but also because sorting out the disputes surrounding it helps
uncover an underlying anthropological principle crucial for a coherent view of the
afterlife.
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As a heads-up, I think that the valuable insight gained from the polemic is this: in
order to have a genuine survival of the human person, that aspect of the human being
inapplicable to a pure physical being–as an irreplaceable subject of nontransferable
experience–must be preserved. Unfortunately, this crucial aspect of being human is
precisely what is denied in Physicalism, since Physicalism conceives the human person to
be physical without remainder. As the result, despite the honorable intention behind
Hick’s laborious effort to bridge the Great Divide, agreement between the Physicalists
and the Dualists is unattainable on the ground of principles deemed nonnegotiable by
both parties.
The chapter opens with the following portrayal of “resurrection of the body,”
which Hick sees as consistent with the Physicalist view of the person as a psychophysical unity:
When someone has died he is, apart from any special divine action, extinct. A
human being is by nature mortal and subject to annihilation at death. But in fact
God, by an act of sovereign power, either sometimes or always resurrects or
reconstitute or re-creates him–not however as the identical physical organism that
he was before death, but as … a “spiritual body” embodying the dispositional
characteristics and memory traces of the deceased physical organism, and
inhabiting an environment with which the spiritual body is continuous as our
present bodies are continuous with our present world. 72
Notably, words like “extinct,” “annihilation,” “reconstitution,” and “physical organism”
are worthy of our attention here because, as we will discuss in the following section, they
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are the main targets of Hick’s critics. 73 In short, what Hick’s “replica” theory of
resurrection suggests is this: resurrection means “the divine re-creation of the individual
after his earthly death as a total psycho-physical ‘replica’ in another space.” 74 Notably,
“in another space” intends to stipulate that the resurrection world is spatially unrelated to
and so inaccessible from our world; it is a space where “nothing in it is at any distance or
in any direction from where I now am. In other words, from my point of view the other
space is nowhere and therefore does not exist.” 75 To help readers appreciate the logical
possibility of his “replica” theory for conceiving resurrection, Hick presents a series of
three cases expanding our imagination one step at a time. Notably, the key challenge
Hick tries to tackle is: is it possible to envision the person to survive death–and so to
maintain “postmortem identity” before and after death–within the parameters of
Physicalism? Hick’s “spearhead” scenario for establishing his eventual claim of
postmortem identity is as follows:
We begin with the idea of someone suddenly ceasing to exist at a certain place in
this world and the next instance coming into existence at another place which is
not contiguous with the first. He has not moved from A to B by making a path
through the intervening space, but has disappeared at A and reappeared at B. …
The person who appears … is exactly similar, as to both bodily and mental
characteristics, to the person disappears. … There is continuity of memory,
complete similarity of bodily features, including fingerprints, hair and eye
coloration and stomach contents, and also of beliefs, habits, and mental
73
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propensities. In fact, there is everything that would lead us to identify the one who
appeared with the one who disappeared, except continuous occupancy of space. 76
Hick suggests that this scenario is imaginable, say, as the result of changes in the
behavior of matter. The person in the scenario would be conscious of himself being the
same person, given that there is exact similarity and continuity of both bodily as well as
mental characteristics and propensities; and so, despite of his lack of continuous
occupancy of space, people who knew the person before his disappearance feel obliged to
recognize him to be whom he claims himself to be. In case some people may not be so
quick to agree with his suggestion of continuous “identity” here, Hick submits two
additional points.
The first is cyberneticist Norbert Wiener’s “insistence that psycho-physical
individuality does not depend upon the numerical identity of the ultimate physical
constituents of the body, but upon the pattern or ‘code’ which is exemplified. So long as
the same code operates, different particles of matter can be used, and those particles can
be in different places.” 77 Wiener’s point basically is “the non-dependence of human
bodily identity through time upon the identity of the physical matter momentarily
composing the body;” 78 it is a claim that bodily identity can be maintained through time
even though the particles made up of the body are different at different moments. Wiener
claims that “the living human body is not a static entity but a pattern of change. ... The
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pattern of the body can be regarded as a message that is in principle capable of being
coded, transmitted, and then translated back into its original form, as sight and sound
patterns may be transmitted by radio and translated back to sound and picture.” 79
As we can see from this statement, Weiner’s theory denies any qualitative
distinction between transmitting a telegraph from one location to another and transmitting
the “encoded pattern” of a living human being. And so, based on Weiner’s notion of the
“information identity” (rather than the numerical identity) of a psychophysical
individuality, Hick suggests that it seems more appropriate than not to speak of the
psychophysical individual re-constituted at the end of this process as being the same
person as the one encoded at the beginning. Even though, by leaving the old body behind,
he is not composed by numerically the same particles, the particles which now compose
his body “embodies exactly the same ‘information.’” 80
The second buffering Hick offers is a restricted definition of the term replica,
which he always puts in quotation marks to indicate that the replication occurs under the
specific situation where “a living person ceases to exist at a certain location, and a being
exactly similar to him in all respects subsequently comes into existence at another
location.” 81 Through such stipulations, Hick intends to make sure that in his theoretical
scenario: 1) the original and the “replica” do not exist simultaneously, and 2) there can
only be one “replica” of the same original.
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The second imaginary case is a step closer to the idea of resurrection than the first
by the additional supposition of sudden death. Hick postulates that “at the moment when
the individual dies a ‘replica’ of him as he was at the moment before his death, and
complete memory up to that instance, comes into existence.” 82 He thinks that the
situation of sudden death of the original and sudden appearance of the “replica”
immediately after warrants us to conclude that the person who died has been recreated.
The third imaginary case, which is meant to give content to the notion of resurrection,
adds to the second by supposing replication in an entirely different space. Specifically,
“after my death, someone comes into existence in another space who is physically and
psychologically indistinguishable from me.” 83 The original Mr. X and his “replica” “have
everything in common that they could possibly have, given that they exist successively in
different spaces;” 84 “they are physically alike in every particular; psychological alike in
every particular; and that Mr. X’s stream of consciousness, memory, emotion and
volition continues in ‘replica’ Mr. X where it left off at the death of earthly Mr. X.” 85
Hick acknowledges that the situation outlined presents a new scenario which would
require modification of the usual concept of “same person” in order for the situation to be
included. But he states that if we knew it to be a regular law of nature that a “replica”
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comes into existence in space two upon the death of the original in space one “it would
… be wantonly paradoxical to rule that they are not the same person.” 86
At the end of the chapter, Hick addresses some objections against his theory. The
one raised by J. J. Clark–which poses the challenging scenario of two or more identical
replications of the original–hits the heart of the matter, namely, human uniqueness. Hick
recounts Clark’s objection as follows:
If it makes sense to suppose that God might create a second space replication of
Mr. X, then it makes sense to suppose that he might create two or more such
second space reproductions. … However, since X2 and X3 would then each be
the same person as X1, they would both be the same person; which is absurd.
Thus the existence of X3 would prohibit us from identifying X2 as being the same
person as X1. Further, it has been argued by J. J. Clark that the bare logical
possibility of X3 has the same effect. 87
Hick responds to Clark by first acknowledging that “A person by definition is unique.
There cannot be two people who are exactly the same in every respect, including their
consciousness and memories. That is to say, if there were a situation satisfying this
description, our present concept of ‘person’ would utterly break down under the strain.” 88
However, Hick reemphasizes that, in the particular scenario he proposes, one and only
one “replica” exists; the fact that other logical possibilities of more than one replica exist
does not make the particular scenario the “replica” theory postulates impossible.
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Critiques of Hick’s Theology of Death
Regarding the “Replica” Theory
David Cheetham rightly observes that the aspect of Hick’s theology of death
which attracted the greatest amount of attention is his “replica” theory. 89 Interestingly,
even though objections came from both the Physicalists and the Dualists, their criticisms
have similarly focused on the issue of postmortem identity, albeit based on different
reasons. In addition to this issue of identity, the Dualists also disapprove Hick’s theory
for failing to capture human uniqueness.
Objection from the Physicalists: Hick’s Theory Operates on a Disguised
Dualism
Even though Hick’s theory is intended to appeal for the case of resurrection
within the framework of Physicalism, the Physicalists deny that the “resurrected” person
Hick describes is the same as the one just died, mainly because the two cannot and do not
have the same physical body. Since the human being is understood by Physicalists as a
psychophysical unity, bodily death marks the end of the physical aspect of the human
being, and so also the end of the whole human being. Notably, for the Physicalists, the
usual criterion of continuous identity is spatiotemporal continuity, whereas Hick’s
“replica” theory of resurrection specifically posits spatiotemporal discontinuity–such
positing is inevitable in order for his theory to accommodate the empirical fact that the
physical body ceases to be at the moment of death.
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Robert Audi protests against Hick’s theory for its collapsing “numerical identity”
with “exact similarity” without adequate reason. 90 Audi reiterates Hick’s scenario that the
“replica” X is created after the original X’s ceasing of existence upon death, and he
comments that “surely a person who comes into existence later than X does is not the
very same person as X, however much like X he is. Nor will it help to say he is the same
in an extended sense. We should then have to say that a perfect replica of, say, a statue is
the same statue in an extended sense.” 91
Audi questions the rationale behind Hick’s collapsing “exact similarity” with
“numerical identity.” Given that all the parameters in Hick’s scenarios are readily
explainable by the duplication hypothesis–which, to Audi, is both logically and
scientifically possible–Audi finds no reason why we should extend the sense of the term
“same person” to accommodate new facts, as Hick advocated. In other words, given the
facts provided in Hick’s scenarios, the Physicalists would see no reason for dropping
their default theory of duplication and discontinuity, which to them is a more acceptable
interpretation all things considered. Audi thinks that even though the spatiotemporalcontinuity requirement for continuous identity is not entirely unshakable, Hick needs to
provide positive arguments against it in order for his “replica” theory to overwrite the
usual criterion and assert continuous personal identity beyond death. Audi suspects that
the reason why the alternative explanation of “duplication” does not occur to Hick is
because Hick often already assumes that the “replica” is the same as the original–likely
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because an unchecked Dualist notion of a disembodied soul is operating beneath Hick’s
attempt at a Physicalist articulation of resurrection. As far as Audi can see, that Dualism
notion seems to be the readiest answer to allow Hick’s scenarios to maintain personal
identity after death.
Similarly, Gerard Loughlin thinks that Hick’s “replica” theory fails “to take
seriously a fully materialist concept of the human person, consonant with a modern
scientific anthropology.” 92 According to Loughlin’s blunt diagnosis of the theory, “the
incipient malaise is dualism or idealism.” 93 This is because, if a human being is deemed
strictly physically to be an “indissoluble psycho-physical unity,” then as “a material
object which persists through time, a person’s identity will consist in … spatiotemporal
continuity.” 94 Since Hick posits spatial discontinuity, the two cannot be identified as the
same person under the Physicalist’s term. Even perfect copies of the original are not the
same entities as their original; as shown in Audi’s demonstration via the case of copying
a statue, two material objects exemplifying the exact same pattern are still different
material objects. Furthermore, subjective consciousness of personal continuity like what
Hick posits cannot be used as a support for continuity, but is based upon it if such
consciousness is objectively correct. In addition, Loughlin challenges the concept of the
human being as a “pattern of change” independent from and transmittable among the
matter exemplifying it. He points out that under the Physicalist’s definition of a
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psychophysical unity “pattern of change” cannot really function as the persistent locus of
personal identity. This is because, at the however brief moment when the person is only
an un-exemplified pattern, namely, right after the original dies and right before the
“replica” is created,
it must be taken, as we should commonly take any non-exemplified or nonrealized pattern, as an abstraction or fiction. … the pattern of arrangement,
conceived apart from its realization, is an abstraction of thought. … Thus, a
person cannot merely be a pattern apart from some changing thing. For such a
person would merely be a conceptual object, conceived in some mind or minds, or
encoded in some material form. 95
As far as Loughlin can see, the only alternative under which the person as a pattern of
change may be more than fictitious (and has in fact continued existing) is to posit such
“pattern” as an ontological reality, existent in its own right. And this implies ontological
Dualism, which fundamentally contradicts the Physicalists’ assumption of the human
being as a psychophysical unity.
Objection from the Dualists: The “Replica” in Hick’s Theory does not Preserve the
Real Human Person
While the Physicalists deny “postmortem identity” in Hick’s scenario because of
spatiotemporal discontinuity, the Dualists deny “postmortem identity” because of the
existential gap between the original and the “replica” as well as the irreplaceability of any
human subject. J. J. Lipner criticizes Hick’s theory on the basis of what the postulated
existential gap implies. 96 First, Lipner detects an “existential gap” between the original
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and the “replica” based on Hick’s words like “de-creating” and “re-creating” for
elucidating his “replica” theory of death and resurrection. Lipner asks that, since in
Hick’s case not only is there no bodily continuity between the original and the “replica,”
there seems to be not even existential continuity between the two–given that they never
exist simultaneously–“How then can we speak of an ‘on-going’ self-consciousness and
genuine ‘memory’ experiences in any intelligible manner?” 97 Lipner argues that it would
be deceptive on God’s part to reconstitute the “replica” with the self-awareness and the
memories of the original and make the “replica” think that it is the original; it also seems
morally reprehensible for God to burden the “replica” with the memories of the original.
Similarly, John Yates rejects the idea that human beings can be existentially gapinclusive entities. 98 He notes a widespread agreement on the requirement of some sort of
continuity for the maintenance of “postmortem identity,” such as an immortal soul in
classical Christian philosophy, or spatiotemporal continuity in modern philosophy.
Without any form of actual continuity bridging across the abyss of death, the person does
not really survive, and the one emerges on the other side is no longer the same person.
Yates thinks that Hick’s claim of “sameness” based on the argument that “it would be
simpler all round to regard the ‘replica’ as identical with a post mortem individual
identical in all respects to it” is done out of convenience, and is not a legitimate reason
for claiming postmortem continuity of personal identity. 99 More importantly, Yates think
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that since people could all be misled, Hick’s suggestion “contradicts our intuition that
there must be objective reasons for ascribing identity. The fact that the ‘replica’ has
matching memories to some pre-mortem individual and is accepted by others in the
resurrection world as identical with this individual proves nothing.” 100 Some objective
criterion needs to be given in order for a new convention for the meaning of “same
person” to be accepted.
In addition, Yates raises a serious objection based on common understandings of
the human person–that is, unlikely a purely physical being, a human being is by nature
irreplaceable. He observes that “For Hick it is the continuity of a code rather than
physical continuity which makes the ‘replica’ identical with the original.” 101 And yet,
there are significant differences between encoding, transmitting and interpreting
sequences of, say, a telegraph versus the identity of a person. This is because, in the
former case all that really matters is the accuracy of the information being transmitted,
whereas in the latter what is at stake is the survival of a conscious self-reflecting subject.
Yates unpacks the non-transferability of the subjective human experience as follows:
What is lacking in these impersonal examples and which cannot be intelligibly
applied to them is the concept of experience. … Does it make sense to say that the
assembled individual shares with the original person his experiences, that he may
claim these previous experiences as his own? It seems not, for it was the original
instantiation of the code who had these experiences, not the code ‘per se’, which
at the time of the experiences did not exist. 102
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Consequently, it is wrong for the “replica” to claim the experiences and memories of the
original as its own, because the “replica” comes into existence only when the original
ceases to exist; and vice versa. Considering this, it seems highly doubtful that God would
wish to create “replicas,” again due to the element of deception implied here, at least an
element of self-deception on God’s part in treating the “replica” as the original. What’s
more, “a divine decision to treat one person as another person no more makes two
persons identical than would a human decision of this kind.” 103
One other important objection against the “replica” theory is based on the
foreseeable scenario of multiple “replicas.” Objections raised on the basis of this scenario
play out what the “replica” theory implies in principle–namely, a human being is
replaceable and the human subjective experience is transferrable–so as to demonstrate its
flaws. For example, Loughlin rejects the “replica” theory’s central contention that
identity of patterns– either bodily or mental–is sufficient to establish the claim of
“postmortem identity.” This is because more than one “replicas” can have patterns
identical to the original, and that contradicts our common understanding of the
uniqueness of the human person. For Loughlin and others, Hick’s “attempt to ward off
the implications of the concept of replication by suggesting that we may be in the sort of
universe in which only one ‘replica’ of each person will in fact occur … is an arbitrary
and woeful ‘replica ex machina’.” 104 As another example, J. J. Clarke unpacks the
scenario where a second “replica” H3 is created after the first “replica” H2 is created–

103

Ibid, 7.

104

Loughlin, “Persons and Replicas,” 311.

186
which is logically permissible under Hick’s theory, but again contradicts the uniqueness
of the human person. 105 Clarke reasons that, in this case, “one would have to say that for
a while H2 could conceivably have been H1, but then on H3’s arrival in the resurrection
world this identification ceased to be possible. This is incoherent.” 106
Notably, as David Cheetham rightly points out, what Clarke and Lipner alike
complain about is not what God does or does not do under any particular scenario, as
Hick assumes when trying to shore up his case; their complaint is that Hick’s theory is
built upon an improper anthropology which inevitably allows multiplicity. And, “If the
full conceptual implications of the meaning of replication cause an inevitable logical
possibility of multiplicity, then Hick’s replica theory is inadequate [on the ground of its
underlying principle].” 107 Upon reflection, I think the “replica” theory does in principle
permit multiplicity, and even Hick himself acknowledges this. For Hick’s theory
critically relies on cyberneticist Norbert Weiner’s anthropological outlook, which equates
a human person to an impersonal pattern of information and thus considers pattern
identity sufficient for personal identity. Unfortunately, as Hick’s critics point out, more
than one impersonal object can bare exactly the same pattern; and yet, no person is really
duplicable.
In contrast, a non-Physicalist anthropology considers a person to be more than
information, but a “carrier” of information, a subject with a view. The reason why a
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human subject is “unique” and so not re-creatable is not because there is only one of it, as
Hick seems to think by nuancing his definition of the “replica;” for even a piece of rock
is unique in this sense, and an omnipotent God can recreate it. Rather, a human being is
“unique” in that, as a subject, its own subjective perspective is by nature irreplaceable. 108
Moreover, the human being is a subject with a “view,” a subjective perspective; its
experiences are by nature nontransferable between the original and the “replica.” Even
though it is possible for the omnipotent God to re-create the memory and the selfawareness of a subject, the product of such re-creation cannot be identified with the
original despite of its exact sameness, because as an “I” the human identity is not
existentially gap-inclusive. 109 A subject is by nature not re-creatable once “de-created”–
not even by an omnipotent God. Hick’s argument from the state of dreamless sleep and
anesthesia does not help because, as critics point out, in all these cases existential
continuity is always already tacitly presupposed.
Last but not the least, Yates raises a weight objection that conceptualizing the
human person as a “psychosomatic unity” is not biblical. Yates states that “Contrary to
the opinion of Hick … the New Testament does not teach that man is an indissoluble
psychosomatic unity who perishes at death.” 110 To substantiate this point, Yates offers
some passages from the teachings of Jesus and some verses from the letters of Paul and
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James. He summarizes that “There are many other passages in the New Testament which
indicate that the early Christians accepted unreflectively a form of dualism and
anticipated a disembodied existence immediately after death.” 111
Regarding Hick’s Soteriology
The second type of criticism regarding Hick’s theology of death is brief but just as
important; it has to do with the soteriology implied by his par-eschatology. For example,
Keith Schmitt observes that, in comparison with Karl Barth’s theology, Hick’s theology
acknowledges a much smaller role for God. 112 God is merely a passive object for
theological reflections; the human being alone determines what he will believe.
Especially with regard to Hick’s par-eschatology, Schmitt notices that “Hick, for
example, makes no reference to the Spirit or a parallel religious phenomenon aiding and
guiding man, this due largely to the accent he places upon the initiative of man itself.” 113
God’s involvement in human growth seems to be little more than creating the
environment as a structure for such growth. In Hick’s theology, God is so far removed
from humanity and the current course of events in the world that Schmitt thinks that it
would not be inaccurate to describe Hick as a deist. Furthermore, Schmitt faults Hick’s
par-eschatology for its eclipsing the role of grace and singularly stressing human efforts
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in human growth and development. He comments that “One might note in Hick a new
sort of law which suggests that man must earn and/or merit his salvation.” 114
Similarly, Stephen Davis voices his concern under the name of Pelagianism. 115
Davis states that “one of my central worries about Hick’s thought is that I think it has
become increasingly Pelagian in recent years.” 116 Davis recognizes a soteriology in
Hick’s theology of death which understands the attainment of salvation and liberation as
primarily our own human achievement within the spiritual environment God set up for
us. Davis opposes this soteriological outlook on the ground that all forms of Pelagianism
lose touch with the moral reality keenly understood in the Christian faith–that is “the firm
grip that evil has on us and our inability to save ourselves.” 117 Remarkably, Hick’s own
words like the following seem to reveal the soundness of his critiques’ observations:
[M]an as he has emerged from the slow evolution of the forms of life exists as a
rational and personal creature in the image of God. But he is still only the raw
material for a further stage of the creative process by which man, the intelligent
animal, is being brought through his own free responses to his environment to that
perfection of this nature which is his finite likeness to God. 118
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Responses and Clarifications
Responses and clarifications by Hick and his supporters are all related to
criticisms of the “replica” theory. Unfortunately, they all seem to miss the point behind
these criticisms. For example, Houston Craighead argues back for Hick that, practically
speaking, the Physicalist’s criterion of bodily continuity for identification is just as
problem-laden as Hick’s mental-physical-character method; and so, the term “same
person” may as well be extended to Hick’s case on the basis of his stipulation of
continuous memory and single instantiation. 119 But the center of the debate is precisely
the question of whether the “replica’s” subjective perception of continuity with the
original is consistent with the objective reality of who he really is; and single instantiation
per se does not seem to be an admissible evidence for this question.
As another example, Stephen Davis defends Hick’s theory by evoking God’s
omnipotent power for solving the identity problem. 120 Along the same line of reasoning,
David Cheetham reminds the reader that Hick is operating within a theistic context, and
so when in doubt “we might seek to guarantee identity by bringing in the notion of divine
will, or intention;” any ambiguity around personal identity may be clarified by appealing
to God’s intending the “replica” to be the same person as the original. 121 However, as
Hick’s critics point out, given the existential gap in Hick’s scenario, identification by fiat
insinuates at least God’s self-deception if not also God’s deceiving the “replica” as well.
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What’s more, God’s dictation of “identification” still does not turn the “replica” into the
same person as the original, because even an omnipotent God cannot contradict bare
logic.
Frank Dilley may be the one who supplied the most extensive defense for the
“replica” theory. 122 As discussed above, Hick himself attempts to guard against the
possibility of multiple “replicas” by stipulating that there is one and only one “replica” of
the original in his particular scenario. Dilley realizes that Hick’s solution does not work,
because “It cannot be right to give, as an answer to a point about logical possibility, a
merely factual answer.” 123 The issue here is whether Hicks’ theory is correct as evinced
through its anthropological implications, and that is precisely where the problem is.
However, Dilley’s solution betrays the same misunderstanding of human uniqueness as
Hick’s theory does and, contrary to Dilley’s intention, reveals even more clearly the
pitfalls of the “replica” theory. Specifically, Dilley acknowledges that Hick’s
endorsement of Wiener’s information pattern model of selfhood compels him to accept
all multiple “replicas” as genuine–for, aren’t all renditions of Beethoven’s Symphony #9
genuine “replicas” of the original? Isn’t it possible to imprint two blocks of matter with
the same pattern? And Dilley’s suggestion is that Hick should just accept them all! These
identical “replicas” are instantiations of the same pattern in numerically different bodies
and, in Dilley’s view, such diverse instantiations of the original serve well God’s purpose
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of best perfecting various traits in the pattern of the original. Understandably, critics of
Dilley cry out that his proposal for Hick sounds more like a business plan to perfect a
company’s product lines than God building up perfect human persons.
John Hick’s own responses in 1991 help clarify that his view of the human being
has in fact always been that of Dualism. 124 Admittedly, Hick’s suggestion in Chapter
Two of Death and Eternal Life (1976) to use the term “soul” only as a “value word”
could have given people the impression that he was a Physicalist, but that statement
should be heard within its proper context. Contrary to what some might have assumed,
Hick does not deny the existence of some kind of immaterial, spiritual substance per se
within the human being. Notably, this may be best seen through his enthusiastic defense
in the book for mind-body Dualism. As to the “replica” theory, Hick explained that “In
spelling out the replica concept, I was trying to show that the Christian doctrine of
resurrection is not ruled out by … the more recent mind-brain identity theory.” 125
Unfortunately, Hick’s reply then still did not seem to show an awareness of the force of
his critics’ arguments, and it defended his theory by once again stipulating that there is
only one “replica” in his particular scenario. He stated that taking exception to it on the
basis of other logically possible scenarios “only creates needless conundrums” by mixing
them together, since they are fundamentally different universes operating under
fundamentally different sets of laws. 126
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Concluding Comments
Stephen Pattison describes Death and Eternal life (1976) as “typical of Hick’s
Enlightenment approach to religion and philosophy of religion,” which is guided by
Hick’s favorite assumption that “there is a substantive, universally accessible reality there
to be rationally discerned, theorized and measured, and reason is autonomous.” 127
Unfortunately, as clearly demonstrated by the “replica” controversy, many others
disagree. And the reason for this failure is succinctly articulated by Sydney Shoemaker,
who says that “what sort of criteria we use in making judgments about the identity of
objects of a certain kind is to say something … about the nature (essence, or concept) of
that sort of objects.” 128 In other words, insofar as the Physicalists and the Dualists hold
different views of the human nature–which they do, in fundamental ways–they cannot
agree on the criterion of continuous identity after death. Consequently, a theory of
“postmortem identity” that aims to satisfy both parties seems unattainable on the ground
of principles.
More related to my own investigation, though, Hick’s theory of death does have
its distinct merits in comparison to the theologies of death reviewed in Chapter Two.
Specifically, Hick’s theology brings to light much more clearly the formative purpose of
temporality and embodiment in human existence. Hick’s insight about human
embodiment as the means of delimitation, externality, and the medium of interaction
makes a lot of sense. His insight about temporality as necessary for perfecting finite
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freedom is thought-provoking. What I plan to do in the following chapters is both to
further develop the insights and to better avoid the oversights in Hick’s theology of death.
More specifically, in Chapter Four, drawing from recent developments in theology, I will
deploy a wide spectrum of new supports for Hick’s insistence on more time after death
for the sake of “person-making.” Then, in Chapter Five, I will present arguments against
the mind-brain Dualism Hick endorses for envisioning the postmortem body; I will argue
instead that George Berkeley’s sacramental Idealism seems to provide a more coherent
framework for thinking about postmortem embodiment.
Interestingly enough, there have been comments made during the “replica” debate
which allude to the need for a reconsideration of Dualism in general. For example, Hilary
Putnam observes perplexingly that “to say that something can consist of two substances
as different as mind and matter are supposed to be and still be an essential unity, is …
very obscure.” 129 Similarly, Robert Audi wants Hick to spell out more the foggy notion
of “spiritual bodies” or bodies in the resurrection world which are said to be composed of
material other than physical matter, since “the ‘spiritual’ is usually contrasted with the
‘bodily,’ and ‘spiritual’ seems to take away with one hand what ‘body’ gives with the
other.” 130 In addition, Keith Schmitt makes the tantalizing remarks that
Hick’s review of H. H. Price as well as his “replica” theory both point to a
proximity between the physical and non-physical even after life. … Furthermore,
the indefinite character of what Hick intends by terming soul “a valuing name for
the self” leaves open the possibility that the physical may entail much of what has
traditionally been attributed to a non-physical realm of man. 131
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Again, even though John Hick as a mind-brain Dualist does not intend to defend
Berkeley’s Idealism, Hick does consider Berkeley’s theory to be compatible with the
teleological core of his theology, especially the “person-making” purpose he emphasizes
for human existence. In Chapter Five of my dissertation, hopefully it will be made clear
that Hick’s “person-making” emphasis is in fact much more effectively and much more
coherently articulated within Berkeley’s sacramental Idealism. Finally, in Chapter Six,
the constructive chapter of my dissertation, I will follow the lead of Hick’s critics
regarding his soteriology, and show how his “person-making” soteriology may be
strengthened by a metaphysic of sanctification.

CHAPTER FOUR
POSTMORTEM PURGATION–A THEOLOGICAL COROLLARY OF THE
CENTRALITY OF SANCTIFICATION IN
THE CHRISTIAN UNDERSTANDING OF SALVATION
A Review of Chapters Two and Three and an Overview of the Current Chapter
To build my chapter on the basis of related insights above, recall that, in Chapter
Two, to first lay down the landscape in which John Hick’s theology of death is situated, I
reviewed contemporary theologies of death and related eschatological works. Particularly
remarkable there is Michael Simpson’s call for a responsible renewal of eschatology by
cleansing away concepts that do not resonate with our deepest moral instinct. Simpson
underscores the necessity to proclaim the Christian hope in a way that is morally
inspiring and life transforming, so that Christianity may continue to be a lively saving
force in society today. It is reasonable to say that, the eschatological notion of the finality
of death seems to be such a concept for theological cleansing, because it impinges on the
justice of God and it overwrites the seriousness of moral transformation. In fact, among
the authors we encountered in Chapter Two, there exists a significant minority voice
arguing for the non-finality of death.
For example, Brian Hebblethwaite observes that, people’s increasing interest
today in the eastern notion of reincarnation “rests on the profound religious conviction
that a single human life on earth, liable to being thwarted or cut short at any moment,
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cannot be the one and only opportunity for a human being to find salvation and eternal
blessedness.” 1 And so, he encourages the discussion of the “next to last things,” or pareschatology in John Hick’s term, which extends the traditional concern with purgatory
“to include the whole next phrase of the creative process.” 2 Similarly, Russell
Aldwinckle reminds us of the realistic state of human beings when they die, saying that
“We are not yet perfect and we have not yet attained. To make death the end is to leave
us spiritually immature and incomplete, even if we are believers, and condemns many,
whose present lives have been mainly frustration and disappointment, to an annihilation
which denies them self-fulfillment or realization of their God-given potentialities.” 3
Joseph Ratzinger gets to the root of the problematic claim of finality by pointing
out temporality as a constitutive element of the human nature. In his words, “Time
characterizes man in his humanity, which itself is temporal inasmuch as it is human.” 4
This is because human being is created to become the Image of God, “capable of Christ,
capable of God and thus capable of unity with the whole communion of saints.” 5 And
moral becoming requires time. As Ratzinger vividly explains, “salvation cannot simply
be given to people in an external way, as one might hand over a sum of money. Rather
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does it claim the entire personal subject who receives it. … the interval between midpoint
and end [of salvation history] becomes intelligible when seen from this angle. Man with
his ambiguous story of acceptance and rejection of grace is an acting subject in God’s
saving plan, and it is on this basis that he inhabits time.” 6 And this is precisely the reason
why the Christian faith is a “historical” faith, believing God’s salvific work operates in
none other than the flow of historical time, as epitomized by the Christ event. Similarly,
Brian Hebblethwaite points out the processive nature and the teleological purpose of the
entire created reality, saying that “it is probably the case that, of all scientific notions,
evolutionary theory has had the most pervasive effect in making Christian theology
rethink its fundamental conception of God’s world.” Hebblethwaite thinks that,
“Christian theology had now to think in terms of a more or less gradual process from
small beginnings right up to a perfected consummation in the future is beyond question or
doubt.” 7
On a more fundamental level, some authors argue against the finality of death on
the ground of divine attributes. For example, Donald Bloesch proposes “a theology of
divine perseverance.” Jürgen Moltmann believes that allowing each person to become
what God intended them to be through continuous growth after death is above all “God’s
concern and his first option.” 8 Russell Aldwinckle especially emphasizes the Christian
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view of God and His purpose for the human person as the primary basis for theologizing
eschatologically. He observes that, “Most of us at death are simply not yet fit for the
rarefied air of the heavenly Himalayas,” and so, he agrees with J. A. T. Robinson’s
stinging claim that, to be content with such excessive emphasis on the finality of death “is
to betray a sub-Christian view of the Fatherhood of God.” 9 Aldwinckle stresses that “The
Christian does not reject this latter alternative [of the finality of death] because he does
not like it. He rejects it primarily because he believes that God has made Himself known
in such a way that we are justified in looking to a future not only in this world, but
beyond death and the end of history as we know it.” 10
The hypothesis of final decision proposed decades ago is an attempt to preserve
the justice of God and the possibility of moral sanctification while maintaining the
traditional claim of the finality of death. However, as many have pointed out, this
hypothesis directly threatens the significance of human existence in time and history,
which is the very avenue deemed indispensable for salvation by Christian faith. Logically
speaking, it is impossible to give the moment of death the primal spot for salvation and to
accord adequate significance to historical existence. Encouragingly, as I recounted near
the end of Chapter Two, there have been recent attempts made in (par)eschatology which
do not allow death to rob life our attention.
For example, when contemplating the proper relationship between “time” and
“eternity,” Walter Kasper suggests that eternity does not abolish time but elevates it,
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which implies for the postmortem state that it cannot be conceived of as being “eternal”
in the sense of timelessness. Similarly, Brian Hebblethwaite suggests considering the
“eternity” of God and the “eternal” life we are destined to in essentially temporal terms.
To him, the final “state of ultimate perfection must itself involve an endlessly dynamic
movement of experience, ecstasy, exploration, and activity.” 11 In addition, Anthony
Thiselton offers the intriguing concept that, physical time is a small part of the
ontologically real time we call “eternity,” which is a multi-dimensional reality including
different “planes” of time. In his view, “time is not one [universal] thing,” but “depends
decisively upon the context.” 12 He thinks that, the fact that certain models for quantum
gravity require ten or even more dimensions for the physical universe gives support to his
theory.
As another example, there are also those who directly addressed the intermediate
state. Jürgen Moltmann conceptualizes postmortem “time” as fellowship with Christ and
postmortem “space” as growth in the Spirit. Donald Bloesch depicts “the four worlds
beyond,” with “Hell” and “heaven” as the future states of the dammed and the saved in
the final consummation, “Hades” and “paradise” as present realities during the interim.
He believes that the final condemnation is not yet pronounced upon those who are not
saved at death, the final and irrevocable separation of the blessed and the damned has not
occurred–both for the living and for the dead.
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In Chapter Three, I discussed John Hick’s theology of death. Notably, his
theology of death stands out especially with its elaborate “par-eschatology” of personmaking, which is a postmortem soteriology under the assumption of the non-finality of
death. Hick “emphatically” rejects the hypothesis of final decision, saying that “We
cannot be content with a theory which gives meaning to death by depriving this life of its
meaning.” 13 Moreover, Hick thinks that rejecting the finality of death will help draw
adequate attention to par-eschatology, which avails Christian theology what he considers
the much needed possibility of dealing with the topic of universal salvation. To him,
finality of death would be injustice “at an intolerable maximum,” considering the great
disparity in life circumstances which hugely impact the outcome of this life. 14 Notably,
Hick’s universalistic concern is particularly relevant under our global context today. In
addition, Hick thinks that the state of sin and imperfection in which most people die
entails that more time beyond the earthly sojourn must be granted, “if a divine purpose of
person-making through the human being’s free responses is to continue to its
completion.” 15 He does not accept the theory of “instantaneous transformation” by God
in our death, because “if he can do this consistently with his creative purpose … the
experience of temporal existence serves no necessary purpose, and this life loses its
significance as a sphere in which the divine intention is at work.” 16
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Despite of all the valuable insights above, the finality of death is currently the
dominant view in mainstream Christianity. In this chapter, I shall join the conversation by
examining this group of authors’ still very controversial claim that the temporal axis of
human existence must extend beyond death. To do this, I begin with a very recent
Protestant scholarship on purgatory which concludes that, if sanctification (“personmaking” in Hick’s term) carries a quintessential import for salvation, then it is
unavoidable that we embrace its corollary: i.e., opportunities for postmortem purgation.
After that, I devote the main portion of this chapter to submit an extensive survey of the
amazing array of developments in Christian theology, many of which making appeal to
previously ignored common knowledge in the light of new discoveries. From diverse
disciplinary angles, they unanimously endorse the soteriological primacy of
sanctification.
There are six sections in this chapter. The first three are more focused looks at
some individual works, which represent the forefront of the current probing. In the first
section, I set up the logical contour of the whole chapter by introducing J. L. Walls’ study
on purgatory. Remarkably, Walls’ study is conducted from the Protestant side to alleviate
two typical suspicions against this Catholic concept based on scripture and doctrine. His
study also deploys three forceful arguments for the necessity of “purgatory”–especially if
salvation ultimately depends on sanctification. In the next section, I discuss A. D.
Wallace and R. D. Rusk’s book on moral transformation. Based on recent scholarship in
New Testament and early Christianity, they contend that sanctification indeed holds such
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a principal place in the original Christian paradigm of salvation. In the following section,
I present P. Rainbow’s scriptural analyses of writings by Paul and James, which show
that the sole biblical criterion for eternal salvation or the “final justification” is not God’s
forensic declaration, as it is in the “initial justification,” but our genuine transformation.
As current as these individual works are, to what extent do they reflect the
collective insights today regarding the soteriological significance of sanctification? To
address this question, the next two sections are aimed to be broad and comprehensive.
First, I enumerate new advancements in ecumenical dialogues, New Testament
scholarship, and Reformation studies to unveil a widely converging consensus on the
soteriological centrality of sanctification. Then, I review recent theological arguments for
emphasizing either sanctification or justification “by faith alone.” Notably, both sides
express some very valid concerns which need to be simultaneously addressed if Christian
soteriology is to be credible and robust. In the final section, I conclude by arguing that,
the recent cross-the-board crystallization on the soteriological primacy of sanctification
withheld, it did not really win the case for sanctification in front of our always untimely
death. In order to truly overcome this impasse for sanctification and to arrive at a
coherent explication of the Gospel of salvation from sin, it is inevitable that we reckon
postmortem purgation as an integral part of God’s saving plan.
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Understanding the Necessity for Postmortem Purgation through the Doctrine of
God, the Logic of Heaven and the Resulting Need for Total Transformation–Jerry Lee
Walls, Purgatory: The Logic of Total Transformation (2012)
In his 2009 article, Neal Judisch observes an encouraging development on the
ecumenical front, namely, “the noteworthy warming of Protestant sensibilities to the idea
of purgatory, understood as an intermediate postmortem state in which souls destined for
heaven are purified or made fit for heavenly life.” 17 At the height of this development
three years later, Jerry Lee Walls’ Purgatory: the logic of total transformation (2012)
offers a sustained Protestant defense for this sanctification model of purgatory. 18 Given
the many hotly contested issues involved, Walls intends to present the case not as a
dogma, but as a proposal originated from some foundational theological commitments.
Even though he claims no knockdown argument or decisive resolution, to the extent that
one agrees with his assessments on certain constitutive theological issues, one is inclined
to take the position in favor of purgatory. As Walls puts it, the debate over purgatory “is
finally a debate about fundamental theological convictions involving the nature of
salvation and the role of human freedom and cooperation in this matter. Even more
fundamentally, this dispute hinges on different accounts of God’s goodness and his love
for all persons.” 19
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Addressing Counterarguments that
Invoke the Scripture and the Doctrine of Salvation
As a result of the Reformation, the strongest objections against purgatory come
from the Protestant camp, and they typically involve either scripture interpretation or the
Protestant doctrine of salvation emphasizing “by faith alone.” So, we begin with Walls’
responses to these common objections to see whether his case even has a foothold for
takeoff.
The first objection is the claim that purgatory is not a biblical concept. On Walls’
reading, even though the scripture does not explicitly teach purgatory, it does not
explicitly rule it out either; “texts cited to show this do not carry nearly as much weight
as often claimed.” 20 Walls reminds the reader that, as a general character of the bible,
there is only a minimal amount of explicit data related to eschatological topics.
Consequently, even though reflections on these topics are indispensable for a fullydeveloped theology of hope, “there is no direct way to settle the issue by straightforward
biblical exegesis of isolated texts.” 21 Walls notices that, unlike their theological
forebears, Catholic theologians today seldom defend the doctrine by locating explicit
textual support from the bible. Correspondingly, he cautions Protestant theologians that,
when critiquing the doctrine, they should “be careful not to mimic the mistakes of earlier
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generations of Catholics, who tried to get too much mileage out of ambiguous texts in
supporting the doctrine.” 22
To still sort out the matter based on the bible, which alone is the authority for
Protestant theology, Walls suggests that we examine and see whether the doctrine agrees
with or can even be reasonably inferred from things that are explicitly taught in Scripture.
More specifically, he suggests that the whole issue hinges on “whether the doctrine is
compatible with, or perhaps even follows from, one’s larger theological commitments,
particularly those pertaining to the nature and conditions of salvation.” 23
The second objection is the claim that purgatory is “a form of salvation by works
that denies justification by faith and devalues the work of Christ to save us.” 24 Walls
clarifies that this objection is directed against the “satisfaction model” of purgatory
“according to which it is necessary for sinners to pay part of the price of punishments in
order to satisfy the justice of God.” 25 However, this model is not the only way purgatory
has been conceived and, arguably, it represents a significant departure from the original
substance of the doctrine. Walls recommends some contemporary Catholic models of
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purgatory, which have sanctification rather than satisfaction as the purpose. 26 He argues
that, since purgatory proper falls under the doctrine of sanctification rather than
justification, “it is quite beside the point to appeal to the blood of Christ or the fact that
justified sinners are no longer under condemnation as grounds for rejecting it.” 27 What’s
more, Walls thinks that the sanctification model of purgatory is perfectly compatible with
the Protestant doctrine of justification by faith, seeing that both pertain to the salvific
work of Christ which not only forgives our sins but also restores God’s image in us.
Notably, the aim of purgatory is the latter, which forgiveness itself cannot accomplish.
Thus, Walls concludes that “Unless grace is limited to forgiveness and justification, the
claim that the doctrine of purgatory represents a version of salvation by works is simply
misguided.” 28
Offering Supporting Argument #1:
The Nature of Salvation Entails that We Become Holy in Fact
Besides answering the two counterarguments above, Walls also offers three
interrelated arguments for purgatory–based on soteriology, on the doctrine of God, and
on the nature of being human. His first argument may be captured by Pinnock’s rhetorical
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question he quotes: “Is the doctrine of purgatory not required by our doctrine of
holiness?” 29 Walls reminds the reader that it is generally acknowledged by all sides that
according to the scripture he who sees the perfectly holy God at their salvific destination
must actually be holy in character (e.g., Heb 12:14). It is not enough that we are forgiven
of sin or have Christ’s alien righteousness imputed to us. And yet, the spiritual
transformation required in order for us to become perfectly holy is not accomplished in
the initial saving work of forgiveness and regeneration. In fact, most, if not all, believers
are not perfectly holy even by the day they die. And so, the obvious question is how these
believers can acquire the actual perfect holiness in order for them to be able to meet the
perfectly holy God as promised. This is precisely the question purgatory answers.
Here, Walls specifically corrects a popular misunderstanding of “heaven,” the
common term for our joyful salvific destiny. It is the idea that just about everyone with
whatever moral disposition would enjoy being in heaven if they are allowed. As Walls
describes, “it is widely believed that heaven is the sort of place where anyone would love
to be, no matter what his tastes, inclinations, desires, and so on, as if it were some sort of
cosmic version of Las Vegas that has something for everyone, whatever he likes.” 30
Using Bishop John Newman’s sermon on the topic, he elucidates that, according to the
scripture, “heaven” as the Kingdom of God is not a state where any and all interests may
be pursued, as is the case in this world: “here everyone does his own pleasure; in heaven
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all must do God’s pleasure.” Therefore, it is entailed by the perfectly holy nature of our
eternal salvation as preordained by the perfect holy God that, such a salvific state would
not be an enjoyable “heaven” for those who have not “cultivated a taste for the holy,”
who have not found full joy in doing God’s holy pleasure. 31 In fact, it is logically
contradictory to think that one can reach the state of eternal salvation, which is perfect
holiness, without actually becoming holy.
Offering Supporting Argument #2:
The Christian Doctrine of God Emphasizes Divine Attributes of Grace and Faithfulness
The second argument Walls presents is the common argument based on the
doctrine of God as a faithful God who is full of grace. Similar to Hick in Evil and the
God of Love (1978), Walls reasons that the doctrine of purgatory is the perfect goodness
of God articulated in the eschatological context because, soteriologically speaking, it
makes possible things that are otherwise impossible within our limited earthly sojourn. It
is this eschatological manifestation of God’s goodness which grounds our real hope for
salvation. God “is good in the moral sense that he hates our evil, and demands our purity,
but he is also good in the sense that he loves us and desires our happiness and true
flourishing, which can only be complete when we are perfected in holiness.” 32 Purgatory
is the avenue furnished by God through which such perfection can fittingly take place. 33
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Reiterating the point of many Catholic theologians, Walls states that purgatory properly
understood demonstrates that God’s grace really is effectual grace, for “The One who
began a good work in you will be faithful to complete it.” (Phil 1:6)
Offering Supporting Argument #3:
The Integrity of Human Identity and the Dignity of Human Freewill
Jerry Walls’ most extensive argument for purgatory comes from the basics of
being human, and it again has three interconnected points. The first and most crucial
point is theological, which has to do with the importance God apparently grants to human
freewill. In this deliberation, Walls counts out four possible solutions to the soteriological
dilemma between the universal sinfulness we have on earth and the perfect holiness we
must have if in “heaven.” Walls reasons that the suggestion that people can see God as
sinners or that hardly anybody gets to see God are not acceptable contenders in Christian
theology. And so, the choice is really between the possibility that people are made holy
instantaneously at death by a unilateral act of God, and the possibility that the
sanctification process continues to unfold beyond death so that through our willing
cooperation we are gradually made holy by God. The question, then, is what role if any
does human freedom play in salvation? In Walls’ view, this is “perhaps the most crucial
matter on which the whole issue turns.” 34 If God requires genuine human response for
salvation, then purgatory is simply a logical inference from that. And Walls thinks that
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there is strong evidence that God does grant human freedom a serious role in salvation.
This empirical evidence is articulated as “the evidential problem of evil”:
If God can unilaterally perfect persons at death who have saving faith, then he
could do so now. So if God does not perfect those persons now, then he is
responsible for whatever evil they commit, for such evil would be properly
eliminable, since he could eliminate it without sacrificing any greater goods, or
causing greater evils. So there’s good reason to think that God cannot unilaterally
perfect persons now, and if so, then he cannot do so at death either. 35
In other words, this is an argument for the significance of freewill from the
obvious prevalence of evil in the world. From a positive angle, Walls notes that the
patient and long-suffering way God uses to sanctify people in this life shows that “The
sanctification process is an intrinsic good that should be completed under its own internal
momentum.” 36 To add a couple of side notes here, Paul O’Callaghan agrees with Walls’
view on freewill by saying that, there really is a capacity in human nature by which
humans can really be said to cooperate with God in the process of salvation despite of the
“fall.” 37 To deny authentically free response to God can “give rise to the
misunderstandings that God justifies the person quite arbitrarily without the persons
being affected or involved,” and salvation “would be simply reduced to a divine theater
of little tangible relevance to the human situation. Man would be as involved in being
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justified as a piece of tinder wood would be in a bonfire.” 38 Along the same line, Valerie
A. Karras leverages on the core Christian understanding of God as Love and the great
Christian commend to love, and points out that “Where there is no freedom, there can be
no love.” 39
The second point Walls raises is metaphysical and it has to do with the essentially
temporal nature of authentic human transformation. In a nutshell, “if man is essentially
temporal, his capacity for moral perfection is likewise.” 40 Humans are essentially
temporal, in that we creatures with only limited cognitive capacities need time to discover
and absorb truth, including moral truths about ourselves and about God. Besides time for
cognition, we also need time to change and develop new dispositions, especially the
disposition of love which jars with our primal selfishness most severely. And so, holiness
as the end product of these can only be formed over time. Instantaneous virtue is
unintelligible. Even though dramatic turnarounds do occur, it always requires practice
and repetition (i.e., time) for those sudden awakenings to take roots in a person’s
nature. 41 Purgatory is that further stage of living which “allows for gradual moral and
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spiritual growth that keeps pace with our ability to recognize and own truth in the
correspondingly progressive fashion.” 42
Relatedly, Walls rejects a very common assumption which seems to make
instantaneous moral perfection plausible, i.e., the so-called “death purgatory.” It is the
idea that sin is associated with the physical body and so separation from the body at death
automatically leaves a person pure. Walls refers to Fletcher’s remarkably incisive
criticism against this view that to think that death can cleanse us from sin is to confuse
moral and spiritual disorders with bodily disorders. In fact, “death has no more power to
cure our pride than old age to remove our covetousness,” and this becomes extremely
clear “when we recall that demons do not have bodies, and the most serious sins have
traditionally been thought to be sins of the spirit rather than sins of the flesh.” 43
Moreover, there is no indication in the scripture which gives death “the final enemy”
such a lofty position as the quick fix for sin.
The third point Walls makes is epistemological and it has to do with personal
identity. The issue here is whether, after undergoing such a dramatic moral
transformation at death in such an instantaneous fashion, there would be sufficient
continuity left for the deceased to recognize themselves as the same person. Here, Walls
cites Charles Taylor’s work that unveils the importance of narrative for a coherent
personal identity. It is crucial that we are able to piece together how we have become
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who we are, because “Part of my sense of its genuineness will turn on how I got there …
As a being who grows and becomes, I can only know myself through the history of my
maturations and regressions, my overcomings and defeats. My self-understanding
necessarily has temporal depth and incorporates narrative.” 44 Furthermore, Walls cites
David Brown’s article to show that, moral transformation entails attitude change, and the
huge attitude change implied by such drastic moral transformation at death would be
something the person cannot account for what has brought it to pass. 45 Consequently, not
being able to trace the connection between one’s earthly past and one’s present character,
“the most natural reaction for an individual in this situation would surely be for him to
experience at least a profound identity crisis.” 46
The Logical Connection between the Centrality of Sanctification and
the Necessity of Postmortem Purgation
Walls’ defense for purgatory may be captured by his responses to the two
common objections against it and his three positive arguments for it above. To prepare
for the rest of this chapter, it is helpful here to mention Walls’ keen observation regarding
the innate connection between a person’s soteriological emphasis and his take on
postmortem purgation. As he describes,
contemporary Protestants who still object to the doctrine of purgatory tend to
conceive of salvation primarily in terms of justification, whereas those are more
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sympathetic to the doctrine tend to stress sanctification and the transformational
dimensions of God’s work to save us. Those who see salvation in forensic legal
terms emphasizes that there is no condemnation for those in Christ and reject
purgatory on the grounds that it undermines this claim. But for those who
conceive salvation primarily in terms of real moral and spiritual transformation,
freedom from condemnation is only the beginning of salvation, crucial as it is.
As we shall see later in this chapter, there has been an increasing stress of
salvation as real moral transformation or “sanctification,” rather than forgiveness of sin
or “justification.” This is true even within Protestantism, and even when interpreting
traditionally pure forensic terms like “atonement” and “imputed righteousness.” 47 A
prominent example of this soteriological shift of emphasis is N. T. Wright who speaks
about the final Day of Judgment in these direct words: “Virtue is what happens–I know
many in the Reformation tradition shudder at the thought of the very word ‘virtue,’ but
there is no help for it if we are to be true to Scripture and to Trinitarian theology–when
the Spirit enables the Christian freely to choose, freely to develop, freely to be shaped by
God, freely to become that which is pleasing to God.” 48 As another example, Zachary
Hayes thinks that transformation is entailed by the very nature of the gift of salvation;
and “To dispense with transformation is to dispense with the gift itself.” 49
With that, my two-fold task for the rest of this chapter is set. First, I marshal all
related theological developments in recent decades to argue that salvation is
47
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sanctification. Even though justification is crucial by putting us on the starting line, inner
sanctity is the finish line where it all comes down to. To paraphrase Hayes’ words, to
dispense with sanctification is none other than dispensing with salvation itself. The
survey is to demonstrate that my first point has increasingly become the consensus of our
day. Second, I spell out the incongruity that, postmortem purgation as the logical
corollary of salvation as sanctification has not received nearly as much endorsement. And
it should. Walls sums it gently like this: “if sanctification is essential, and not merely an
optional luxury item for those on the way of salvation, the doctrine of purgatory may be
crucial for a coherent account of this claim.” 50
How the Early Christians Understood Salvation–A. J. Wallace and R. D. Rusk, Moral
Transformation: The Original Christian Paradigm of Salvation (2011)
The most common objection to the soteriological emphasis on sanctification
seems to be a post-Reformation emphasis on justification by faith alone. For this reason,
A. J. Wallace and R. D. Rusk’s book Moral transformation: the original Christian
paradigm of salvation (2011) is particularly interesting, because it locates itself squarely
within the inspiration that stirred the Reformers to strive to recover the original Christian
Gospel; and yet, based on recent scholarship that has not been paid adequate attention to,
it unearths sanctification (or “moral transformation” in their terms) to be the original
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Christian paradigm of salvation. 51 The authors highlight the Reformers’ determined effort
to rectify erroneous doctrines and incorrect understandings of the bible with better
knowledge from new scholarship despite of fierce opposition from dominant traditions of
their day. Similarly, the aim of their book is to pull together different lines of recent
scholarship and display a compelling picture of what the original Christian message truly
conveys. The authors applaud the Reformers for prioritizing faithfulness to the bible over
the status quo; for them, “if tradition had deviated from the early Christian teachings, it
carries little weight–even if the majority believed it.” 52 In this sense, they see their study
to be right in the constantly renewing spirit of the Reformation.
Regarding the Person of Jesus and the Essence of His Saving Work
Wallace and Rusk begin their study with an overview of the Gospels’ depiction of
Jesus and his teaching under its social historical contexts. They argue that, unlike the
post-Reformation concentration on Jesus’ death on the cross as the atonement for sin, the
Gospel accounts focus much more on Jesus’ life and ministry, and portray him as a
divinely appointed teacher, prophet, and leader who died as a martyr for the cause he
represented. More importantly, the Gospels attest to Jesus’ life and ministry as centered
upon moral transformations of the society and of the individual. The best known example
of this is Jesus’ teaching on ritual purity. Jesus taught that God did not want ritual purity
but moral purity, as reflected, for example, by caring for others in need. The message
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behind these Gospel depictions of Jesus is to challenge people to follow Jesus and
commit to his path to moral transformation. God’s resurrecting Jesus shows, above all,
that his cause of transformation is worth even to die for.
Consistent with this Gospel depiction of the person of Jesus, early Christians
appreciated the work of Jesus primarily through the moral transformation he brought to
their lives (e.g., Mt 1:21). Rather than placing Jesus’ salvific significance on his death as
the substitutionary punishment, they stressed that Jesus saved them by liberating them
from the bondage of sin and enabling them to live rightly. To show this, Wallace and
Rusk point to the variety of images New Testament authors used to describe the moral
transformation Jesus engendered in them. Here, they identify two different focuses when
explicating Jesus’ work: guilt from the past vs. sinfulness in the present. There is a
tendency in the post-Reformation traditions to focus on past guilt and explicate salvation
in Jesus mainly as sparing us from the resultant wrath of God and our deserving
punishments. On Wallace and Rusk’s reading of the bible, though, only a handful of
scripture verses mention this idea; and, when they do, they always interpret it within the
larger framework of moral transformation. In contrast, the overwhelming majority of
scripture passages focuses on present sinfulness and conveys the moral transformation
view of salvation. According to this view, salvation in Jesus means a transformation of
sinful character, thoughts and behavior; being spared from God’s wrath derives from that
as a result of the positive changes in us.
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One thing that often tends to cloud the transformation view of salvation is the
ritual language describing Jesus as the “sacrifice” for our sin. The Wallace and Rusk
point out that, this langue in the New Testament is a figure of speech under that particular
cultural context for describing moral transformation brought by Jesus. They explain that,
anthropological studies have found within different cultures the common pattern of
gradual abandonment of sacrificial rituals together with their magical connotations, and
use “sacrifice” instead to speak metaphorically about morality and ethics. Based on the
clear contrast the Gospels make about the importance of morality vis-à-vis ritual
sacrifice, it is quite obvious that the New Testament authors particularly rejected sacrifice
as a religious ritual and used this cultic terminology metaphorically within the context of
morality. For example, just as the “Passover lamb” that brought ritual purification in the
past, Jesus brought moral purification to people by “saving his people from sins” (Mt
1:21). Both cases have the concept of purification in common, but the purifying
transformation brought by Jesus did not work through the magic power of blood to
cleanse what it touches, as was assumed in sacrificial rituals. According to Wallace and
Rusk’s understanding of the New Testament authors,
They used the language of ritual purity not because Jesus’ accomplishments
worked through the same magical mechanism, but to express the moral
transformation Jesus had brought to their lives. They saw themselves as the
temple that Jesus had purified morally with his blood, in a way analogous to the
way in which blood had purified temples ritually in the past. Christ’s martyrdom
lent itself naturally to the parallel of a purification sacrifice. His noble selfsacrifice brought [moral] purity to his followers through his movements that have
transformed their lives. 53
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To further validate their point, they introduce two more pieces of evidence
regarding the ritual practice in Judaism. First are early Christian writings against the
belief that ritual sacrifices were a part of the covenant between God and Israel. They
believed, instead, that in the covenant at Sinai God provided guidelines to control the
ritual system already in use. He then criticized it through the mouths of the prophets, and
abolished it entirely after Jesus. As one scholar observes, according to these early
Christian writers, “God did not need or want the sacrifices of the Jews, but rather
demanded obedience, learning to do good, desisting from evil, seeking justice, correcting
oppression, and support the widow and orphan.” 54 The second evidence comes from
recent studies of the sacrificial system in historical Judaism which contradict the
portrayal of Jesus’ death as a “substitutionary death” on behalf of others to atone for their
sin. Specifically, for the Israelites, there was no sacrifice arranged to cleanse deliberate
moral sin; they relied on a long tradition of repentance and prayer as the only available
solution for that. Even though a burnt offering might help appease God to grant
forgiveness, sinners’ ultimate standing before God depended solely on God’s grace and
their own repentance, and not on any ritual sacrifices they might perform. Also, many
scholars have taken pains to clarify that, laying a hand on the sacrificial animal during a
religious ritual was meant to identify the animal with the offeror, and not to transfer his
sins to the animal; for that would have polluted the gift given to God. The only time when
such a transfer of sin was intended was on Yom Kippur. But the Israelites did not
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sacrifice the animal; instead, they sent it away into the wilderness. Thus, it appears that
“later Christian concepts of sacrificial atoning death have been systematically projected
back onto Judaism” of the New Testament time. 55
Another misleading notion is that Jesus died an “effective death,” i.e., his death
achieved something in and of itself. Rather than seeing Jesus’ death as an inevitable
consequence of his activities, i.e., as martyrdom, this view perceives Jesus’ death “as a
supernatural event that achieved certain cosmic changes.” 56 Wallace and Rusk challenge
this notion on the basis of scholarships on ancient Greek literatures. Specifically, at the
time of Jesus, there were Greek accounts that portrayed human death as “effective.” They
are generally stories of human sacrifice which included descriptions of the problem
which required this death as a solution, the supernatural effects of this death, and the
mechanism of how this death worked to solve that problem. In contrast with these
accounts of effective death, neither Greek nor Jewish accounts of Martyrdom portrayed
martyrs’ death as “effective.” Using the death of a solider as an example, Wallace and
Rusk explain that “A soldier who died for his country fought to the death for his course
and dies in the process of doing so. The soldier intended to serve and protect the country,
not to die. The death itself did not function as the mechanism that defeated the enemy.” 57
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Looking at the Gospel accounts of Jesus’ death, we see none of them identifying
any problem which would require a death with supernatural effects. Notably, this is
because, unlike the post-Reformation tradition which indicates God’s forgiveness of our
sins as the problem which required Jesus’ effective death, “Jews believed that God
forgave sins through repentance, and the gospel accounts endorsed this view consistently
and recorded it concurringly.” 58 The authors call our attention to the glaring fact that
The Gospels provide lengthy and detailed accounts of the death of Jesus, and yet
provide no clear description of any supernatural effects of his death. … No gospel
writer mentioned the idea that the world’s sin centered on Jesus when he died on
the cross, nor did they state that Jesus suffered the punishment for all humanity.
Despite describing the whole course of Jesus at length, they failed completely to
mention any concept of effective death. This omission by the gospel writers thus
challenges strongly the idea that they believed Jesus’ death had an important and
supernatural effect. 59
In comparison, New Testament statement about Jesus dying “for us” and other
similar constructs fit very well with the ancient genre for describing martyrdom. Jesus’
Resurrection is God’s unprecedented validation of Jesus’ brave and selfless death for his
cause. Furthermore, because the idea of martyrdom was qualitatively different from the
idea of effective death, “presence of martyrdom language in the New Testament should
not be taken as proof that Jesus had a supernatural effect. If anything, they should incline
us away from that conclusion.” 60
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Wallace and Rusk see the interpretation of Jesus’ death as “effective” to be the
result of overreliance on a small number of brief and ambiguous verses, mostly from the
Pauline epistles. Here, they refer to some expert’s in-depth investigation which
substantiates their view, 61 but they try to get their point across primarily by appealing to
some general observations. For example, several of these “proof texts” are regarded by
New Testament scholars as containing some of the most widely debated phrases for
translation and interpretation–either because they involve rare Greek words that have
obscure meanings, or because the meaning of key terms is unclear, or because the
difficulties they present when pierced together with the logic of the wider passage, or
because the ambiguity as to how the writer interpreted the quoted passage. Tellingly,
many different interpretations of these verses exist today. Even taking these “proof texts”
as they are,
The contexts of these passages do not elaborate on any notion of effective death.
They do not spell out a mechanism by which such a death might have worked. In
fact, whenever passages elaborate on the cause for which Christ died or draw an
application from his death, they always do so in terms of his cause of moral
transformation. … Paul seems to have never expanded on his brief allusions to
Christ’s death by expounding the idea that his death had supernatural effects.
Conversely, whenever Paul did expand on these allusions, he always did so in
terms of moral transformation. 62
The best example of this is 1 Peter 2: 21-25. While, using the suffering servant
imagery from Isaiah 53:5, it does state that Christ bore our sin in his suffering on the
cross, it also states immediately following that “so that we may die to sins and live for
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righteousness.” Thus, there is a dire scarcity of New Testament verses that could really be
used to support the “effective death” interpretation. Wallace and Rusk reason that, if
early Christians had really understood Jesus’ death as having far-reaching supernatural
effects, they would have mentioned it much more often and elaborated it more much
directly. Instead, we do not find unambiguous and widespread discussions of Jesus’
“effective death.” And so it seems very problematic to circulate such a central concept of
salvation which was built on such a small number of brief and ambiguous sentences.
The Early Christians’ Key Doctrines of Salvation
It is clear from the above that, early Christians thought of the person of Jesus as a
moral transformer; Jesus saved them by morally transforming them, and not by some
sacrificial ritual or some superficial mechanism that left their moral status untouched.
Having this Christological foundation properly laid, and with the benefit of modern New
Testament scholarship, Wallace and Rusk devote the main portion of their book to
explore how early Christians really understood “final judgment,” “faith,” “justification,”
and “grace and forgiveness.” Together, these constitutive concepts unveiled to us the
original Christian paradigm of salvation, which is none other than moral transformation.
First, to appreciate salvation within its appropriate horizon, the authors examine
early Christians’ eschatological understanding of the “final judgment.” Notably, certain
post-Reformation views prevalent today teach that final judgment depends only on
beliefs and trust in God; even though moral conduct is good, it does not have much direct
bearing on the final judgment. In contrast, Wallace and Rusk point to many passages in
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the Old Testament which speak about God’s judgment after death that is made according
to the virtuousness of a person during his life. This belief is particularly emphasized
during periods of injustice Jews experienced, which gave them much hope in the face of
severe prosecution and even martyrdom. More importantly, according to their reading of
the New Testament, Jesus and his followers largely endorsed this common Jewish
doctrine; they continued to believe that God would base his final reward and punishment
of a person on his moral dispositions, on how he lived his life. Early Christians
understood God’s final judgment to be personal and intelligent rather than legalistic.
“Conduct” referred to the outward manifestation of a person’s inward disposition; as
Jesus teaches, “a tree is known by its fruit” (Mt 7:20).
Based on this eschatological outlook, the early Christians considered imitation of
Jesus vital not optional. Their confidence in obtaining a positive final judgment was
rooted in living out a Christ-imitating life and developing a Christ-imitating disposition.
To show this, Wallace and Rusk go through every book in the New Testament to
demonstrate that the texts are suffused with moral exhortations and calls for
perseverance. Moreover, what the New Testament authors repeatedly held up as the
central theological theme was not “faith,” but love for others out of which correct
conduct flow. Remarkably, the pervasiveness of moral admonition in the biblical texts
attests to a widely-held conviction that people did have the ability to change with the help
of God.
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A crucial but severely distorted concept of salvation is “faith.” Notably, certain
post-Reformation teaching posits almost an antithesis between faith and moral strivings,
defining “faith” mainly as belief and trust in doctrines of who Jesus is and how he saves
people. The authors urgently point out that “this post Reformation concept of faith is
almost the complete opposite of what the New Testament writers meant by the word.” 63
Specifically, recent studies of how the ancient Greek word for “faith” (pistis) was used
have discovered that it most often meant faithfulness, loyalty, and the attitude of
commitment and obedience. The word pistis is used in this sense when the New
Testament writers speak about John the Baptist, Moses, slave masters, and other teachers;
and it carries exactly the same meaning when referred to Jesus. Even though early
Christians did consider beliefs about Jesus important, “no New Testament passages
advocate beliefs, trust or reliance in ideas about what Christ achieved as the grounds for
final judgment,” nor did the New Testament writers refer to such beliefs when they spoke
of “faith” toward Jesus. 64 For them, “faith” (pistis) toward Jesus meant faithfulness
toward Jesus; moreover, “faith” was not the opposite of efforts and moral strivings,
because
this faithfulness encompasses loyalty, obedience and perseverance. … In their
minds, being faithful to Jesus meant being committed to his movements, his
teachings, his example and his cause. It meant obeying his teachings and striving
to live in the way he had instructed. It meant remaining loyal to him and
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persevering in the way of life that he had taught. For the early Christians, living
rightly and being faithful to Christ were one and the same. 65
Another poorly understood concept is “righteousness.” As Wallace and Rusk
explain, this is particularly relevant for a correct understanding of the Apostle Paul’s
teaching of “justification by faith.” For Paul, a person is considered righteous by staying
faithful to Jesus; “God considered righteous the people who faithfully followed the
example and teachings of Jesus. … Both righteousness and positive judgment depend
upon the same criterion,” i.e., moral character. 66 Relatedly, to discredit the forensically
driven take of the concept, Wallace and Rusk look into new scholarship on the Greek
word dikaiosyne for righteousness. They explain that, current translation of “justice” is
based on the Latin word iustitia, not the original Greek word dikaiosyne. That translation
was done in 1600 A.D. by scholars who were well-versed in Latin and had a heavily legal
frame of mind. To them, iustitia appeared to denote a person’s forensic and legal standing
of guilt or innocence, rather than actual conduct. In contrast, recent biblical study focused
on the original Greek word dikaiosyne, and
scholars have found that the word generally has little to do in the courts of law.
Generally, in the Old Testament, dikaiosyne concerns correct behavior–moral
virtual and good conduct–with virtually no mention of a legal meaning. As one
scholar comments about the meaning of dikaiosyne in the LXX: “There can be
little doubt that as applied to human beings the term usually has an ethical rather
than forensic flavor.” Studies in the New Testament reached similar
conclusions. 67
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One other set of poorly understood concepts are “forgiveness” and “grace,” which
are at the center of the question Martin Luther agonized over: “how does a holy God
justify the sinner?” The answer Wallace and Rusk find to this question, in a nutshell, is
that God justifies the ungodly by helping them become godly; it is indeed only “through
faith and not by work,” in the sense that justification can only be achieved with God’s
help and not by human effort itself. First, regarding God’s forgiveness, the authors
acknowledge that it is often invoked as the reason behind the forensic conceptualization
of “righteousness” and “justification”–the idea is, God imputes the “alien” righteousness
of Jesus to us independently of how we have lived our lives. Consistent with their
discussions above on “sacrifice,” in the authors’ view, no such legalistic gesture was
considered either necessary or adequate for obtaining God’s forgiveness. Instead, first
century Jews commonly held the view that “if people repented of their sinfulness and
turned to live righteously, God would graciously forgive their past wrongs. They used the
common phrase, repentance and forgiveness, to express the idea. .… No Jew worried
about how they could escape the guilt of their sins before God. They knew how–through
repentance and forgiveness.” 68 On the authors’ reading, the New Testament authors
shared this belief in God’s mercy and forgiveness resulting from sincere repentance;
together with the doctrine of final judgment, this understanding of God’s forgiveness
motivated people to truly repent and be morally transformed.
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More importantly, for the early Christians, the concept of “grace” went far beyond
God’s gracious forgiveness and acceptance of the ungodly; “it meant the active
involvement by God and his agents in order to free people from the power of sinfulness
and to lead them into a righteous way of life.” 69 This undeserved grace from God is
manifested, above all, in God’s sending Jesus to deliver people out of their sinful ways of
living and show them the way to eternal salvation, which they could not have done by
themselves without this divine intervention. And so, their ideas of “salvation by grace”
did not at all contradict their doctrines of righteous living and final judgment. God sent
Jesus to them precisely as the result of God’s concern for how people lived their lives,
and it is the grace of God that “he shall save his people from their sins” (Mt 1:21) and so
make them fitted for eternal life.
Further Supports from Historical Study and Theological Reasoning
Wallace and Rusk use the main portion of their book to show that, early
Christians understood the “final judgment,” “faith,” “righteousness,” “forgiveness and
grace” consistently around moral transformation. In the last part of their book, the authors
offer some further supports for the transformation paradigm from historical studies of
literatures generated from the first few Christian centuries. They also issue some further
critiques against the forensic paradigm based on theological rationales. First, the authors
introduce data from studies of the history of doctrinal developments in Christianity to
show that, from the period immediately after the New Testament till the fourth century,
Christians held the transformation paradigm of salvation. This conclusion is based on
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studies of over 7,000 pages of Christian manuscripts surviving from this historical period.
This huge source of ancient literature encompasses writings, in chronological order, by
“the apostolic fathers,” “the apologists,” and the “theologians.” 70 In Wallace and Rusk’s
view, it is especially significant that independent studies of Christian writers from the
first two centuries uncovered a paradigm of salvation which is consistent with what they
themselves found from reading the New Testament authors. This shows that the
transformation view is an accurate understanding of the original Christian paradigm of
salvation, because
the generation of Christians immediately following the apostles learned
Christianity firsthand from the people that Jesus himself had taught. They in turn
passed it on to the next generation. Thus, these early Christians were very wellplaced to learn Christian doctrines accurately. We have no reason to presume
that Christians worldwide forgot the heart of the Christian message after the
completion of the New Testament. 71
After the early centuries, aberrations occurred. Wallace and Rusk show that
several major doctrinal changes took place from the fourth century to the Reformation
which led the tradition away from the original paradigm of salvation. Although these
changes were usually the result of misunderstandings and influences from evolving
culture and they provoked fiery oppositions during their times and for centuries
following, once established, these changes were taught as self-evident norms of
Christianity.
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One of the two alternations the authors particularly target is the doctrine of “penal
substitution”: “either in the sense that our sins are imputed to Christ and his obedience to
us, or in the sense that God was angry with him for our sakes and inflicted on him
punishment due to us.” 72 On their reading, this idea is largely absent from the bible. It is
also entirely absent from Christian writings from the earliest period despite of their
lengthy discussions of Jesus’ salvific achievement; and so, “Protestant scholars of
doctrinal history often express puzzlement at the absence of these Reformation ideas in
the early Christian writings.” 73
The most worrisome issue with the talk of “penal substitution” is that it falsely
shifts the attention of God’s forgiveness of sin from our repentance to Jesus’ supposedly
sacrificial death. But the scripture clearly reveals that God freely forgives those who
sincerely repent without any demand for sacrifice. For example, in the Old Testament,
prophet Ezekiel taught that God prefers to forgive rather than punish sinners (Ez 18:32).
Also, in the Gospels, we read that during Jesus’ earthly ministry he regularly told
repented sinners that God had forgiven them before he even went on the cross; Jesus also
instructed people to forgive others just as God forgives them. Here, Wallace and Rusk
particularly emphasize God’s freedom and willingness to forgive without issuing them
commensurate punishments–so long as we repent, stating that “The Jews believed that
God offered forgiveness freely out of love if the person repents. They believed that God
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could forgive out of loving kindness and choose to avoid punishing sinners. He would
forgive people who changed their ways.” 74
But when the original concept of repentance-forgiveness was lost in history,
“penal substitution” theory was invented to handle the problem created by a blurred view
of God’s forgiveness. Specifically, contrary to the God of Ezekiel who declares that “I
have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and
live,” Athanasius thought instead that “it would, of course, have been unthinkable that
God should go back upon his word and that man, having transgressed, should not die.”
This gave him the reason to suggest his “satisfaction theory,” which was carried over
later on by Anselm who explicitly stated that God cannot forgive freely without
punishment. The Reformers followed this line of thinking and developed it into the
concept of “penal substitution” which has persisted till today. As seen from the above,
such a twisted sense of “forgiveness” not only contradicts the biblical depiction of a
graceful God who forgives repentant sinners freely out of abundant love, it also has no
historical basis in Israel’s sacrificial customs.
Likewise, Wallace and Rusk see the modern notion of “saving faith” as growing
out of a misunderstanding of the early Christian term for faithfulness. What’s more,
symptomatic of doctrinal meanderings over the history, this notion is logically incoherent
with the usually heard-together concept of “penal substitution.” Specifically, it has been
frequently claimed that, Christ’s “penal substitution” becomes atonement for us, if we
believe, trust, and rely on what Christ has done for us–hence the “saving faith.” The
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logical disconnect in this claim is this: “If Jesus has indeed saved us by paying our debt
on the across, it follows that our debt is now paid and that God will not judge us
negatively. Jesus would have paid our debt regardless of whether or not we believe that
he had paid it. … Penal substitution need not require any belief in it in order to be
effective.” 75
To conclude, Wallace and Rusk find problematic claims such as these which
obstruct a clear hearing of the original Christian Gospel of salvation as genuine moral
transformation. In their own words,
Such a claim makes the teaching and example of Christ valueless for salvation. It
nullifies the significance of imitating Christ for final judgment. …. Moral conduct
might still be desirable, and God might still command it. We could still learn from
the teachings and example of Christ. Moral transformation might even be an
inevitable consequence of the working of the Holy Spirit. Yet, claiming the final
judgment does not depend on character makes all these only of secondary import.
Whatever is needed to gain a positive final judgment becomes the most important
focus, and the early Christian message of moral transformation becomes a
message we need not actually follow. 76
In Search for the Biblical Theology of Salvation–Paul Rainbow, The Way of Salvation:
The Role of Christian Obedience in Justification (2005)
In previous section, Wallace and Rusk build their case for the soteriological
centrality of sanctification against some post-Reformation teachings prevalent today.
Besides Reformation theology, teachings of the Apostle Paul on “justification by faith
alone” is the other source often appealed to when criticisms are raised against the
sanctification emphasis, claiming that it is a form of salvation by works that Paul
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vigorously opposed. In this section, I present another instance of recent scholarship in
biblical theology which particularly aims to clarify the biblical doctrine of justification.
All in all, the author finds that a truly biblical concept of justification contains a
transformative aspect; what’s more, the bible teaches that salvation hinges on actual
moral transformation evinced by good works.
An Urgent Concern over Antinomianism
In the Preface of The Way of Salvation: The Role of Christian Obedience in
Justification (2005), 77 Baptist bible scholar Paul Rainbow describes his book as “the
harvest of some three decades of prayerful study of the Bible and of Christian theology,
with one eye on worrisome trends in contemporary evangelical Christianity in North
America and Britain.” 78 Specifically, Rainbow is aware that “For nearly half a
millennium, sola fide has been a rallying cry of Protestantism. The phrase is supposed to
sum up the gospel Paul preached, over against all humanistic hubris in religion.” 79 Due to
the following reasons, though, the phrase often has antinomianism lurking behind it and
so “yields up a large share of its utility.” 80 Theoretically, Rainbow thinks that such
singular emphasis on “faith alone” reflects a Reformation bias toward Paul within the
biblical cannon, and a further bias toward selected texts even within the Pauline corpus.
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Without the full biblical message in view, “stress on faith alone severs justification too
cleanly from sanctification,” and makes it difficult to convincingly demonstrate the
theological necessity for sanctification. 81 Rainbow worries that such narrow emphasis
renders the “faith alone” doctrine susceptible to an inherent ethical
groundlessness. If justification be wholly independent of sanctification, then the
requirement of sanctity becomes an add-on, and does not arise from the very
nature of God’s gift of righteousness. On that hypothesis, the imperative to do
good does not arise out of the fact that good behavior is part and parcel of
righteousness itself, but from a different principle and collection of scriptural
texts. .… There will always be those who argue from justification by faith alone
that whatever follows is optional. And they have, not Scripture, but a relentless
logic on their side. 82
Empirically, Rainbow is troubled by the church history which shows that “From
the sixteenth century onwards … antinomianism has clung like a shadow to every
conquest won by the doctrine of sola fide.” 83 He also cites concurringly that “One
prominent Lutheran theologian has dubbed antinomianism ‘the heresy of the
contemporary American church’.” 84 The cause for that is “faith alone” leaves out the
nature of the faith that saves, namely, that which engenders genuine transformation; and
so, it easily gives rise to the distorted soteriological idea that forgiveness of sin or
justification by faith is the saving mechanism in its own right. Like his fellow Protestants,
Rainbow considers Scripture to be the area where such doctrinal dispute may be settled,
and so he revisits pertinent teachings of Paul and James with his book. Rainbow
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challenges his fellow Protestants that “If Protestantism is to live up its radical claim to
derive its doctrines from the bible, then its doctrine of justification needs” to incorporate
all scriptural data. 85 The part of his thesis directly related to my investigation is this: “For
persons to be justified in the full sense, God’s present imputation of righteousness to
those who are incorporated in Christ by faith must be legitimized in the end by his
approbation of an actual righteousness which he brings about in them during the
meantime.” 86
The Dual Aspects of Grace and the Dual Aspects of Faith according to Paul
To clearly unpack the Apostle Paul’s multilayered doctrine of justification, Paul
Rainbow underscores several conceptual duals in Paul’s thinking; isolating the two parts
of these duals from each other will lead to distorted and false doctrines. First is the dual
aspects of God’s grace: the charitable aspect of grace is represented by the imputation of
Christ’s alien righteousness into us at conversion, which grants us an acceptable standing
before God but does not change our sinful nature; in comparison, the transforming aspect
of grace “conceives and gives birth to a new life, a new creation … a bias toward actual
righteousness. It enlists the freed will as a secondary cause in bringing forth the fruit of
good works.” 87 These two aspects, “the charitable and the empowering, are notionally
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distinct but they permeate one another in reality. For us to tap into one without the other
is no option.” 88
Correspondingly, saving faith as the receptacle of God’s grace has two aspects as
well, best reflected in faith’s dual-relationship to Christ–the “indivisible object of
Christian faith.” 89 Rainbow identifies from the first half of Romans “a double boon” that
Christ administers to his followers: “Christ is our substitute who died and rose again for
our benefit; he is also the archetype into whose image God’s power changes us.” 90 And
so, saving faith holds onto Christ undivided “in his dual capacity as our legal
representative and as the influence who remakes us like himself.” 91 Saving faith is a
“vital union” with Christ the Head through which the believer as Christ’s Body “enjoys a
share in God’s positive verdict upon him, and is remade after the pattern of his
obedience.” 92 Because the Savior who died for us is the one and the same person who
transforms us, the faith that saves cannot divide God’s total package of grace through
Christ by believing in Jesus as our benefactor without believing him as our liberator from
sin as well. Notably, saving faith differs from futile faith by good works, which is the
“fruit of the Spirit,” the natural result of God’s grace working in us.
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The Initial vs. the Final Justification according to Paul
Rainbow identifies in Paul two distinct phases of justification: the initial, which
takes place at conversion; the final, which takes place on the Last Day. In Rainbow’s
view, such distinction is quite consistent with the general eschatological outlook of the
New Testament as a whole, especially regarding the arrival of God’s Kingdom in two
phases, and thus the “already” and “not-yet” nature of it. The twofold distinction in
justification is a reflection of that in the personal realm: “We are ‘already’ justified, but
we are ‘not yet’ justified. Now in the present we have tasted of our future justification.
The justification of God’s people has been inaugurated; it has yet to be consummated.” 93
He thinks that, since the Apostle Paul uses the same concept and terminology when
speaking about these two different phases, both together constitute the complete Pauline
doctrine of justification. Different from the initial justification where we are imputed with
“alien” righteousness of Jesus and so are not actually righteous, at the final justification
judgment will be made according to “deeds,” the outward “index of faith’s genuineness;”
it will be made according to our “actual righteousness.” 94 As Rainbow puts it, “From the
human side, what is required for inaugural justification is faith (Rom 3:28), and for final
justification, faith expressed in love (Gal. 5:6) or work(s) (2 Thes. 1:11; Jas. 2:24).” 95
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Furthermore, Rainbow gathers data to show that, contrary to some may claim,
“What will be at stake for believers at the last judgment is their eternal destiny, not just
the secondary issue of rewards.” 96 In other words, what hangs in the balance for
sanctification is not some trivial matter, but eternal salvation itself. On Rainbow’s
reading, even though determining ultimate destinies and issuing rewards and punishments
both take place at the end, they are only “theoretically distinct:”
There is a total lack of evidence in Paul for the notion of two or more separate
judgments for different purposes. On the contrary, whether salvation or final
destruction (1 Cor 3:15, 17), and what rewards for those who are saved (1 Cor
3:14-15), are to be settled in one and the same assize (1 Cor 3:15-17). The
primary purpose of the Last Judgment is to pronounce the everlasting destinies for
each person according to actual righteousness–including the believers. The fact
that a believer’s eternal fate is yet to be determined in the End can be seen, for
example, from the passage where Paul advises the Corinthian church to do certain
things so that the spirit of a person gone astray may “be saved” in the day of the
Lord Jesus (1 Cor 5:5). As another example, Paul also says a believer who suffers
the loss of his work because the work is not founded upon Christ may himself still
“be saved,” even though just barely as if being rescued from burning fire (1 Cor
3:15). Paul also clearly warns people in church that those who persist in sin will
not inherit the Kingdom of God (1 Cor 6:9-10; Gal 5:21; Eph 5:5). 97
Between justification inaugurated and justification consummated is the Christian
walk during which “Christians work out their salvation, energized by God in will and
deed.” 98 Rainbow thinks that, for Paul, the doctrine of sanctification is an integral part of
the doctrine of justification, in that it describes the imminent path between the two events
through which our nature is gradually transformed by God to be in conformity to his Son;
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for God justifies no one whom he does not also intend to sanctify (Rom 5:18-19; 8:29).
Faith is the means and not the end in and of itself for our salvation–it is the means to
sanctify us to become Christ-like. Some may protest the “already” and “not-yet”
distinction of justification by saying that it does not provide us “assurance.” Rainbow
responds by saying that the scripture establishes assurance not by stressing “faith alone,”
but by the internal witness of the Holy Spirit and the external fruits of the Spirit
observable to us. Using the Apostle Paul as the example, Rainbow advocates “a
spirituality of duty rather than of possession,” reminding the reader that
Paul’s daily spirituality was not centered in answering the question, “How can I
know for sure that I am already saved?” but in the question, “Am I responding in
trust and obedience to my Lord in the here and now?” … Nowhere in Paul’s
epistles do we find a paragraph which addresses nervousness about individual
status and destiny. … Paul devoted himself to faithfully carrying out his
commission in the strength of God’s enablement, sure that God will see to his
final salvation. Paul’s strategy on the Christian journey is well summed up in the
motto: “Rest in the Lord without presumption; Labor with the Lord without
anxiety.” 99
Justification according to James
There is no question that, the Apostle James teaches that in order to be justified at
the final judgment, Christians need to perfect their faith by bringing forth good fruit of
their faith (Jas 2:14). Moreover, it is arguably a consensus view today that Paul and
James are in substantive agreement on this topic, despite their different formulations of
the theme under different contexts. Besides our discussion above, the most direct
evidence for this is the verse where Paul states that “the only thing that counts is faith
made effective through love.” (Gal 5:6) As to the fact that James and Paul do place their
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emphasis differently, Rainbow highlights the Apostle James’ often overlooked
prominence in early Christianity, reminding the reader that
Paul deferred to James consistently as his ecclesiastical superior. On five
occasions Paul went to Jerusalem to report on the progress of this mission; James
did not seek out Paul. James was the judge of Paul’s gospel (Gal 2:2), not Paul
James’s. When competing missionaries were in deadlock, Antioch appealed to the
apostles and elders in Jerusalem for decision, never Jerusalem to another local
church. In the primitive church, James was the more universally known and
respected personage. That is not to say that Paul was any less inspired by God, or
a less reliable witness to divine revelation in his own right. Nor is it to deny that
he was more articulate theologically than other evangelists and churchmen of his
day. What it does mean is that when we speak of a canon, of a plumb line for
determining what is normative in doctrine, anything James says weighs at least as
heavily as what Paul says on the same subject. 100
The Apostle James’ emphasis on “the fruit” is particularly helpful for
safeguarding against the constant danger of antinomianism, which apparently flared up
frequently during Paul’s mission to the Gentiles despite his apostolic caliber for clearly
articulating the Gospel of salvation. In Rainbow’s succinct words,
Paul’s success … had a downside. While many were converted to his preaching of
justification by faith, some also corrupted his message to vile ends and used it to
support their conformity to the lifestyle of the society around them. Among those
who came to Paul’s side in resisting these elements were, notably, James, Cephas
and John–the very pillars who had ratified Paul’s ways of putting the good news
(Gal 2:9). It is from the highest echelon of leadership in the church, therefore, that
we hear an urgent appeal to use caution in setting forth Paul’s doctrine of
grace. 101
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An Addendum: In Search for
the Complete Depiction of Salvation in the Bible
Paul Rainbow’s work uncovers the Apostle Paul’s “comprehensive doctrine of
justification” which anchors justification ultimately upon the eschatological goal of
sanctification. Notably, Rainbow’s distinction between the initial and the final
justification enables us to smoothly reconcile the few Pauline verses Wallace and Rusk
find ambiguous and difficult with the transformation paradigm overall. Before wrapping
up this section, I want to briefly introduce more scholarship in biblical theology which
helps us see even more clearly the soteriological centrality of sanctification in the New
Testament.
Protestant bible scholar Brenda B. Colijn’s Images of Salvation in the New
Testament (2010) is motivated by her conviction that the lopsided slogan of “faith alone”
leaves out the vastly rich variety of New Testament images for salvation. 102 Her
examination of nearly thirty New Testament images for salvation unveils that genuine
moral transformation is the eschatological aim which undergirds all the important
soteriological concepts in the New Testament. For example, the scripture tells that our
justification via Jesus’ death on the cross “reconciles” us to God, justification “makes
possible a restored relationship with God.” Hence Colijin argues that justification should
be viewed above all as relational. 103 It is “not merely the declaration of a new legal status
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but the creation of a new relationship.” 104 Importantly, this new relationship with God
cannot help but have transformative impact on us. As another example, Colijin states that
“salvation through participation has a strong foundation in the New Testament,
particularly in the writings of John and Paul.” 105 The end result of this process is Christ
being formed in us (Gal 4:19) and we truly “participate” in God and reflect God’s
character and glory. In her concluding chapter Colijin reiterates that the New Testament
understands salvation not as an external transaction outside of us, but as an essentially
internal transformation that “involves a radical reorientation of one’s life that initiates a
process of growth into the image of Christ.” 106
The main discourse among the research on Paul in recent decades has been the
“new perspective on Paul” (NPP). The term was coined by James Dunn in a 1983 article
titled “The New Perspective on Paul,” 107 and it was later amplified by other well-known
scholars such as Krister Stendahl and E. P. Sanders. The “new perspective” has to do
with the Apostle Paul’s teaching on justification by faith. The “old perspective” interprets
the apostle’s objection to justification by work as saying that works in general do not
factor into salvation. Even though scholars under the umbrella term the “new
perspective” nuance it differently, they are in complete agreement against the “old
perspective” on human works. The NPP interprets Paul’s objection as against ritualistic
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religious observations, but not good Christian works as the fruit of the Spirit. According
to the NPP, it is a grave misrepresentation of Paul to separate faith from good works, or
even set them in opposition to each other for salvation.
Another related insight of New Testament studies came from reexaminations of
the meaning of “righteousness” in the Bible. As Paul Rainbow recounts, in the 1960s, a
group of biblical theologians by the name of the Käsemann School traced Paul’s concept
of justification to the background notion of “righteousness” in the Old Testament, which
means “faithfulness to the terms of a covenant, whether on God’s part or that of
humans.” 108 Specifically, they saw Paul’s phrase “the righteousness of God” as the key to
his entire soteriology, and it denotes God’s redemptive action to save his people and all
creation. More importantly, they clarify that God’s “justifying” action by pronouncing
something in the right is effective rather than simply declarative, because “his is a
creative Word which effects what it declares and thus brings into being a new
creation.” 109 Later on, J. A. Ziesler and John Reumann built on the works of the
Kasemann School on “righteousness” and traced in Greek the noun “righteous”
(dikaiosyne) and the verb “justify” (dikaioun) to a common stem (dikai-). This, to them,
suggests that “being declared righteous and actually being righteous may have something
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to do with each other after all, in spite of the split in Protestant theology between
justification and sanctification.” 110
One last development I want to introduce is the so-called “pistis Christou” debate,
which we already encountered somewhat in the work by Wallace and Rusk (2005). David
Stubbs’ recent article offers a comprehensive look at this still ongoing debate within the
New Testament circle. 111 According to Stubbs’ account, the controversy has to do with
the Greek phrase pistis Christou and its near equivalents. This phrase appears about ten
times in the Pauline epistles, all within theologically crucial sections which have been
claimed to be the proof-texts for the Reformation understanding of “justification by
faith.” The issue here is “whether ‘faith’ in these phrases refers principally to the
believer’s ‘faith in Christ,’ as traditionally understood, or should be translated and
understood as ‘the faith of Christ,’” which means faithfulness of Christ and faithfulness
to Christ. 112 In the article, Stubbs defends the faithfulness interpretation, on the ground
that it “not only serves well in understanding of Paul, but it creates new harmonies out of
the old antitheses or disjunctions between old covenant and new and between Paul and
the Gospels;” more importantly, the way of interpreting “faith” reveals an organic unity
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between Paul’s influential theology on justification and Paul’s equally important writings
on ethics. 113
A Growing Consensus from Ecumenical Dialogues and Historical Studies
The previous two sections demonstrate the soteriological centrality of
sanctification from the perspectives of the bible and early Christianity. The end of last
section also touches on three major developments in the New Testament studies which at
least indirectly cast their vote for the primacy of sanctification. Starting this section, I will
zoom out the lens to take in a fuller view of the overall state of the question, particularly
as manifested through discussions related to the doctrine of justification. As Paul
Rainbow reports, ever since the 1950s, the question of “what God requires people to do
in the present life in order to secure their entrance into the life of the world to come has
again become a storm center of controversy among Christians.” 114 Several discourses
from entirely different domains have been going on which, one way or the other, wrestled
with the Reformation doctrine of justification. In this section, I present related
developments in ecumenical dialogues and in historical studies related to Luther and
Calvin. And we will discover again a widely converging theme regarding the
soteriological primacy of sanctification. In the next section, I will present recent
exchanges in theology related to the justification-sanctification dual, and this will lead to
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my comments and reflections on the necessity of postmortem purgation in the concluding
section of this chapter.
Ecumenical Dialogues Related to the Doctrine of Justification
The importance of the soteriological question may be seen from the extremely
wide and quite sustained attentions it has regained in recent decades. Paul Rainbow
credits Hans Kung’s dissertation Justification: The Doctrine of Karl Barth and a Catholic
Reflection in 1957 with breaking the ice for dialogue after 400 years’ stalemate. Kung
claims to find that the Council of Trent and the Reformed theologian Karl Barth are in
substantive agreement on the doctrine of justification. Paul O’Callaghan traces the
beginning of the ecumenical conversations as far back as 1956 when some French
speaking Lutherans and Catholics, called the Group des Dombes, engaged with the
doctrine of justification in their dialogue on “original sin.” 115 The earliest ecumenical
document which directly dealt with the doctrine of justification may be the LutheranCatholic “Malta Report” titled The Gospel and the Church (1972). Despite their brevity,
these earlier attempts laid bare the fundamental issues and inspired further conversations.
After that, there are as many as nineteen important documents on justification generated
from dialogues in which either Lutherans or Catholics were not involved. They dated as
early as 1966, with conversation partners from the Anglicans, the Methodists, the
Baptists, and the Orthodox in geographic regions of Europe, North America, and even
Russia.
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But the most significant advances on this ecumenical front are made between the
Catholics and the Lutherans. Anthony Lane recounts as many as eight documents
produced from their dialogues over the last fifty years. They are part of a cumulative
effort to identify common beliefs, clear up misunderstandings, and spotlight issues yet to
be resolved. 116 Briefly, after Kung’s 1957 dissertation with its earth-shattering claim, the
next important document was produced in 1983 by the Roman Catholic Church and
Lutheran World Ministries, the US branch of the Lutheran World Federation, titled
Justification by Faith. In 1986, as the result of several years of bilateral conversation, a
Joint Ecumenical Commission on the Examination of the Sixteenth-Century
Condemnations, mostly Roman Catholic and Lutheran theologians in Germany,
generated The Condemnations of the Reformation Era: Do They Still Apply? which
looked specifically at the condemnations issued by each side during Reformation against
the teachings of the other. In 1987, the Second Anglican-Roman Catholic International
Commission (ARCIC II) produced a document titled Salvation and the Church: An
Agreed Statement by the Second Anglican-Roman Catholic International Commission
ARCIC II. In 1992, the English Roman Catholic-Methodist Committee issued a document
titled “Justification–A Consensus Statement” as the result of their meetings since the
early 80s. In 1994, a lengthy report titled Church and Justification: Understanding the
Church in the Light of the Doctrine of Justification was published by a group in Germany
which explored the relationship between justification and ecclesiology. Again in 1994,
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another important article titled “Evangelicals and Catholics Together” (ECT) was
released in the United States, representing views of a group of eight Evangelical and
seven Catholic leaders. A follow-up article endorsed by another group of eighteen
Evangelicals and fifteen Roman Catholics titled “The Gift of Salvation,” also known as
ECT II, was published in 1997 as an effort to resolve some of the controversies broke out
after the issuance of ECT I.
The most noteworthy document from the Catholic-Lutheran exchange has to be
the “Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification” (JDDJ), which was signed by
officials of the Lutheran World Fellowship (LWF) and the Vatican on 31 October 1999 in
Augsburg, Germany. Overall, this landmark document gives the impression that “at least
some propositions put forward by the two sides in the sixteenth century, perceived as
contradictory in the polemic atmosphere of the time, may be viewed as complementary
aspects of a complex truth.” 117 David Truemper identifies the upshot of this document in
§15, which declares the inherently transformative nature of justification as the following:
“together we confess: by grace alone, in faith in Christ’s saving work and not because of
any merit on our part, we are accepted by God and receive the Holy Spirit, who renews
our hearts while equipping and calling us to do good works.” 118 Another significant
paragraph is §18 which, while affirming the uniquely important role of the doctrine of

117

118

Rainbow, The Way of Salvation, 3.

David G. Truemper, “Introduction to the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification,” in
Rereading Paul Together: Protestant and Catholic Perspectives on Justification, ed. David E. Aune (Grand
Rapids, MN: Baker Academic, 2006), 29-42.

250
justification in Lutheranism, underscores the innate connection between doctrines of
justification and sanctification as the following: “more than just one part of Christian
doctrine, it stands in an essential relation to all truths of faith, which are to be seen as
internally related to each other.” Interestingly, evangelical theologian Tony Lane states
his observation of JDDJ that “the dialogue documents generally accept the Catholic
definition of justification.” 119
Is Lane correct in saying that JDDJ articulates a doctrine of justification which in
fact reflects the Catholic emphasis on sanctification? Section 4 of the document generates
the following seven carefully worded assertions designed to address key aspects of the
Reformation controversy. Based on my reading of them, Lane’s assessment of JDDJ is
quite accurate:
1. We can confess together that all persons depend completely on the saving
grace of God for their salvation.
2. We confess together that God forgives sin by grace and at the same time frees
human beings from sin’s enslaving power and imparts the gift of new life in
Christ.
3. We confess together that sinners are justified by faith in the saving action of
God in Christ.
4. We confess together that in baptism the Holy Spirit unites one with Christ,
justifies and truly renews the person. But the justified must all through life
constantly look to God’s unconditional justifying grace.
5. We confess together that persons are justified by faith in the gospel of “apart
from works prescribed by the law.”
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6. We confess together that the faithful can rely on the mercy and promises of
God.
7. We confess together that good works–a Christian life lived in faith, hope and
the love–follow justification and are its fruits. 120
It is not surprising that various parties’ reactions to JDDJ reflect their different
stands on the doctrine. But it is quite interesting that Baptist theologian Tony Lane
concludes that evangelical doctrines on salvation are in fact much more in line with the
Catholics’ “transformationalist” view of justification, whereas the “declarative” view of
their fellow Protestant Lutherans which emphasizes justification more as an acquittal or
an imputation of Christ’s alien righteousness is largely absent from it.
The “New Perspectives” on Luther and on Calvin
Developments in recent decades not only resulted in the “new perspective on
Paul,” but also the “new perspectives” on the Reformers Martin Luther and John Calvin,
which drive a substantive wedge between the Reformers and Lutheranism and Calvinism
in their forensic emphasis for justification. The most shocking claim by the “new
perspectives” may be that genuine “participation” in the divine nature is the controlling
theme in both Luther and Calvin’s soteriological thinking. For example, Marcus Johnson
attempts to demonstrate a striking parallel between Luther and Calvin in their usage of
the believer’s “union with Christ” as the central motif for explicating Christ’s saving
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works. 121 Even though both Calvin and Luther saw a forensic element in justification,
they conceived justification above all as the direct consequence of the “union” through
the indwelling Christ; for them, “faith justifies by reason of the fact that faith joins one to
the Christ who justifies.” 122 Moreover, faith necessarily entails spiritual renewal as the
result of the vital union it draws the believer into; justification and sanctification are thus
organically related to each other through the person of Christ. Johnson raises criticism
against the post-Reformation soteriology in which Calvin and Luther’s marked emphasis
on the transforming “union” with Christ has been lost. Similarly, Ted Peters conducts a
search for the heart of the Reformation faith and concludes that, regarding the central
question of “how does faith justify?”, both Luther’s and Calvin’s answer is by Christ’s
real indwelling in the believer. 123 As he aptly puts, “the key to understanding how faith
justifies is to see that it is not faith itself that justifies. Rather, it is Christ who is present
in faith.” 124
Notably, this alternative reading of Luther was originated in the late 1970s by the
“Finnish School” at the University of Helsinki as part of the Lutheran-Orthodox dialogue
in Finland. The Finnish School argues that, consistent with the concept of “deification” in
ancient and Eastern Christianity which Luther endorsed, his idea of justification is rooted
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in his presupposition of Christ’s actual presence in faith (in ipsa fide Chirstus adest). 125
For Luther, justification as the result of a “real-ontic” participation entails “both declaring
righteous and making righteous” via Christ’s real indwelling in the believer through the
Holy Spirit. 126 An evidence of Luther’s both-and understanding of justification may be
his usage of the classic notions of Christ as “grace” (gratia, favor) and “gift” (donum):
“The former denotes that the sinner is declared righteous (the forensic aspect) and the
latter that the person is made righteous (the effective aspect).” 127 The most classic
example of Luther’s own formulation of the “union” motif may be found in his Lectures
on Galatians (1535; WA 40:228-29). When describing “true faith,” Luther says “it takes
hold of Christ in such a way that Christ is the object of faith, or rather not the object, but
so to speak, the One who is present in the faith itself. … Therefore, faith justifies because
it takes hold of and possesses this treasure, the present Christ.” Luther’s central premise
on the real presence of Christ in the faith of the believer is vividly described by Luther
scholar Paul Althaus as the following: “The believing heart holds fast to Christ just as the
setting of a ring grips the jewel: we have Christ in faith. Only in faith are Christ and man
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so joined together, so made one, that man in God’s judgment participates in Christ’s
righteousness.” 128
Among Calvin scholars, Marcus Johnson is the most recent example of those who
see “union with Christ” as the controlling principle in Calvin’s soteriology. 129 Johnson
situates this debate highly within the “bedrock doctrinal convictions that undergird basic
Protestant beliefs about salvation–that is, justification, sanctification, union with Christ,
and the relationship between them (ordo salutis)”. 130 His first argument for this
alternative take on Calvin is that it is nearly impossible to comprehend many of the
pivotal contents in Calvin’s Institutes without the notion of “union with Christ.” For
example, Calvin opens his discussion on “The Way in Which We Receive the Grace of
Christ” with a chapter on the Spirit-wrought union with Christ. As another example,
Calvin begins his discussions of justification and sanctification by emphasizing that both
benefits are “received only insofar as faith receives / grasps / possesses Christ himself.” 131
In Calvin’s own words, “We do not, therefore, contemplate him outside ourselves from
afar in order that his righteousness may be imputed to us, but because we put on Christ
and are engrafted into his body–in short, because he deigns to make us one with him.” 132
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(Inst. 3.11.10) Secondly, Johnson points to the sacramental nature of Calvin’s applied
soteriology, according to which the benefits of salvation can only be received through
partaking in the sacraments of the blood and the body of Christ, which is by faith a
mystical union between Christ and the believer.
There are several other findings in recent Calvin scholarship which help us
appreciate the Reformer’s soteriology under the overall tone more appropriate to it,
namely, the goal of sanctification. For example, Alan Clifford discerns some significant
differences between Calvin and the Calvinists. 133 Most strikingly, Clifford claims that the
authentic perspective of Calvin holds a view of progressive justification, which is a
gradual process of spiritual growth assisted every step by God’s double-grace of
forgiveness and sanctification. This process of salvation involves “a perpetual correlation
between repeated pardon and progressive sanctification, with the proviso that
‘justification’ always means ‘forgiveness’ at every stage of a believer’s pilgrimage.” 134
As another example, Jonathan Rainbow highlights Calvin’s characteristic rubric of
double-grace (duplex gratia) as the correct way of understanding how the Reformer
relates justification to sanctification. 135 On the one hand, Calvin intends to secure the
assurance of salvation via the doctrine of gratuitous justification; on the other hand, he
wants to preserve the mandate of Christian obedience via the doctrine of sanctification.
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The two sides cannot be separated because of the unity of God’s grace behind them both;
“Sanctification is salvation, just as much as justification is salvation.” 136
The third example is the finding of the theme of “deification” in Calvin’s
soteriology. 137 Trevor Hart presents Calvin’s understanding of the atonement as
principally incarnational. 138 He finds that Calvin conceives our at-one-ment with God as
being accomplished in the very person of Christ, who is homoousios with the Father.
Christ’s incarnation results in a hypostatic union, which is an atoning union; incarnation
unites our “polluted flesh” with the eternal Son and so raises it up to the Godhead. In
Calvin’s own words, “It was for the Son of God to become for us ‘Immanuel’… in such a
way that his divinity and our human nature might by mutual connection grow together.”
(Inst. II. xii.1) Hart concludes that, in this sense we may say that for Calvin “the
Incarnation is the Atonement;” we are reconciled to God by becoming like God in
disposition. 139
Recent Theological Reflections on the Justification-Sanctification Dual
The previous section shows that, sanctification not only has the New Testament
and early Christianity on its side, but also official pronouncements from recent ecclesial
dialogues on its side; it even has Luther and Calvin on its side. In this section, I will first
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introduce the evangelical stand on the debate, and we will find out that sanctification
seems to have won the vote from evangelical theology as well and maybe even the vote
from Christian theology in general. The rest of this section will be given to the voices we
have not heard much so far, namely, those who stepped out in the debate to defend
justification. Two things will become clear from this hearing: one, justification
proponents do not really equate salvation with justification, and the center of their
soteriology is none other than sanctification; two, justification proponents raise some
very legitimate concerns based on the reality of Christian life that, unless credibly
resolved, have the power to veto the whole sanctification project after all, no matter how
many votes it has garnered from theory.
The Theological Votes for Sanctification
Maybe surprisingly to some, in the justification debate the theological points
expressed from the evangelical quarter endorse not the “declarative” view of the orthodox
Protestants, but the “transformationalist” view of the Catholics. A good example of this is
Baptist theologian Anthony Lane’s Justification by Faith in Catholic-Protestant
Dialogue: An Evangelical Assessment (2006), which shows an objective grasp of the
viewpoints from both sides of the dialogue. 140 Lane identifies the most substantive issue
in the debate to be: “Is eternal life something that we in some sense earn or merit, even if
it is only by grace that we are able to do so?” 141 That is, to what extent is the eternal life
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granted according to our actual deserve? The answer according to Trent is that eternal life
is both “a grace promised in his mercy through Jesus Christ to the children of God” and
“a reward to be faithfully bestowed on the promise of God himself for their good works
and merits.” Trent assigns a determinative significance to the actual merits of a person for
receiving eternal life, stating that “Nothing more is needed for the justified to be
considered to have fully satisfied God’s law, according to this state of life, by the [actual]
deeds they have wrought in him and to have truly merited to gain eternal life” (ch. 16; cf.
can. 32). Lane comments sympathetically:
Would Protestants really want to say that the reward is unmerited in the sense that
God might just as well give it to Hitler as to mother Teresa? Most would not–
though more radical Lutherans might be prepared to accept the statement. When
they say that the reward is unmerited Protestants wish to affirm that the reward
given is out of all proportion to the works rewarded, not that the works rewarded
are totally without value and indistinguishable from heinous crimes. 142
After all is said and done, Lane comes to “the surprising conclusion that
Evangelicals in particular are perhaps better placed to reach understanding with Rome
than are orthodox Protestants in general.” 143 He confirms R. J. Neuhaus’ observation that
“justification by faith alone” matters much more to those within the Lutheran or Calvinist
orthodoxy than to other Evangelicals such as the Wesleyans or the Baptists. 144 For the
latter groups, the most fundamental distinction is between the “born-again” Christian and
the nominal Christian. It has to do with the differentiation Bonhoeffer makes between
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“cheap grace” and “costly grace”: cheap grace promises “forgiveness without repentance,
grace without discipleship,” and turns the biblical doctrine of justification into a “secular
message of self-esteem.” 145 In contrast, Bonhoeffer states clearly that “The only man who
has the right to say that he is justified by grace alone is the man who has left all to follow
Christ. … Those who tried to use this grace as a dispensation from following Christ are
simply deceiving themselves.” 146
When expressing a Pentecostal reaction to the JDDJ, Frank Macchia explains the
fundamental consistency between Pentecostalism and the Catholic stand on the issue. 147
The key point Macchia makes is the central import the “full Gospel” carries for
Pentecostals. The “full Gospel” proclaims the Good News that Christ saves us in all
aspects of our life “through the agency of the Spirit by sanctifying us, healing our bodies,
delivering us from the oppression of sin, and coming again one day soon to raise us from
the dead or to transform those of us who happen to be alive on earth so that this mortality
may put on immortality.” 148 Pentecostalism insists on a “victim centered” explication of
the doctrine of justification with the justice accomplished by Christ at its core, which
truly delivers people from sin, injustice, and oppression. Macchia notices a lack of
emphasis in the JDDJ regarding the salvific role of the Holy Spirit. And he proposes a
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pneumatological foundation of justification instead, seeing that to be “the precise
theological linkage between the Lutheran emphasis on declared righteousness and the
Catholic stress on the renewal of life.” 149 It may be called “justification through new
creation” which, as the Holy Spirit’s saving work in us, goes beyond unmerited pardon
from God and brings the righteousness of the Kingdom that by its very nature is truly
liberating and transforming.
Outside the Evangelical camp, numerous other arguments have been made to
underscore the soteriological necessity of actual spiritual renewal. One type of argument
locates a “transformative aspect” of justification. 150 It spotlights the innate bond between
justification and justice, between the Gospel and the Law, and between the forgiveness of
God and the Commandments of God. 151 Another type of argument tries to integrate
“justification by faith” with Theosis on the account of their common foundation in
Christ’s Incarnation (kenosis). 152 Still another type of argument connects justification
with sanctification as “a unity of distinctions” rooted in the selfsame work of Christ, 153
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and through the selfsame “active faith.” 154 Even though sanctification is not automatic, it
is inevitable, and there can be no justification which does not engender sanctification. 155
Thus, the doctrine of justification must have a strong doctrine of sanctification as its
necessary counterpoint to steer clear of dangerous heresies. 156 One other type of
argument stresses the inevitability of good works as the result of justification. Luther’s
“ear-catching irony” is evoked where he describes the Christian as simultaneously “the
freest lord of all” and “the most dutiful servant of all;” Calvin’s stand on this is
characterized by his famous comments on Galatians 5:6, saying “It is not our doctrine
that the faith which justifies is alone; we maintain that it is invariably accompanied by
good works.” 157
“By faith alone!”–What Do They Really Mean to Say?
In the justification debate, there are some who explicitly defended the “faith
alone” position. Here, I introduce works by several of the spokespersons of the “faith
alone” side to find out what exactly they mean to convey. Eberhard Jungel’s book,
Justification–The Heart of the Christian Faith: A Theological Study with an Ecumenical
Purpose (2001), shortly after the Joint Declaration is said to be “easily the most
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substantial contribution to that debate from the non placet Lutheran side.” 158 Given the
fact that the third edition of Jungel’s book came into print less than a year after its first
appearance, this statement is very likely to be accurate. Jungel’s discontent over the JDDJ
has to do with what he perceives to be an overshadowing of “justification by faith alone”
as the controlling principle for all Christian doctrines. In his view, the most valuable
heritage from the Reformers is their search (and re-proclamation) of a gracious God, the
basic problem motivated the doctrine. If the central status of this doctrine is obscured, we
lose sight of the riches of God’s grace as an absolutely unconditional gift for us. And,
“As long as we think we have to achieve something before God in order to gain God’s
recognition we begrudge ourselves the good that God has already planned and bestowed
on us in Jesus Christ.” 159 To Jungel, deemphasizing “by faith alone” also betrays an
inadequate understanding of the severity of our fallen nature. It plays down the
seriousness of sin, trivializes the joy of the Good News, and robs the conscience of any
lasting and certain consolation.
All that said, Jungel’s take on justification is not merely forensic. His actual
position on it may be seen as a modern explication of Luther’s famous motto of
Christians being the freest lord of all and the most dutiful servant of all. Specifically,
Jungel insists on the creative and effective nature of God’s Word of judgment, which not
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only pronounces and discloses reality, but also helps to bring it to pass; “the Word can
both pronounce and make us righteous.” 160 Jungel declares that “This forensic act is the
effective act of making the ungodly righteous. It is! Imparted righteousness … is not
something which differs from imputed righteousness. … God granting divine
righteousness in such a way as to effectively change the being of humans.” 161 Moreover,
humans are actively involved in justification by their “faith,” which is their affirmative
response to God’s definitive affirmation of them in justification. Jungel in particular
emphasizes that “faith is trusting with the heart. … in it decisions are made concerning
the whole person,” 162 “the foundational act of a life lived definitively outside itself,” 163
which allows us to be made anew by God. Tellingly, his book ends on ethics by stating
that “it should be evident that from such faith deeds of gratitude proceed quite
spontaneously. … There is no more liberating basis for ethics than the doctrine of
justification of sinners by faith alone.” 164
In the anthology published shortly after the JDDJ, Bruce McCormack’s article
clearly intends to salvage the “forensicism” position on justification. 165 McCormack
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senses that our age is one in which people desire real and fundamental transformation in
their life. He laments that “Today’s Protestants give every indication of wanting to
understand justification as being itself transformative.” 166 An evidence for this is that
“there are no hotter topics in Protestant theology today than the themes of Theosis, union
with Christ … Efforts to find what look like Roman and Eastern soteriologies in the
Reformers themselves are rapidly becoming something of a cottage industry.” 167 To this,
McCormack offers a candid articulation of his concern over the lack of clear distinction
between justification and sanctification, saying
it made God’s forgiveness of sin conditional upon the current state of our actual
righteousness. … it makes the root of our justification to lie in what God does in
us. But to the extent that we see our salvation as in any way contingent upon what
we are or have become at a particular point in time, we shift the locus of our
attention from what Luther called the ‘alien righteousness of Christ’ (which is
complete in itself) to a work of God in us which is radically incomplete. And to
just that extent, we make personal assurance of salvation to rest on a work which,
as incomplete, can never bring adequate comfort. Those with sensitive
consciences are thrown back on their own experience of grace, in an effort to
discern whether God has really been at work “in them.” 168
Interestingly, McCormack suggests that as Protestants it is in fact possible to
maintain the “forensicism” interpretation of justification and respond to people’s longing
for real change. How? By recognizing that justification as “a judicial act for God is never
merely judicial; it is itself transformative. … Imputation is itself regenerative.” 169 In other
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words, he acknowledges that God’s declarative act has to be simultaneously
transformative, just like Jungel does.
Robert Kolb offers an outline of the key points of “radical Lutheranism,” whose
perceived radicalness comes precisely from its singular emphasis on “faith alone.” 170
Kolb describes Radical Lutheranism’s take on Luther in contrast to the “Finnish school”
as the result of their different take on human nature. For example, Gerhard Forde, the
founder of Radical Lutheranism, calls for a “radical Lutheran” proclamation of the gospel
on the basis of an anthropology focusing on the bondage of the will. In Forde’s view,
“what is at stake is the radical gospel, radical grace,” which challenges “an anthropology
which sees the human being as a continuously existing subject possessing ‘free choice of
will’ over against God … The radical gospel is the end of that being and the beginning of
a new being in faith and hope.” 171 And yet, alongside Forde’s sharp vigilance against
hubris and his keen awareness of the persistence of sin, we find his understanding of
justification to be both forensic and effective, just like Jungel and McCormack’s: God’s
declarative Word is his instrument of recreation; justification is both “dying and rising”
with Christ, it is “God’s killing sinners and out of them bringing children of God to life;”
and “faith in Christ is to be defined as the orientation and nature of the entire human
creation, not simply a set of psychological characteristics.” 172
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There are those who spend their writing especially on the complexity and the
challenge of the Christian life. For example, Alan Spence’s Justification: A Guide for the
Perplexed (2012) gives “faith alone” the prized place in Christian faith, for he perceives
it to be the divine remedy for a worrisome ailment of our day, namely, the overwhelming
burden on people’s conscience. 173 Specifically, Spence recognizes in our postmodern
society “a movement in which the demand upon us to live with integrity in a manifestly
unjust world has come to challenge many aspects of our corporate and personal
behavior;” in his view, “the level of personal accountability is raised so high that many of
us find ourselves overwhelmed by a sense of guilt and personal failure along with
estrangement from God.” 174 Spence thinks that it is the message of justification which
most clearly conveys God’s pardon and forgiveness; it has the power “to provide a
lifeline of hope to those who find themselves adrift in the sea of moral failure and
personal guilt. For those who regret that their lives have been compromised by sin and
who are ashamed of their participation in its dark designs, the promise of justification
comes as unimaginable good news.” 175 Spence is concerned that “many of the spiritual
practitioners of the Western Church are now generally ill-equipped to administer such
medication. No longer comfortable in affirming the radical nature of our guilt and
personal accountability under a transcendent law and before a holy God, they have over
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the years lost the art of applying the divine remedy to those, both religious and otherwise,
who have been caught up in so helpless a condition.” 176
Due to the same concerns for the overburdened conscience, Joseph Dillow insists
that works of the regenerate person are the basis for future reward or rebuke, but not the
basis for eternal salvation. 177 He wants to distinguish “the ‘salvation’ that is obtained by
enduring to the end (Mt 10:22) from shame and disgrace, not from damnation.” 178 Eternal
salvation must always be based only on God’s unmerited grace to us through faith. To
those who object, Dillow retorts, “since post-conversion works are not perfect and
complete, how can they have any role in obtaining final entrance in to heaven?” 179 To
this end, Gerard Forde’s student Marc Kolden reminds the reader that the Reformers took
“faith alone,” above all, as a pastoral matter. 180 Kolden explains that,
Many pre-Reformation Christians … thought of Jesus as the new Moses (the first
lawgiver) and turned the good news of salvation into a new form of law so that
people supposed they could achieve salvation by living according to Jesus’
teaching–with the help of grace, of course. But then the radical, freeing gospel of
divine forgiveness is lost and the result is despair over not being able to live up
to Jesus’ teachings (or perhaps pride at thinking one has done so). … The
Lutheran reformers argued that Christian preachers and teachers must distinguish
between law and promise so as not to lose the promise. 181
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Lastly, Randall Gleason’s comments on the whole “Lordship salvation”
controversy perhaps offer us the clearest articulation of the real legitimate concerns of the
“faith alone” proponents. 182 The debate broke out in late 1950s, with intense episodes
added in 1980s and continues to this day. Heated exchanges over the decades have
involved influential figures from Fuller Theological Seminary, Westminster Theological
Seminary, and Dallas Seminary, John MacArthur a well-known bible teacher on radio,
and others from Christianity Today, the Evangelical Theological Society, the advocacy
group Christians United for Reformation (CURE), the Campus Crusade for Christ, etc.
Gleason calls the crossfire “one of the most hotly debated controversies within twentiethcentury Evangelicalism.” 183 The eye of the storm revolves around this: “Must Christ be
our Lord in order to be our Savior?” Those who answered “no” to this question point to
the harm of basing assurance of salvation on complete Christian surrender, and prefer to
distinguish saving faith from discipleship; in contrast, those who answered “yes” to this
question point to the harm of a false sense of assurance, and highlight the inseparable
bond the saving faith carries with repentance, obedience, and renewal. Gleason’s
reservation over the “Lordship Salvation” view is based on the real challenges
experienced during the sanctifying process, especially the deep-seated impact of sin and
the huge diversity of spiritual maturity he observes among Christians.
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Specifically, Gleason reminds “Lordship” advocates of the existence of
“immature faith” which, though surely not as ideal as the saving faith they define, ought
to be affirmed to allow room to grow. He reminder the reader that “Faith is frequently
presented in Scripture as something that grows and matures (Jas 1:2-4). … examples
abound throughout Scripture of genuine faith mixed with unbelief.” 184 In Gleason’s view,
to use the degree of obedience as the measure for the genuineness of faith overlooks the
reciprocal dynamic between commitment to Jesus’ Lordship and transformation as a lifelong pilgrimage (2 Cor 3:18), with many twists and turns along the way. He stresses that,
total dedication never occurs instantaneously but is attainable only at the end; true
believers continuously struggle in their progress toward sanctity. We should not question
the genuineness of their faith when that happens. Considering the frailty of spiritual life
to the destructive impact of guilt and despair, “to doubt the salvation of every believer
who seriously struggles with disobedience in his life leaves him vulnerable to the
accusing work of Satan (Rom 8:33-39; Rv 12:10).” 185
I think by now it is finally clear that, what is really at stake is much deeper than
the insecure psyche or the uneasy conscience; what concerns justification proponents the
most is the threat of the sanctification process itself being derailed. As we see above,
“faith alone” advocates deem sanctification extremely important; in fact, one may say
that their high esteem for sanctification is the very reason why they insist on “faith
alone”–so that people would neither self-deceive nor despair and abandon their always
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imperfect and often strenuous walk onto sanctity. The only difference is, instead of
focusing on the cup half full, they are more mindful of the other half that is empty:
namely, when all is said and done, the reality is, most if not all people are not even close
to complete holiness by the time they die.
Concluding Comments: A Call for Another “Copernican Revolution”
Our long and winding tour this chapter is intended to demonstrate a few things.
Most importantly, it is to display a panoramic view of the unprecedentedly broad
consensus regarding the primacy of sanctification within the order of salvation.
Forgiveness is not itself the goal; justification is for sanctification. For salvation to be an
ontological truth instead of a mere legal fiction, it must be transformative rather than only
declarative; it must be person-making. As Paul O’Callaghan puts, “if God did not effect a
real change in men by forgiving him … such forgiveness would be either meaningless in
reality or hedged in intention.” 186 Thus, we can conclude unequivocally that, just as a
fruitless tree is futile, salvation is in vain without sanctification. Major arguments for it
we have encountered include the early Christians’ soteriological focus on eschatological
renewal, the effectiveness and the indivisibility of God’s saving grace, as well as the
inherently transformative nature of saving faith. Arguably, the fact that diverse
disciplines ranging from exegetical scholarship, to biblical theology, to historical
theology, to constructive theology, and even to ecumenical dialogues have all in their
own ways come to the clear defense for the soteriological centrality of sanctification is
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itself a phenomenal support for the thesis. No doubt, this widely crystalizing insight
emerged during recent decades is a remarkable step forward in Christian soteriology.
And yet, even a brief reality check is enough to dash any naive optimism for
sanctification. As the result, Anthony Lane quotes sympathetically that “it used to be said
that every good Catholic became a Lutheran on his deathbed!” 187 That is to say,
confronted by the utter inadequacy of their own merits earned in life, even the
sanctification advocates do not entrust their eternal destination to their actual merits at the
end of life, but resort again to God’s incommensurate mercy to promote them to heaven,
as the justification advocates do. However, the question is, is that really an option? If so,
why should people agonize over sanctification during life? Why does Christianity devote
all its attention to something that at death would be taken care of for us perfectly by God
anyhow? If the process of sanctification is allowed to be called off by death at any and
every arbitrary point, as we observe in life, does God really value sanctification for us
that much, as proclaimed in the Christian faith? Again, if it were logically possible for
God to instantly achieve sanctification for us, why wouldn’t God do it at the beginning of
time instead of extraneously sending Jesus “in the fullness of time”? If the sanctification
process were to end at death, as most sanctification advocates now hold, all the
arguments of the sanctification proponents would fold upon themselves when confronted
by death and become self-refuting. Sanctification seems to be soteriologically
inconsequential after all.
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So we see that our newfound soteriological clarity about the primacy of
sanctification did not really ease the perennial tension between justification and
sanctification; instead of brining the two sides “in balance,” as many observers remarked
in relief, it in fact left both sides hanging with their equally valid concerns still
unaddressed. On the one hand, the justification proponents can no longer feel comforted
because, it now becomes clear that, the degree of our salvation is no more than the degree
of sanctification; on the other hand, the sanctification proponents cannot be satisfied
either, because the reality of our spiritual life is that no one dies a saint, sanctification is
at most a half-baked process at death with much left to be desired. So now, our
conscience can neither be satisfied, because of the keener awareness of our spiritual
incompleteness; nor be assuaged, because of the clearer realization of what genuine
salvation logically entails. The toughest opponent of the sanctification advocates is not
the justification advocates, for they too support sanctification; the toughest opponent of
the sanctification advocates is death–ruthlessly mocking sanctification with its always
unpredictable and always uncompromising interruption.
That is, unless death is not the final end. At this point, if the acceptance of the
necessity or at least the possibility of postmortem purgation hinges upon the
soteriological primacy of sanctification, as we hear Jerry Walls positing at the beginning
of this chapter, then I think a robust case has been made for it–thanks to the insights
independently produced by an impressive host of scholars from a large variety of
disciplines. Even though many of these authors may not currently recognize this
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necessity, as soon as they follow their insights to the logical end, they shall see that it
really is inevitable. Once again, as Jerry Walls argues in Section I, the nature of eternal
salvation implies that, no one can see God without being perfectly holy; neither does God
seem likely to short circus the sanctification process at death by violating our God-given
freewill. Therefore, if sanctification holds such crucial import for our salvation, but it is
unfinished by the time we die, it is reasonable to expect that God will allow its
momentum to continue after death in order to arrive at its preordained goal. And so,
death, otherwise a breaking-point in the case of sanctification, turns out to be a
breakthrough point into a vastly new soteriological horizon.
In welcoming Jerry Walls’ book on purgatory, William Abraham states that “For
a generation or more a stout Protestant doctrine of purgatory has been an accident waiting
to happen.” To paraphrase him, one may say that, in order for a truly biblical and
logically coherent Christian message of sanctification, a stout doctrine on postmortem
purgation has been an accident long waiting to happen. When discussing the pistis
Christou debate, David Stubbs hopes that the exegetical insights from it will become “a
force in a larger sea-change in Protestant theology, a change in which salvation, the law
and the righteousness of God take on new meanings.” 188 To paraphrase Stubbs, one may
say that, after decades of deliberation on sanctification, the challenge for a real seachange is here–the call for a Christian soteriology that properly incorporates postmortem
purgation, which will finally render credible and intelligible Jesus’ central Gospel of
salvation from sin. Lastly, to paraphrase John Hick’s favorite metaphor of the Copernican
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revolution, an analogous revolution with similarly far-reaching consequence is needed,
where we no longer consider the earthly embodiment to be the determining center of our
creaturely tenure, but only as a tiny portion of the immense plan that God has in store for
us to bring us home.

CHAPTER FIVE
POSTMORTEM EMBODIMENT IN LIGHT OF
GEORGE BERKELEY’S SACRAMENTAL IDEALISM
Chapter Overview
In the previous chapter, I argued that postmortem time is necessitated by the
central position sanctification occupies in the Christian understanding of salvation.
Remarkably, as physicist John Polkinghorne points out when envisioning the world to
come, there exists an innate connection between time and matter. 1 Specifically, modern
discovery of general relativity reveals that time, space and matter are all linked together
in a single “packaged deal.” Polkinghorne thinks that such linkage seems to be a general
feature of the Creator’s will that is likely to continue in the world to come. Hence, if there
will be “time” in the life after, as argued in the previous chapter, there will also be
“matter” and “space” for it. That is to say, during the “time” of postmortem existence,
human beings will live “embodied” with “matter” of the next world. Moreover,
Polkinghorne observes similarly like John Hick that “matter of this universe has a
physical character that is appropriate to its evolutionary role as the medium within which
creatures existing at some epistemic distance from their Creator are allowed to be
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themselves and to make themselves.” 2 I think it is reasonable to anticipate that such a
formative function of “matter” for person-making will again be its key purpose in
postmortem embodiment.
In this chapter, I argue that postmortem embodiment in the Berkeleian sense is the
most robust and convincing way to envision bodily existence after death. Furthermore,
Berkeley’s sacramental conceptualization of embodiment is most helpful for grasping the
pedagogical role of “body” Hick suggests in the process of salvation. When making these
arguments in this chapter, I pay particular attention to Hans Bynagle’s dual-emphasis of
compatibility with Christian orthodoxy and tenability with established philosophical and
scientific truths. 3 My aim for such balanced investigation is, on the one hand, to better
recover crucial insights from scripture and tradition and, on the other hand, to better
demonstrate the rationale and the credibility of the Christian understanding of the
afterlife. Without this balance, the Christian Hope may be so distorted by concepts
foreign to it that it becomes hardly recognizable as Christian; or, the Christian Hope may
be so clouded by muddied notions that it appears hardly intelligible or credible to inspire
genuine hope.
In the first section, I begin by recapping relevant points from the previous two
chapters of my dissertation. I then supplement it with other works in philosophy related
to postmortem embodiment. And I close the section with a summary of insights generated
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so far for a proper conceptualization of postmortem embodiment, as well as open
questions to be addressed in the next section. In the next section, I introduce Berkeley’s
Idealism as the robust framework for envisioning postmortem embodiment. I spotlight
particularly its principal congeniality with the sacramental and pedagogical
understandings of the world and of the body in Christian theology. In the following
section, I review New Testament passages and earliest Christian traditions on postmortem
embodiment under the concept of “Resurrection.” It shows that the Berkeleian definition
of postmortem embodiment not only does not contradict these Christian orthodoxies on
“Resurrection,” it often is most effective in conveying the theological insights behind
them. At the end of this section, I show that Berkeley’s understanding of the body also
seems required for rendering several other core Christian beliefs more intelligible, such
as Incarnation, Trinity, and Creation ex nihilo.
To more thoroughly establish Berkeley’s Idealism as the proper framework for
conceptualizing postmortem embodiment, in the section after, I broaden the conversation
by introducing current philosophical literatures on the mind-body relation, known as the
“philosophy of mind.” Even though this investigation is based on human life now, it
looks into the human nature in general. And so, insights coming from these works apply
to the life after as well. Overall, a deadlock exists between the Physicalist and the Dualist
in their portraits of the human being; while each captures some key features, each also
suffers some fatal flaws. Listening in to their quarrels further demonstrates the strengths
of Berkeley’s Idealism for depicting the human person, even though few in the debate
considered Idealism an option. As we shall see, Berkeley’s Idealism well communicates
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the insights of Physicalism and Dualism while avoiding the pitfalls of them both. In the
following section, I broaden the conversation even more by bringing in philosophical
writings inspired by modern physics. Given that physics is considered the scientific study
of the physical, metaphysical insights generated from that field call for our close attention
when assessing Berkeley’s Idealistic claims. Surprisingly, breakthroughs in physics
during the past century seem to cast vote for Berkeley’s Idealism. I conclude the chapter
by recounting the key points in this chapter and anticipating the questions to be addressed
in the next chapter.
The Current State of the Discourse on Postmortem Embodiment
A Recap of Related Points from Chapters Two and Three
Chapter Two reviews the literature from theologies of death and eschatologies.
An important thing to recall is that disagreement exists on how salvation is to be
envisioned for the material world in general and the material body in particular. Some
think that it is nonsensical to speak about salvation of matter as such. To define matter’s
salvation as being transformed into something permanent and incorruptible is
unintelligible, given our scientific understanding that all material organisms are
constantly changing and inherently perishable. To think that matter needs to be saved
from hindering God’s presence to us does not make sense either, because spiritual issues
reside ultimately in the spirit and not the body; this is made particularly clear by the case
of the demons who do not have a body. I also add that talks about “salvation of the
matter” divert our attention from the proper focus, i.e., the human spirit, so much so that
some anticipate human salvation as gaining a body willed by ourselves or discarding the
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body all together. However, others insist on the “salvation” of the body because the spirit
naturally inclines towards a body, because the body is a good creation of God, and
because God’s eschatological victory entails God being “all in all.” In my view, this
disagreement is directly caused by a muddied notion of “matter” and so also the material
body. And so the crucial question is how to understand the body in a way that adequately
captures the importance it occupies in Christian eschatology and yet not contradict
science or muddy soteriology.
There is also some emerging consensus from recent eschatology and theologies of
death. First, soteriology in moral and spiritual terms needs to be kept front and center
when reflecting on postmortem issues, not the mere technical aspects of surviving death,
because soteriology is the foothold from where Christian eschatology takes off. Second,
the biblical emphasis on the indispensable role of the Holy Spirit both for the resurgence
of life in general and for the postmortem “body” in particular must be retrieved. Third,
the Christian doctrine of “Resurrection” goes beyond the human body and speaks about
the human person as a whole. The embodied existence goes beyond physicality and
represents the entire concrete history of a lived personal reality. 4 Forth, there has been an
increasing recognition of the formative purpose of embodiment in postmortem existence
for the sake of continuous human becoming. For example, bodily existence after death
was hypothesized as the medium for self-expression and intercommunion, or as the
avenue for the healing and restoration work of the Spirit. Multiple resurrections and
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gradual embodiments according to a person’s spiritual states have also been
hypothesized.
Chapter Three introduces John Hick’s theology of death and mainly has to do
with philosophical considerations of postmortem existence. Two unique insights on
embodiment should be recalled. First, Hick understands the why of embodiment in terms
of person-making. Embodiment is a means of delimitation for humans with finite
cognitive capacities. Moreover, it establishes some concrete externalities, and it furnishes
the medium for interactions. Here, Hick especially emphasizes the expedience of
“matter” for setting up an orderly environment, which offers both an epistemological
distance for exercising freewill and a set of fixed existential parameters for humans to
wrestle with in order to survive. For this is the way through which human intelligence is
developed and moral characters formed. Second, regarding the how of postmortem
embodiments, Hick conjectures in principle that each embodiment will be tailored to the
specific laws of the worlds a person needs to live through in order to reach the eventual
union with God. Borrowing concepts from Hinduism, Hick envisions that an individual’s
personal continuity across the string of episodes of embodiment resides in the
individual’s “objective identity”–which is from the view of “a hypothetical external
observer,” and not in the “subjective identity”–which is from “the view of the
consciousness in question.” 5
Valuable insights are also gained from Hick’s not so successful attempt to come
up with a survival scenario within the Physicalist’s framework, i.e., the “replica” theory.
After the dust of the “replica” controversy settled it became clear that genuine survival of
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the human being necessitates that the unique aspect of being human, namely, as a subject
of internal experience, must be preserved. Because internal experiences, by definition, are
nontransferable, it entails that unlike purely physical beings the human being cannot be
replaced once it ceases to exist–this in short is the Dualists’ objection to Hick’s theory. It
also entails that true survival of the human being builds on certain concepts qualitatively
foreign to “matter” known according to physics–this in short is the Physicalists’ objection
to Hick’s theory.
The Broader Philosophical Discourse on Bodily Existence after Death
What else has been generated on postmortem embodiment in the wider
philosophical circle? These are efforts to produce a conceivable account of the Christian
doctrine of “Resurrection” within a credible metaphysical framework. In this segment, I
begin by introducing major theories offered by Physicalists who understand the human
being as purely physical. After that, I comment on theories offered by Dualists who
understand the human being as partly physical and partly spiritual. I end this segment
with comments and observations on the current difficulties in coherently conceptualizing
the bodily resurrection.
Resurrection Envisioned within the Framework of Physicalism
The great majority of recent philosophical deliberations on “Resurrection” came
from the Physicalist (rather than the Dualist) camp. As a whole, they all face the
challenging issue of personal survival. As Hans Bynagle reports, “Surviva1 is a
significant issue for those who argue for the compatibility of orthodox Christian belief
with Physicalism or some closely neighboring view. … [There are] notorious issues
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about personal identity, specifically how a person instantiated by some future resurrection
body can be identical with the person instantiated by my present body.” 6 John Copper
explains that the existential gap opened up by bodily death seems impossible to bridge on
the Physicalist’s terms because they see no part in the human person that is not physical
and so they commit to “an unbreakable connection between persons and their bodies.” 7
For them, personal identity is tied to numerical identity of the body, that particular earthly
body which inevitably disintegrates when the person dies. As we shall see in the
following, the Physicalists contemplated different theories to try to overcome this
problem–from physical continuity, to causal continuity, to subjective continuity, to
denying the necessity of personal continuity. Unfortunately, it seems that none of them
really succeeded in maintaining genuine human survival.
Preserving material continuity via re-assemblage, staggered resurrection, or “body
snatching”
This type of attempt tries to address the concern that, since the person is identical
with the body, if the resurrected body is different from the earthly body, there are really
two different persons instead of the same person before and after death. God reassembling old body parts to bring the person back to life is the oldest response to
address this issue. It is suggested by Athenagoras in the late second century to solve the
“chain consumption” problem–how can martyrs be alive again after their bodies being
devoured and digested by beasts, whose bodies are also devoured and digested by other
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beasts or other humans? Athenagoras’ answer is that God will retrieve and reassemble
their body parts back to the original state; for God is so powerful that he is capable of
even mightier deeds.
A modern version of the reassembly theory is proposed by David Hershenov who
takes into account our knowledge of the body as a dynamic system which replaces all of
its cells every few years. He suggests that even though human bodies share the same
particles during earthly existence, this poses no problem for material continuity after
death, because God can resurrect people in a staggered fashion, so after the one first
resurrected assimilates new matter and releases the old matter, the old matter may be
used in resurrecting other beings. 8
Another modern attempt at keeping material continuity is the “body snatching”
scenario proposed by Peter van Inwagen. 9 Van Inwagen’s rationale for attempting such
an admittedly novel solution, in his words, is this: “If human persons are physical
substances, nothing but physical continuity can ground the identity of human persons
across time. The problem for the Christian materialist, therefore, is to try to present a
plausible theory according to which such physical continuity exists.” Like Hershenov,
Van Inwagen is aware that “the atoms of which a living organism is composed are in
continuous flux,” and he thinks “This fact … confronts the materialist who believes in
resurrection with a grave metaphysical difficulty.” This is because, if there is no overlap
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between the set of particles constituting the earthly body and the set of particles
constituting the resurrected body, the person does not really survive; and yet, it is
extremely difficult to reconcile the apparent fact of bodily discontinuity with the identity
requirement of “material continuity.”
So, using Socrates as an example, Van Inwagen speculates that, right before
Socrates’ death, God “could have miraculously translated Socrates’ fresh corpse to some
distant place for safe-keeping (at the same time removing the hemlock and undoing the
physiological damage it had done) and have replaced it with a simulacrum, a perfect
physical duplicate of Socrates’ corpse; later, on the day of resurrection, he could
reanimate Socrates’ corpse, and the reanimated corpse, no longer a corpse but once more
a living organism, would be Socrates. Or, I suggested, he might do this with some part of
the corpse, its brain or brain-stem or left cerebral hemisphere or cerebral cortex–
something whose presence in a newly whole human organism would insure that that
organism be Socrates.”
Positing an immanent causal connection between the bodies before and after
death
This type of attempt also aims at eliminating the existential gap through some
kind of continuity within the Physicalist’s framework. However, these authors realized
the fact failed to be recognized by the previous authors that mere identity or overlapping
of material substance–whether in part or in total–does not guarantee personal identity or
continuity of a living thing. For example, John Cooper states that “it is well known that
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material composition is not the source of self-identity in living things.” 10 And so, they try
to preserve continuity (and so identity) through the so-called “immanent causal
connection” between the earthly life and the resurrected life. The rationale behind this
type of attempt is the understanding that, instead of by some external factors like God’s
miraculous tracking and reassembling old body parts, “an organism at one time is
identical to an organism at another time only if there is the proper biological continuity
linking the two. The organism’s parts must be caught up in the same life processes and
these [ongoing] life processes must be responsible for the role and position of the parts.” 11
Under this principle, personal continuity exists only when the particles constituting the
person “remain caught up in a life without interruption;” what’s more, “Both the selfmaintained structural integrity of the organism and the addition of new matter must be
due to biological processes.” 12
The main advocate here is Dean Zimmerman who proposed the so-called
“fission” scenario. He claims that the proposed scenario satisfies the principle of
“immanent causation” for biological continuity, which requires “the parts, states, and
processes of the organism be caused by the previous parts, states, and processes of that
organism.” 13 His theory suggests something like this: at the moment of a person’s death,
God causes the dying body to undergo fission such that the particles constituting the body
split into two sets of particles, with one set of them constituting the corpse and the other
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set constituting a living being. According to Zimmerman, such fission ensures that the
resurrected body is caught up in the same life process with the dying body and is
immanently caused by it; in this way, personal continuity and survival are ensured.
On technical grounds, David Hershenov raises a significant objection against the
“fission” theory–that is, the resurrected body and the earthly body are never caught in the
same life process, given that fission can only be hypothesized to occur when the earthly
body dies. As he explains, in Zimmerman’s fission scenario, “The new particles never
composed any cells, tissues, and organs with the older particles; they never combined
with any of the older particles to form part of any skeletal structures; and they were never
involved in any metabolic or homeostatic processes with the already existing particles.
Contrast this with the normal bodily assimilation of new matter and the loss of old. …
[which maintains] an overlap of the new and the old, and this enables the new particles to
be assimilated into the individual’s body.” 14 Consequently, “fission” does not preserve
personal identity. Another technical objection he raises has to do with the speed of the
fission–which is instantaneous rather than gradual, and the amount of particles involved–
which is all the particles in the dying body. Based on our understanding of how fission
occurs, he doubts that a living organism can survive such sudden change in such
magnitude. What’s more, bio-fission is a split of existing particles which results in two
entities that are half the size of the original, since it takes place within the material
constrains of the original entity; but we do not observe the corpse changing in that way.
On anthropological grounds, Joseph Baltimore objects to the “fission” theory
because it violates the metaphysical principle of (objective) identity, which stipulates that
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“For any x and y, if x is identical to y, then, necessarily, x is identical to y.” 15
Specifically, in Zimmermann’s “fission” scenario, there are two sets of particles–one of
the earthly body and one of the resurrected body–both are equally valid candidates for the
person’s identity. Also, oddly enough, the validity of the candidacy of the earthly set of
particles hinges on the external event of fission. But metaphysical identity is not the kind
which can be affected by external factors–Socrates is still Socrates, no matter what
happens to him externally.
The response Zimmermann gave to his critics is that God makes sure that only
one set of particles exists to be the person. But this is “identity by fiat” rather than by
fact. Kevin Corcoran, another key proponent of the “fission” theory, offers a response
that basically boils down to “identity by scripture.” His four-step reasoning for physical
identity through immanent causation is this: “(1) Bodies cease to exist. (2) The scriptures
teach that my body is going to be raised. (3) The Immanent Causal Condition for the
persistence of bodies is true. (4) Therefore, immanent causal relations can cross temporal
gaps.” 16 This seems hardly convincing as a metaphysical argument.
Although a Physicalist herself, Christina van Dyke’s critique against the
“immanent causation” hypothesis exposes the root issue of this theory. She points out
that, by definition, “A life is the sort of thing whose ‘causal paths’ end at death; … the
resurrected human being can be identical to the original human being only if, in some
way or other, the life of a human being doesn’t end at death–that is, if the appropriate
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causal paths remain intact.” 17 In other words, physical life by definition ends at physical
death. I want to add that Physicalists’ attempts to locate an “immanent causation” across
the chasm of death appear to be assuming the conclusion that has yet to be argued for.
That is, they already posit that “immanent causation” does exist within the Physicalist
framework, and they try to create scenarios that may fit Physicalism. The resulting case
does justice neither to the nature of “immanent causation,” as Van Dyke points out, nor to
biological phenomena scientifically understood, as Hershenov points out. Simply put:
what empirical data within the Physicalist’ constraints do we have for proposing that a
completely dead physical entity can issue life again out from its dead self? The only
possible answer may be “Resurrection”–but that is the question we set out to explain.
Shortchanging objective identity with subjective perception of identity
With objective identity appearing largely unattainable within Physicalism, this
type of attempts focuses instead on subjective identity. As Lynn Baker observes, the
criterion of identity used here is subjective: identity exists if there is mental continuity
across death in terms of memory, personality, self-awareness, etc. 18 Baker further
observes that these views share the same defect, i.e., the ontological possibility of
duplicates. As we learned from the “replica” controversy, this very possibility is
symptomatic of fundamental flaws in the anthropological assumptions they start with.
The problem, as John Cooper points out, is that they “located personal identity in a set of
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[mental] attributes instead of in a continuously existing entity,” 19 whereas true identity
can only be associated with the latter but not necessarily with the former. Most
importantly, unlike purely physical beings (e.g., a statue) which do not have a subjective
perspective, the human “I” is logically irreplaceable once it ceases to exist, even if its
subjective experiences were transferred to another being. The most extensive effort along
this line may be Lynne Baker’s “constitution view” of the human person. As we shall see,
this theory also suffers the “duplicate” problem Baker diagnoses in other theories,
avoiding it only by “fiat” under “divine mystery.” What’s more, Baker’s complicated
theoretical maneuvers are seen by some as covertly Dualistic–this unwitting result, in my
view, betrays the fundamental impossibility to render an ontologically coherent account
of survival within the Physicalist’s framework.
Specifically, Baker distinguishes her version of Physicalism by the fact that it sees
the human person as constituted by, but not identical to, the earthly body. Examples of
physical constitution Baker gives include: pieces of paper constitute a dollar bill, pieces
of cloth constitute the American flags, and pieces of bronze constitute a statue. Baker
emphasizes that the body is not identical to the human person, because “Smith's body
alters radically while Smith endures.” 20 According to her theory, human beings differ
from other beings in that “they have first-person perspectives essentially;” but this
perspective still must be supported by a physical body. 21 This, to her, entails that while a
person cannot exist without body, the person has no problem surviving death as long as
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there is some sort of physical body, 22 and “sameness of pre- and post-mortem person is
sameness of first-person perspective.” 23 Against the problem of “duplication,” Baker
shores up her view by claiming “mystery,” “miracle,” “primitive fact,” and ultimately
“God’s free decree.” As she puts it, “For it is part of God's natural knowledge that it is
metaphysically impossible for one person to be identical to two persons. And according
to the notion of God's natural knowledge, what is metaphysically impossible is not within
God's power to bring about. Hence, there is no threat from the duplication problem.” 24
Baker’s critics are not convinced. Peter van Inwagen, a fellow Physicalist,
finds it incomprehensible to say that the human being is constituted by but not
identical to his physical body. As he puts it, “I have only one major objection to
‘constitution theory’: I can’t bring myself to take seriously the idea that constitution
is real. … there is nothing numerically distinct from me that is spatially coextensive
with me.” 25 More importantly, he raises the question of “what is it for x and y to have
the same first-person perspective? … what is the numerical identity of first-person
perspectives?” 26 This, in essence, is the question of the ontological basis for the
objective identity within the “constitution view.” As he explains, “it’s hard to see
how being told that God can make a post-resurrection person me by giving that
person a first-person perspective numerically identical with mine explains anything–
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for an essential part of giving a person a first-person perspective identical with mine
is to make that person identical with me.” 27 That is to say, objective identity is not
that kind of thing attainable by decree, even by divine decree.
Buckareff and Van Wagenen raise an objection within Baker’s framework
itself. The gist of it is this: given that Physicalism explains a person’s mental states
through its physical states without remainder, “the relevant [mental] properties
mentioned are properties a person derives from the [particular] body to which she
bears the constitution relation;” consequently, personal identity is lost when the
physical identity it builds upon is lost, as is allowed by the “constitutive view.” 28
Their point becomes clear by their reminder for us that “orthodox Christians take
resurrected persons to have undergone a fairly radical bodily change. What is
doubtful is that persons who are resurrected are any longer human organisms. In fact,
their status as organisms is dubious.” 29 Given that Physicalism understands all
mental states including the first-person perspective as the direct result of the physical
states, the drastic degree of bodily dissimilarity posited in the Christian doctrine of
Resurrection seems to preclude the possibility of maintaining sameness of the mental
states. On this ground, Dean Zimmerman, another fellow Physicalist of Baker’s, objects
to her theory to even be called Physicalism in the proper sense. This is because, as far as
Zimmerman can see,
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Organisms and aggregates of matter cannot, presumably, lose all of their physical
parts at once; and there are limits on the ways in which the subsequent physical
states of organisms and aggregates may evolve out of earlier ones. Baker’s
persons are free of such constraints. They can, miraculously, jump from one body
to another, losing the shape and size and so on of the one body, and
instantaneously acquiring those of that other, whatever they may be. Not even a
miracle could allow mere hunks of matter or organisms to perform such feats. I
would say that, if the current size and shape and physical makeup of an object
puts no necessary constraints upon the immediately subsequent size and shape
and physical makeup of that object, then the object does not really have that size,
shape, or make-up–however appropriate it is to ascribe them to it in ordinary
contexts on the basis of relations to things that really have them. Persons that can
pass instantaneously from organic matter to ectoplasm (or whatever intermediatestate bodies are made of) are ‘physical’ in an attenuated sense at best, able to pass
from one body to another like shadows or spirits. 30
Last but not least, there is the fundamental issue of whether the mental can even be
properly said to be “constituted” by the physical. As Hans Bynagle reports, currently, no
constitution views have provide any conceivable account of exactly how the mental is
constituted by the physical. 31 Empirical experiences reveal that physical constitution
basically is either by composition or by proper relation or by a combination of the two. An
example of constitution by composition would be a bunch of stones collectively constitute
a pile of stones. An example of constitution by proper relation would be a sand depression
constitutes a footprint as the result of its causal relation to the prior event of a foot pressing
on the sand. But neither way seems helpful in explaining how the physical constituted the
mental, as constitutionism claims. As we shall discuss in more details in the segment
below on the “philosophy of mind,” this inconceivability is the result of the fundamental
incommensurability between the quanta (the quantified) and the qualia (the felt), which
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are the building blocks of the physical and the mental, respectively. And so, one cannot
help but asking, “By virtue of what would the one constitute the other?” 32
Forfeiting personal identity all together
Christina Van Dyke concludes that the common difficulty the Physicalists face in
securing personal identity is rooted in the fact that no living organisms, especially
humans, can be restored to numerical identity after it ceases to live–even God cannot do
that, because God cannot violate logic. 33 Perhaps due to this intrinsic difficulty, some
Physicalists suggest that human existence can be gap-inclusive, or that personal
continuity after death is not necessary. For example, David Hershenov thinks existential
gap should be allowed because, “If it does not matter whether we are initially a result of a
miracle, in vitro fertilization or sexual reproduction, why should it matter when the parts
are reassembled a second time?” 34 The reason, again, is that, unlike physical artifacts
such as a bronze statue, the human subject’s having an internal perspective entails that,
even though it matters not how it begins, once it does begin, it cannot be restored after it
ceases to be. As another example, Buckareff and Van Wagenen propose that “A person
may survive in some looser, weaker sense. And perhaps this is all we really need for an
adequate metaphysics of resurrection.” 35
The concept of “Resurrection” is central to the Christian understanding of
postmortem existence. Therefore, to the suggestion that personal identity may not be
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necessary–which Physicalism seems inevitably lead to–a theologically minded response
has to be an unequivocal “no.” First, as John Copper articulates,
It is a central biblical promise and a basic hope of Christians that we who now
live on earth will be with Christ forever in his new creation. Implicit in this
vision is the unspoken assumption of numerical personal identity: the persons
who will be there are one and the same as those who existed previously on this
earth. God has not just promised to have an indefinite group of people there, a
wholly different crowd perhaps. Nor is he intending to resurrect people who look
like us and believe they are us, but are in fact mere copies of us. 36
In other words, the very genuineness of the Christian Hope is at stake when it
comes to the issue of whether the resurrected person is in fact the same as the one who
died–if not, the Christian Hope is actually in vain. Copper thinks that “It is so
fundamental that inadequacy on this point would be sufficient for rejection of that version
of personal eschatology.” 37 I would add: if personal continuity were not necessary, the
notion of “re-surrection” would not have come into existence in the first, as the “re”
denotes. What’s more, the Christian understanding of salvation is affected by whether or
not the resurrected person is the same as the one who died. This is because core
soteriological notions of justification and sanctification are all moral concepts associated
with a personal subject; they become nonsensical if the subject who is to undergo the
salvific process is surrogated before reaching the eventual eschaton–that can only mean
that the person did not really get saved. God’s plan of salvation appears illogical under
this light. In addition, I think the scriptural response to the Physicalist’s proposals would
be an unequivocal “no” as well, considering that the biblical authors, in contrast to the
Physicalists, emphasize precisely differences and discontinuity between the earthly and
36
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the resurrected bodies. As Baker points out, “A resurrection body is a ‘spiritual’ body.
Whatever a spiritual body is, it is incorruptible. All earthly bodies are corruptible.
Anything corruptible is essentially corruptible, and anything that is incorruptible is
essentially incorruptible.” 38
Resurrection Envisioned within the Framework of Dualism
According to substantive Dualism, the human person is a composite of the
physical body and the non-physical soul; death is an event in which the body dies
whereas the soul separates from the body and lives on; and “Resurrection” is a
subsequent event through which the soul is reunited with the body. Notably, substantive
Dualism has been the usual framework used to articulate the Christian understanding of
“Resurrection,” and there is little work done recently by Dualists to offer further thoughts
on the topic.
This may give the impression that the Dualist’s depiction of “Resurrection” is
watertight. In reality, however, the Dualistic conceptualization faces a severe challenge
posed by the metaphysical principle stipulating that “objects which are distinct at any
time must be distinct at all times.” Particularly, it raises the questions of personal identity
and postmortem survival: for if the Dualist’s account of resurrection equates the human
person with a non-physical entity, it should identify that non-physical entity with the
human person at all times, rather than with the composite before death but with the nonphysical element of it after death; otherwise, the human person cannot be identified with
that non-physical element at any time, and so the person does not really survive death.
Notably, a closer look at Dualists’ typical arguments reveals that all the cogent defenses
38

Baker, “Christian Materialism,” 52.

296
they were able to marshal are for the non-physical element in the human person, and so
these defenses go no further than defending Idealism; as to the physical element, little is
said in their arguments. Perhaps realizing that, Dualist John Copper defines his Dualistic
position by saying that “By ‘Dualism’ I mean the ontological possibility that human
persons can exist temporarily without being embodied. … It makes no commitment to the
various philosophical Dualisms.” 39
Another important challenge against Dualism’s depiction of the Christian concept
of “Resurrection” comes from theology. As Baker points out, the Dualists “leave
dangling the question of why resurrection should be bodily.” 40 That is, why
embodiedness is explicitly emphasized in this Christian eschatological concept, given
that the eschatological aim according to Christianity is perfect union with God, who does
not have body?
Accumulated Insights and Unresolved Questions
Several valuable insights may be gathered from various discourses so far on
postmortem embodiment. Positively, we learn from John Hick to properly appreciate
embodiment as the very path through which human beings are made to become the Image
of God. We also learned from recent eschatological reflections about the need to keep
soteriology front and center, to keep the role of the Holy Spirit front and center, and to
consider postmortem embodiment as the concrete trajectory of growth of the entire
person. Negatively, we see the confusion in soteriology caused by muddied notions of
“matter.” And, through the failed attempts by Hick and by the Physicalists, we realized
39
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that a philosophically intelligible and theologically acceptable account of postmortem
embodiment is unattainable within the parameters of Physicalism. On the other hand, we
see that the Dualist’s depiction of “Resurrection” faces its own formidable challenge of
postmortem identity, as made clear by the metaphysical principle that “objects which are
distinct at any time must be distinct at all times.” In addition, the Dualist leaves
unanswered the puzzling theological question of why resurrection has to be embodied, if
the human person is essentially non-physical and is eschatologically destined to unite
with God who is also non-physical.
Our investigations above also exposed several important issues left open. Hans
Bynagle captures them well with his dual concern: how to think about postmortem
embodiment in a way that is both compatible with core Christian beliefs and tenable on
veritable grounds? 41 I have spent the above space describing the lack of philosophical
tenability in both Physicalism and Dualism in current literature for rendering a
convincing picture of “Resurrection,” a key Christian notion of postmortem survival; I
will elaborate more on their philosophical lacks in a following section when I introduce
the Philosophy of Mind debate. In the last section of this chapter, I will describe their
lack of scientific tenability. Here, I only want to unpack a bit more their lack of
theological rigor. Specifically, during an interdisciplinary dialogue on “Resurrection,”
Ted Peters clarifies that “St. Paul … speaks of heavenly bodies (somata epourania) with
their doxa – connoting glory or radiance. … Glory here does not emphasize a body with
radiance or any other such quality. ‘Rather, this reflects Jewish eschatological language
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for the future state of the righteous.’” 42 And so, articulations of the Christian notion of
“Resurrection” must be conducive for conveying this soteriological nature of
“Resurrection,” which is dying to sin and being raised to the life of righteousness. Along
the same line of thinking, Andreas Schuele states that
the Christian understanding of resurrection is not limited to the question of
continuity and discontinuity between life before and life beyond physical death.
It is not the fact that we have to die that brings resurrection to the theological
agenda. … conceiving of resurrection requires us to relate what we are destined
to become, as well as what we are at any present moment and what we have been
in the past, to the fullness of Christ's own life. … It seems, therefore, of utmost
consequence that Christianity had to express its understanding of life and death
in a way that would correspond to its view of a ‘person’ as that which is destined
to be transformed into the image of Christ. This, it seems to me, is the very
essence of the idea of resurrection that New Testament traditions. 43
How do the Physicalist and the Dualist’s depictions of “Resurrection” measure up
against this soteriological core in the doctrine of “Resurrection” as being transformed into
the image of God? When defending his “body snatching” scenario, Peter Inwagen
acknowledges that some may respond by saying that “God would not do such a frivolous
thing!” To me, this response seems applicable to all the solutions the Physicalists have
come up with, because in all their scenarios God has to perform some extraneous acts for
no apparent reason other than the Physicalist metaphysical commitment, and yet still
losing the person to death in the end. To a less apparent degree, the Dualist’s outlook is
susceptible to the same criticism, because the prime import of embodiment so
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emphasized by the doctrine of “Resurrection” is left unilluminated and so tends to appear
frivolous in their disembodied renditions of the afterlife.
In his most recent book on Christology, theologian Michael Welker makes the
interesting suggestion that we understand Jesus’ resurrected body as a manifestation and
a revelation of the Spirit. As Welker puts it, “In the resurrection of Jesus Christ, we
encounter the Spirit in ‘bodily’ form.” 44 Moreover, Welker sees the human body as “a
realm, a sphere in which God intends to ‘dwell’ and through which also to be
glorified.” 45 In the rest of this chapter, I will try to show that George Berkeley’s
sacramental Idealism offers us the framework to conceive bodily existence after death in
a way that is both agreeable with core Christian concepts and tenable according to
knowledge from philosophy and physical science. Borrowing Welker’s phrases, it may be
said that, according to Berkeley’s Idealism, the postmortem “body” would be where the
human spirit is to be manifested and where God is to be encountered and glorified.
George Berkeley’s Sacramental Idealism and the Purpose of Embodiment
There are three segments in this section. In the first segment, I outline the key
features of Bishop George Berkeley’s Idealism. In the second segment, I offer a more
detailed report on a unique aspect of Berkeley’s Idealism, namely, his sacramental
understanding of the material reality as “divine communication” from God. With this
segment as a bridge, in the third segment, I demonstrate the soundness of Berkeley’s
Idealism via the Theology of the Body, which is a contemporary Christian understanding
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of embodiment under the pedagogical, soteriological aim of being transformed into the
image of God.
Introducing Berkeley’s Idealism
In this segment, I introduce Berkeley’s Idealism using his most representative
work, “Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous,” supplemented by his “A Treatise
Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge” and “An Essay Towards a New Theory
of Vision.” I begin by sketching out Berkeley’s position on some basic ontological
questions. I then recount the main objections Berkeley raised against the claim of a
“material substance” independent from all minds. I finish the segment by describing the
unique strengths Berkeley highlights for us regarding his Idealistic outlook.
Berkeley’s Thesis in a Nutshell
In a nutshell, Berkeley denies any “material substance” existing independently
from the mind. According to Berkeley, there exist only two types of things: spirits and
their perceptions. All those which exist but cannot perceive must be the perceptions of
spirit–if not of finite spirits, they are certainly of the infinite Spirit God “in whom all
things move and have their beings.” (Acts 17:28) This entails that no unperceiving things
can exist completely independently from mind. The unperceiving things perceived by us
are collections of ideas in the form of sensible qualities. Therefore, the so-called
“corporeal substance” is in fact a mere collection of ideas of sensible qualities which, as
ideas of mind, cannot exist except in a mind; and the “corporeal world” we perceive is
nothing but a world of sense perceptions.
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By “ideas,” Berkeley does not mean fictions and fancies of the mind, but regular
notions of the mind; he uses “idea” to emphasize its derivative and dependent status visà-vis the mind. In Berkeley’s view, recognizing the sensible things as collections of ideas
of the mind does not render those things any less “real,” because these ideas are
imprinted on our mind by God rather than conjured up or malleable by ourselves. As far
as Berkeley can see, “By the principles premised we are not deprived of any one thing in
nature. Whatever we see, feel, hear, or anywise conceive or understand remains as secure
as ever, and is as real as ever.” 46 Sensible things are real as real sense perceptions, which
are exactly what we gather and all that we gather from everyday experience; they need
not at all be an independent “substance” to be “real” for us in carrying out our life as we
do. Scientific knowledge about the world describes regularities in terms of succession of
ideas, e.g., thunder follows lightening, pain follows a pinch; it says nothing and cannot
say anything about the so-called “material substance” independent of the mind.
Two points in Berkeley’s Idealism are particularly relevant for our current
investigation. First, Berkeley thinks that a spirit is not directly perceivable by other
spirits. He says that “I have properly no idea, either of God or any other spirit; for these
being active, that which perceives ideas, thinks and wills cannot be represented by things
perfectly inert, as our ideas are.” 47 In other words, this impossibility is the result of the
utter incommensurability between a spirit and an idea. And so, the sensible qualities of a
person we perceive (e.g., color, figure, motion, etc.) are markers pointing out for us the
46
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existence of a finite spirit like ourselves. An important implication of this is the necessity
for the spirit to have perceivable “markers” for there to be interactions among spirits.
Relatedly, second, Berkeley conceives the “body” as a collection of markers of a spirit.
Sensible “body,” rightly considered, is nothing but a collection of such qualities or ideas
in our mind. Notably, Berkeley thinks his Idealistic understanding of the “body” is
particularly helpful for illuminating and defending the Christian doctrine of
“resurrection.” He says,
about the Resurrection, … Take away this material substance, about the
identity whereof all the dispute is, and mean by body what every plain
ordinary person means by that word, to wit, that which is immediately
seen and felt, which is only a combination of sensible qualities or ideas,
and then their most unanswerable objections come to nothing. 48
Berkeley’s Step-by-Step Rebuttal against the Common Arguments for a “Physical
Substance”
In “Three Dialogues,” Berkeley patiently goes through all the common arguments
for “physical substance,” and methodically dispels them one by one. Berkeley’s
objections against the claim of an independent “physical substance” may be summed up
this way: upon close examination, this claim turns out to be unsubstantiated and also
incoherent. It is “unsubstantiated,” because we have no evidence which would suggest
the existence of such substance; it is “incoherent,” because the concept itself is logically
intractable.
Claim: A material substance is where the sensible qualities we perceive inhere
It is claimed that the sense qualities we perceive point to some external object in
which they inhere, and this external object is a material substance. We can infer this
48
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especially from those less intense qualities–for even though we hardly perceive them,
they still exist somewhere. Berkeley replies that every sensible quality–to however small
degree it is perceived–is nothing but perceptions in the mind; by definition, no sensible
qualities can exist outside the mind which senses them. It is a contradiction in terms to
say that some sensible qualities exist in a “material substance” which does not sense.
Berkeley also points to a familiar experience of ours: the same cup of water can feel cold
to our left hand and warm to our right hand at the same time, if the two hands have
previously been in waters of different temperatures. This relative nature applies to all
other sense experiences (e.g., sight, sound, taste, etc.) which, he argues, shows that sense
qualities are entirely in our mind, and not in something “external” and objective to the
mind.
Claim: Scientific observations enable us to distinguish a thing in itself vs. the thing as
perceived by us
It is claimed that scientific observations have opened our eyes to the difference
between a thing in itself versus the thing in our perception. For example, heat sensed by
us is in itself motions of unperceivable particles; the latter is the cause of the former.
Berkeley replies that all of our perceptions–whether obtained through the naked eye or
through a scientific instrument like a microscope–are still perceptions in the mind; no
mental perceptions can be in “the thing itself” outside the mind. Moreover, all
perceptions are equally apparent and valid, for they are equally perceptions by the mind–
in what way can we differentiate some mental perceptions as “apparent” and other mental
perceptions as “true, in the thing itself”? We really have no basis to pick one perceptive
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scope of the mind (e.g., through the microscope) among many and claim that particular
scope to be “the thing in itself.”
Claim: Even though some qualities exist only in the mind (i.e., the “secondary qualities),
there are still other qualities which inhere in an external object (i.e., the “primary
qualities”)
It is claimed that, even though qualities like sound and color, or the so-called
“secondary qualities,” exist completely in our mind, qualities like shape, solidity, and
motion, the so-called “primary qualities,” inhere in the material object external to the
mind. Berkeley replies that “primary qualities” are also nothing but perceptions in the
mind. The most obvious evidence is that “primary qualities” also demonstrate relativity
rather than absoluteness vis-à-vis the mind, like the “secondary qualities” do. For
example, the same motion can be perceived as fast and slow at the same time, the same
solidity can be perceived as soft and firm at the same time, etc., depending on the
condition of the mind which senses it. Moreover, Berkeley asks the reader to notice the
fact that, it is impossible for us to separate “primary qualities” in our mind from
“secondary qualities;” “primary qualities” such as shape and motion always coexist with
some “secondary qualities.” Thus, no “primary qualities” can exist outside the mind.
Claim: Since sensible qualities cannot exist by themselves, it is necessary to suppose a
substratum to support them, and this substratum is a material substance
It is claimed that sensible qualities cannot exist on their own; therefore, we must
suppose some substratum to “support” them, and this substratum is a material substance.
Berkeley replies that, first, it is a contradiction in terms to say that the sensible qualities

305
manifest in our mind exist in some “material substance”–for these qualities are sensations
in nature, but the “material substance” does not sense; these qualities are thoughts, but the
“material substance” does not think. Second, in where does this “supporting” relationship
between the sensible qualities and its “material” substratum exist? And how? Inferring
from the sensible qualities a “material substance” as their substratum is unfounded. Even
though it is correct to notice that the sensible qualities exist independently of our finite
minds, it is wrong to conclude that they exist independently of all minds. Since these
qualities are sensible qualities, there can be no substratum to “support” them except that
which can sense, i.e., the spirit.
Claim: Our ideas are “representations” of external objects which are not immediately
perceivable by us; these objects are material things
It is claimed by John Locke that, there are two types of objects external to the
mind. One is our ideas, which are perceived by us immediately; the other is things in
themselves, which are not directly perceivable and are perceived by us only via the
mediation of ideas serving as their representations. The second type of objects is material
things which exist without the mind. Berkeley replies that an idea cannot be an accurate
representation of anything except another idea, and neither idea can exist in some
unperceiving “substance” outside the mind. It is inconceivable how sensible ideas can
give a representation of a thing which is insensible. At this point, Berkeley urges his
readers to carefully examine the basis upon which they come to agree with the claim that
certain “material substance” exists which is insensible itself and exists independently of
the mind. He asks, “Whatever we perceive is perceived immediately or mediately: by
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sense, or by reason and reflection. But, as you have excluded sense, pray show me what
reason you have to believe their existence; or what medium you can possibly make use of
to prove it?” 49
Claim: The perception of “distance” suggests something outside of and so external
to us
It is claimed that our perception of distance shows that some things exist
externally outside of us. Berkeley replies that, in dreams, we perceive things existing
outside of us, but we all know that those things in fact exist only in our mind. Moreover,
Berkeley points out that newborns and blind men do not know how to react properly to
ideas of distance when they first gain eyesight. This shows that “distance” is also nothing
but a collection of ideas; we learn it from experience by association. Specifically, as
Berkeley explains, “from the ideas you actually perceive by sight, you have by
experience learned to collect what other ideas you will (according to the standing order of
nature) be affected with, after such a certain succession of time and motion.” 50
Claim: The mind is affected by sensible ideas of which it finds neither itself nor the ideas
themselves to be the cause; the cause of these ideas is called “matter”
It is claimed that, since the sensible qualities are ideas occurring to our minds
without we ourselves causing them to happen, and these ideas cannot cause themselves to
occur to our minds, they must have some cause that is neither us nor themselves.
“Matter” is the name for this external cause of ideas in our minds. Berkeley replies, first,
by protesting that this way of defining “matter” is not what is commonly meant by the
49
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word, which “signifies an extended, solid, moveable, unthinking, inactive substance”–
something, by now, has been shown to give us no reason at all to suppose its existence.
Even if we suppose that it did exist, how can this “material substance,” which itself is
unthinking and thus inactive, be a cause of anything, not to say a cause of thinking? For
all genuine actions are volitions, and volitions can exist in nowhere except in a mind.
Even though it is correct to deduce an external cause of our ideas, that cause cannot be
properly defined as an unthinking “material substance,” because nothing can give to
another that which it itself does not yet have.
Claim: Activities of our material brain is the cause or occasion for ideas in our mind
As another version of the above, it is claimed that activities in the material brain
are discovered to be the cause or the occasion for ideas in our mind. Notably, this is what
we often hear in the mind-brain debate today. Berkeley replies that the so-called
“material brain” we observe, being something observable, is still just a collection of ideas
and so exists only in the mind. Furthermore, Berkeley asks, “What connection is there
between a motion in the nerves, and the sensations of sound or color in the mind? Or how
is it possible these should be the effect of that?” 51 These questions Berkeley raised are
known today in the mind-brain debate as the “problem of incommensurability” between
the mental and the physical attributes.
Claim: “Matter” is the instrument God uses to generate ideas in our mind
It is claimed that, even though God is the Supreme Cause of all things, the
unthinking “matter” can still be a cause through that kind of action proper to it, namely,
motion. And so, matter is the instrument God uses to produce ideas in our mind. Berkeley
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replies by asking, first, how is it possible to even conceive the “material substance” to be
an instrument for God, when it is devoid of all sensible qualities we know of? Second,
what basis do we have to even think that this unknown and unknowable “substance”
actually exists in independence? Is it by sensible experiences? But the substance is said to
be insensible. Is it by inference? But all inferences are connected to ideas in our mind.
Third, Berkeley raises an objection based on the divine attribute of omnipotence. He
argues that it is quite conceivable that God affects the ideas in our mind by a mere act of
God’s will without there being any external objects resembling them; our perceiving
mind would not notice any difference between the two situations. Hence, it is inconsistent
with the infinite perfection of God, if God uses some lifeless inactive “material” as his
instrument to produce ideas in our mind, while God could have done it perfectly without
it.
Claim: Things would not be real without supposing the existence of “matter”
It is claimed that, the real existence of things cannot be maintained without
supposing the existence of a “material substance.” Berkeley replies by asking, “Is it not a
sufficient evidence to me of the existence of this glove, that I see it, and feel it, and wear
it?” If not, “how is it possible I should be assured of the reality of this thing, which I
actually see in this place, by supposing that some unknown thing, which I never did or
can see, exists after an unknown manner, in an unknown place, or in no place at all?”
And, “How can the supposed reality of that which is intangible be a proof that anything
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tangible really exists? Or, of that which is invisible, that any visible thing, or, in general
of anything which is imperceptible, that a perceptible exists?” 52
As another version of the above, it is claimed that, without a “material substance”
external to the mind, we cannot distinguish real things and “chimeras” produced by our
mind–since ideas are all in the mind. Berkeley replies by pointing out that products of our
own mind, such as dreams and fancies, “are faint and indistinct,” often “dim, irregular,
and confused,” and “not being connected, and of a piece with the preceding and
subsequent transactions of our lives;” besides, they all entirely depend on our own mind.
In contrast, sensible ideas are real because they “are more vivid and clear … being
imprinted on the mind by a Spirit distinct from us, have not the like dependence on our
will.” 53
Claim: It is at least possible that “material substance” may in fact exist, since there is no
logical contradiction in supposing it; our inability to conceive it does not guarantee that it
does exist
As a last resort for upholding Physicalism, it is claimed that, at least it is not
logically impossible to suppose that “material substance” may exist; our inability to
conceive it does not mean that we have successfully proved its nonexistence. Berkeley
replies by first pointing out that, it is utterly irresponsible to insist something which “you
know not what, for you know not what reason, to you know not what purpose” still just
may exist, even when one does not even know what this thing or its existing means. He
protests: “Is it come to this, that you only believe the existence of material objects, and
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that your belief is founded barely on the possibility of its being true? Then you will have
me bring reasons against it: though another would think it reasonable the proof should lie
on him who holds the affirmative.” 54 And, “It is to me a sufficient reason not to believe
the existence of anything, if I see no reason for believing it. What it is you would have
me believe, since you say you have no manner of notion of it. … to believe you know not
what and you know not why.” 55
In sum
At the end of the dialogues, Berkeley summarily declares that “In fact, I deny it to
be possible!” He denies even the mere logical possibility for the so-called “matter” as “an
extended, solid, figured, moveable substance, existing without the mind” to actually exist.
First, we find no and we can find no evidence whatsoever which would lead us to believe
its existence. As he puts it:
Either you perceive the being of Matter immediately or mediately. If
immediately, pray inform me by which of the senses you perceive it. If
mediately, let me know by what reasoning it is inferred from those things which
you perceive immediately. 56
I have no reason for believing the existence of Matter. I have no immediate
intuition thereof: neither can I immediately from my sensations, ideas, notions,
actions, or passions, infer an unthinking, unperceiving, inactive Substance–either
by probable deduction, or necessary consequence. … no sign or symptom
whatever that leads to a rational belief of Matter. 57
Second, Berkeley denies the existence of “material substance” because he finds
the notion itself to be entirely empty of any meaning; we know that the thing described
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by a concept with no meaning cannot exist. Berkeley recounts how the dialogues look
into what exactly is meant by the term “matter.” It begins with the claim that “matter” is a
substance–but how can we know a substance without knowing any of its accidents or
sensible qualities? It is then claimed that “matter” is the substratum supporting the
sensible qualities–but how can such supporting relationship be conceived? It is then
claimed to be the archetype of ideas, the external cause of ideas, the instrument or
occasion of ideas, and finally, it is claimed to be something in general without any
positive content–in Berkeley’s words, “I know not what is meant by its existence, or how
it exists. … its where, its how, its entity, or anything belonging to it.” 58
In Berkeley’s view, “material substance” is just a name introduced by
philosophers to denote a kind of existence independent from the mind. However, close
examination reveals that, the “material substance” they contend for “is an Unknown
Somewhat (if indeed it may be termed somewhat), which is quite stripped of all sensible
qualities, and can neither be perceived by sense, nor apprehended by the mind.” 59 And so,
it is “no more than a hypothesis; and a false and groundless one too.” 60 In the end,
“Matter comes to nothing.” 61
Some Unique Strengths of Berkeley’s Idealism
In addition to dismantling the concept of “material substance,” Berkeley calls to
attention several important strengths of his Idealism.
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Confirming the common sense
First, Berkeley argues that his Idealism is no more and no less than what we
actually posit when carrying on our everyday living. It is not a “novelty,” as his critics
claim, but the common folk’s common sense. For, to a common folk, what he perceives
by sense is what he calls real and thinks it really exists; what he does not perceive, he
calls unreal and thinks that it does not exist. And this is precisely how Berkeley’s
Idealism understands reality as well. It is those who uphold Physicalism that actually
claim something entirely opposite to common sense. As Berkeley describes,
That the qualities we perceive are not [really] on the objects: that we must not
believe our senses: that we know nothing of the real nature of things, and can
never be assured even of their existence: that real colors and sounds are nothing
but certain unknown figures and motions: that motions are in themselves neither
swift nor slow: that there are in bodies without extensions, without any particular
magnitude or figure: that a thing stupid, thoughtless, and inactive, operates on a
spirit: that the least particle of a body contains innumerable extended parts–these
are the novelties, these are the strange notions which shock the genuine
uncorrupted judgment of all mankind; and being once admitted, embarrass the
mind with endless doubts and difficulties. 62
Combating skepticism
As a related point, Berkeley thinks that his Idealism is particularly effective in
combating skepticism, a worrisome plague that was particularly prevalent in his time. It
was claimed that the philosophers knew better, for they knew the “real” nature of things
behind the mere appearances seen by other people. Consequently, endless doubts are
planted in people’s minds when they are told that
You may indeed know that fire appears hot, and water fluid; but this is no more
than knowing what sensations are produced in your own mind, upon the
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application of fire and water to your organs of sense. Their internal constitution,
their true and real nature, you are utterly in the dark as to that. 63
It seems, then, we are altogether put off with the appearances of things, and those
false ones too–The very meat I eat, and the cloth I wear, have nothing in them
like what I see and feel. … what any one of them is in its own true nature, I
declare positively I know not. And the same is true with regard to every other
corporeal thing. And, what is more, we are not only ignorant of the true and real
nature of things, but even of their existence. 64
By claiming an absolutely objective “reality” outside the mind distinct from the
ways they are perceived, this “sophisticated” Physicalism in effect denies sensible things
in everyday life to be real. But Berkeley reasons, “That a thing should be really perceived
by my senses, and at the same time not really exist, is to me a plain contradiction;” and so
he says, “it is my opinion that the real things are those very things I see, and feel, and
perceive by my senses. These I know; and, finding they answer all the necessities and
purposes of life, have no reason to be solicitous about any other unknown beings.” 65
There is no valid reason to be skeptical about the real nature or even the very existence of
things we sense. This is because
I should not have known them but that I perceived them by my senses; and
things perceived by the senses are immediately perceived; and things
immediately perceived are ideas; and ideas cannot exist without the mind; their
existence therefore consists in being perceived; when, therefore, they are actually
perceived there can be no doubt of their existence. 66
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Pointing toward God
Berkeley emphasizes that his Idealism is especially effective in pointing out for
people the existence of an infinitely perfect Mind, i.e., God. This is because, it is obvious
that ideas cannot exist other than in a mind; it is equally obvious that they do not depend
on our finite minds, seeing that it is beyond our power to determine what sensible ideas
come to mind. We are thus led to infer that “there must be some other Mind wherein they
exist. As sure, therefore, as the sensible world really exists, so sure is there an infinite
omnipresent Spirit who contains and supports it.” 67 It is according to the laws established
by this Mind that sensible ideas exhibit themselves to us finite minds. Hence, one cannot
help but realizing “There is a mind which affects me every moment with all the sensible
impressions I perceive. And, from the variety, order, and manner of these, I conclude the
Author of them to be wise, powerful, and good, beyond comprehension.” 68
A scripture verse Berkeley highly favors is “in God we live and move and have
our being.” (Acts 17:28) He points out that people usually first believe the existence of
God, which is a bigger hurdle of faith to overcome, and then they believe the
omniscience of God, which is relatively easier to accept once God is believed to exist.
His Idealism leads people to belief in God through the opposite order, which is easier to
come by. He explains, “Men commonly believe that all things are known or perceived by
God, because they believe the being of a God; whereas I, on the other side, immediately
and necessarily conclude the being of a God, because all sensible things must be
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perceived by Him.” 69 “This furnishes you with a direct and immediate demonstration,
from a most evident principle; … an infinite Mind should be necessarily inferred from the
bare existence of the sensible world. 70
Affirming the world around us
Last but not least, Berkeley thinks that Physicalism renders the world around us
illusory and with no apparent purpose–because God does not need such a world of
physical things to effect ideas in our mind, and it is contradictory to “Divine wisdom, to
make something in vain, or do that by tedious roundabout methods which might have
been performed in a much more easy and compendious way.” 71 In contrast, his Idealism
recognizes the world around us to be a world of ideas for our mind, as the direct result of
divine ingenuity under God’s purpose; it is a world suffused with divine wisdom and
intention, a world radiant of the personal presence of God.
“A World for Us”: A Recent Update
John Foster’s recent book offers us a good understanding of modern day Idealists’
stand on Berkeley’s classic thesis. 72 In the Preface, Foster states that “the aim of this
work is to establish that the existence of the physical world is logically sustained by the
world-suggestive way in which, under God’s ordinance and authority, things are disposed
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to appear at the human empirical viewpoint.” 73 He underlines the fact that this Idealistic
understanding of the world stands in sharp contrast to materialistic view “which takes the
world to have an existence that is both logically independent of the human mind and
metaphysically fundamental.” And he argues that “it is only by accepting the Idealist
thesis that we can represent the physical world as having the empirical immanence it
needs if it is to form a world for us.” 74
In positioning his own work in relation to Berkeley, Foster states that “Berkeley’s
version of this Idealism is not entirely to my liking. In particular, he has what is, from my
standpoint, an impoverished view of the sorts of entity and property that the Idealistic
world can contain. … But it is to his vision of a world that is created by the orderly way
in which God brings about our sensory experiences that my own approach can be
ultimately traced.” 75 In other words, even though modern knowledge may warrant
relaxation of certain stipulations in Berkeley’s theory, which will result in a more
enriched world of ideas, Berkeley’s Idealism is substantively endorsed by Idealists of our
day.
The Sacramental Core of Berkeley’s Idealism
In this segment, I zoom in on a quintessential understanding of Berkeley’s
Idealism, namely, the sacramentality of embodied experiences. I begin by highlighting a
distinctively Berkeleian theme, i.e., sense experiences are the language God uses to
communicate with us. I follow that by describing Berkeley’s two fascinating observations
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regarding our sense perceptions, which supply fascinating support to his sacramental
understanding of sense perception. First is his observation that the concept of “distance”
is learned through experiences of association and not directly perceived. Second is his
observation that different types of sense experiences (e.g., sight, touch, etc.) do not really
have any necessary connection with one another; they are regularly associated together in
our understanding as the result of experience. In other words, our sense experiences are
the way they are as the result of God’s personal intentions and intimate workings, and so
sense experiences are God’s communication to us.
The Upshot: Sense Experiences as Communication from God
Like other theologians who admire the Creator because of the creation, Berkeley
recognizes the divine attributes through the world around us. For example, he repeatedly
calls to attention that, the fact that our myriad sense experiences appear in a law-like
order and steadiness, immensely intricate and stunningly coherent at the same time,
witnesses to the wisdom and benevolence of its Author. The regularity of the world
allows us to learn about its laws, and this “gives us a sort of foresight which enables us to
regulate our actions for the benefit of life. … without this we should be eternally at a
loss.” 76 Creation also attests to the divine attribute of faithfulness, in that God sustains us
through every moment of our existence. As Berkeley puts it, “Whenever the course of
nature is interrupted by a miracle, men are ready to own the presence of a superior agent.
But, when we see things go on in the ordinary course they do not excite in us any
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reflection; their order and concatenation … [in fact are] an argument of the greatest
wisdom, power, and goodness in their Creator.” 77
More importantly, the extremely immanent nature of God’s presence to us is
made exceptionally clear through the way Berkeley understands the ideas in our mind,
i.e., all of our sense perceptions are created and sustained for us by an All-Perfect Mind.
That is to say, humans experiencing sense perception is the direct result of God
immediately present and acting on their minds. In Berkeley’s words, “God concerns
Himself so nearly in our affairs,” that He is “a Spirit who is intimately present to our
minds, producing in them all that variety of ideas or sensations which continually affect
us, on whom we have an absolute and entire dependence, in short ‘in whom we live, and
move, and have our being.’” 78 When unpacking the relationship between visual and
tangible experiences, Berkeley even writes endearingly that “visible ideas are the
Language whereby the governing Spirit on whom we depend informs us what tangible
ideas he is about to imprint upon us, in case we excite this or that motion in our own
bodies.” 79 According to Berkeley, God is made manifest by all that we experience
because, just as the way we experience other finite spirits like ourselves
after the same manner we see God; all the difference is that, whereas someone
finite and narrow assemblage of ideas denotes a particular human mind,
whithersoever we direct our view, we do at all times and in all places perceive
manifest tokens of the Divinity: everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise
perceive by sense, being a sign or effect of the power of God; as is our
perception of those very motions which are produced by men. 80
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Observation #1: “Distance” is a Notion Taught by Experience, rather than Perceived
Directly
To demonstrate the utter closeness of God unveiled by his Idealism, in A New
Theory of Vision, Berkeley deconstructs our seemingly mundane experience of distance.
In his words,
it is shown (1) that distance or outness is neither immediately of itself perceived
by sight, nor yet apprehended or judged of by lines and angles, or anything that
has a necessary connection with it; but (2) that it is only suggested to our
thoughts by certain visible ideas and sensations attending vision, which in their
own nature have no manner of similitude or relation either with distance or
things placed at a distance; but, by a connection taught us by experience, they
come to signify and suggest them to us, after the same manner that words of any
language suggest the ideas they are made to stand for. 81
The concept of “distance” is developed over time in our mind as the result of
repeatedly experiencing regularities of certain visual ideas of varying degrees of outness
vis-à-vis us always being associated with certain series of tangible ideas. “Distance”
denotes a customary connection regarding what ideas of touch will be imprinted on our
minds in consequence of such and such actions when such and such visual ideas come
up; it does not mark out for us some external things actually existing outside of us. It has
become such a habitual notion to us through daily living that we can predict what
tangible experience will come up as the result of certain visual experiences. Tellingly, it
is not so for blind men, as Berkeley keenly observes,
a man born blind, being made to see, would, at first, have no idea of distance by
sight; the sun and stars, the remotest objects as well as the nearer, would all seem
to be in his eye, or rather in his mind. The objects intromitted by sight would
seem to him (as in truth they are) no other than a new set of thoughts or
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sensations, each whereof is as near to him as the perceptions of pain or pleasure,
or the most inward passions of his soul. 82
That newborns cannot react properly to visual experiences until sometime after is
a well-known fact, which should offer strong support to Berkeley’s point. Berkeley
validates his view with a further treatise Theory of vision vindicated and explained. In it,
we learn about the case of a thirteen-year-old boy who was blind from infancy as the
result of cataracts. As Berkeley predicted, when his vision was restored by an English
surgeon by the name of William Cheselden, he had severe difficulties comprehending
visual experiences, especially the idea of “distance.” Two-dimensional paintings
confused him. Rather than knowing it instinctually, he had to learn from scratch how to
associate tactile experiences with visual ones.
Observation #2: None of the Sensory Properties We Experience Have Any Necessary
Connection to One Another; They Are Known to Manifest Together Only Through
Experience
Furthermore, Berkeley makes the astonishing statement that various types of
sense experience (e.g., sight, sound, touch, etc.) are completely distinct ideas which
possess no necessary connection whatsoever with one another. As he explains,
That which I see is only variety of light and colors. That which I feel is hard or
soft, hot or cold, rough or smooth. What similitude, what connection have those
ideas with these? Or how is it possible that anyone should see reason to give one
and the same name to combinations of ideas so very different before he had
experienced their co-existence? We do not find there is any necessary connection
betwixt this or that tangible quality and any color whatsoever. And we may
sometimes perceive colors where there is nothing to be felt. All which doth make
it manifest that no man, at first receiving of his sight, would know there was any
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agreement between this or that particular object of his sight and any object of
touch he had been already acquainted with. 83
To demonstrate his point more clearly, Berkeley invites the reader to think
counterfactually:
Now, that there is no necessary connection between these two distinct extensions
is evident from hence: because our eyes might have been framed in such a
manner as to be able to see nothing but what were less than the minimum
tangible. In which case it is not impossible we might have perceived all the
immediate objects of sight, the very same that we do now: but unto those visible
appearances there would not be connected those different tangible magnitudes
that are now. Which shows the judgments we make of the magnitude of things
placed at a distance from the various greatness of the immediate objects of sight
do not arise from any essential or necessary but only a customary tie, which has
been observed between them. 84
“We see God”: A Quick Summary
To conclude my introduction of Berkeley’s Idealism via the previous two
sections, it helps to quote Sigmund Bonk’s remark on the sacramental core of Berkeley’s
Idealism. Bonk reminds us that, unlike what his philosophical critics usually focus on,
“Berkeley did not simply ‘deny’ matter … but he interpreted it newly, namely as a
(primarily visual) language by which God speaks to us … the idea is that we can see God
through this delicate, diaphanous medium if we look at physical nature in the right
(contemplative) manner.” 85 As to God’s purpose for communicating to us through the
world of ideas, Berkeley himself says it the best in the Fifth Dialogue of his later work
Alciphron:
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To me, it seems that man can see neither deep nor far, who is not sensible of his
own misery, sinfulness, and dependence; who does not perceive that , this
present world is not designed or adapted to make rational souls happy; who
would not be glad of getting into a better state; and who would not be overjoyed
to find that, the road leading there was the love of God and man, the practicing
every virtue, the living reasonably while we are here on earth, proportioning our
esteem to the value of things, and so using this world as not to abuse it. … Can
there be a higher ambition than to overcome the world, or a wiser than to subdue
ourselves, or a more comfortable doctrine than the remission of sins, or a more
joyful prospect than that of having our base nature renewed and assimilated to
the Deity, our being made fellow-citizens with angels, and sons of God? 86
Berkeley’s “Divine Language” View of the Physical World and
the Reason for the Tremendous Intricacy in the Organization of the World of Ideas
Berkeley’s remark in Alciphron quoted above is one of those rare occasions where
he directly reflected on God’s purpose for placing us in a world of ideas. Given that
Berkeley’s focus is metaphysics and not theology, he simply declares that “I do not
design to trouble myself with drawing corollaries from the doctrine I have hitherto laid
down,” and he allows that “others may, so far as they shall think convenient, employ
their thoughts in extending it farther, and applying it to whatever purposes it may be
subservient to.” 87 In this segment, I show that the answer to the challenge Berkeley
acknowledged regarding his Idealism is actually already given by himself, albeit only
briefly and generally, i.e., for the sake of effective person-making. The detailed workings
of that answer are amply elaborated in the sacramental theology of the world. Recent
theological reflections on the phenomenon of “virtual reality” in a way offer support for
Berkeley as well. A specification of the sacramental view of the physical reality is the
Theology of the Body, which appreciates embodiment as the very avenue for humans to
86

George Berkeley, “Alciphron,” Fifth Dialogue, paragraph #5.

87

Berkeley, “A New Theory of Vision,” paragraph #149.

323
be made into the image of God. Notably, both the sacramental theology and the Theology
of the Body presume Dualism. As will become clear, however, their central sacramental
theme of person-making can only be effectively conveyed in Berkeley’s Idealistic world
of ideas.
Why Such Abundant Intricacy in the Organization of the World of Ideas?–A Question
Berkeley Only Answered Very Briefly
When addressing objections to his Idealism, there is only one time when Berkeley
did admit it to have some force, and that is the observation that the world of ideas is
nonetheless organized with such a tremendous degree of intricacy. Berkeley ponders:
to what purpose serves that curious organization of plants, and the animal
mechanism in the parts of animals; might not vegetables grow, and shoot forth
leaves of blossoms, and animals perform all their motions as well without as with
all that variety of internal parts so elegantly contrived and put together; which,
being ideas, have nothing powerful or operative in them, nor have any necessary
connection with the effects ascribed to them? If it be a Spirit that immediately
produces every effect by a fiat or act of his will, we must think all that is fine and
artificial in the works, whether of man or nature, to be made in vain. If so, why
may not the Intelligence do it, without his being at the pains of making the
movements and putting them together? Why does not an empty case serve as
well as another? The like may be said of all the clockwork of nature, great part
whereof is so wonderfully fine and subtle as scarce to be discerned by the best
microscope. In short, it will be asked, how, upon our principles, any tolerable
account can be given, or any final cause assigned of an innumerable multitude of
bodies and machines, framed with the most exquisite art, which in the common
philosophy have very apposite uses assigned them, and serve to explain
abundance of phenomena? 88
The best response Berkeley was able to come up with amounts to an appeal to the
relative weights of different evidences. He argues, “though there were some difficulties
relating to the administration of Providence, and the uses by it assigned to the several
parts of nature, which I could not solve by the foregoing principles, yet this objection
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could be of small weight against the truth and certainty of those things which may be
proved a priori, with the utmost evidence and rigor of demonstration.” 89
The question of why God “would be at the expense (if one may so speak) of all
that art and regularity to no purpose” is particularly puzzling when we consider the
phenomenon of growth and development, or “evolution” in modern-day term, for “the
slow and gradual methods observed in the production of natural things do not seem to
have for their cause the immediate hand of an Almighty Agent.” 90 To this Berkeley
answers by simply saying that, in fact, “the operating according to general and stated
laws is so necessary for our guidance in the affairs of life, and letting us into the secret of
nature, that without it all reach and compass of thought, all human sagacity and design,
could serve to no manner of purpose.” 91 As we shall see in the following segments, the
amazing degree of intricacy in the way which this world of ideas is presented to us in fact
is necessary–not only for the practical reason of enabling us to carry about everyday life
but, much more importantly, for the spiritual reason of effectively making us into the
“children of God” with its convincing concreteness.
An Illumination from the Importance of “Concreteness” According to Karl Rahner’s
Sacramental Theology of the World
Karl Rahner’s sacramental theology of the world helps us understand that human
“materiality”–which according to Berkeley is a set of ideas God presents to our mind–
offers the concrete context required for the finite and free human spirit to actualize itself
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into what God intends it to become. 92 Specifically, Rahner’s anthropology conceptualizes
the human person as responsible and free, and the material world of time and space
provides the “concrete mediation” for humans to exercise their freedom through concrete
activities and thus to decide about them very selves.
From the point of soteriology, Rahner emphasizes that Christianity is an
“incarnational faith” which situates the process of salvation squarely in the concrete
history–as epitomized in the Christ event. Due to the finite nature of the human spirit, it
has to be through the concrete reality of the “material” world that God is most clearly
revealed and humans truly saved. Specifically, on the one hand, God’s supernatural
reality is revealed to us through the “categorical” reality of the concrete world, and
“God’s gift of himself, the gratuitously elevated determination of man … is itself always
mediated categorically.” 93 And so, as Berkeley’s Idealism would completely endorse and
offer better account for, “there is for Christianity no separate and sacral realm where
alone God is to be found.” 94 On the other hand, similar to Hick’s seeing the world as a
cognitive distance for human self-discovery, Rahner understands that, for the human
subject, “his subjectivity and his free, personal self-interpretation take place precisely in
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and through his being in the world;” 95 “the subject’s self-alienation in world is precisely
the way in which the subject discovers himself and affirms himself in a definitive way.” 96
A Second Illumination from “Virtual Reality” and the Felt Necessity of Concreteness via
Embodiment
Interestingly, “virtual reality” created by information technology provides a
modern way to appreciate Berkeley’s Idealistic world of ideas–as Bruce Umbaugh
suggests, the universe may be seen as “virtual world all the way down.” 97 More
importantly, recent theological reflections on the phenomenon of “virtual reality” offer
support to Rahner’s emphasis on the soteriological essentiality of existential concreteness
through embodiment–the effect brought by none other than the degree of intricacy of the
world Berkeley marveled. The key insight is this: to the extent that a “virtual” setting
fails to be concrete, it fails to produce existential effects for the purpose of personmaking.
As Gary Mann describes, virtual reality is the result of human interface with the
computer through which sense perceptions are manipulated to generate the feel of
existing in an artificially created environment. 98 In the words of an expert in the field,
virtual reality can seem very real: “It's not like television or a personal computer. With
those you're still on the outside. With virtual reality, once that field of view surrounds
you and controls everything you see, you're inside. That paradigm shift of perception
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becomes absolutely compelling.” 99 In their editorial on cyber spirituality, Yust, Hyde,
and Ota talk about “avatar,” a type of virtual reality through which even the embodied
self can be manipulated. 100 They report that “Massively multi-player online role-playing
games (MMPORGs) often involve the creation of avatars: virtual characters that embody
aspects of the self a player wants to ‘try on’ or ‘try out’ in the virtual world of the game.
The term ‘avatar’ comes from the Sanskrit and refers to the Hindu concept of a deity
(most often Vishnu) that manifests in an incarnate (animal or human) form
(Dictionary.com 2010).” 101
One aspect of being concrete is the lack of malleability to human will, as
Berkeley points out when differentiating sense ideas from fancies. And so, one concern
over virtual reality is its potential underlying message that human redemption is to escape
from the constraints of the embodied world and into the realm created according to one’s
own liking. The virtual realm does not operate according to parameters established by
God; instead, it is “a world in which one can be the determinative deity-virtually
omniscient, omnipotent, and eternal.” 102 Another aspect of being concrete is the feel of
realness; to the extent it is felt real, it forms the person–for better or for worse. To the
extent that virtual reality is seriously engaged as it would be in a physical environment,
Yust et al. report positively that inhabiting an alternative identity through an avatar
“provides ‘an education both as to the character of that which is sought and in self99
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knowledge’” for participating young gamers. 103 However, given that human beings are
embodied beings, the fullest human presence can only be embodied presence; and so
some see virtual reality as creating a highly diluted notion of presence. 104 This is seen as
particularly detrimental to the soteriological aim of becoming a self-giving person,
because “the body expresses the soul and so the giving of the whole human person
generally requires bodily presence.” 105
When concluding his article on theology related to information technology, Gary
Mann underscores several areas for further work in order for Christian theology to be
relevant for the information age. Mann’s points are very valid and warrant being quoted
in full length. Unbeknown to Mann who is suspicious of the gnostic tendency in the
notion of “disembodiment,” his points capture both the theological strengths and the
cultural importance of Berkeley’s Idealism for us today. Mann advocates:
1. Restoring a sense of an active divine presence immanent in the processes of
the natural world would assist in revisioning the relation of God and the world in
ways more understandable for a culture with a scientific conceptual
framework…. so that (1) religious and theological affirmations are understood to
be relevantly connected with the natural world and (2) a prophetic-critical voice
can be heard in science and technology.
2. Renewed study in the doctrinal area of the Incarnation and sacramentology,
focusing on the relationship between the divine spirit/presence and the natural
body/world, is integral to any attempt to restore a sense of the sacredness and
value of the whole creation.
3. Most importantly, theology must seriously consider the consequences of the
Greek dichotomy of body and spirit for our culture, a dichotomy which is at the
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heart of any gnostic movement. The notion of the person as a psychosomatic
unity must continue to be reconsidered, particularly in light of current scientific
assertions of the mind/body as being a multilevel organism and not two separable
entities. This also calls for the formulation of an understanding of physical
embodiment, envisioning how our physical body and its functioning contextually
impacts on our theology. …
Lastly, theologians must incorporate into our theological reflection, construction,
and teaching a ‘bodily epistemology’–the knowing through our bodies in their
psycho-somatic wholeness. … a concretization of knowing. 106
A Third Illumination from the Theology of the Body
Human embodiment has been investigated in theology since the time of Church
Fathers. For example, as Hans Boersma’s recent book explains, Gregory of Nyssa
understands embodiment as being in service for our growth in virtue. 107 Similarly, Adam
Cooper’s recent book looks into how St. Maximus the Confessor understands the status
and the function of the human body and the world in God’s economy of salvation. 108 A.
Cooper reports that St. Maximus understands the material world in general and the bodily
reality in particular “as a single though indispensable dimension of a multi-faceted
symbolic pedagogy that engages the soul through history, scripture, Christ, and Church;”
as such, they hold “a definitive, constitutive place in God’s creative, saving, and
sanctifying economies.” 109 In our time, Karl Rahner also addressed the theological
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question of the body in the order of salvation in terms of its concreteness for freedomexercising. 110
However, as M. T. Prokes tells us, the phrase “body theology” came into
prominence only in the 1960s, and that is not a mere coincidence. 111 Specifically, this is
the time when “matter” itself has been understood in a brand new way, thanks to modern
physics, and so “A Theology of the Body would not have been able to emerge with the
same scope and intensity prior to the twentieth century.” 112 Prokes defines the Theology
of the Body as faith seeking understanding concerning the body and the material universe
and, to her, “to reflect theologically upon the embodied person is to penetrate ever more
deeply, in the light of Revelation and Tradition, into the sacred mystery of the total
person from the perspective of corporeality.” 113
Prokes stresses that, to attempt any faith understanding of the body, “there must
be an abiding awareness of the eschatological destiny of the whole body-person;” 114 that
is to say, the theological significance of the body should be probed under the proper
background, namely, the eschatological destiny of the person. More specifically,
“theological reflection on the embodied person springs from what has been divinely
revealed concerning the human vocation to be ‘the image and likeness of God.’” 115 The
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purpose of the body can only be properly derived from the vocation of the person given
by God. In addition, like Gary Mann, Prokes thinks that “in approaching the study of
body, the co-inherence of Christian doctrines will prompt theologians to see the manner
in which there is an illumination of body meaning from doctrine to doctrine.” 116 Given
the organic coherence of all Christian doctrines, new theological insights gained
regarding human embodiment should bring new insights to other theological subjects as
well. Lastly, Prokes calls to attention “the immense spectrum that the discipline spans. As
Ratzinger notes, this extends from the ‘wavicles’ of matter tracked at dizzying speeds, to
the inner perichoretic relations of Trinitarian life.” 117 Given the innately interdisciplinary
nature of the topic of the body, empirical knowledge from related fields helps deepen
theological understandings of the body through faith and revelation.
The vocational purpose of embodiment is made particularly salient by Pope John
Paul II’s Theology of the Body. Carl Andersen and Jose Granados’ recent book does an
excellent job in explaining the Pope’s theology through the theme of the human vocation
to love. 118 Even though John Paul II’s theology was generated specifically for the marital
context, it is applicable for all aspects of our embodied life. The body has been wrongly
looked upon as something to fear, to worship, or to despise. The right understanding of
the body is discovered when its meaning is sought in relation to the meaning of the whole
person. In short, the body is both God’s call for us to love, and the path of fulfillment for
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human beings, which is none other than the path of love. Livio Melina sums it well by
saying that “The body speaks of God; it reveals his goodness and wisdom. It also speaks
of us … our vocation to love. This is a prophetic word, pronounced by the body in God’s
name, revealing to us the path to take toward human fulfillment: the way of love.” 119
First, the human body pronounces God’s call for us to love others, our Godordained vocation. The call is most clearly revealed in the differences in human
embodiment and the complementarities among them as the result. Andersen and
Granados observe that “The fact that man and woman are different keeps them aware of
their need for each other, reminding them that they are not complete in themselves. This
difference (inscribed, remember, in the male and female body) is thus the beginning of a
dynamic movement that takes each partner beyond him–or herself.” 120 It is easy to see
that our fundamental need for and the resulting drive toward one another applies not only
to the male-female relations but to all human interactions due to the differences in our
particular embodied expressions.
Second, the body is also God’s path for us to love; human embodiment is the way
for us to answer God’s call to love and, through it, to find our fulfillment. This is because
the body is precisely that portal through which we come in contact with others and with
the outside world. Because the human person is created to be the Image of God, who is
Love, John Paul II writes in his first encyclical that “Man remains a being that is
incomprehensible for himself, his life is senseless, if love is not revealed to him, if he
does not encounter love.” (RH, 10) Thanks to our God-given body, “Man’s self119
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consciousness–his awareness of his true dignity–comes to fruition … in a gesture of
hospitality toward the world that comes to knock at the door of his [bodily] senses.” 121
Therefore, “The body is like a road on which our freedom journeys to God and grows in
relationship with him;” 122 it is the path through which we are made to become like God.
The Compatibility of Berkeley’s Idealism with Christian Orthodoxies
In this section, I demonstrate the strong compatibility between Berkeley’s
Idealism and Christian orthodoxies, which is assumed to be nonexistent by many if not
most people. In the first segment, I begin by outlining New Testament scriptures related
to “Resurrection,” followed by related insights generated from recent biblical scholarship.
Through these, I intend to uncover a more accurate understanding of the biblical
perspective on postmortem embodiment under the notion of “Resurrection.” In the
second segment, I discuss what “Resurrection” meant during the time of the Church
Fathers. Through it, I intend to gain a better grasp of the rationale and thus the spiritual
insights they intended to convey under the creed of “bodily resurrection.” In the third
segment, I show the strengths of Berkeley’s Idealism through its unique illuminations for
the central Christian beliefs such as Incarnation, Trinity, and Creation ex nihilo. All these
made clear that Berkeley’s Idealism is not only sound when tested under the light of
Christian orthodoxies, it is often required in order to effectively communicate core
Christian insights.
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Biblical Teachings on “Resurrection”
An Outline of All the Related New Testament Verses
In this segment, I outline all New Testament passages related to “Resurrection” in
the order as they appear in the New Testament. These verses reflect the earliest Christian
understanding of resurrection in light of their experiences of Jesus’ resurrection. Before I
begin, one important thing to keep in mind is the largely silent posture of these verses
when it comes to the question of metaphysics. As John Honner keenly observes,
“traditional theology of the resurrection is less specific about ontological questions. …
The New Testament understanding of the resurrection of the dead also has its own
complex evolution. Because the biblical writers are more interested in ‘completion’ and
‘perfection’ than in ontology, talk about resurrection leaves questions about the nature of
the risen body and the locale of heaven, literally, ‘hanging in the air.’” 123 Consequently,
we should focus on the theological meanings they intended to convey.
Matthew 22: 23-32
This section in the Gospel of Matthew recounts Jesus’ exchange with some
Sadducees who claimed that there was no resurrection. They challenged Jesus with the
scenario of a woman who was married to seven brothers before she died, and they asked
him whose wife she will be upon resurrection. Above all, Jesus affirmed the reality of
resurrection with a scripture verse the Sadducees themselves would have been familiar
with, i.e., God declaring that “I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of
Jacob.” Jesus reasoned that the powerfulness of God entails that “He is God not of the
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dead, but of the living.” (22:32) Another important detail in this story is that Jesus
underscored the qualitatively different nature of the resurrected existence, saying “For in
the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are like angels in
heaven.” (22:30)
John 5:24-29; 6:35-40; 11:23-26
Some of these verses are part of Jesus’ “I am” teachings; others belong to the
story of Jesus’ raising Lazarus. The most salient theme here is that belief in Jesus is the
cause of passing from death to the resurrection life. For example, “I am the resurrection
and the life. Those who believe in me, even though they die, will live, and everyone who
lives and believes in me will never die.” (11:25-26) Also, we read about the two opposite
types of resurrection, namely, “those who have done good, to the resurrection of life, and
those who have done evil, to the resurrection of condemnation.” (5:29)
Acts 24:15
This verse is part of Acts’ account of Paul’s defense of himself before Felix,
where he states his belief in two opposite types of resurrections, i.e., “there will be a
resurrection of both the righteous and the unrighteous.”
Romans 6:4-13, 8:11
These verses in Romans spotlight the intrinsic connection between bodily
resurrection–which means here the resurrection to life–and spiritual renewal. For
example, we read Paul’s linking resurrection with baptism, saying that “Therefore we
have been buried with him by baptism into death, so that, just as Christ was raised from
the dead by the glory of the Father, so we too might walk in newness of life.” (6:4)
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Relatedly, these verses make clear the crucial role of the Holy Spirit in the believer’s
spiritual renewal and eventual resurrection, stating that “If the Spirit of him who raised
Jesus from the dead dwells in you, he who raised Christ from the dead will give life to
your mortal bodies also through his Spirit that dwells in you.” (8:11)
1 Corinthians 15
These passages probably are the best-known New Testament verses related to
resurrection. Theologically, Paul emphasizes the constitutive import of the factuality of
Jesus’ resurrection for the Christian faith, putting it succinctly that “if Christ has not been
raised, our preaching is in vain and so is your faith.” (15:14) If Jesus were not raised,
“you are still in your sins” (15:17), human strivings for the good are futile (15:30-32),
and death pronounces our final defeat. But, thanks to Jesus’ resurrection, the definitive
victory of Good over Evil has come to pass. Moreover, Paul situates resurrection–first of
Jesus and then of the believers–within God’s power and providence since the beginning
of time (15:54-57).
Technically, Paul responded to those who doubted resurrection by stressing the
tremendous transformation from the earthly life to the resurrected life, which is death.
For example, we read here Paul’s numerous contrasts of different types of embodiment,
especially the “physical body” versus the “spiritual body” (15:44). And we hear from
Paul that “flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, nor does the perishable
inherit the imperishable. Listen, I will tell you a mystery! We will not all die, but we will
all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trumpet. For the
trumpet will sound, and the dead will be raised imperishable, and we will be changed. For
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this perishable body must put on imperishability, and this mortal body must put on
immortality.” (15:50-53)
2 Corinthians 5:1-9
These verses in Paul’s second letter to the Corinthians carry on the previous
theme of the drastic contrast between the earthly body and the heavenly body. It is
expressed through the Apostle’s longing to leave behind “the earthly tent” in which we
groan under burden and to “have a dwelling from God, a house not made with hands”
(5:1) “so that what is mortal may be swallowed up by life” (5:4). Also, these verses
reiterate the themes in Romans regarding the centrality of spiritual renewal in the
Christian life–“whether we are at home [with the Lord] or away”–with “our aim to please
him” (5:9), as well as the indispensable role of the Holy Spirit given to us by God as “a
guarantee” (5:5) for the resurrected life.
Philippians 3:10-12, 21
Here, Paul once again specifies the route to attaining “resurrection from the
dead”– namely, through knowing “the power of his resurrection,” which is the power of
God, and “the sharing of his sufferings by becoming like him in his death” (3:10), which
is a Christ-like life of self-sacrifice. In other words, resurrection to life necessitates
spiritual renewal to a God-centered life. Paul also conveys his expectation of “our
humble body” being made different by Christ so as to “be conformed to the body of his
glory.” (3:21)
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1 Thessalonians 4:13-17
Here, Paul describes the multiple rounds of resurrection at Jesus’ Second Coming,
where “the dead in Christ will rise first” (4:16), in order to inspire hope regarding those
who died among the Thessalonians.
Revelation 20:4-5
Multiple rounds of resurrection are also implied by the author of Revelation when
he describes his apocalyptic vision that “I also saw the souls of those who had been
beheaded for their testimony to Jesus and for the word of God. … They came to life and
reigned with Christ a thousand years. (The rest of the dead did not come to life until the
thousand years were ended.) This is the first resurrection.” (20:4-5)
Summary
Scripture outlines above make clear that New Testament verses on the topic
convey a handful of repeated themes. The most important theme is the fundamental
import of the reality of resurrection for the validity of the Christian faith. Moreover,
resurrection is rooted in the power of God who ordained it from the very beginning as a
centered piece in his plan for our salvation. Also, there is a Trinitarian understanding of
the resurrection, which grounds it in the power of the Father, epitomizes it through the
sacrifice of the Son, and operates it through the continuous working of the Holy Spirit.
Consequently, resurrection cannot occur except in the context of spiritual renewal
through faith. In addition, we find an important nuance between the “resurrection to life,”
which is what most of the related scriptures describe, and the “resurrection to
condemnation.” This seems to imply the moral neutrality of “Resurrection” per se, and so
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the conditionality of postmortem embodiment upon the state of the spirit. On the
“technical” front, we notice the biblical emphasis of contrast rather than continuity
between the earthly body and the resurrected body, as well as the theme of multiple
rounds of resurrection.
Considering the fundamental differences in the character of Jesus and other
humans (i.e., Jesus never sinned) and in the purpose of Jesus and believers’ resurrection
(i.e., declarative versus salvific), I did not include New Testament accounts of Jesus’ own
resurrection. Here, I only want to note in agreement with Joanne Dewart that,
metaphysically speaking,
these three [resurrection] stories speak volumes about the ambivalence in the
belief of the church at the end of the first century concerning the resurrected
body of Jesus. … the overcoming of Thomas’ doubt … implies a physical body.
But, equally noteworthy, two of the other stories–that of Mary Magdalen, who
does not at first recognize her Lord and is forbidden to touch him, and that of
Jesus appearing among his disciples through closed doors imply precisely the
opposite. The question of the nature of Jesus’ risen body (and therefore of the
future resurrection body of the Christian) was still apparently an open one. 124
Insights from Biblical Scholarship
Even though the Christian belief in resurrection is articulated in the New
Testament and has its catalyst in the resurrection of Jesus, recent scholarship on the Old
Testament also sheds light on the Christian understanding. Joanne Dewart finds several
important Old Testament insights on resurrection that laid the infrastructure through
which the Christian hope was communicated. 125 First, there is “the ancient Israelite
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conviction that no true life was possible without the body, and, consequently, that any
existence of the soul separated from the body (as existence in Sheol was envisioned to
be) could be merely a pale shadow of real life.” 126 Second, postmortem existence was
necessitated by the gradually deepened appreciation of “the worth and [moral]
responsibility of the individual” and, more importantly, by the Jewish conviction in the
justice of God in the face of “the problem of the suffering of the just in its most acute
form–martyrdom.” 127 In her words, “with the covenant individualized and the notion of
divine faithfulness and justice deeply engrained, the hope of a retributive afterlife could
not be long in entering Jewish thought.” 128 Third, there was the understanding of a
“double-resurrection” where “some to everlasting life and some to shame and everlasting
contempt.” (Dn 12: 3)
New Testament scholarship on “Resurrection” generated observations similar to
what we noticed in the previous segment, where we directly examined relevant scriptures.
On the theological front, the most important thing to note is that several authors
underscored the inner relation between the believer’s bodily resurrection and spiritual
renewal. 129 On the technical front, first, there seems to be a consensus regarding the
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holistic nature of the Apostle Paul’s remarks on postmortem existence. 130 As Peter
Lampe underscores, God's salvation gets hold of the entire person and subjects the entire
person to a transforming and newly creating act called “Resurrection.” Second, there is
an agreement on the indispensability of embodiedness in postmortem existence.
According to Lampe, precisely because of this, Paul talks about “Resurrection” instead of
such things as “spiritual immortality” or “ascending souls;” without the bodily aspect of
this transformation, there would be no legitimate usage of the word “Resurrection.”
Third, scholars highlight the qualitative difference between the earthly body and the
resurrected body. This is made particularly clear by the scholarship on the spectrum of
meanings of the Greek word soma Paul uses in various occasions. As James Dunn
explains,
For Paul soma has a spectrum of meaning. The idea of body as physical, or of the
physicality of “body,” is only one end of the spectrum of Paul’s usage. For Paul
soma as denoting the human body includes the physical body but is not to be
simply identified with the physical body. Soma in Paul is more than the physical
body. A better way of characterizing its more typical connotation would be
embodiment. … In Paul’s most characteristic usage soma is the person as
embodied. 131
Dunn tries to support his thesis by the uniquely Pauline distinction, i.e., between
soma and sarx. He observes that
Paul seems to have deliberately pulled the two senses apart, and in soma to have
retained the Hebraic sense of the whole person, while using sarx with a negative
connotation more reminiscent of Greek’s Dualistic tendency. The two spectrums
of his usage overlap (Romans 8:13; 1 Corinthians 6:16). But more characteristic
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of Paul is the use of a more negative phrase to qualify the otherwise neutral
“body”–for example, “body of sin” (Romans 6:6), “mortal body” (Romans 8:11),
whereas “flesh” is more regularly negative without any qualifying phrase or
adjectives (most strikingly Romans 8:3-12). 132
And so, for Paul, “body” is not interchangeable with “physical body,” but denotes
“that wholeness of existence in the particularity of that existence in a particular
context.” 133 Specifically, in the earthly context of embodiment, “body” means that
particular form of existence characterized by physicality; but, in the different context of
resurrection, “body” shall denote the mode of being appropriate for that particular
context. Furthermore, in Dunn’s view, the verse “flesh and blood cannot inherit the
kingdom of God” clearly conveys the qualitative difference Paul intend to underscore
between the earthly and the resurrected bodies. He reasons that “in Paul’s usage, sarx is
consistently set in antithesis to pneuma (Romans 2:28; 8:4-9, 13; Galatians 3:3; 4:29;
5:16-17; 6:8; Philippians 3:3). It would be strange indeed, then, to find here that Paul
suddenly determined to associate the sarx positively with pneuma and to advocate not
just a resurrection body but a resurrected flesh.” 134
In addition, an interesting suggestion is made by Markus Cromhout who argues
for a processive connotation in Paul’s understanding of the after-life. 135 The scriptural
basis for his interpretation is the Greek word καταλυθῇ. When it is used by Paul
elsewhere, it describes a continuous process of being built up spiritually by God, for
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example, in terms of the Christian community. Thus, when the same word is used in 2
Corinthians 5:1 to describe the heavenly body as “a dwelling from God,” Cromhout
thinks that it refers to God’s continuous building up of the spiritual body after death, a
process of continuous transformation, to be completed at the parousia. In his words, “2
Corinthians 5:1 then tells what will happen immediately after death. When our earthly
tent-dwelling is ‘dissolved’ or ‘destroyed’ (aorist tense of καταλυθῇ suggests the moment
when death occurs), there immediately is a building from God (Hoekema 1994:106) …
What Paul is saying is that we will enter a glorious heavenly existence, not a temporary
one such as our present existence, clothed with a spiritual body which, for the moment,
will be under construction.” 136
Another intriguing suggestion is made by P. W. Gooch, who argues that Paul’s
statements regarding “the spiritual body (soma)” can be properly read in a “disembodied”
sense, that is, without a physical body with extension in space. 137 Gooch reasons, for
those who insist on the physicality of the resurrection body, they have to explain the
spiritual nature of the “spiritual body” by suggesting a new physicality defined by moral
characters, e.g., as being controlled by the Spirit; but a non-physical being can have these
moral characters just as well. And so, “everything the 'materialists' read in Paul’s
characterization of the resurrection body might be possible in a [physically] disembodied
resurrected state, except of course the materiality of the body. But materiality is not
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necessarily implied in anything Paul says, even on the materialists' own reading.” 138
Also, Gooch brings up the requirement of characteristic similarity for the resurrection to
be a state of closeness to God. He points out that “we shall see him face to face–and (here
is why that word is metaphorical) not because he will be like us but because we shall be
like him (I John 3. 2).” 139 But God is non-physical. It is difficult to fathom how a
physical resurrection would be state of closeness to God who is non-physical. So Gooch
concludes that “Exegetically, nothing in the text forbids this interpretative move, while
some things may encourage it; philosophically, the alternatives land us in muddles and
confusions, at least in the context of Christian theism.” 140
In sum, recent scholarship on resurrection confirms our findings through direct
engagement with the scripture. Theologically, the prime import of soteriological
concerns behind biblical witnesses of resurrection cannot be overemphasized, especially
regarding resurrection’s intrinsic connection to spiritual renewal and its reliance on the
Holy Spirit. Technically, there has been a crystallization of the holistic nature of biblical
discourses on resurrection; the notion that the scripture stipulates physicality in
resurrection is misconceived. In my view, both points stand as criticisms against the
Physicalist and the Dualist’s philosophizing of resurrection; and they offer strong
endorsement for Berkeley’s Idealistic take.
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Reading the Bible through the Lens of Idealism
A more general objection based on the scripture is that Berkeley’s Idealism is not
biblical. Berkeley’s own response is that “matter” in the bible carries the common folk’s
meaning, i.e., as perceived by senses; at the minimum, nowhere does the scripture
mention the notion of a “material substance” that exists independently from the mind,
especially God’s mind. James Spiegel argues further that not only is Berkeley’s Idealism
congruent with the bible, it is even favored by certain scriptural themes. 141 Above all, the
linguistic metaphor plays a central role in Berkeley’s Idealism; this metaphor is also
salient in the scriptures. For example, “If one carefully examines the creation account
given in the book of Genesis … there is a fruitful analogy between the manner in which
God created the world ex nihilo and the ordinary human experience of sharing ideas
through speech.” 142
Early Christian Traditions on the “Resurrection”
In this section, I introduce understandings of “Resurrection” according to
Christian traditions during the first four centuries, as described in Joanne Dewart’s book
in the Message of the Fathers of Church series. 143 As we shall see, debates over the
nature of the resurrection body under various historical contexts were rooted in concerns
from soteriology and anthropology. Even though many church fathers did hold a largely
Physicalistic notion of the resurrected body, once we realize the theological concerns
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behind their Physicalistic stand, it becomes clear that their concerns can be adequately
addressed within Berkeley’s Idealistic framework (e.g., the value of the created world
contra Gnosticism); what’s more, some of their concerns can only be addressed within
this Idealistic framework (e.g., maintaining personal identity through death).
Late 1st to Early 2nd Centuries: A Physicalistic Leaning
The original writings Dewart examined for this period belong to I Clement, II
Clement, the Didache, Ignatius, and Polycarp. She reports that, “Resurrection is not in
itself often a focus of discussion and, when it does occur, it is subordinated to other
concerns: exhortation to the Christian life, rejection of a docetic Christology or
expectation of the millennial reign of Christ.” 144 Moreover, Dewart observes “a lack of
clarity concerning the meaning these writers gave to ‘body’ and consequently concerning
the nature of the resurrection body,” 145 perhaps as the result of the topic not being the
focus of their attention. That said, she also observes that “in general the Apostolic Fathers
were moving towards a more material understanding of the resurrection than that held by
Paul and John.” 146 The reason she offered to account for this Physicalistic trend include:
the fight against Docetism; growing concerns over gnostic soteriologies; and the
assumption that a fleshly body is necessary for the just to share Christ’s triumphant reign
after the Second Coming.
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Latter Half of the 2nd Century: The Apologists
Dewart recounts that the Apologists during the latter half of the second century
had a different task: unlike the Apostolic Fathers who were mainly concerned with issues
internal to the Christian community, the Apologists strived to demonstrate to the outside
community the morality and the reasonableness of the Christian faith. A crucial aspect of
this task is establishing the credibility of the Christian eschatological hope, e.g., as
expressed in the doctrine of resurrection. As a whole, “no one coherent eschatological
picture emerges from this period. There were fundamental differences of opinion among
Christians themselves concerning the worth of the material world, the relationship
between body and soul, the nature of the eschatological kingdom and–tied in with all
these–the meaning of resurrection.” 147 Notably, it is during this period that the notion of
“chain consumption” was first addressed by Athenagoras. Athenagoras’ insistence on the
resurrection of the flesh was rooted in his concern for maintaining personal identity
through death. In his words, without resurrection of the original flesh, “the same parts
would not be united with one another in a way that conforms to their nature, nor would
the same men be reconstituted as they were.” 148
The 2nd to the 4th Centuries: Combating Gnosticism
The question of the nature of the resurrection body is at the center of the
crossfires during this period between Christian orthodoxy and Christian Gnosticism,
which shared a tendency to anticipate the resurrected body to be immaterial.
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Irenaeus’ famous treatises against the Gnostics fiercely defended the resurrection
of the flesh, his main reasons being “a strongly positive creationist theology (a position in
stark contrast with gnostic Dualism) and of an equally strong expectation of a material
millenarian kingdom.” 149 Tertullian also affirmed the goodness of the body by claiming
resurrection of the flesh. But he emphasized as well the sacramental role of the body for
the salvation of the soul, saying that “To such a degree is the flesh the pivot of salvation,
that since by it the soul becomes linked with God, it is the flesh which makes possible the
soul’s election by God,” for example, in baptism, laying on hands, anointing, etc. 150 To
the question of why the flesh is needed in resurrection, given that he conceives the
resurrection body will be like that of the angels who make no use of flesh, he simply
replied that “You will have no right, on the ground that the member will in the future be
inactive, to deny the possibility of its existing anew. For it is feasible for a thing to exist
anew and none the less be inactive.” 151 Methodius was also in favor of a fleshly
resurrection body, because his soteriology conceptualized the eternal life to be the earthly
life being restored to incorruptibility and immortality.
Origen was a lone voice who vigorously stressed the Pauline “spiritual body”
upon resurrection. He rebuked the idea of a fleshly resurrection by insisting on “the
resurrection in a way worthy of God,” saying that “our hope is not one of worms, nor
does our soul desire a body that has rotted.” [Principles II.x.8.] In addition, Origen
suggested that the nature of the risen body will depend on the spiritual state of the person.
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The 4th Century: Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine
Having gained imperial recognition, the church during this time was concerned
more with topics related to Christology and the Trinity. For those authors who did
become involved in the resurrection controversy during this period, a main reason was
the fear that the extreme asceticism of certain monasticisms at the time may lead to a
disdain towards the body. Gregory of Nyssa suggested the idea of “reassembly by
markings the soul put on the materials that previously formed its body” to alleviate the
fear of loss of identity upon resurrection. 152
Augustine’s repeated struggles with the question of the nature of the resurrection
body are thought-provoking. As Dewart explains, Augustine attempted to find the proper
role for the body to play in human salvation. The dilemma he wrestled without resolution
is this: on the one hand, Augustine held strong conviction about the intrinsic goodness of
the human body, which he advocated tirelessly in the polemic against the Manichees; on
the other hand, he cannot quite articulate the necessity of the risen body in the meeting
with God. And so, according to Dewart, “No writer of the patristic age tried harder than
Augustine to explain the mediating Pauline phrase, ‘spiritual body,’ to describe what
changes the earthly body will undergo.” 153 Augustine was certain that “The contraryminded are clearly those who believe that the risen body will be corporeal and that God
will, therefore, be seen materially.” 154
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Some Key Christian Doctrines Understood within Berkeley’s Idealism
In this section, I show how Berkeley’s Idealism seems to be a more coherent
framework for understanding central Christian doctrines on the nature of Jesus, the
Trinity, and God’s act of creation. I also address the question of whether Berkeley’s
Idealism is biblical. Overall, Berkeley appears to be correct in claiming that his Idealism
better demonstrates the truths in the Christian faith–the primary aim he in fact attributed
to all of his philosophical endeavors.
Eschatological Concepts
As explained above, Berkeley’s Idealism seems to be the only metaphysical
framework which renders a coherent account of a bodily resurrection. The “spiritual
body” is understood simply as a different set of perceptual ideas the mind experiences
after death. 155 The same goes with the beliefs in heaven and hell. 156 As Marc Hight points
out, in the Siris Berkeley comments approvingly of the Platonists’ claim that “heaven is
not defined so much by its local situation as by its purity,” for it is those who are pure in
heart that can see God face to face. 157 Hight comments that “on Berkeley’s account,
neither heaven nor hell are properly speaking locations, but rather shorthand locutions for
felicitous or infelicitous orderings of ideas perceived by finite minds. The resulting
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picture is both consonant with Christian dogma and makes it more amenable to
reason.” 158
Christological and Trinitarian Concepts
Marc Hight observes that a number of Christian doctrines appear intractable or at
least difficult to comprehend without the Idealistic framework. 159 The doctrine of
Incarnation is one of them. Hight explains:
As an individual, Christ is supposedly both fully human and fully divine. The
problem for materialists is that such a description is difficult to understand given
that the divine nature of Christ the Son must be immaterial yet the human nature
of the Son is clearly bodily. Since materialists interpret “body” as material while
denying that the divinity of God is material, we have the difficult outcome that
Christ is composed of distinct even incommensurable substances. 160
The answer Berkeley’s Idealism can offer seems more understandable: “Bodies in
Berkeley's system are collections of sensory idea. Thus he needs only to account for why
and how Christ qua divine can perceive passive sensory ideas associated with bodies like
those finite human beings typically possess.” 161 The concept of Trinity is another central
Christian mystery better illuminated by Berkeley’s Idealism. Hight explains:
The doctrine of the Incarnation reveals that the Son is essentially at least partly a
bodily being. For a materialist or a standard substance Dualist, that entails that
the Son is at least partly material. God, however, is consistently depicted as an
immaterial being. The mystery is thus deepened by the apparent claim that the
Holy Trinity involves the numerical unity of beings that are composed of
distinct, incommensurable substances. That claim appears to be simply
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incoherent. … For materialists there is no escaping the worry that believers are
forced to accept the unity of incommensurable substances when everywhere else
they are told to keep them separate. 162
In comparison, Berkeley’s Idealism avoids the awkward assertion that God is a
unified entity and yet with two distinct and incommensurable substances within. Hight
sees it to be the overall advantage of Berkeley’s Idealism that “when it comes to most of
the Christian mysteries, the deep problems are theological and not logical or
metaphysical, just as they ought to be for members of the faith.” 163
Creation ex nihilo
Interestingly, two self-identified non-Berkeleians detect that the Christian
doctrine of creation ex nihilo and continuous sustenance logically implies Berkeley’s
Idealism–just as Berkeley himself claimed, even though their aim is to show that these
Christian beliefs about creation are false. As P. A. Byrne argues, “we could not conceive
of a substantial nature of independently existing, enduring things being created out of
nothing by the mere will of a spiritual being. Only the sort of world Berkeley describes
can be imagined to have come into existence out of nothing as the direct result of the
volition of a mind, for it is nothing other than a series of volitions of a mind.” 164 To the
question “How can something material be thought of as coming into existence simply as
the result of the deliberate thought of mind (without interposing physical means)? His
reply is simple: only if the thing thus created is in reality something mental, a part of the
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furniture of the mind which does the creating.” 165 Moreover, Byrne thinks that the
doctrine of creation ex nihilo entails the dependence of the world upon God’s continuous
sustenance of it every moment of its existence; this radical degree of complete
dependence is much more adequately captured in Berkeley’s Idealistic framework.
Similarly, Nicholas Everitt thinks that the radical degree of dependence the world
is said to have upon the will of God and the omniscient amount of knowledge God is said
to have regarding the world resemble the dependence of mental states on a mind and the
knowledge content of a mind on the mind–both of which are best captured under
Berkeley’s notion of the world as divine ideas. 166 Everitt concludes that theism implies
Idealism; to that extent, Berkeley’s position is certainly more consistent than that of his
theistic critics.
Appreciating Berkeley’s Idealism in Light of the Mind-Brain Debate
In this section, I demonstrate the relative rigor of Berkeley’s Idealism by
examining the recent mind-brain debate in the philosophy of mind. As Vadim V.
Vasilyev describes, this philosophical investigation was brought to a new intensity when
David Chalmers raised the “hard problem of consciousness” during a 1994 conference. 167
Chalmers’ point is this, comparing to the relatively easy problem of identifying
psychological mechanisms of conscious states, the more difficult problem is: why and
how do physical activities in the brain give rise to mental states? To me, the “hard
165
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problem of consciousness” is the litmus test of all theories in philosophical anthropology.
As Fredrick Ferre rightly emphasized, a satisfactory portrait of the human person must be
both adequate enough to capture the essential features of subjective experience, and
coherent enough to honor the intuition of human wholeness. 168 I argue in this section
through what we learn from the mind-brain debate that such an adequate and coherent
portrait of the human person seems possible within Berkeley’s Idealism, according to
which the brain is a set of sense ideas in the mind (the “how” question), which perceives
them for the purpose of person-making (the “why” question).
Recall from above that John Hick objects to the Physicalist’s mind-brain identity
theory because no positive evidence for it seems possible or even conceivable beyond
merely begging the question. Also, he objects to calling mental states “epiphenomena” of
the brain without independent causal power, because arguments for this view are selfrefuting and cannot be logically made. To add to Hick’s points for a more complete
picture of the mind-brain debate, in this section I begin by discussing difficulties in the
Physicalist position. After that, I discuss main issues in the Dualist position. I finish by
discussing problems associated with the middle position between the two in three
versions of “dual-aspect Monism.” In a nutshell, the Physicalist’s account of the human
person lacks adequacy for human subjectivity, the Dualist’s account of the human person
lacks coherence for human wholeness, and the dual-aspect Monist’s account in the
middle lacks clarity. In comparison, Berkeley’s Idealism overcomes their issues while
preserving their insights–namely, the ontological unity of the person as emphasized by
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the Physicalist, the spiritual essence of the person as emphasized by the Dualist, and the
necessity of having them both as emphasized by the dual-aspect Monist.
Problems in the Physicalists’ Portrait of the Human Person
In this segment, I present the main issues in the Physicalist’s portrait of the human
person. To begin with, even though the Physicalists hold that the human being is entirely
physical, their portrait has features unrecognizable according to common understandings
of what it means to be purely physical. As Victor Reppert points out, by having to include
reason and purpose in its anthropology, Physicalism attributes “to matter powers and
liabilities when it is part of a mind that it lacks when it is, say, part of a rock. From the
point of view of materialist orthodoxy, this is simply not acceptable.” 169 More
damagingly, Physicalism leaves out main features of human consciousness, including
indivisibility, the subjective perspective, qualia, intentionality, meaning-seeking, and the
causal influence of mental concepts. After explaining these issues, I introduce the most
sustained attempt in the Physicalist camp to preserve the genuineness of mental life,
called “Non-reductive Physicalism,” and I give the reasons why it does not accomplish
this goal. I wrap up this segment by discussing how the discipline of theoretical
mathematics and the belief in divine causality bring serious challenge as well to the
Physicalist’s portrait of the human person.
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The Fundamental Incommensurability between the Mental vs. the Physical
Attributes
Hans Bynagle describes in detail the fundamental incommensurability between
attributes of the mental and of the brain states, termed “non-isomorphism”. 170 For
example, a violin note as the object of the mind may be smooth and continuous, whereas
its associated brain states are structured and discontinuous. Spatial perceptions are the
most obvious case in point. Even though these perceptions have to do with space, “the
‘spatial’ features of the objects of consciousness are not ‘in,’ or features of, the space
occupied by the brain–nor are they even spatially relatable to that region of space.” 171
Bynagle concludes that “The very existence of these heteromorphic ‘spatial’ features and
relations–features and relations that are not in or of the physical space of the brain and its
processes–indicates there is more to reality than what is comprehended by our ordinary
concepts of the physical.” 172
Attributes of Consciousness Unaccountable within Physicalism
So many key attributes of consciousness are unaccounted for and unaccountable
within Physicalism that a group of Physicalists decided to call themselves the “new
mysterians,” because they have more or less given up on explaining consciousness and
treated it instead as an unexplainable mystery. 173 For example, a key feature of
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consciousness is intentionality or “aboutness.” As Steven Evans explains, mental states
carry meaning; it is unfathomable how a purely physical entity or the states of it can
provide that meaning to itself without a mind. A completely physical process is not about
anything; it just is. 174 Another constitutive feature is the subjective or felt character of
mental experience, the sense of internality unknown to a purely physical entity. As Frank
Dilley points out, this paradigmatic difference “is not merely an empirical problem but a
conceptual one.” 175 Still another mental feature is rationality. As William Hasker points
out, this mental operation of deciphering right versus wrong or pros versus cons
presupposes certain interests and preferences and, most importantly, it presupposes a
central entity to which these teleological considerations matter in an integrative way. And
so, a holistic self rather than a mere bundle of particles must be posited behind these
mental operations, “since we cannot reasonably suppose the behavior of elementary
particles to be influenced directly by norms and objectives.” 176
This leads to another crucial attribute of the mind, i.e., its indivisibility. This
mental feature has been discussed under several other names, e.g., “simplicity,”
“wholeness,” “unity,” “oneness,” and “singularity.” They all refer to the fact that our selfawareness is unified with no divisible parts that could be separated from it and still exist,
like all physical things are known to have. Stewart Goetz calls this fact the “simple
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argument” for the non-physicality of the self. 177 Goetz supports his view by pointing to
the “binding” problem in neuroscience: researchers have tried without success to locate a
single point in the brain where diverse stimuli to numerous cells and regions of the brain
are unified into a singular effect that corresponds to the singular nature of the first-person
perspective. Goetz thinks that “the mere fact that the binding problem exists is
confirmation of the reality of the apparent standard simplicity of the self.” 178 Similarly,
William Hasker is convinced that a purely physical entity is incapable of integrating
multiple pieces of information from different parts of the brain into a unified experience.
In his words, “A person’s being aware of a complex fact does not consist of parts of the
person being aware of parts of the fact, nor can a complex state of consciousness exist
distributed among the parts of the complex object. Once we this we see that materialism
is in deep trouble.” 179
Frank Dilley captures the situation summarily that the non-physicality of the self
has been argued for based on the fact that “its contents (qualia, feelings, thoughts, etc.)
cannot be located in the physical world (inside or outside the [physical] self) and that its
ways of responding (reasoning, free will, intentionality, etc.) are not ways that material
bodies operate. … the data of consciousness, including qualia, mental content and
intentionality, cannot be reduced to physical properties.” 180 He reviews and reports that
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“The roster of the dissatisfied in contemporary philosophy of mind is impressive, as the
following observations will show. Many of those I cite had hoped to find solutions more
compatible with materialism, such as dual-aspect/panpsychist pictures of mind or as
property Dualism and new forms of epiphenomenalism, but they are unhappy with their
results, as they tell us.” 181 As the result, there exists “a ‘qualitative gap,’ ‘an impassable
chasm’ between mental states and brain processes that no one knows how to bridge from
the materialist side.” 182
As Dilley points out, if the Physicalist’s portrait of the human being is true, much
is at stake. For example, there would be no persistent self who exists over time, not to say
beyond death; content of beliefs and rationalities would be inconsequential; notions of
freewill and moral responsibility would be nonsensical. 183 What’s more, as John Hick
points out, Physicalists themselves would have to stop arguing for their case, because
they reduce all causality to the particle level which is mindless and deny any genuine
causal power of mental events, including reasoning. Fredrick Ferre catches the irony by
pointing out that “Science is, above all, a purposive, norm-guided, mentally initiated
activity. Philosophy joins it, when at its best, in manifesting just these qualities, whose
effectiveness is denied by naturalists. Such denials, in sum, would entail the death of both
philosophy and science.” 184
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Non-reductive Physicalism: A Physicalist’s Attempt to Adequately Capture the Mental
Life
The most sustained effort to bring the Physicalist’s portrait of the human person
closer to a genuine mental life is “Non-reductive Physicalism” developed by Nancy
Murphy. 185 Her theory belongs to Physicalism, because it denies any non-physical
element in the human person. The mental is nothing but the physical assembling in
certain complex ways. But she claims her theory to be non-reductive in that it tries to
preserve meaning, freedom, and responsibility; it does so by acknowledging them as
functions of the physical brain influenced by environmental factors including society,
culture, and God. More specifically, Murphy conceives the mental as “supervening” upon
the physical, which means the mental depends on the physical and yet is not reducible to
it. She thinks that the “supervening” relation does not mean that the mental is determined
by the physical upon which it supervenes, because the mind can exercise “downward
causation” from the higher level.
According to James Stump’s analysis, however, the “downward causation” in
Murphy’s theory cannot be genuinely causal. 186 Stump explains, since “supervening”
entails that the higher level is completely dependent on the lower level, the higher level
cannot be other than what the lower level determines it to be. And so, “the causal efficacy
of the higher levels is empty if, once the analysis is pushed back a step, it turns out that
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any difference in the higher levels must have been effected by a difference in the lower
level–how else would there have been a difference for the Physicalist [who denies
anything that is not physical]?” 187 This means that “I have not made the decision; it was
made by my neurons.” 188 Steven Evans critiques “downward causation” from another
angle, saying that if the mental is not completely determined by the physical, the mind
should no longer be called an entirely physical entity, for it has causal power which
cannot be fully explained by laws of physics, chemistry and biology and it possess
capacities such as freewill and moral reasoning which are not associable with mere
configurations of particles, no matter how complex these configurations are. 189
What’s more, Stump thinks that connecting the mental with the physical by the
vague label “supervening” is asserting a fictional relation which turns out to be
inconceivable upon closer examination. His reason is this. For “supervening” to be an
explanation offered within Physicalism, it must be a “materialistically acceptable fact.”
Notably, “A fact is materialistically acceptable if it is a fact about physical things, or is a
fact about non-physical things which strongly supervene on physical things.” 190 It turns
out that a Physicalist cannot really use the latter option, because that would be an infinite
regression; she cannot use the former option either, because facts about physical thing
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would not be able to bridge the explanatory gap between the mental and the physical.
Hence, the term “supervening” suffers the classic “reflexivity” problem.
Two More Challenges Physicalism Faces–from Mathematics and from the
Understanding of Divine Agency in the Physical World
Outside these anthropological considerations, there are still two major challenges
against the Physicalist’s portrait of the human person regarding its physicalistic
commitment in general.
Mathematics
This is a metaphysical critique. Ben Carter suggests that Physicalism cannot be
rationally argued as an accurate account of the universe and, insofar as it attempts to do
so, it is self-refuting. 191 The self-contradictoriness resides in the Physicalist’s inevitable
reliance on mathematics to establish his case. Specifically, the Physicalist considers all
phenomena in the universe to be particles in motion; since physical events occur as
contingent facts, the Physicalist must utilize mathematics which deals with necessary
truths as the principle criteria to evaluate and generalize about material things.
Mathematical truths are absolute standards in that they are unaffected by the particular
configurations actualized in the material domain. Notably, it is this necessary character of
mathematics which propels it into the eternal and sacred category in the eyes of Plato and
Galileo. And yet, the use of mathematics by the Physicalist suggests that reality cannot be
completely captured under the physical. Mathematical reality is “bigger” than physical
reality, “since ‘mathematical existence allows anything to exist,…but what is logically
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possible need not exist physically.” 192 Consequently, “the materialist is tossed on the
horns of a dilemma. If he is right, he cannot prove it. If he can prove it, he is wrong.” 193
Similarly, mathematical physicist John Polkinghorne suggests that the physical
world obeys a much larger mathematical blueprint. Like Ben Carter, Polkinghorne thinks
that mathematics deals with eternal truths which already exist. He reports that
mathematicians across the board believe that theoretical mathematics is not a human
contrivance but a discovery of existing truths. Polkinghorne reasons, “The prime numbers
and the Mandelbrot set (frequently discussed in relation to fractals and chaos theory)
have always been ‘there.’ But ‘where’ have they been? If these convictions of the
mathematicians are correct (as I believe them to be), then in addition to the physical
world that the scientists investigate, there must be an everlasting noetic world of
mathematical entities that the mathematicians investigate.” 194 Some object that the world
appears mathematical only because the mind imposes mathematics on the world like a
Procrustean bed would do to its guest; mathematics in fact is a grossly exaggerated
tautology. Polkinghorne answers by pointing out that “Kurt Godel proved that all
axiomatic systems rich enough to incorporate the natural numbers (the integers), contain
stateable but undecidable propositions and that their self-consistency cannot be
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established. Mathematical truth is found to exceed the proving of theorems and to elude
total capture in the confining meshes of any logical net.” 195
The question of divine agency in the physical world
This is a theological critique by Dennis Bielfeldt. 196 It is particularly worth the
attention of Christian theologians who claim to be Physicalists. Bielfeldt reminds us that
Physicalism not only conceives the ultimate reality of the world we live to be particles of
physics, it also commits to the assumption of “causal closure” of the physical to nonphysical causalities. The principle of “causal closure” entails a causally inert God,
because God is not physical. Bielfeldt denies the effectiveness of the Physicalist’s
strategy to protect the robustness of divine agency through hypotheses of “information
transfer without energy transfer” or “downward causation between two layers of one
ontic domain.” As far as he can see, both claims are unsubstantiated as well as covertly
Dualistic and so are afflicted by issues in Dualism discussed in the next segment.
Specifically, the first strategy claims that divine agency can be carried out through
inputting information into the physical system, for example, at the micro level that is
objectively undetermined; such information transfer does not violate the causal-closure
requirement because it is done without energy transfer and so without violating the
energy conservation principle. Bielfeldt finds this theory problematic because “we
currently have no way to conceive how information could be propagated without energy
transfer. All information transfer appears to require a causal realization in physical
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systems.” 197 The fact that computer hardware operates according to programming does
not validate the theory, because what ultimately causes the actual operation of various
circuits is still an input of energy into the hardware. Bielfeldt also shares Willem Drees’
discomfort about attributing a metaphysical cause to physical activities at the quantum
level, because “Quantum mechanics as currently formulated certainly requires no
metaphysical supplementation, and to give it any seems to threaten its very integrity.” 198
Not to say that situating God’s action in moments of quantum indeterminacy or chaotic
randomness means “God would still be in the business of intervening through ‘lawsuspending-miracle’” 199 which is not fitting for a God believed to act with omnipotent
causal power.
The second defense strategy of the Physicalist is divine agency through
“downward causation.” In addition to the problem pointed out above that the “higher
entities” do not really have causal primacy in this setup, Bielfeldt raises the crucial
question of empirical evidence. He reports that “we have no empirical support for such a
real top-down causation in nature. … in fact, the advent of quantum mechanics has
challenged the very intelligibility of downward causal explanations, for it can account for
those higher-level actualizations which previous theory had relegated to the effects of the
‘emergent’ (McLaughlin 1992, 89-91).” 200 Moreover, “We do not have empirical
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evidence for the existence of real irreducible causal power at the higher level that is not
finally determined by events and processes at lower levels.” 201
Problems in the Dualists’ Portrait of the Human Person
The fact that the Physicalist’s portrait of the human person has many defects does
not mean that the Dualist’s portrait is acceptable. In this segment, I discuss the issues of
Dualism in three areas: the ontological unity of the human being (the “what” question for
Dualism), the intimate association of body and mind (the “why” question for Dualism),
and the inconceivability of substantive interaction (the “how” question for Dualism). I
finish by analyzing the most sustained but unsuccessful effort from the Dualist camp to
repair the fragmented picture, called “Emergent Dualism.” Before that, I want to quickly
address a frequently heard objection against Dualism, that is, the issue of individuation.
The objection is something like this: each person is individuated through the body;
without a body, as the Dualist posits for the postmortem life, the person would become
unidentifiable. In my view, that does not seem to be an issue. As Taliaferro and Goetz
explain, each soul is individuated “intrinsically or per se” as a numerical particular, since
if a person is essentially nonphysical-which is precisely what I try to argue through this
entire chapter–then personal identity is ontologically prior to having a body, not the other
way around. 202
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The “What” Question for Dualism–Regarding Human Nature and Its Essential Unity
The first challenge to the Dualist’s portrait of the human person is the “what”
question: what is the conception of human nature? Like many have protested, by positing
two independent and ontologically distinct substances in the human makeup, it drives an
unseemly and unbridgeable wedge in the middle of the unity of human nature. As alluded
to above, inserting such an ontological duality into the essentially unified human nature
generates grave difficulties for central Christian doctrines such as Incarnation and Trinity.
What’s more, the supposed physical element in the human being seems to obstruct its
eschatological union with God, given that God is essentially non-physical.
The “Why” Questions for Dualism–Regarding the Mutual Dependence We Observe
between Body and Mind as well as Their Gradual Evolution Together
There is also the question of “why” the two supposed substances are juxtaposed in
the way we observe, especially the extensive dependence of the mind on a particular body
and the general evolution of biological life “if the soul is held to be capable of existing,
and of carrying on a meaningful conscious life, apart from this or any other body.” 203 To
me, the Dualist’s answer to the “why” question of duality in the human being is
reasonably satisfactory. That said, this answer makes the most sense when heard within
the Idealist’s framework, not only because the Idealist’s framework assigns the proper role
to the physical, i.e., not substantive but derivative and pedagogical, but also because
unresolvable issues associated with the “what” question above and the “how” question
below for Dualism threatens the credibility of the answer to the “why” question as well.
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The Dualist’s answer to the “why” question of duality boils down to the purpose of
person-making. For example, Taliaferro and Goetz state that being embodied in a material
world is the opportunity God gives us to choose to live in a good and just way, so that we
may attain beatitude. The soul joins a body for this pedagogical purpose, because the
privacy of the soul entails that the soul needs a body to gather information and to interact
with other souls; more importantly, the soul needs the body to grow and develop. The fact
that a soul is increasingly more dependent on a particular body–called the “pairing
problem”–is explained under the notion of “soul structure” coined by Richard Swinburne.
Under this concept, the soul takes on a particular “structure” as the result of its
development over time, meaning that “at any present moment there is a set of memories,
beliefs, desires, perceptions and other mental states present to the self which affect the set
of memories, beliefs and desires which develop in the future and which, to a great extent,
influence what these future sets will be, but without determining them.” 204 The “structure”
the soul accumulates over time entails its growing attachment to a particular body. For
example, a Chinese soul would find an Indian body relatively difficult to use.
The “How” Question for Dualism–Regarding the Feasibility of Interaction between Two
Ontologically Different Substances
The question of how the two supposed substances interact with each other is
troublesome for two reasons.
Problem #1: The necessity of ontological sameness between cause and effect
As Berkeley points out, an effect is necessarily of the same ontological nature as
its cause. One may say that, modern day Physicalists’ insistence on the “causal closure”
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of the physical is not only a methodological constraint, but also a metaphysical dictate.
The truth in Berkeley’s statement may be seen through the so-called “causal joint
conundrum.” 205 We encountered this issue above when unpacking the notion of
“supervening.” For the same reason, Bielfeldt calls the Dualist’s assertion of substantive
interaction “notoriously difficult philosophically.” 206 Specifically, again, it seems
impossible to offer a coherent account of the nature of that causal “link” which connects
two ontologically different orders of being. Bielfeldt reflects when discussing the
problem of divine agency, “what could be the nature of such a cosmic pineal gland
mingling the humors of the infinite and the finite? … God/universe substance Dualism is
embarrassing for the same reason as mind/body Dualism.” 207 The “causal joint
conundrum” helps us see that, the substantive dissimilarity the Dualist posits between the
physical and the spiritual entails that the two are not ontologically bridgeable.
Problem #2: The requirement of accessibility for interactions to take place
Even if substantive interaction were possible in theory, there is still the technical
question of accessibility. As Stewart Goetz explains, according to Descartes, any entity
that is extended is divisible into substantive parts, like all physical things are; since the
soul is indivisible, it must not be extended, which means that the soul is non-spatial. And
here lies the problem: “for any two entities to interact causally, they must stand in a
relation to each other which is such that the substance acted upon (the patient) is
accessible to the agent’s exercised causal power. And it is simply impossible to conceive
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how a spatial substance and a non-spatial substance can stand in the requisite
accessibility relationship.” 208
Non-Cartesian Dualist William Hasker attempts to solve this issue by redefining
the soul as spatial. However, there is the “occupancy” problem with this
conceptualization of the soul. As Jaegwon Kim explains, spatial occupancy requires that
no more than one entity occupies a location at any time, “something like the
impenetrability of matter;” but if the spatial “soul” fits this criterion, why are such
“souls” considered non-physical? 209 There is also the problem of “incompatible
attributes.” 210 As Frank Dilley explains, physical attributes like spatiality are foreign to
the soul with consciousness and freewill, which is the very reason why the soul is
historically considered non-physical in the first place. In Dilley’s words, “Something
seems amiss when elements like spatiality and energy and qualia and rationality are
combined.” 211 The brain and the mind are seen as non-identical precisely because mental
properties are not found in anything studies by physics.
Emergent Dualism: A Dualist’s Attempt to Coherently Account the Mind-Body Relation
Because of these puzzling issues, defenses of Dualism are often in an ad hoc
fashion, claiming it to be something “learned from experience,” or the best conclusion
possible, or “ultimately mysterious.” Fredrick Ferre rejects these ad hoc defenses by
pointing out that, “Tu quoque arguments are rightly classified as fallacies, because their
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premises may be true (you may indeed have done just as badly as I have done) without
requiring the conclusion that my position is better (both our positions may be false and a
third position, neither yours nor mine, may be best).” 212 Notably, as I have been trying to
argue, that third position which best captures the human being is Berkeley’s Idealism.
William Hasker’s Emergent Dualism is an exception in its arduous efforts to fix the
Dualist’s divisive picture. Specifically, while holding onto the substantive distinction
between the physical and the mental, Emergent Dualism claims that the mental emerges
out of the physical as the result of the physical coming into certain complex functional
configurations. What emerges is a new individual entity with causal power of its own.
Hasker thinks that, compared to traditional Dualism, his theory better incorporates the
empirical facts of bio evolution and the mind’s intimate dependence on the biological
organism.
Objections to Hasker’s theory are several. Besides the interaction problem we just
discussed, another objection raised by traditional Dualist Stewart Goetz is similar to
Berkeley’s point that a thing cannot give to others what it itself does not have. Goetz
argues that, the power to cause something into existence is such a great creative power
that it seems unlikely to exist in physical things per se. In his words, “It is what
philosophers think of as a great-making property, and it seems to me that such a power is
and can only be exemplified by the greatest possible or most perfect being. … it does not
strike me as intuitively plausible insofar as it implies exemplification of a great-making
property by entities whose nature as material is constituted by non-great-making
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properties.” 213 In addition, non-reductive Physicalist Nancy Murphy objects on the
account that, Hasker cannot define the mental to be substantively different from the
physical and then claim that the mental nonetheless emerge from the physical; it is
impossible to have it both ways. 214
Problems in the Dual-Aspect Monists’ Portrait of the Human Person
There have been some efforts to articulate a middle position between Physicalism
and Dualism, characterized by their common assertion of only one substance with both a
physical and a non-physical aspect. In my view, these theories face the common question
of “One what?”–What exactly is the nature of this single substance they hypothesize? It is
clear that none of the dual-aspect Monists intend their theories to be categorized under
Idealism, and so the “oneness” in their theories appears ambiguous if not equivocal; to
the extent that their definitions of it lean towards either Dualism or Physicalism, they
share the same issues with them.
Thomas Aquinas’ Hylomorphism
The hylomorphism of Thomas Aquinas defines the human being as a composite
substance which unifies body and soul. Aquinas rejects the Dualist’s portrait of the
human person by stipulating that the soul and the body are not two actually existing
substances, but from these two things one actually existing substance is made. According
to Aquinas, the soul relates to the body extremely intimately, i.e., as its form.
Nonetheless, the soul is an exceptional form, in that, unlike other material forms which
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dissolve when the matter they form dissolve, the soul subsists apart from the body after
death and will be reunited with the body at the resurrection. 215
Charges of incoherence and equivocation have been brought against the notion of
the human nature as a “composite substance” and the notion of the soul as a “subsisting
form.” For example, Christopher Conn comments,
Surely we cannot have it both ways: we cannot say both (a) that we are the
product of this union, and (b) that it is possible for us to survive the dissolution
of this union. … If the composite theory is true, then we are not presently
identical with our souls, since objects which are distinct at any time must be
distinct at all times. If the composite theory is true, then we shall never be
identical with our souls. So even if our souls should continue to exist after we
have died, since our souls will not be us, it follows that we will not exist during
this time. 216
That is to say, if the human nature is essentially a composite, then the de-composition of
this composite in death is by definition the end of it; the person did not really survey.
Notably, the assertion of a composite substance causes problem not only for the belief in
survival, but also for the belief in postmortem purgation, both beliefs of which Aquinas
affirms.
Regarding Aquinas’ definition of the “soul,” Hans Bynagle thinks that it is an
equivocation to call the soul a “form,” which in the regular sense of the term denotes
configuration and arrangement; because “soul is identified as that form whose imposition
on or union with certain matter accounts for that matter being a living human body rather
than a mere mass of matter. Though ‘form’ suggests configuration or arrangement, it
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must in this instance comprise something more, for it takes more than just a particular
configuration of matter to make it a living human body. But what this ‘more’ must be is
not easy to identify. … Whatever it is, it serves to constitute the soul (or at least allows
the soul to be) not simply a ‘state’ of some matter.” 217 Similarly, William Hasker objects
by saying that “according to them there are certain mental activities involving abstract
reasoning that are performed only by the soul with no assistance from the body. Clearly,
this would not be possible if the soul was understood merely as a pattern or structure of
the body.” 218
Alfred Whitehead’s Account of the Cosmos with a Physical as well as a “Mental”
Pole
Some claim that Alfred Whitehead’s bipolar cosmology, by positing a mental as
well a physical pole on the elementary level of the universe, avoids the pitfalls of
Dualism without losing the reality of a genuine mental life. 219 According to Fredrick
Ferre, informed by knowledge from post-Einsteinian physics, Whitehead “holds that the
basic energetic occasions of the universe have the capacity to receive and incorporate
characteristics (e.g., wave patterns) into themselves in an internal way that is similar in
kind only to the way mentality connects to its immediate environment … Thus at the root
of all things is something functioning sufficiently like prehensive human mentality to
justify positing a ‘mental pole’ in the most elementary quanta of energy.” 220

217

Bynagle, “Debating Soul,” 114.

218

Hasker, “Emergent Dualism,” 95.

219

For example, see Ferre, “Review Essay.”

220

Ferre, “Review Essay,” 83.

375
However, as mathematical physicist John Polkinghorne points out in several
occasions, Whitehead’s assertion of a “mental pole” in the elemental units of the physical
universe in fact is “difficult to reconcile with our scientific knowledge” discovered by
modern physics. 221 Polkinghorne explains that, for Whitehead, “Events are basic to his
metaphysics and each event is held to have a quasi-subjective phase (prehension)
followed by an objectification (concrescence), a sort of wedding of the material and
mental in the marriage bed of occurrence. This seems to me to be an unhappily literal
way of seeking a synthesis. It is not the case in quantum theory that every article has a
little bit of undulation in it, which when added together gives a wave. The mixture is
more subtle.” 222
John Polkinghorne’s “One World Stuff”
John Polkinghorne himself has been trying for years to sketch out some sort of
dual-aspect Monism, “a complementary world of mind/matter in which these polar
opposites cohere as contrasting aspects of the world-stuff.” 223 Inspired by the notion of
“complementarity” in quantum physics, Polkinghorne envisions the one “world stuff”
being manifested by entities like stones whose nature is located entirely at the material
pole, by entities like mathematic truths whose nature is located entirely at the mental
pole, and also by entities like humans whose nature includes both. His aim is to
“acknowledge the fundamental distinction between experience of the material and
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experience of the mental but which would neither impose on reality a sharp division into
two unconnected kinds of substance nor deny the psychosomatic unity of human
beings.” 224 As I have been trying to argue, Berkeley’s Idealism accomplishes exactly
this–it differentiates the fundamental distinction between experiences of the material and
the mental, without imposing an ontological divide into the fundamental unity of the
reality in general or the human nature in particular. What’s more, in comparison to
Polkinghorne’s mixed notion of “one world stuff,” Berkeley’s idealistic Monism seems
much more substantive, rigorous and effective for achieving these aims.
However, in Polkinghorne’s opinion, “the classical metaphysical strategies of
materialism, Idealism and Cartesian Dualism all exhibit a bankruptcy in the face of the
many layered, and yet interconnected, character of our encounter with reality.” 225 As to
the reason why Polkinghorne maintains such a low assessment of Idealism, I suspect that
it has much to do with his passion for the study of the physical world. In his words, “so
marvelously patterned is that [sense] experience that I for one cannot doubt that it is the
discernment of an actual reality. I refuse to join the Idealists in assigning an ontological
priority to the mental over the material. … The natural convincing explanation of the
success of science is that it is gaining a tightening grasp of an actual reality. … The terms
of the understanding are dictated by the way things are. There is a material world we can
learn about.” 226 Polkinghorne’s reservation against Idealism is likely to be representative.
However, as I have tried to clarify in the above, Berkeley’s Idealism does not at all deny
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the reality or the actuality of the physical; it only denies it to be independent from the
mind, especially the Mind of God. And so, it does not take away any of the reality
Polkinghorne studies. What’s more, as I will show in the next section, the challenge
Polkinghorne sees mathematics to be for Physicalism leads some physicists to arrive
precisely at the position of Berkeley’s Idealism.
“Matter” According to Those Who Study It the Best:
Metaphysical Reflections on the basis of Quantum Physics
Given that Berkeley’s Idealism makes ontological claims regarding the physical,
insights generated from the philosophy of science regarding both the nature of “matter”
and the nature of the discipline of physics seem quite relevant for assessing the validity of
Berkeley’s views. It is particularly so for our time, when studies in modern physics
unveiled for us unexpected knowledge regarding the most basic building blocks of the
physical reality that literally turned the world upside down. In a nutshell, knowledge of
modern physics helped illuminate the truths in Berkeley’s Idealism.
The Old World Turned Upside Down
John Honner succinctly captures the profound impact modern physics carries for
metaphysics:
In the past few decades, there has been a surge of interest in the implications of
quantum physics for our worldview. We live in an epoch in which something
quite dramatic in human awareness is happening. What quantum physics may
demand of us is a new habit of thought. Earlier generations learnt to think that
the earth is round rather than flat, even though it seems flat on a restricted
horizon. Another generation learnt to think of the earth as moving around the
sun, even though the sun seems to move around the earth. … Microphysics today
produces metaphysical consequences. This is something rare in the history of the
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relationship between experimental science and philosophy, and it must be
allowed to have its impact on the ontologies we use in theology. 227
During an interdisciplinary dialogue on the resurrection, Robert John Russell
expressed the same view, saying that we must be prepared to reconstruct current work in
eschatology in light of contemporary physics–especially relativity theory and quantum
physics. 228 Specifically, there came this earth shattering realization that “Our
understanding of matter, as understood by modern physics, is far more complex and
obscure than any conception we might have of the soul.” 229 I think Berkeley would be
happy to know that quantum discoveries have shaken the long-held view that “a sharp
and absolute distinction can be made between a subject (observer and observing system)
and an object (the external thing), and between one object and another (a materialist
principle), so that the external world is seen to be a collection of independent and quite
separable objects;” they have also qualified the view that “objects have the properties we
attribute to them whether we are observing them or not.” 230 Based on knowledge from
quantum physics, some philosophers of the mind even suggested that, the reason why the
brain cannot function normally without subjective experience is because, as the
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underlying substratum, “subjective experiences were a condition of the very existence or
efficacy of the physical events making up brain activity.” 231
In the rest of this section, utilizing Ken Wilber’s anthology, I introduce
metaphysical writings by modern physicists. 232 Wilber’s volume is a condensed
collection of original essays by founders of modern physics regarding the nature of the
discipline of physics as well as the nature of the physical reality. Authors he reviewed
include Albert Einstein, Erwin Schrödinger, Werner Heisenberg, Arthur Eddington,
Wolfgang Pauli, Louis de Broglie, James Jeans, and Max Planck. The mere fact that so
many founders of modern physics were inspired enough by their scientific discoveries to
produce philosophical works on these topics is in itself quite remarkable, not to mention
that the intellectual weight these thinkers carry as a group is unparalleled. As we shall
see, mathematic physicist John Polkinghorne’s observation of the “unreasonable success”
of mathematics in capturing the physical reality is very typical among modern
physicists. 233 The inferences they drew from this fundamental significance of
mathematics for physics are: first, studies in physics do not and cannot speak about
“substance,” but only about relations and regularities; second, the reality of the world is
not physical, but Idealistic. Notably, these insights convey the metaphysical gist of
Berkeley’s Idealism.
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“At the heart of nature … we find mathematical symmetries” (Werner Heisenberg)
Ken Wilbur summarizes the recently recognized status of mathematics for modern
physics this way: “every physicist in this volume was profoundly struck by the fact that
the natural [material] realm … obeys in some sense the laws or forms of mathematics, or,
in general, obeys some sort of archetypal mental-forms … Heisenberg and Pauli looking
for the archetypal forms which underlie the material realm; de Broglie claiming mindforms have to precede (ontologically) matter forms; Einstein and Jeans finding a central
mathematical form to the cosmos.” 234 In James Jeans’ 235 own words, “what we are
finding, in a whole torrent of surprising new knowledge, is that the way which explains
them [physical realities] more clearly, more fully, and more naturally than any other is
the mathematical way, the explanation in terms of mathematical concepts. It is true, in a
sense somewhat different from that intended by Galileo, that ‘Nature’s great book is
written in mathematical language.’” 236 Similarly, Wolfgang Pauli 237 articulates his
Platonic-Pythagorean worldview in his essay “the influence of archetypal ideas on
Kepler’s construction of scientific theories” written in collaboration with Carl Jung.
Werner Heisenberg 238 wrote extensively on the mathematical core of the physical
reality. To motivate his case, Heisenberg explains,
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If I endeavor today to take up some of the old problems concerning the structure
of matter and the concept of natural law, it is because the development of atomic
physics in our own day has radically altered our whole outlook on nature and
the structure of matter. It is perhaps not an improper exaggeration to maintain
that some of the old problems have quite recently found a clear and final
solution. So it is permissible today to speak about this new and perhaps
conclusive answer to questions that were formulated here thousands of years
ago. 239
Heisenberg sums up his point in a nutshell:
To put it in rather general and precise terms, we may hope that a philosophical
analysis of recent scientific developments will contribute to a replacement of
conflicting dogmatic opinions about the basic problems we have broached, by a
sober readjustment to a new situation, which, in itself, can even now be regarded
as a revolution in human life on earth.… If I may already anticipate at this point
the outcome of such a comparison; it seems that, in spite of the tremendous
success that the concept of the atom has achieved in modern science, Plato was
very much nearer to the truth about the structure of matter than Leucippus or
Democritus. 240
Heisenberg unpacks his point patiently from ancient philosophy. He explains that,
the controversy between the founders of atomism and Plato rose from their search for a
universal principle to which all the diversities in the world may be traced. The atomists
posited “atom” as the smallest unit of existence, eternal and indestructible, from which all
other things are composed. Plato took the strongest exception to that; for him, the most
basic foundation of all existence is not “atom,” but Ideas in terms of mathematical forms.
After thousands of years of pursuit, quantum physics today finally revealed that
mathematics is the only adequate language for describing the physical reality on the
elemental level. And so, Heisenberg concludes:
I think that on this point modern physics has definitely decided for Plato. For the
smallest units of matter are, in fact, not physical objects in the ordinary sense of
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the word; they are forms, structures or–in Plato’s sense–Ideas, which can be
unambiguously spoken of only in the language of mathematics. … The unitary
principle that governs the course of the world…can be expressed and understood
only in mathematical forms. The central problem of theoretical physics nowadays
is the mathematical formulation of the natural law underlying the behavior of
elementary particles. From the experimental situation we infer that a satisfactory
theory of the elementary particles must at the same time be the theory of physics
in general, and hence, of everything else belonging to this physics. … Plato was
right in believing that ultimately, at the heart of nature, among the smallest units
of matter, we find mathematical symmetries. 241
“The house that Jack built” (Arthur Eddington)
The governing role pure mathematics occupies in quantum physics entails that
physics does not and cannot speak about “substance” but only about regularities and
relationships because, as Sir James Jeans points out, “a mathematical formula can never
tell us what a thing is, but only how it behaves.” 242 The fact that the objects of research in
physics are symbolic formulas and not “things in themselves” has been underscored by
many of these authors; physics studies not reality itself, but mathematical representations
of reality. For example, Neal Bohr stresses that “it must be recognized that we are here
dealing with a purely symbolic procedure.” 243 Sir James Jeans vividly describes the
findings of physics as “a sheaf of mathematical formulae,” saying that
we can never understand what events are, but must limit ourselves to describing
the patterns of events in mathematical terms; no other aim is possible. Physicists
who are trying to understand nature may work in many different fields and by
many different methods: one may dig, one may sow, one may reap. But the final
harvest will always be a sheaf of mathematical formulae. These will never
describe nature itself … Thus our studies can never put us into contact with
reality. 244
241

Ibid, 51.

242

Ibid, 142.

243

Niels Bohr (1885-1962), the 1922 Nobel Prize winner in physics.

244

Wilber, Quantum Questions, 8.

383
Arthur Eddington 245 is particularly articulate in driving the point home with his
“shadowgraph” analogy, saying that “in the world of physics we watch a shadowgraph
performance of familiar life. The shadow of my elbow rests on the shadow table as the
shadow ink flows over the shadow paper.” 246 “However much the ramifications of
physics may be extended by further scientific discovery, they cannot from their very
nature entrench on the background in which they have their being … We have learned
that the exploration of the external world by the methods of physical science leads not to
the concrete reality but to a shadow world of symbols, beneath which those methods are
unadapted for penetrating.” 247 Therefore, “Physics most strongly insists that its methods
do not penetrate behind the symbolism.” 248 Eddington reports that “The symbolic nature
of physics is generally recognized, and the scheme of physics is now formulated in such a
way as to make it almost self-evident that it is a partial aspect of something wider.” 249
Notably, the “shadowy” character holds true for all types of physics–ancient,
Newtonian, Einsteinian, and quantum. In the words of Erwin Schrodinger, 250 “please note
that the very recent advance [of quantum and relativistic physics] does not lie in the
world of physics itself having acquired this shadowy character; it had ever since
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Democritus of Abdera and even before, but we were not aware of it; we thought we were
dealing with the world itself.” 251 This profound revelation by the new physics regarding
the symbolic nature of physics is so monumental, that Arthur Eddington thinks that “The
frank realization that physical science is concerned with a world of shadows is one of the
most significant of recent advances.” 252 Similarly, James Jeans declares
the essential fact is simply that all the pictures which science now draws of
nature, and which alone seem capable of according with observational fact, are
mathematical pictures. … They are nothing more than pictures–fictions if you
like, if by fiction you mean that science is not yet in contact with ultimate reality.
Many would hold that, from the broad philosophical standpoint, the outstanding
achievement of twentieth-century physics is not the theory of relativity with its
welding together of space and time, or the theory of quantum with its present
apparent negation of the law of causation, or the dissection of the atom with the
resultant discovery that things are not what they seem; it is the general
recognition that we are not yet in touch with ultimate reality. 253
That even the most complete account of things physical amounts to no more than
a set of symbols is made clear by Arthur Eddington’s explanation on the cyclical nature
of definitions in physics. In his words,
The definitions of physics proceed according to the method immortalized in “the
House that Jack built”: this is the potential, that was derived from the interval, that
was measured by the scale, that was made from the matter, that embodied the
stress, that … But instead of finishing with Jack, whom, of course, every
youngster must know without need for an introduction, we make a circuit back to
the beginning of the round: that worried the cat, that killed the rat, that ate the
malt, that lay in the house, that was built by the priest all shaven and shorn, that
married the man … we can go round and round forever. 254

251

Wilber, Quantum Questions, 9.

252

Ibid, 9.

253

Ibid, 9-10.

254

Ibid, 173.

385
That is to say, knowledge generated through physics is about regularities and
relationships among entities, and not about the intrinsic nature of these entities. This is
because:
Whenever we state the properties of a body in terms of physical quantities we are
imparting knowledge as to the response of various metrical indicators to its
presence, and nothing more. After all, knowledge of this kind is fairly
comprehensive. A knowledge of the response of all kinds of objects … would
determine completely its relation to its environment, leaving only its inner un-getable nature undetermined. In the relativity theory, we accept this as full
knowledge, the nature of an object insofar as it is ascertainable by scientific
inquiry being the abstraction of its relations to all surrounding objects. 255
Thus, contrary to what we thought we knew about “matter,” which was supposed
to be made up of tiny billiard-ball like “atoms,” we now realized that the “physical atom
is, like everything else in physics, a schedule of pointer readings.” 256 Consequently,
physics uncovers the linkage of pointer readings with other pointer readings, leaving
unspecified the nature of the entities beneath these pointers. And so, “The supposed
approach [to the world-stuff] through the physical world leads only into the cycle of
physics, where we run round and round like a kitten chasing its tail and never reach the
world-stuff at all.” 257
The principle openness of knowledge from physics regarding the intrinsic nature
of things is noteworthy. As Arthur Eddington clarifies,
If today you ask a physicist what he has finally made out the ether or the electron
to be, the answer will not be a description in terms of billiard balls or fly-wheels
or anything concrete; he will point instead to a number of symbols connected by
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a set of mathematical equations which they satisfy. What do the symbols stand
for? The mysterious reply is given that physics is indifferent to that; it has no
means of probing beneath the symbolism. To understand the phenomenon of the
physical world, it is necessary to know the equation which the symbols of obey
but not the nature of that which is being symbolized. 258
In Eddington’s view, the scheme of symbols physics lays bare “proclaims its own
hollowness. It can be–nay it cries out to be–filled with something that shall transform it
from skeleton into substance, from plan into execution, from symbols into interpretation
of the symbols.” 259 He feels that “It is almost as though the modern conception of the
physical world had deliberately left room for the reality of spirit and consciousness.” 260
In the next segment, I present the argument that the studies of physics point towards the
mental as the ultimate reality.
“The universe begins to look more like a great thought than a great machine”
(James Jeans)
Arthur Eddington made the pithy statement that “the stuff of the world is mind
stuff.” 261 By this, he means that
the nature of all reality is spiritual, not material or a Dualism of matter and spirit.
The hypothesis that its nature can be, to any degree, material does not enter into
my reckoning, because as we now understand matter, the putting together of the
objective “material” and the noun “nature” does not make sense. … My answer
does not deny the existence of the physical world … Only we do not get down to
the intrinsic nature of things that way. 262
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He explains it vividly, “The realistic matter and fields of force of former physical theory
are altogether irrelevant–except in so far as the mind stuff has itself spun these
imaginings. The symbolic matter and fields of force of present-day theory [of physics]
are more relevant, but they bear to it the same relation that the bursar’s accounts bear to
the activity of the college.” 263 Similarly, James Jeans concludes that “the universe begins
to look more like a great thought than a great machine.” 264 Jeans methodically argues for
it from the mathematical nature of the universe in a top-down fashion, the incapability of
any material presentation to capture the world reveled by modern physics (e.g., the
curved universe), and the necessity for the effect to be of the same ontological nature as
its cause.
Mathematics from Top down
Jeans reports that, the world uncovered by modern physics appears to operate
according to pure mathematics–rules mathematicians formulated out of their own minds
without any consideration of the outside world, as it would otherwise be in applied
mathematics. Jeans observes in amazement that “Now it emerges that the shadow play
that we described as the fall of the apple to the ground, the ebb and flow of the tides, the
motion of electrons in the atom, are produced by actors who seem very conversant with
these purely mathematical concepts … which were formulated long before we discovered
that the shadows on the wall.” 265 He illustrates this at length:
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for instance, a deaf engineer studying the action of a pianola might try first to
interpret it as a machine, but would be baffled by the continuous reiteration of
intervals 1, 5, 8, 13, in the motions of his crackers. A deaf musician, although he
could hear nothing, would immediately recognize this succession of numbers as
intervals of the common chords. In this way, he would recognize a kinship
between his own thoughts and the thoughts which had resulted in the making of
the pianola; he would say that it had come into existence through the thought of a
musician. In the same way, a scientific study of the action of the universe has
suggested a conclusion which may be summed up, though very crudely and quite
inadequately, because we have no language at our command except that derived
from our terrestrial concepts and experiences, in a statement that the universe
appears to have been designed by a pure mathematician. 266
Some may object that the seeming coincidence between operation of the world
and pure mathematics is the result of molding nature into our own preconceived notions.
To this, Jeans responds by saying that, if the new mathematical interpretations of the
world are all products of our subjectivity we would have seen it long ago. What’s more,
“it is exceedingly hard to believe that such intricate concepts as a finite curved space and
an expanding space can have entered into pure mathematics through any sort of
unconscious or subconscious experience of the workings of the actual universe.” 267 He
contends that “the universe now appears to be mathematical in a sense different from any
which Kant contemplated or possibly could have contemplated with–in brief, the
mathematics enters the universe from above instead of from below.” 268 It is “from above”
and not “below” because, as Polkinghorne explains, discoveries by pure mathematicians
through theoretical thinking uncover rules established long before they discovered them.
Jeans agrees with Plato’s statement that “God forever geometries,” in that “geometry sets
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limits to what would otherwise be unlimited;” “the universe of the theory of relativity is
finite just because it is geometrical.” 269
Key Concepts of Modern Physics Unrealizable by “Matter” in the Traditional
Sense
James Jeans argues further that, the universe is not only created by thought, but
also consists of thought, because “all these concepts [used to describe the universe] seem
to my mind to be structures of pure thought incapable of realization in any sense which
would probably be described as material.” 270 His explanations of this technical point are
worthy quoting in full length:
For instance, anyone who has written or lectured on the finiteness of space is
accustomed to the objection that the concept of a finite space is self-contradictory
and nonsensical. If space is finite, our critics say, it must be possible to go out
beyond this finite space, and what can we possibly find beyond it except more
space, and so on ad infinitum?–which proves that space cannot be finite. And
again, they say, if space is expanding, what can it possibly expand into, if not into
more space?–which again proves that what is expanding can only be a part of
space, so that the whole of space cannot expand.
The 20th century critics who make these comments are still in the state of mind of
the 19th century scientists; they take it for granted that the universe must admit of
material representation. If we grant their premises, we must, I think, also grant
their conclusion–that we are talking nonsense–for their logic is irrefutable.
But modern science cannot possibly grant their conclusion; it insists on the
finiteness of space at all costs. This, of course, means that we must deny the
premises which our critics unknowingly assume. The universe cannot admit of
material presentation, and the reason, I think, is that it has become a mere mental
concept. It is the same, I think, with other more technical concepts, typified by the
‘exclusion principle’, which seem to imply a sort of action at a distance. 271
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Meeting Berkeley from the Other Side
James Jeans begins his argument with the puzzling appearance of disparity
between, for example, the occurrence of atomic disturbances in the sun and the
subsequent occurrence of poetic thoughts about the sunset. Since cause and effect must
be of the same ontological nature, Descartes posits two entirely difference substances
running in parallel without interaction. In contrast, Idealist philosophers like Berkeley
affirm the genuine reality of mind and matter interaction, but they posit that matter must
be of the same nature as mind. The Idealists made their case for Idealism through the link
closest to us along the A-Z causal chain, namely, thoughts in our mind. According James
Jeans,
modern [physical] science seems to me to lead, by a very different road, to a not
altogether dissimilar conclusion. … Physical science, troubling little about C,
and D, proceeds directly to the far end of the chain; its business is to study the
workings of X, Y, Z. And, as it seems to me, its conclusions suggest that the end
links of the chain, whether we go to the cosmos as a whole or to the innermost
structure of the atoms, are of the same nature as A, B–of the nature of pure
thought; we are led to the conclusions of Berkeley, but we reach them from the
other end. 272
Concluding Thoughts
In this chapter, I have tried to argue for postmortem embodiment in a Berkeleian
sense. I showed that, related theological and philosophical debates so far have generated
some valuable insights and also left some important questions. Given all these, the task is
to find a theologically sound as well as philosophically tenable account of postmortem
embodiment that adequately conveys the Christian soteriological core of sanctification
and is sufficiently rigorous in the light of veritable truths from philosophy and science.
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Berkeley’s Idealism offers this possibility with its seamlessly argued metaphysics and
with its central theological insight regarding all bodily experiences as sacramental and
pedagogical channels of God. What’s more, unlike many might have believed, the
Berkeleian postmortem embodiment is not only permitted by relevant Christian
orthodoxies from the bible and the earliest church traditions, it is necessitated as a much
more intelligible framework to house central Christian doctrines like resurrection, heaven
and hell, Incarnation, Trinity, and Creation ex nihilo. The strengths of Berkeley’s
Idealism became even more salient, once we see that it answers the “really hard problem”
in the mind-body debate much more convincingly than rival frameworks of Physicalism,
Dualism, and dual-aspect Monism. Last but not least, modern physics uncovered for us
the symbolic nature of all studies of the physical reality, and so encourages a worldview
of the Berkeleian kind.
Berkeley’s Idealism not only preserves valid insights from other metaphysical
frameworks, namely, the essential oneness of the human nature insisted by Physicalism,
and the spiritual core of the human nature upheld by Dualism, it also is very congenial for
expressing crucial theological insights, such as the soteriological connection between
postmortem embodiment and spiritual renewal according to the scripture, the
continuation of the whole person according the earliest Christian traditions, and the
formative aim of embodiment according to the theology of the body. It corrects the
inaccurate human portraits by the Physicalist and Dualist in the areas of the mental life
and the mind-body interrelation, respectively. It helps us understand why martyrs could
have intimate communion with and be closer to Christ without the earthly body. It also
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helps answer the question Augustine was puzzled by, namely the indispensable role of
the body for meeting God face to face–as the formative path. It helps better conceptualize
classic concepts like the soul’s “natural inclination to forming a body,” i.e., as its path
home.
Arthur Eddington once said that, our world is “the world to be lived in,” and not
the world to be theorized in an armchair. 273 We might have misunderstood the meaning
of our sensations before, but the physical science has helped us understand how things
are different than they seem, as it did many times before, e.g., with the misconception of
a flat earth. However, the correct common intuition of non-malleability beneath the term
“physical substance” is completely preserved in Berkeley’s world of ideas. Nonmalleability does not require an ontologically distinct “substance;” it is rooted in a Mind.
With the postmortem stage of time and body setup, in the next and also final
chapter, I will switch gears and address the theological question of the central plot to be
played on this stage. I will look particularly into how Paul’s statement of “the wage of sin
is death” may be illuminated by Aquinas’ teleological Ontology.
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CHAPTER SIX
FROM DEATH TO ETERNAL LIFE–EXPLICATING THE BIBLICAL THEOLOGY
OF DEATH VIA A METAPHYSIC OF SANCTIFICATION
Overview
After the soteriological and the philosophical delineations about death in previous
chapters, a crucial question remains: what is the cause of death? Recall from Chapter
Two that Oscar Cullmann considers identifying sin as the cause of death to be a
constitutive element for the Christian faith. As he puts it, “The belief in the resurrection
presupposes the Jewish connection between death and sin. … Death can be conquered
only to the extent that sin is removed.” 1 Along the same line, Roger Troisfontaines names
death as the “immanent sanction” for sin: rather than a mere external sanction imposed
from outside, death as the “organic” penalty of sin has an intrinsic relation with the
offense. 2 Similarly, Donald Bloesch states that “We need to gain a victory over sin before
we gain assurance of life beyond the grave. ‘From sin to righteousness’ proceeds ‘from
death to life.’” 3 Notably, since scientific discoveries have revealed physical death to be
an inherent feature of all biological existences, several authors we reviewed explicitly
caution theological speculations to avoid crudely attributing sin as the cause of physical
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death. 4 Given that the human essence is not physical, the proper object of theology is not
the physical death per se but the spiritual death. Hence Jesus teaches to “fear not the
physical death of the body, but to be concerned about the eternal death of the spirit.” (Lk
12:4)
In this chapter of my dissertation, I wrestle with the question of the cause of the
kind of death we should keep vigilant against. In the first section, I lift out from the
scripture a biblical Theology of Death which upholds a salient theme from Genesis to
Revelation: that is, death is caused by sin, whereas eternal life awaits the righteous
person. With the biblical foundation thus in view, in the next section, I introduce some
literature regarding the necessity and the advantage for theology to go deeper than human
ethics and conduct its reflections on the level of ontology, on the level of how humans
intrinsically are meant to be. Then, as a response, in the following section, I construct a
metaphysic for the biblical theology of death, using Aquinas’ ontology of being per se as
good. In essence, spiritual “death” is an obstruction of being caused by self-centeredness,
the root of all sin; selfishness is “death dealing” because the ontologically proper way of
being human–who is the Image of God–is to imitate its Creator, its Ground of being and
the Ground of all beings, which is Self-giving. As the other side of the same ontological
coin, the sanctification process is truly immortalizing. We become real “partakers of
divine nature” (2 Pt 1: 4) when we reach the epitome of all virtues, i.e., the Agape Love.
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Key Themes in the Biblical Theology of Death
In this section, I go through the Old and the New Testaments to show how the
Bible, from three different angles, depicts death as the result of sin: 1) sin as a corruption
inevitably leads to death; 2) eternal life results from holiness; and 3) the path from death
to eternal life (or “Resurrection”) is none other than the spiritual process of sanctification.
Sin Leads to Death and Death Is Caused by Sin
In Genesis, the very first book of the Bible, we read the genesis of death: even
though Adam was explicitly instructed by God that “You may freely eat of every tree of
the garden; but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for in the
day that you eat of it you shall die” (Gn 2: 16-17), he and Eve ate the fruit from the tree,
and so reaped the seed of their disobedience. Remarkably, physical death did not occur
“in the day” of their disobedient act, but long after. From this, we can already realize that,
the lethal impact of their action was taking place in a non-physical manner. Later, in
Deuteronomy, the nature of the “choice of fruit” Adam faced was made explicit–it is a
choice between life and death:
See, I have set before you today life and prosperity, death and adversity. If you
obey the commandments of the Lord your God that I am commanding you today,
by loving the Lord your God, walking in his ways, and observing his
commandments, decrees, and ordinances, then you shall live and become
numerous, and the Lord your God will bless you in the land that you are entering
to possess. But if your heart turns away and you do not hear, but are led astray to
bow down to other gods and serve them, I declare to you today that you shall
perish; you shall not live long in the land that you are crossing the Jordan to enter
and possess. I call heaven and earth to witness against you today that I have set
before you life and death, blessings and curses. Choose life so that you and your
descendants may live, loving the Lord your God, obeying him, and holding fast
to him; for that means life to you and length of days, so that you may live in the
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land that the Lord swore to give to your ancestors, to Abraham, to Isaac, and to
Jacob. 5
What is the gist of God’s commands, which is intended to give us life (Ps
119:93)? Jesus captures it the best with the dual Love Command, i.e., loving God above
all and loving others as ourselves (Mt 22:34-40, Lk 10:27, Mk 12:28-31). But the Old
Testament already teaches people to “do justly, love mercy, and walk humbly with your
God.” (Mi 6:8) And so, according to the Bible, selfless love leads to life; it is the best
manifestation of obedience to God (e.g., Col 3:14). In contrast, selfishness is at the core
of all forms of disobedience or sin (e.g., Gal 5:19-21); an existence lived with oneself as
the center, in disjunction from God the Creator and from caring relations with others,
leads to death. Thus, in Proverbs, we read that “wickedness overthrows the sinner” (Prv
13:6). In Psalms, we read that the wicked are “like chaff that the wind drives away” (Ps
1:4); destruction awaits them at the end of their downward spiraling path. Similarly, the
New Testament authors frequently portray the life-oppressing nature of sin with images
of bondage and slavery (e.g., Jn 8:34), and they are unequivocal about the fatal
consequence of selfishness: “one is tempted by one’s own desire, being lured and enticed
by it; then, when that desire has conceived, it gives birth to sin, and that sin, when it is
fully grown, gives birth to death.” (Jas 1:14-15)
Holiness Leads to Life and Eternal Life is the Reward for the Just
In comparison, “In the path of righteousness there is life, in walking its path there
is no death.” (Prv 28:28) Needless to say, those who are righteous still die the physical

5

Deuteronomy 30:15-20.

397
death, and so again it is clear that the scripture talks about “life” for the righteous in the
spiritual sense. In the Gospels, Jesus is described as proclaiming God’s reward of
immortality and “eternal life” for those who give their genuine love and care for the least
among us, who feed the hungry and visit the sick and the imprisoned (Mt 25:46), who
sacrifice their life so others can hear the Good News (Mk 10: 29), and who follow Jesus’
selfless path of the cross like sheep following their shepherd (Jn 10:28). The crucial
connection between selfless love and eternal Life is made the clearest by Jesus during his
exchange with a lawyer who tried to test him:
Just then a lawyer stood up to test Jesus. “Teacher,” he said, “what must I do to
inherit eternal life?” He said to him, “What is written in the law? What do you
read there?” He answered, “You shall love the Lord your God with all your
heart, and with all your soul, and with all your strength, and with all your mind;
and your neighbor as yourself.” And he said to him, “You have given the right
answer; do this, and you will live.” 6
The Path from Death to Eternal Life–Resurrection as Sanctification
Besides the scriptural teachings about sin and death, righteousness and eternal
life, we can also grasp the core of the biblical theology of death through how the Bible,
especially the New Testament, discusses Resurrection–the central event which bridges
the chasm between death and eternal life for the Christian faith.
Let us begin with that all too familiar passage from the Gospel of John, which is
considered to be such a good representation of the Christian understanding of salvation,
that it is the one displayed on highway billboards, in football stadiums, and even on Tshirts for modern day evangelization: “For God so loved the world that he gave his only
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Son, so that everyone who believes in him may not perish but may have eternal life.” (Jn
3:16) How exactly is this eternal life to be had–as the result of God giving his only Son?
Jesus’ own name says it all: “you are to name him Jesus, for he will save his people from
their sins.” (Mt 1:21) But in case we misunderstand Jesus’ salvific work of taking away
people’s sin and giving them eternal life in a merely legalistic rather than intrinsic way,
Jesus’ own response to a man’s question of how to gain eternal life cannot be clearer: to
deny themselves and “follow me.” (Mk 10:21) And, as to what is “following” Jesus, he
says simply “By this everyone will know that you are my disciples, if you have love for
one another.” (Jn 13:35)
As best exemplified through Jesus’ own life, death, and resurrection, the New
Testament theology of death recognizes the path from death to life as the Cross–that is,
the inward death by sin is to be overcome via the cleansing of self-centeredness (2 Cor
4:16). And so, our resurrection from the real worrisome death, i.e., of “the inward man,”
to the real desirable life, i.e., in the eternal, is the process of sanctification. Just like a
grain of wheat which gains the fruit-bearing life by falling into the earth to die, “Those
who love their life lose it, and those who hate their life in this world will keep it for
eternal life.” (Jn 12:25) The Apostle John describes the passage from death in sin to life
eternal as selfless love for others, saying that
We know that we have passed from death to life because we love one another.
Whoever does not love abides in death. All who hate a brother or sister are
murderers, and you know that murderers do not have eternal life abiding in them.
We know love by this that he laid down his life for us–and we ought to lay down
our lives for one another. 7
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The Apostle Paul evokes the washing ceremony of baptism to help Christians understand
their rising to new life as “death” to sin:
Do you not know that all of us who have been baptized into Christ Jesus were
baptized into his death? Therefore, we have been buried with him by baptism
into death, so that, just as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the
Father, so we too might walk in newness of life. For, if we have been united with
him in a death like his, we will certainly be united with him in a resurrection like
his. We know that our old self was crucified with him so that the body of sin
might be destroyed, and we might no longer be enslaved to sin. For whoever has
died is freed from sin. But if we have died with Christ, we believe that we will
also live with him. 8
Moreover, that Christianity understands the deliverance from death in sin to life
eternal as the path of sanctification is reflected through the role God the Holy Spirit is
understood as playing in this process. Needless to say, the most salient character of the
Holy Spirit is his holiness. But, more importantly, the Holy Spirit is introduced as both
the Life Giver and the Sanctifier. As the Giver of Life (2 Cor 3:6), the Holy Spirit is
called “the Spirit of life” (Rom 8:2), “the eternal Spirit” (Heb 9:14), through whom one
must be born again in order to see the eternal Kingdom of God (Jn 3:3-8). Also, the Holy
Spirit is known as the Spirit of Resurrection; and “If the Spirit of him who raised Jesus
from the dead dwells in you, he who raised Christ from the dead will give life to your
mortal bodies also through his Spirit that dwells in you.” (Rom 8:11) And, “If you sow to
your own flesh, you will reap corruption from the flesh; but if you sow to the Spirit, you
will reap eternal life from the Spirit.” (Gal 6:8)
Why does the Holy Spirit have such life-giving power? The scripture explains that
“the Spirit is life because of righteousness.” (Rom 8:10) And, “if you live according to
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the flesh, you will die; but if by the Spirit you put to death the deeds of the body, you will
live.” (Rom 8:13) This “killing” of our “fleshly” (i.e., selfish) deeds by the Holy Spirit
means us being “sanctified by the Holy Spirit” (Rom 15:16), evinced by the resulting
virtues of “the fruit of the Spirit”: “love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, generosity,
faithfulness, gentleness, and self-control.” (Gal 5:22-23) This is precisely “salvation
through sanctification by the Spirit and belief in the truth” of the Gospel (2 Thes 2:13).
Jesus also promised his disciples that the Holy Spirit “will prove the world wrong about
sin and righteousness and judgment” (Jn 16:8).
The Need for an Ontological Explication of Death, Resurrection, and the Eternal Life
As reviewed in Chapter Two, Henry Novello emphasizes the importance of the
Christian understanding of salvation as human beings truly attaining the higher, divine
nature, and so also the necessity to construct the theology of death within an ontological
(rather than a merely metaphorical or ethical) frame of thinking. Novello’s highlighting
salvation as deification, in fact, reflects an increasing appreciation among theologians
regarding the crucial soteriological insights expressed by the eastern orthodox doctrine of
Theosis.
Orthodox theologian Valerie Karras well captures the nature of the doctrine of
deification by calling it “a direct consequence of an incarnational, hence ontological,
soteriology.” 9 That is to say, the Eastern Church understands the Incarnation as
accomplishing not only justification, but also sanctification–which makes possible true
9
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union with God through participation. As Church Father Athanasius famously declares,
“He [the Logos] became man that we might be deified.” Similarly, Gregory of Nazianzus
states that “For that which He has not assumed He has not healed; but that which is
united to His Godhead is also saved.” Karras calls this notion of “salvation as sharing” an
ontological soteriology: it conceptualizes our salvation as no less than sharing the divine
nature, on the confident basis of “humanity’s being one in essence, substance, or nature
in our humanity with Jesus Christ, which is in turn homoousios with God the Father.” 10
When our eventual salvation is understood as deification, a mere juridical or forensic
articulation of sin and redemption is no longer sufficient; the explication must reach
down to the most fundamental, the ontological level. As Karras points out:
Human beings are not restored to communion with God through an act of
spiritual prestidigitation where God looks and thinks he sees humanity but in fact
really seeing his Son. … Humanity’s justification through forgiveness of sins is
not a mere covering over man’s sins, but a real destruction of them. It is not a
mere external decision, but a reality. … We understand this teaching better if we
remember the relation between Adam and Christ. As we became not only
apparently but really sinful because of Adam, so through Christ the Second
Adam we become really justified. 11
Admittedly, the talk of “becoming God” may cause the outcry of blasphemy or at
least the worry of conceptual intractability; but these negative reactions are not warranted
once we realize that the soteriological aim of becoming God is not so much about
coveting the glory of God, but about becoming Christ-like in terms of holiness and Agape
Love–the Command given to all Christians. In contrast to a mere juridical expression of
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salvation, the ontological expression of salvation, i.e., in terms of deification, makes clear
the drastic degree of genuine transformation which must take place within the human
nature. Moreover, as Karras observes, this ontological way of understanding salvation is
more “holistic,” in that it stresses the intrinsic connection between immortalization–
which is the result of becoming God, and sanctification–which is the process of becoming
God. 12
Similarly, in the field of Christian ethics, Richard Connor voiced the need for a
Metaphysic of Sanctification rooted in the human esse, so that a deeper ethical
commitment may be inspired from people. 13 Specifically, Connor detects a false
ontological profile of the human person as “a self-contained substance.” In Connor’s
view, if people live their lives according to this understanding of the human person, they
would be “people who do good, but are uncommitted in their deepest selves to the service
of God and others … in its deepest recesses seeking self-fulfillment while performing
statistically verifiable deeds of altruism and God centeredness. In a word, they would be a
selfish people with a veneer of do-goodism.” 14 Related to this false ontological profile of
the person as an essentially self-centered being is “a minimalist ethic,” according to
which the average individual “finds himself called merely to avoid evil;” sanctity is
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expected only for the elite few who are so inclined. 15 Connor observes that such
understandings of the human person and of ethics cannot offer a convincing support to
Vatican II’s universal call to holiness. Notably, in my view, the issue goes way beyond
Vatican II’s call; ultimately, it has to do with the universality of our common humanity
and the universality of God’s saving will–if God’s salvific plan is intended for the entire
human race, it seems necessary that God’s plan has to be rooted above all in the very
essence of this common human nature, in the human esse.
As the result, Connor invites “a fully-developed Metaphysic of Sanctification”
which explicates the “onto-logic of holiness” in connection with the very essence of
being human. 16 And he sees Aquinas’ profile of the human esse as an “expanding act” to
be an expedient candidate for appreciating sanctity and loving relations with others in the
very definition of the human person. In his words, “If esse is expanding act, then it will
be relational by that very fact: it will be transcendental. Relation will not be considered
exclusively as an accident, but will be one of the dimensions of esse.” 17 Even though I
would not myself describe Aquinas’ notion of the human esse as an “expanding act,” I
completely agree with Connor’s keen observation of the need to explicate holiness
through the metaphysical understanding of human nature and its fulfillment. Furthermore,
I agree with Connor that Aquinas’ metaphysics offer an effective ontological explication
of the biblical teaching about sanctity, i.e., to have life is to give oneself as God intends
15
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us to; to do the opposite is death. Admittedly, a theological project that aimed to treat
sanctification as thoroughly as entailed by the concept of Theosis is inconceivable
without the possibility of postmortem time or postmortem embodiment in a Berkeleian
sense. But, with both obstacles removed in the previous chapters, we may now attempt
such a project.
Sanctity as Existential Vitality–Bringing Forth a Metaphysic of Sanctification from
Thomas Aquinas’ Teleological Ontology
In this section, on the basis of Aquinas’ teleological ontology articulated in
Summa Theologiae, I present a metaphysic which recognizes sanctity as existential
vitality. I want to establish that the actualization process depicted in Aquinas’ ontology
is, for humans, none other than the process of sanctification. Moreover, the fruition of
this ontological becoming–through which a potential being becomes a full being–can be
reasonably understood as the perfect existential vitality which the Bible describes as the
“eternal life” in store for the just. To some, however, the causal linkage between sin and
ontological thwarting and, vice versa, between sanctity and existential vitality may not be
that obvious in the Summa. Even though it is commonly known that the content of the
Summa is organized along the cosmic movement of “procession and return”–the First
Part deals with God and creations proceeding from God, the Second Part deals with
ethics as the human striving towards their Final End, and the Third Part deals with Christ
and the Sacraments as the God-given path back to God–this schematic structure,
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especially the connection between human ethics and their Return to God, is usually
viewed as prescriptive and systematic rather than descriptive and “organic.”
For example, a Thomistic scholar made the claim that Aquinas’ ontological notion
of “goodness” is entirely different from the moral sense of goodness. 18 As another
example, Karl Barth raises the criticism that, Aquinas perceives the human being
primarily as a “knower” who is the Image of God on the account of the intellect. In
Barth’s view, this anthropological depiction by Aquinas betrays an over-confidence in the
human reason and, relatedly, an insufficient assessment of the serious need of salvation
from sin. 19 I want to show instead that beneath the Aristotelian terminology Aquinas
adopts in the Summa is a theistic ontology quite consistent with the Christian
understandings of God as Agape Love, human beings as moral agents, and salvation as
sanctification. What’s more, I want to show that Aquinas’ teleological ontology deeply
situates morality in the very core of being human, which in essence is the type of
“metaphysics of sanctity” Richard Connor earnestly solicited for the purpose of inspiring
genuine ethical commitment. The main dots are already there in substance; they only
need to be connected and the connections be made explicit. Even though Aquinas himself
seems to be not so vocal about a completely immanent causal link between sanctity and
Eternal Life, that could be the result of conceptual hurdles like the “finality” of death and
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the nature of “embodiment,” the possible refinements of which have been proposed in my
previous chapters.
Existence Is Inherently Good Because It Is the Preordained Means for
Ontological Actualization
Aquinas’ ontology is distinctive for its categorical declaration that being and
existence per se are good. It is a concept rooted in Aquinas’ overall understanding of
finite existence as “driven”–a dynamism set in motion by God towards the eventual
fulfillment in God. Tellingly, Aquinas opens the Summa by describing the divine
attributes with the help of Aristotle’s philosophical language of causality: as the First
Cause and the Efficient Cause of all, God brought all things from the state of potential
being into the state of actual being, and continually sustains all finite forms of existence
during their grand processions of becoming. Against this thoroughly theistic and
teleological background, being and existence are valued as the very path through which
finite entities progress from mere potentiality to actual but imperfect being, and then
ultimately arrive at perfect being. Being and existence per se is good, because it is the
divinely ordained mechanism for ontological fulfillment. In Aquinas’ own words:
Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea; … The essence
of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. … it is clear that a
thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection.
But everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore, it is clear that a thing is
perfect so far as it exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual. 20
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“Goodness” in an Ontological Sense Is Substantively the Same as
Moral Goodness or “Virtue”
That being the case, Aquinas’ notion of ontological “goodness” in terms of
instrumentality for existential fulfillment is not unrelated to or an equivocation of the
meaning of “goodness” in the moral sense, as some asserted. For example, in a debate
about the issue of theodicy, Brian Davies states that Aquinas understands “goodness”
primarily in terms of ontological “desirability” rather than morality. Davies thinks that
“God’s goodness for Aquinas is not moral goodness” because, for Aquinas, goodness is
always accessed against a certain standard “But God … is wholly good as the source and
pattern of all creaturely goodness, from which it follows that there are no standards over
and against him in the light of which he must conduct himself.” 21 In other words,
whatever God does is called “good” because God is the ultimate standard setter for
evaluating “goodness.”
It is true that in Part One of the Summa Aquinas uses Aristotle’s philosophical
terminology of causality to define God’s essential “goodness” as God’s universal
“desirability.” Specifically, since God is the First Cause of all, God must be perfectly
actual in an ontological sense, and so God is sought after by all those which are caused
into existence by God in their self-actualizations, because their perfect models are
contained in God their perfect Maker. And yet, it is important to remember that the
Summa begins with God and ends with Christ. And so, despite all the philosophical
language, it does not explicate that impersonal First Cause of the Greeks which brought
21
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forth finite existences by inevitable “overflowing,” but by the personal God of Jesus, our
Abba Father. Aquinas’ “First Cause” with ontological perfection and full actuality is the
Creator who intentionally caused all finite things into existence, preordained the path and
the perfectly fulfilling End for them, and continuously assists them in their strivings
through natural principles and supernatural grace. As Aquinas himself emphasizes, “We
must hold that the will of God is the cause of things; and that He acts by the will, and not,
as some have supposed, by a necessity of His nature.” 22
The significance of the willful nature of divine causality is made clear by the
modern day Thomist, Karl Rahner. According to Rahner, “that man is the event of a free,
unmerited and forgiving, and absolute self-communication of God is the innermost center
of the Christian understanding of existence.” By “self-communication of God,” Rahner
means in an ontological sense that “God in his own most proper reality makes himself the
innermost constitutive element of man.” 23 God gives all their existence and, most
remarkably, God “the Giver himself is the gift”! We know that God loves and forgives
unconditionally, because the very existence of finite beings attests to the fact that God
gives Godself–which is being itself–indiscriminatingly, continuously, out of God’s will,
to all that which absolutely depend on Him. This utterly self-giving nature of the Creator
is captured under the biblical term Agape Love–which is moral goodness par excellence.
And so, we see that in Aquinas’ ontology the goodness and perfection of God in the
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ontological sense are substantively consistent with the moral sense, in fact, to the most
perfect degree. Notably, Rahner’s theology is described by some as a “theology of grace”
because of the effectiveness of his work in demonstrating the entire created reality as
being overwhelmingly saturated and sustained by the Creator’s self-giving goodness.
Moreover, in a corresponding fashion, ontological “goodness” is also
substantively consistent with moral goodness when Aquinas uses the word to describe
humans–who are the best image of the Creator by the token of their intellect and will, and
so who by definition fall under moral considerations. A good evidence for this may be
Aquinas’ discussion of human virtues as having their best exemplar in God:
As Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi), “the soul needs to follow something in
order to give birth to virtue: this something is God: if we follow Him we shall
live aright.” Consequently, the exemplar of human virtue must needs pre-exist in
God, just as in Him pre-exist the types of all things. Accordingly, virtue may be
considered as existing originally in God. 24
An even more helpful example of the substantive consistency between ontological
goodness and moral goodness can be found in how Aquinas explicates virtue–
ontologically and teleologically, as perfection of a certain power of action such that it
best disposes a being towards its proper end. To see this more clearly, we may unpack
“virtue” in three increasingly revealing layers in terms of its ontologically teleological
nature. First and most basically, virtue is a “habit.” 25 According to Aquinas,
habit implies order to act. … For it is essential to habit to imply some relation to a
thing’s nature, in so far as it is suitable or unsuitable thereto. But a thing’s nature,
which is the end of generation, is further ordained to another end, which is either
24
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an operation, or the product of an operation, to which one attains by means of
operation. Wherefore, habit implies relation not only to the very nature of a thing,
but also, consequently, to operation, inasmuch as this is the end of nature, or
conducive to the end. 26
And so, being a “habit,” virtue implies an order to act, a certain relation to operation.
Second, “habit” for Aquinas means a “disposition,” 27 and so virtue also has the
key property of “disposition,” which is the thing “whereby that which is disposed, is well
or ill-disposed either in regard to itself, that is to its nature, or in regard to something else,
that is to the end.” 28 Notably, for a thing to be disposed to something else, one necessary
condition is that “that which is disposed should be distinct from that to which it is
disposed; and so, that it should be related to it as potentiality is to act.” 29 This entails that
virtue not only implies order to act, but also a directional order to act.
Third and most importantly, virtue is the perfection of a certain principle of act. 30
On Aquinas’ account, “Every power which may be variously directed to act, needs a
habit whereby it is well disposed to its act.” 31 While the intellectual and the appetitive
powers are the subjects of habits, the primary subject of a “habit” is the will. Virtue is a
certain perfection of the power to act in that it perfectly disposes actions towards the
teleological end preordained for the human nature. So, taken together, virtue is a
26
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perfection of a certain power of action such that it best disposes human being’s existential
movement towards its proper end.
To put it more explicitly, for the proper existence of human beings, morality is
intrinsically relevant. The ontological “goodness” of human existence does not merely
denote instrumentality for ontological fulfillment; more fundamentally, human existence
is ontologically “good” because it is the instrument for this particular kind of ontological
fulfillment, namely, by perfectly imitating the ontological perfection of God through
moral virtues. The ontological perfection of the human beings, who are in essence beings
with intellect and will, is moral perfection. From this ontological understanding of virtue,
we can further deduce that just as the existence of fish by nature requires water for it to
thrive, the existence of human beings, who are the best image of the Creator who
willingly gives Himself, is preordained to thrive through virtuous living. Again, for the
human being with intellect and will and so an essentially moral agent, ontological
goodness has to be goodness in the moral sense as well; ontological progress results from
virtue living.
Correspondingly, Ontological “Evil” Is Substantively the Same as
Moral Evil or “Vice”
Corresponding to his definition of being per se as good, Aquinas defines
ontological “evil” as non-being, “For since being, as such, is good, the absence of one
implies the absence of the other.” 32 It does not mean that evil in the ontological sense is a
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fiction, but that evil in the ontological sense is a privation of some sort of being which
should have been there. Following Augustine, Aquinas particularly underscores the fact
that, as a privation of being, evil does not and cannot have ontological autonomy, existing
independently by itself; instead, it must have being–which is ontologically good–as its
subject. 33 Consequently, there can never be an evil First Principle, or an evil Efficient
Cause; neither can evil take hold of any being in its entirety or become the essence of it.
Notably, these stipulations by Aquinas help uncover the parasitic, corrosive and lethal
nature of ontological evil–it is the aberration of being, it is a derailment of being from the
right track, it hinders and halts existential becoming. Ontological evil as a “privation” of
that which should have been there thwarts and diminishes existence.
Regarding moral evil or “vice,” Aquinas defines it in substantively the same way
as he defines ontological evil–it is the opposite of how things should be according to
teleological providence. Specifically, when describing the ontological nature of vice,
Aquinas contrasts it with virtue in terms of how they each relate to the nature of things: in
essence, “the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed in a manner befitting its
nature,” whereas “the vice of any thing consists in its being disposed in a manner not
befitting its nature.” 34 Therefore, moral evil is ontological evil, because by it the human
being is ill disposed according to its nature; it causes the human being to stray away from
the teleological end. Aquinas explains further that, even though inordinate act resulting
from vice (or “sin”) cannot completely destroy the fundamental human nature created by
33
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God, sin diminishes the natural inclination to virtue. 35 Considering that virtue is the
perfection of the active principle which guides human beings’ existential movement, such
diminishment of the proper drive is ontologically fatal. It renders a lost existence, a
wandering being, heading towards nonbeing.
Notably, from individual psyche to the health of the society, there are already
ample evidences for the erosive impact of moral evil. But Aquinas’ ontology helps us
recognize the lethal nature of moral evil on the most constitutive level. Even though
ontology deals with “the way things are” in terms of their fundamental nature, whereas
morality deals with “what should we do” in terms of choices available to the human will,
logically speaking, what we should do is determined by what we are, and so morality
properly construed is not a mere human construct but has its ultimate foundation in
ontology. Thanks to Aquinas’ metaphysical unpacking of ethics, we see why moral evil
rooted in self-centeredness is not just disruptive interpersonally to the others, but also
destructive personally to the self: examined on the ontological plain, moral evil is a form
of human existence in contradiction to the preordained teleological nature of imitating
divine self-giving.
Beatitude Requires Rectitude of the Will
The ontological significance of moral goodness may be further demonstrated by
seeing how Aquinas explains the necessity of moral rectitude for the Final End. On
Aquinas’ account, the universal Last End for all human beings is perfect happiness or
Beatitude when we are finally united with God the Uncreated Good, “Who alone by His
35
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infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy man's will.” 36 And he quotes the scripture to insist
that rectitude of the will is necessary for attaining the Last End: “It is written (Mt 5:8):
‘Blessed are the clean of heart; for they shall see God’: and (Heb 12:14): ‘Follow peace
with all men, and holiness; without which no man shall see God.’ 37 He reasons that,
without being fully rectified, the will is not properly oriented toward the Last End, which
is Perfect Goodness itself, and so it cannot arrive at the Last End; moreover, if the will is
not fully rectified, it would not find perfect satisfaction and happiness in God, even if it
were able to come into union with God–because an unrectified will does not and cannot
enjoy such close presence of God, who is Perfect Goodness. In Aquinas’ own words:
Rectitude of will is necessary for Happiness both antecedently and concomitantly.
Antecedently, because rectitude of the will consists in being duly ordered to the
last end. … Concomitantly, because… final Happiness consists in the vision of
the Divine Essence, which is the very essence of goodness. So that the will of him
who sees the Essence of God, of necessity, loves, whatever he loves, in
subordination to God; … And this is precisely what makes the will right. 38
The Moral Law Is the Operative Principle for the
Ontological Fulfillment of Human Beings
Lastly, the ontological importance of moral goodness may be demonstrated by
seeing how Aquinas describes the way human beings’ Final End is attained–by following
the moral law. Specifically, according to Aquinas, different creatures must attain the
Final End through actions suited for them. Given that the human creatures are best
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characterized by intellect and will–the two necessary and sufficient parameters for moral
considerations, Aquinas declares that “moral acts are the same as human acts.” 39
Logically, for human beings, the existential operation for ontological fulfillment is
repeating good actions for the cultivation of virtue; sanctification is that suitable path of
existential actualization preordained for the human beings. And so, Aquinas considers his
elaborate discussion of ethics as none other than describing by what acts we may obtain
the beatific Final End, and by what acts we are prevented from obtaining it, since “Man is
perfected by virtue, for those actions whereby he is directed to happiness.” 40
On Aquinas’ account, there are both internal and external “laws” governing
human actions; these are principles to be understood by the intellect in guiding the human
being into the eventual Happiness, 41 “because it is by law that man is directed how to
perform his proper acts in view of his last end.” 42 Externally, there is the “eternal law,”
which refers to the unchanging providence of God that regulates the entire universe; 43
and also the “divine laws,” which signify God’s supernatural revelations through the Old
and the New Testaments. 44 Internally, there is the “natural law” which is the “imprint” of
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God’s eternal law on the human reason, “whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper
act and end” and “whereby we discern what is good and what is evil.” 45
Comments on the Strengths of Aquinas’ Teleological Ontology for a
Metaphysic of Sanctification
From the above, we see from the ways Aquinas’ ontology defines goodness and
evil, understands the Final End, conceptualizes the process of actualization that, his
metaphysic is substantively a Metaphysic of Sanctification. Admittedly, even though
Aquinas states several times that, aided by grace, the human being can be made into a
partaker of the Divine Nature, 46 he stops short of describing the eternal life for human
beings as the immanent culmination of their holiness. Instead, Aquinas acknowledges the
utter inadequacy of human merits, and depicts eternal life only as a gracious “reward”
given to them by God. 47 I wonder whether this absence of explicit identification of
existential vitality (or “eternal life”) with holiness is due to the lack of a robust pareschatology, something like John Hick proposes. As discussed in the previous chapters,
Aquinas’ assertion of the “finality” of death and his body-soul dualism make it difficult
to envision a post-mortem sanctification process that is thorough in extent and intelligible
metaphysically. Without these conditions, a gaping chasm exists between the very limited
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degree of sanctity accomplishable during a single lifetime and the perfect existential
vitality “eternal life” represents.
That said, these issues are removable “glitches” that should not prevent Aquinas’
ontology from being an illuminating Metaphysic of Sanctification that truly does justice
to the life-giving significance of morality and goodness for human existence. In fact,
Aquinas’ ontology seems particularly remarkable here on two accounts–it deepens
metaphysics with morality, and it grounds morality in metaphysics. On the one hand,
Aquinas’ teleological ontology of being per se as good enables us to better detect the
moral momentum beneath human existence, which is set in motion in the beginning and
perpetually draws all human beings towards the Good End. In other words, human
existence is created for and geared towards the eventual moral perfection from day one.
As another theologian puts it, Creation is for salvation and sanctification; ontology is to
be annotated by ethics.
On the other hand, Aquinas’ ontology helps us recognize morality as the very
ontological blueprint for the proper way of being human. As a contrast, ethicists like Karl
Barth delineate ethics primarily as an external mandate, even a divine mandate, and so do
not make clear the immanent nature of morality for being human, and the immanently
life-giving effect of moral precepts for the ontological vitality of human existence. As the
result, ethics appear substantively arbitrary rather than immanently consequential and
constantly binding. Notably, this immanent root of ethics in ontology is particularly
underscored by the Natural Law tradition in ethics, which approaches ethics
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metaphysically following Aquinas’ “natural law” notion discussed above. Despite their
interpretive variations, Natural Law ethicists all agree that morality is grounded in
ontological reality, in how things really are, rather than in social or cultural customs–
hence the word “Natural.” And they value the strength of Aquinas’ metaphysics for
conveying the universal applicability and the steadfast governing power of morality–
hence the word “Law.” Putting it vividly, the moral law is “pegged to nature in its
broadest sense.” 48
Concluding Remarks
In this chapter of my dissertation, I attempt to drive home the soteriological
importance of sanctification by recognizing it from the very fabric of being and reality. I
began by presenting the biblical theology of death which consistently attributes sin as its
cause and, correspondingly, promises righteous living with eternal life. Then, I
introduced the eastern orthodox doctrine of Theosis and Richard Conner’s petition for a
Metaphysic of Sanctification in order to show the need for understanding morality and
sanctification ontologically. Lastly, I discussed how Aquinas’ ontology can be reasonably
understood as a Metaphysic of Sanctification: in a nutshell, sanctity truly brings life; the
existential process of ontological becoming is for humans the process of sanctification.
In his demonstration of the center of Christian life as self-giving, Michael Himes
makes it clear how the moral command epitomized by self-less love is indeed a matter of
life and death for the human existence:
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“the one who holds onto life loses it; the one who gives life away sees it become
everlasting life” …That statement is, in fact, the key to the whole gospel story.
For a long time when I heard or read that line, I interpreted it as a commandment.
Only gradually did it occur to me that it is not a commandment but a description.
Jesus is not telling us, “This is how you ought to live,” but rather, “This is how
the world is. This is what it is like to exist.” If you give your life away, it
becomes everlasting life, but if you hold onto it, you lose it. To be is to be for
others. … This is obviously true if one begins from the claim that God is perfect
self-gift. If the very source and ground of being, God, is self-gift, then it follows
that if you really want to be human, give yourself away. To the extent that you
choose not to give yourself away, to that extent you do not fully exist. …
existence is proportional to self-gift. 49
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION
Review of Chapters
Chapter One, “Introduction,” of my dissertation begins with a report on the urgent
need in our time to address the topic of human mortality theological, and the lack of
investigations on this topic from the field of Christian theology. It then describes the
methodologies I employ in my dissertation, and presents the thesis of my dissertation.
In Chapter Two, “A Review of Current Literatures in the Theology of Death,” I
review eleven sustained works in contemporary theologies of death, plus related
developments in eschatology. I schematize the literatures around the dual themes of time
and space within the postmortem context. My aim here is to paint the current landscape
of this discourse, to capture major insights gained so far, and to identify significant issues
waiting to be addressed.
The first group of works I review revolves around the question of whether death
ends once and for all the process of salvation for a person. Our moral imperfection at
death is obvious. To conceptualize the triumph of salvation within the traditional
assertion of the finality of death, theologians like Ladislaus Boros proposed the “final
decision” hypothesis which, in various ways, assigns decisive import to the very moment
of death. Theologians like Joseph Ratzinger strongly disagreed. The main reason behind
their objection is the Christian understanding of time as a teleological process of human
420
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becoming. They pointed out that, Christianity as a historical faith understands human
temporality to be the stage upon which the plot of salvation unfolds. As epitomized in the
historical event of Jesus Christ, God saves us through time. Even though the claim of the
finality of death may be intended to underscore the seriousness of temporal life,
ironically, since death intrudes life randomly in time, it seems impossible to accord real
significance to life if death were allowed the final word. Theologians like Jürgen
Moltmann also pointed to the divine attributes of omnipotence and omnibenevolence,
arguing that the all-loving and all-powerful God would not permit death to thwart his
salvific plan of becoming “all in all.” Despite of the soundness of these anti-finality
arguments, the claim of the finality of death is still dominant in mainstream Christianity
today. In Chapter Four of my dissertation, I will try to strengthen the case against the
finality of death with the help of recent advancements in theology.
The second group of works I review revolves around “body” in postmortem life.
There is an emerging consensus that the Doctrine of Resurrection goes beyond human
physicality and speaks about the human person as a whole; it speaks about God
preserving the entire history of a lived personal reality beyond death. There is also an
increasing recognition of the need to keep moral and spiritual issues front and center
when reflecting upon postmortem existence, rather than the merely “technical” concern
of surviving death. In addition, more thoughts have been given to the person-making
purpose of embodiment in the afterlife. The biggest disagreement among this group of
works has to do with the state of the body in the final eschaton: some insist on the
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resurrection of the flesh, given its goodness as God’s creation and the universal scope of
God’s saving plan; others think that the physical body occupies no part in the eternal,
given our scientific understanding of the constantly changing and inherently perishable
nature of all material realities. In my view, this disagreement is caused by the ambiguity
of our current conceptualization of “matter.” In Chapter Five, with the help of Bishop
Berkeley’s sacramental idealism, I will tackle the question of how to understand “body”
in a way that does not contradict science and yet adequately conveys the importance it is
given by the Christian tradition.
The third theme touched upon in this literature, albeit not extensively, is the
relationship between death and sin. As Oscar Cullmann points out, the deepest contrast
between Christianity and Platonism regarding death is Christianity’s constant spotlight on
sin; according to Christianity, “Death can be conquered only to the extent that sin is
removed.” 1 Similarly, Donald Bloesch comments that “We need to gain a victory over
sin before we gain assurance of life beyond the grave. ‘From sin to righteousness’
proceeds ‘from death to life.’” 2 Roger Troisfontaines names death as sin’s “immanent
sanction.” 3 Unfortunately, little explanation has been given as to why Christianity insists
on an immanent connection between death and sin, except occasional cautions against
simplistically calling Original Sin the cause of our physical death. In Chapter Six, with
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the help of Thomas Aquinas’ teleological ontology, I will try to unpack the biblical
insights related to the immanent causation between death and sin.
Chapter Three is titled “John Hick’s Theology of Death in Death and Eternal Life
(1976).” 4 It is meant to set up a springboard for the major themes to be investigated in the
following chapters of my dissertation. Comparing to the other works we reviewed so far,
Hick’s theology is particularly effective in illuminating the formative function of
temporality and embodiment for human existence, which is a grand process of personmaking for us to grow and develop into the Image of God.
Regarding temporality, Hick lays out a “par-eschatology” after some intensive
explorations of the eastern religions. His par-eschatology may be summed up as “many
lives in many worlds,” which is a postmortem soteriology under the assumption of the
non-finality of death. He emphatically rejects Ladislaus Boros’ hypothesis of “final
decision,” saying that “We cannot be content with a theory which gives meaning to death
by depriving this life of its meaning.” 5 Hick thinks that rejecting the finality of death will
help draw attention to par-eschatology, which avails Christian theology what he considers
the much needed possibility of dealing with the topic of universal salvation. Hick’s
universalistic concern seems particularly pertinent for our ever more globalized context
today. He reasons that, the state of sin and imperfection in which most people die entails
that more time must be granted beyond our earthly sojourn, “if a divine purpose of
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person-making through the human being’s free responses is to continue to its
completion.” 6
Regarding embodiment, Hick also offers some helpful insights. Specifically, he
conceives human embodiment under the overarching purpose of person-making.
Embodiment is a means of delimitation for us humans who have only limited cognitive
capacities. Embodiment also furnishes the medium for human interaction and
communion. Hick especially highlights the expedience of “matter” for establishing an
orderly environment. This setting of concrete externalities provides us with both the
epistemological distance needed for exercising freewill, and also the fixed existential
parameters to wrestle with for survival. Through the collective life in the material
environment, human intelligence is developed and moral characters formed. Hick
conjectures that each postmortem embodiment of a person will be tailored to the specific
laws of the world(s) the person is to live through in order to reach the eventual union with
God.
In addition, valuable insights on postmortem embodiment are gained from the
heated debates over Hick’s “replica” theory. His theory is an attempt to come up with a
survival scenario within the physicalist’s framework, which defines the human being as
entirely physical without remainder. The controversy helps us realize that, genuine
survival of the human person requires that the unique aspect of being human: namely, as
a subject of internal experiences–must be preserved. Since subjective experiences by
nature are the product of a particular subject, they are not really transferable to another
subject. One crucial implication is that, unlike completely physical entities such as rocks
6
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and trees, a human being cannot be brought back to existence after its subjectivity ceases,
even only instantaneously–that, in short, is the Dualists’ objection to Hick’s theory. The
other crucial implication is that true survival of the human person presupposes certain
concepts of subjectivity which are qualitatively foreign to “matter” described by physics–
that, in short, is the Physicalists’ objection to Hick’s theory.
In Chapter Four, “Postmortem Purgation–A Theological Corollary of the
Centrality of Sanctification in the Christian Understanding of Salvation,” I present
support for the case against the asserted finality of death. I begin by introducing a very
recent Protestant scholarship on purgatory which concludes that, if sanctification is
indispensable for salvation, we must embrace its corollary, i.e., opportunities for
postmortem purgation. 7 The main portion of this chapter is then dedicated to deploying
an extensive survey of recent developments in areas like New Testament and early
Christianity, Reformation studies, the “faith-alone” polemic in Protestantism, and
ecumenical dialogues. Scholarships covered here include exegesis and biblical theology
related to the Apostle Paul, historical theology related to Luther and Calvin, constructive
theology on Theosis, as well as joint declarations by the Catholic, the Orthodox, and the
Protestant churches. All in all, we witness an unprecedentedly wide recognition of the
soteriological centrality of sanctification: for salvation captured under the word “heaven”
to be genuine, it must be an ontological truth rather than a mere legal fiction, and so it
must be a thorough transformation rather than a mere declaration. No doubt, this
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converging insight emerged in recent decades from multiple directions is a considerable
step forward.
And yet, “justification” advocates are quick to offer us a reality check lest we may
be naively optimistic for achieving sanctification. So we see that, in the justificationsanctification debate over salvation, the toughest opponent of the sanctification advocates
is not the justification advocates, but death–ruthlessly mocking sanctification with its
always unpredictable and always uncompromising interruption. If the sanctification
process ends at death, all the arguments recently reached for the centrality of
sanctification collapse when confronted by death–sanctification seems to be
soteriologically inconsequential after all. To solve this issue, sanctification advocates
usually count on death to be the moment of moral perfection. But, if so, why should
people agonize over sanctification during life? Why does Christianity concern itself so
much with something that at death would be taken care of for us perfectly by God? If it
were possible for God to instantly achieve sanctification for us, why wouldn’t God do it
at the beginning of time, instead of sending Jesus “in the fullness of time”? Given the
soteriological centrality of sanctification clarified in recently theology, it seems that death
is better conceived not as a breaking-point in the process of sanctification, but as a
potential breakthrough point into vastly new horizons for continuous person-making.
Chapter Five is titled “Postmortem Embodiment in Light of George Berkeley’s
Sacramental Idealism.” As physicist John Polkinghorne points out, there exists an innate
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connection between time and matter. 8 If, as argued in the previous chapter, death is not
final and postmortem time seems necessary, how does postmortem embodiment look
like? In this chapter, I argue that postmortem embodiment conceived within George
Berkeley’s sacramental idealism is the most coherent way for envisioning our bodily
existence after death. More importantly, Berkeley’s sacramental conceptualizations of
materiality in general and of embodiment in particular are most conducive for grasping
the person-making role of “body” in the grand scheme of salvation. As a theologically
sound and philosophically tenable account of postmortem embodiment, it not only
effectively conveys the soteriological centrality of sanctification in Christian soteriology,
but is also sufficiently rigorous in the light of veritable truths reported from philosophy
and modern science.
I begin the chapter by reporting on recent attempts by physicalists and dualists
alike to produce a persuasive account of the Christian doctrine of “resurrection.” None of
them seem convincing. Then, using Berkeley’s “Three Dialogues between Hylas and
Philonous,” “A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge,” and “An
Essay towards a New Theory of Vision,” I introduce his sacramental Idealism as a much
robust but seldom noticed alternative. Berkeley’s distinct brand of Idealism is
characterized by his conceptualization of the material world as divine communication to
us. Substantively, it is very much in line with the long string of Sacramental Theology
(e.g., from St. Augustine to Karl Rahner); it is also very congenial to the Theology of the
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Body inaugurated by John Pope II. Moreover, Berkeley’s Idealism resonates quite
interestingly with recent theological reflections on “virtual reality.”
The above strengths noted, though, how does Berkeley’s idealism score under the
criteria of related Christian orthodoxy? To address this question, I review New Testament
passages and church Fathers’ works on “resurrection” and postmortem embodiment. I
show that the Berkeleian definition of postmortem embodiment not only does not
contradict related Christian orthodoxies, it often is most effective in expressing the
theological insights originally motivated them. In addition, I recount the intriguing
arguments by some that Berkeley’s idealistic understanding of the material reality is
necessary for rendering intelligible several other core Christian doctrines, such as
Incarnation, Trinity, and Creation ex nihilo.
To more thoroughly establish Berkeley’s Idealism as the proper framework for
conceptualizing all embodiments, I broaden my investigation further by introducing
current philosophical literatures on the mind-body relation, known as the “philosophy of
mind.” Overall, while the Physicalist’s portrait of the human person is inadequate for
depicting a genuine mental life, the Dualist portrait is incoherent in explaining the mindbody interaction, and the dual-aspect Monist’s portrait as an attempt to have it both ways
is a fragmented and blurred patchwork. In comparison, the human portrait under
Berkeley’s Idealism captures the key features of them all, while avoiding the flaws of
them all.
In the last section of this chapter, I broaden my investigative scope even further
by bringing in metaphysical writings of founders of modern physics, in order that we may
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learn about the material reality from those who study it the best. Arguably, in and of
itself, it is already quite thought-provoking to find that, so many of the founders of
modern physics were inspired and urged by their own scientific discoveries to pen down
some metaphysic insights. Perhaps still unbeknownst to many, during the past century,
paradigm-shifting discoveries of quantum physics and relativity unveiled pure
mathematics to be the most basic foundation of all material realities. With that, came the
shocking realization that empirical regularities found in physics are symbolic in nature:
that is, they are descriptions of relationships, not “substance;” more importantly, given
the fundamentally “circular” (i.e., symbolic) nature of studies in physics, scientific
investigations of “materiality” can only speak about relationships, never about
“substance.” And so, unexpectedly, modern physics seems to encourage a worldview of
the Berkeleian kind.
Chapter Six is titled “From Death to Eternal Life–Explicating the Biblical
Theology of Death via a Metaphysic of Sanctification.” Lucy Bregman points out that
“‘death,’ for Christian spirituality, has never been exclusively the physical death and
dying of scientific medicine or thanatology. Death is a pervasive imagery linked to
Christ’s death, to our own sacrifice of self, to a life ‘hid with Christ in God.’” 9 Along the
same line, Wolfgang Schoberth states that “Death is not a proper theme in dogmatics or
an object in confessional statements. It is theologically relevant only in relation to sin, the
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last judgment, the resurrection, and so forth.” 10 That is to say, the kind of death that
properly concerns Christian theology is spiritual death.
In this constructive chapter of my dissertation, I first trace from the scripture a
biblical theology of death with a salient thread running from Genesis to Revelation:
namely, the connection between death and sin, holiness and eternal life. The scripture
consistently associates corruption and death with evil and sin, and links sanctity and
righteousness with vitality and eternal life. Moreover, New Testament authors repeatedly
depict God’s salvific work in the life of the believers under the theme of “death and
resurrection” through the Holy Spirit, who is the Power of Resurrection and the Giver of
Life.
Are these just primitive concepts of physical death or metaphorical langue for
spiritual death? To unearth the crucial insights contained in the biblical theology of death,
I utilize Thomas Aquinas’ teleological ontology in Summa Theologiae shed light on the
ontologically imminent connection between sin and death, sanctity and life. I attempt to
show that, Aquinas’ ontology is built upon St. Augustine’s notion of evil as “non-being.”
It is a grand teleological drama of the entire creation being drawn towards its own
perfection in the union with God the Creator who, as the First Cause of all existence, is
best characterized by ontological perfection and complete goodness. Creaturely existence
is none other than a dynamic momentum set in motion by God; it is intended to be a
journey from non-being, through being and, eventually, to perfect being. All beings, in so
far as they exist, exist in varying stages on this journey towards perfection, and so are
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good; to the extent that a being is good, to that same extent that this being truly exists as
intended by God. Sin, given its corrosive and destructive nature as moral evil, is a
privation and annihilation of being; thus, in a concrete and real sense, sin lead to death.
Therefore, unlike some Aquinas scholar claimed, God’s ontological goodness and
perfection according to Aquinas is none other than God’s moral goodness and perfection.
Tellingly, Aquinas depicts the ethical process of growth in virtues as a process of
cultivating the divine disposition of Goodness and agape Love, which is rewarded by
God with none other than Eternal Life.
Intended Contributions
Rebecca Housel and Jeremy Wisnewski observe that our cultural frenzy over
Twilight the vampire-themed romance novels betrays a universal human longing that
death is not inevitable and the purest form of love has been found. 11 It may be said that,
Christianity, being a faith engendered by the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ,
affirms precisely this perennial longing of the human heart. As a theology engaging the
Christian tradition with contemporary culture, my dissertation is aimed to contribute in
the following ways.
First, I want to show that, upon closer examination, the widely-held assertion of
the finality of death is unwarranted. This assertion overshadows the centrality of
sanctification in the Christian understanding of salvation, with harmful consequences
ranging from pseudo theological impasses, to falsely conceived “shortcuts” to heaven,
and to self-righteous disdain and even mockery of the Gospel message of salvation. More
11
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than forty years ago, Michael Simpson called for a responsible renewal of eschatology by
cleansing away concepts that do not resonate with our deepest moral instinct. 12 He
underscores the necessity to proclaim the Christian Hope in a way that is morally
inspiring and life transforming, in order that Christianity may continue to be a lively
saving force in our society today. After decades of deliberation, it seems reasonable to
say that the assertion of the finality of death is one of those concepts needing theological
cleansing, in order that Christianity may continue to inspire hope and transform lives in
our culture today.
Second, by advocating Bishop Berkeley’s sacramental idealism as the proper
framework for envisioning postmortem embodiment, I intend to contribute by improving
the coherence of our articulation of the Christian Hope. Without such a robust
metaphysics regarding “matter” and the material body, eschatological proclamations like
the Resurrection lack intelligibility and so cannot credibly inspire hope. For example, as
Candido Pozo points out, it appears puzzling as to why Christian eschatology insists that
“the material body can contribute to a more intense possession of God”–who is
essentially Spirit. 13 Notably, when searching for the proper concept of postmortem
embodiment, I pay particular attention to Hans Bynagle’s dual-emphasis of compatibility
with Christian orthodoxy and tenability with established philosophical and scientific
truths. 14 In this way, I may better recover crucial insights from scripture and tradition, and
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also better demonstrate the logic and credibility of the Christian understanding of life
after death.
Third, I intend to contribute by spotlighting the immanent connection between
death and sin on the ontological level, so that the lethal nature of sin can be fully grasped,
and the life-giving nature of holiness thoroughly appreciated. Decades ago, Richard
Connor points to the urgent need that, Vatican II’s universal call to holiness must be
complemented and underpinned by a metaphysical conceptualization of the human
person which understands holiness as the very essence of human fulfillment. Without
such metaphysics, morality tends to become “a veneer of do-goodism” without the
deepest human self being committed to the service of God and of others. 15 Connor calls
this moral frame of mind a minimalist ethic where “sanctity has typically been a graduate
course for those so inclined … for the few and the elite.” 16 Now, with the removal of the
“finality” of death, a formidable conceptual barrier to a thoroughgoing conceptualization
of sanctity as human fulfillment, we are liberated to attempt such a metaphysical notion,
according to which sanctity is none other than life to the fullest, being at its perfection. It
illuminates the “onto-logic” of sanctity as true life, sin as true death. Death is examined
against the background of true life, so that, as Martin Luther declared in The Freedom of
Christians, death may be unmasked, disarmed, and turned into a servant for our salvation.

15

Richard Connor, “Relation, the Thomistic esse, and American Culture: Toward a Metaphysic of
Sanctity,” Communio 17 (1990): 455.
16

Ibid, 464.

REFERENCE LIST
Aden, Ross. “Justification and Sanctification: A Conversation between Lutheranism and
Orthodoxy.” St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 38, no. 1 (1994): 87-109.
Aldwinckle, Russell Foaster. Death in the Secular City: Life after Death in
Contemporary Theology and Philosophy. Grand Rapids, MI: William B.
Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1974.
Andersen, Carl, and Jose Granados. Called to Love: Approaching John Paul II’s
Theology of the Body. New York, NY: Doubleday, 2009.
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa contra Gentiles (Summary against the Pagans: c. 1259-1265).
______. Summa Theologiae (Summary of Theology: c. 1265-1273).
Aries, Phillippe. Western Attitudes toward Death: From the Middle Ages to the Present.
Translated by Patricia M. Ranum. Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University
Press, 1974.
Audi, Robert. “Eschatological Verification and Personal Identity.” International Journal
for Philosophy of Religion 7, no. 4 (1976): 391-408.
Baker, Lynne Rudder. “Persons and the Metaphysics of Resurrection.” Religious Studies
43, no. 3 (September 2007): 333-348.
______. “Christian Materialism in a Scientific Age.” International Journal of Philosophy
and Religion 70 (2011): 47-59.
Baltimore, Joseph A. “Got to Have Soul.” Religious Studies 42, no. 4 (December 2006):
417-430.
Barth, Karl. Church Dogmatics, II/2. Translated by J. Strathearn McNab, edited by G. W.
Bromiley and T. F. Torrance. Edinburgh: T & T Scott, 1957.
Berkeley, George. “Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous.” In A New Theory of
Vision and Other Selected Philosophical Writings, with an Introduction by A. D.
Lindsay, 197-303. New York, NY: E. P. Dutton, 1910.

434

435
______. “An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision.” In A New Theory of Vision and
Other Selected Philosophical Writings, with an Introduction by A. D. Lindsay, 186. New York, NY: E. P. Dutton, 1910.
______. “A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge.” In A New Theory
of Vision and Other Selected Philosophical Writings, with an Introduction by A.
D. Lindsay, 87-195. New York, NY: E. P. Dutton, 1910.
Bernard, Justine. “Purgatory and the Dilemma of Sanctification.” Faith and Philosophy
24, no. 3 (July 2007): 311-330.
Bielfeldt, Dennis. “Can Western Monotheism Avoid Substance Dualism?” Zygon 36, no.
1 (March 2001): 153-177.
Bloesch, Donald G. The Last Things: Resurrection, Judgment, Glory. Downers Grove, IL:
InterVarsity Press, 2004.
Boersma, Hans. Embodiment and Virtue in Gregory of Nyssa: An Anagogical Approach.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Bonk, Sigmund. “We see God”: George Berkeley’s Philosophical Theology. New York,
NY: Peter Lang, 1997.
Boros, Ladislaus. The Mystery of Death. Translated by Gregory Bainbridge. New York,
NY: Herder and Herder, 1965.
______. “Death: A theological Reflection.” In The Mystery of Suffering and Death,
edited by Michael J. Taylor, 139-155. Staten Island, NY: Alba House, 1973.
Bregman, Lucy. Beyond Silence and Denial. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox
Press, 1999.
Brondo, David A. Paul on the Cross: Reconstructing the Apostle’s Story of Redemption.
Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2006.
Brown, David. “No Heaven without Purgatory.” Religious Studies 21, no. 4 (December
1985): 447-456.
Buckareff, Andrei A., and Joel S. Van Wagenen. “Surviving Resurrection.” International
Journal of Philosophy and Religion 67 (2010): 123-139.

436
Bynagle, Hans E. “Debating Soul, Body, and Survival–A Review Essay.” Christian
Scholar's Review 32, no. 1 (2002): 109-136.
Byrne, P. A. “Berkeley, Scientific Realism and Creation.” Religious Studies 20, no. 3
(September 1984): 453-464.
Carter, Ben M. “Mathematics and Metaphysics.” Perspectives on Science and Christian
Faith 55, no. 3 (2003): 159-165.
Cheetham, David. John Hick: A Critical Introduction and Reflection. Burlington, VT:
Ashgate, 2003.
Chia, Roland. “Salvation as Justification and Deification.” Scottish Journal of Theology
64, no. 2 (2011): 125-139.
Clarke, J. J. “John Hick’s Resurrection.” Sophia 10 (1971): 18-22.
Clifford, Alan C. “Justification: The Calvin-Saumur Perspective.” The Evangelical
Quarterly 79 no. 4 (2007): 331-348.
Colijin, Brenda B. Images of Salvation in the New Testament. Downers Grove, IL: IVP
Academic, 2010.
Combs, William W. “The Disjunction between Justification and Sanctification in
Contemporary Evangelical Theology.” Detroit Baptist Seminary Journal 6 (Fall
2001): 17-44.
Conn, Christopher H. “Human Nature and the Possibility of Life after Death: Why
Christian Orthodoxy Requires Compositional Substance Dualism.” Philosophy
and Theology 20 (2008): 129-149.
Connor, Richard. “Relation, the Thomistic esse, and American Culture: Toward a
Metaphysic of Sanctity.” Communio 17 (1990): 455-464.
Cooper, Adam G. The Body in St. Maximus the Confessor: Holy Flesh, Wholly Deified.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Cooper, John. “The Identity of Resurrected Persons: Fatal Flaw of Monistic
Anthropology.” Calvin Theological Journal 23, no. 1 (1988): 19-36.
Corcoran, Kevin. “Dualism, Materialism, and the Problem of Post Mortem Survival.”
Philosophia Christi 4, no. 2 (2002): 411-425.

437
______. “The Constitutive View of Persons.” In In Search of the Soul: Four Views of the
Mind-Body Problem, edited by Joel Green and Stuart Palmer, 153-176. Downers
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005.
Craighead, Houston. “Audi’s Critique of Hick: An Evaluation.” International Journal for
Philosophy of Religion 10, no. 1 (1979): 51-60.
Cromhout, Markus. “The Dead in Christ: Recovering Paul’s Understanding of the Afterlife.” Hervormde Teologiese Studies 60, no. 1-2 (2004): 83-101.
Cullmann, Oscar. Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead? The Witness of
the New Testament. Harvard University, Ingersoll Lecture, 1955. London:
Epworth, 1958.
Davies, Brian. The Thought of Thomas Aquinas. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.
Davis, Stephen T. “Critical Response: Hick and Dilley on Life after Death.” In Problems
in the Philosophy of Religion, edited by Harold Hewitt Jr., 156-159. New York,
NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1991.
D’Entreves, Alexander Passerin. Natural Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy.
Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994.
Dewart, Joanne E. McWilliam. Death and Resurrection. Message of the Fathers of the
Church, Series #22. Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1986.
Dilley, Frank B. “Resurrection and the ‘Replica Objection’.” Religious Studies 19, no. 4
(December 1983): 459-474.
______. “John Hick on the Self and Resurrection.” In Problems in the Philosophy of
Religion, edited by Harold Hewitt Jr., 138-155. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press,
1991.
______. “A Critique of Emergent Dualism.” Faith and Philosophy 20, no. 1 (January
2003): 37-49.
______. “Taking Consciousness Seriously: A Defense of Cartesian Dualism.”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 55 (2004): 135-153.
Dillow, Joseph C. “Did Jesus Teach Salvation by Works? A Review.” Bibliotheca Sacra
165 (October-December 2008): 463-79.
Dunn, James D. G. “The New Perspective on Paul.” Bulletin of the John Rylands
University Library of Manchester 65, no. 2 (Spring 1983): 95-122.

438
______. “How Are the Dead Raised? With What Body Do They Come? Reflections on 1
Corinthians 15.” Southwestern Journal of Theology 45, no. 1 (2002): 4-18.
Dyer, George J. “Recent Developments in the Theology of Death.” In The Mystery of
Suffering and Death, edited by Michael J. Taylor, 103-117. Staten Island, NY:
Alba House: 1973.
Egan, Harvey D. “In Purgatory We Shall All Be Mystics.” Theological Studies 73, no. 4
(2012): 870-889.
Evans, C. Stephen. “Separable Souls: Dualism, Selfhood, and the Possibility of Life after
Death.” Christian Scholar’s Review 34, no. 3 (Spring 2005): 327-340.
Everitt, Nicholas. “Quasi-Berkeleyan Idealism as Perspicuous Theism.” Faith and
Philosophy 14, no. 3 (July 1997): 353-377.
Feifel, Herman, ed. The Meaning of Death. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
1959.
Fergusson, David. “Reclaiming the Doctrine of Sanctification.” Interpretation 53, no. 4
(October 1999): 380-390.
Ferre, Frederick. “Review Essay of ‘Dueling over Dualism’.” Journal for the Study of
Religion, Nature, and Culture 4, no. 1 (March 2010): 72-87.
Foster, John. A World for Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008.
Foster, Richard. “Salvation Is for Life.” Theology Today 61 (2004): 297-308.
Gillman, John. “A Thematic Comparison: 1 Cor 15:50-57 and 2 Cor 5:1-5.” Journal of
Biblical Literature 107, no. 3 (1988): 439-454.
Gleason, Randall. “The Lordship Salvation Debate.” Evangelical Review of Theology 27,
no. 1 (2003): 55-72.
Goetz, Stewart. “Substance Dualism.” In In Search of the Soul: Four Views of the MindBody Problem, edited by Joel Green and Stuart Palmer, 33-60. Downers Grove,
IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005.
Gooch, P. W. “On Disembodied Resurrected Persons: A Study in the Logic of Christian
Eschatology.” Religious Studies 17, no. 2 (June 1981): 199-213.
Gula, Richard M. Reason Informed by Faith. New York, NY: Paulist, 1989.

439
Hart, Trevor. “Humankind in Christ and Christ in Humankind: Salvation as Participation
in Our Substitute in the Theology of John Calvin.” Scottish Journal of Theology
42, no. 1 (1989): 67-84.
Hasker, William. “On Behalf of Emergent Dualism.” In In Search of the Soul: Four
Views of the Mind-Body Problem, edited by Joel Green and Stuart Palmer, 75-100.
Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005.
Hayes, Zachary. Visions of a Future: A Study of Christian Eschatology. Collegeville, MN:
Liturgical Press, 1992.
Hebblethwaite, Brian. The Christian Hope. New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
2010.
Hershenov, David B. “Van Inwagen, Zimmerman, and the Materialist Conception of
Resurrection.” Religious Studies 38, no. 4 (December 2002): 451-469.
______. “The Metaphysical Problem of Intermittent Existence and the Possibility of
Resurrection.” Faith and Philosophy 20, no. 1 (January 2003): 24-37.
Hick, John. Evil and the God of Love. San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row, 1978.
______. “Reply.” In Problems in the Philosophy of Religion, edited by Harold Hewitt Jr.,
160-161. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1991.
______. Death and Eternal Life. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1994.
Hight, Marc A. “Berkeley and Bodily Resurrection.” Journal of the History of
Philosophy 45, no 3 (July 2007): 443-458.
______. “How Immaterialism Can Save Your Soul.” Revue philosophique de la France
et de l'etranger 200, no. 1 (2010): 109-122.
______. “Preserving the Torments of Hell: Berkeleian Immaterialism and the Afterlife.”
Science et Esprit 63, no. 2 (2011): 179-192.
Hight, Marc A., and Joshua Bohannon. “The Son More Visible: Immaterialism and the
Incarnation.” Modern Theology 26, no. 1 (January 2010): 120-148.
Himes, Michael, Andrea S. Shappell, Jan Pilarski, Stacy Hennessy, Katie Bergin, and
Sarah Keyes. Doing the Truth in Love: Conversations about God, Relationships,
and Service. New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1995.

440
Hinlicky, Paul R. “Theological Anthropology: Toward Integrating theosis and
Justification by Faith.” Journal of Ecumenical Studies 34 no.1 (Winter 1997): 3873.
Honner, John. “A New Ontology: Incarnation, Eucharist, Resurrection, and Physics.”
Pacifica 4 (1991): 15-50.
Housel, Rebecca, and J. Jeremy Wisnewski, eds. Twilight and Philosophy: Vampires,
Vegetarians, and the Pursuit of Immortality. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., 2009.
Johnson, Marcus. “Luther and Calvin on Union with Christ.” Fides et Historia 39, no. 2
(Summer/Fall 2007): 59-77.
______. “New or Nuanced Perspective on Calvin? A Reply to Thomas Wenger.” Journal
of the Evangelical Theological Society 51, no. 3 (September 2008): 543-558.
Johnson, Thomas K. “Law and Gospel: The Hermeneutical/Homiletical Key to
Reformation Theology and Ethics.” Evangelical Review of Theology 36, no. 2
(2012): 143-160.
Judisch, Neal. “Sanctification, Satisfaction, and the Purpose of Purgatory.” Faith and
Philosophy 26, no. 2 (April 2009): 167-185.
Jüngel, Eberhard. Death: The Riddle and the Mystery. Translated by Iain and Ute Nicol.
Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1975.
______. Justification–the Heart of the Christian Faith: A Theological Study with an
Ecumenical Purpose. Translated by Jeffery F. Cayzer, with an Introduction by
John Webster. New York, NY: T & T Clark, 2001.
Karkkainen, Veli-Matti. “‘Drinking from the Same Wells with Orthodox and Catholics:
Insights from the Finnish Interpretation of Luther’s Theology.” Currents in
Theology and Mission 34, no. 2 (April 2007): 85-96.
______. “The Lutheran Doctrine of Justification in the Global Context.” Currents in
Theology and Mission 38, no. 1 (February 2011): 4-16.
Karras, Valerie A. “Beyond Justification: An Orthodox Perspective.” In Justification and
the Future of the Ecumenical Movement: The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine
of Justification, edited by William G. Rusch, 99-132. Collegeville, MN: Liturgical
Press, 2003.

441
Kasper, Walter. “Individual Salvation and Eschatological Consummation.” In Faith and
the Future: Studies in Christian Eschatology, edited by John P. Galvin, 7-24. New
York, NY: Paulist Press, 1994.
Keith, Kevin T. “Life Extension: Proponents, Opponents, and the Social Impact of the
Defeat of Death.” In Speaking of Death: America’s New Sense of Mortality,
edited by Michael Bartalos, 102-151. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2009.
Kolb, Robert. “Contemporary Lutheran Understandings of the Doctrine of Justification:
A Selective Glimpse.” In Justification: What’s at Stake in the Current Debates,
edited by Mark Husbands and Daniel Treier, 153-176. Downers Grove, IL:
InterVarsity Press, 2004.
Kolden, Marc. “Background Comments on the Doctrine of Justification by Faith Alone.”
In By Faith Alone: Essays on Justification in Honor of Gerhard O. Forde, edited
by Joseph A. Burgess and Marc Kolden, 22-30. Grand Rapids, MI: William B.
Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2004.
Kreeft, Peter. Love is Stronger than Death. San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1992.
Kung, Hans. Eternal Life? Life after Death as a Medical, Philosophical, and Theological
Problem. Translated by Edward Quinn. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984.
Lampe, Peter. “Paul’s Concept of a Spiritual Body.” In Resurrection: Theological and
Scientific Assessments, edited by Ted Peters, Robert John Russell, and Michael
Welker, 103-114. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2002.
Lane, Anthony N. S. Justification by Faith in Catholic-Protestant Dialogue: An
Evangelical Assessment. New York, NY: T & T Clark, 2006.
Lane, Dermot A. Keeping Hope Alive: Stirrings in Christian Theology. New York, NY:
Paulist Press, 1996.
Lewis, Hywel David. The Elusive Self, based on the Gifford Lectures delivered in the
University of Edinburgh, 1966-68. Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1982.
Lipner, J. J. “Hick’s Resurrection.” Sophia 18 (1979): 22-34.
Loughlin, Gerard. “Persons and Replicas.” Modern Theology 1, no. 4 (July 1985): 303319.
Macchia, Frank D. “Justification and the Spirit of Life: A Pentecostal Response to the
Joint Declaration.” In Justification and the Future of the Ecumenical Movement:

442
The Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification, edited by William G.
Rusch, 133-149. Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2003.
Mann, Gary. “Tech-Gnosticism: Disembodying Technology and Embodying Theology.”
Dialog: A Journal of Theology 34, no. 3 (1995): 206-212.
McCormack, Bruce L. “What’s at Stake in Current Debates over Justification? The Crisis
of Protestantism in the West.” In Justification: What’s at Stake in the Current
Debates, edited by Mark Husbands and Daniel Treier, 81-117. Downers Grove,
IL: InterVarsity Press, 2004.
Moltmann, Jürgen. The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology. Translated by Margaret
Kohl. New York, NY: Augsburg Fortress Press, 1996.
Moody, Raymond. Life after Life. Atlanta, GA: Mockingbird, 1975.
Mosser, Carl. “The Greatest Possible Blessing: Calvin and Deification.” Scottish Journal
of Theology 55, no. 1 (2002): 39-60.
Murphy, Nancy. “Non-reductive Physicalism.” In In Search of the Soul: Four Views of
the Mind-Body Problem, edited by Joel Green and Stuart Palmer, 115-138.
Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005.
Novello, Henry. Death as Transformation: A Contemporary Theology of Death.
Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2011.
O’Callaghan, Paul. Fides Christi: The Justification Debate. Portland, OR: Four Courts
Press, 1997.
______. Christ Our Hope: An Introduction to Eschatology. Washington, D.C.: Catholic
University of America Press, 2011.
O’Collins, Gerald. “In the End, Love.” In Faith and the Future: Studies in Christian
Eschatology, edited by John P. Galvin, 25-42. New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1994.
Pattison, Stephen. “Re-review: Death and Eternal Life by John Hick.” Modern Believing
35, no. 2 (April 1994): 31-35.
Paulien, Jon. “The Resurrection and the New Testament: A Fresh Look in Light of
Recent Research.” Andrews University Seminary Studies 50, no. 2 (2012): 249269.

443
Peters, Ted. “Introduction: What Is to Come.” In Resurrection: Theological and Scientific
Assessments, edited by Ted Peters, Robert John Russell, and Michael Welker,
viii-xvii. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2002.
______. “Resurrection: The Conceptual Challenge.” In Resurrection: Theological and
Scientific Assessments, edited by Ted Peters, Robert John Russell, and Michael
Welker, 297-321. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2002.
______. “The Heart of the Reformation Faith.” Dialog: A Journal of Theology 44, no. 1
(Spring 2005): 6-14.
Plantinga, Alvin. “Against Materialism.” Faith and Philosophy 23, no. 1 (January 2006):
3-32.
______. “A New Argument against Materialism.” Philosophia Christi 14, no. 1 (2012):
9-27.
Polkinghorne, John. Science and Creation: The Search for Understanding. Boston, MA:
Shambhala Publications, 1989.
______. Faith, Science, and Understanding. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
2000.
______. “Eschatological Credibility: Emergent and Teleological Processes.” In
Resurrection: Theological and Scientific Assessments, edited by Ted Peters,
Robert John Russell, and Michael Welker, 43-55. Grand Rapids, MI: William B.
Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2002.
______. The God of Hope and the End of the World. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2002.
Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity. "Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of
Justification" (31 October 1999).
Pozo, Candido. Theology of the Beyond. Translated by Mark A. Pilon. Staten Island, NY:
St. Paul’s, 2009.
Price, H. H. “Survival and the Idea of ‘Another World’.” In Immorality (Basic Problems
in Philosophy Series), edited by Terence Penelhum, 21-47. Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth, 1974.
Prokes, Mary Timothy. Toward a Theology of the Body. Grand Rapids, MI: William B.
Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1996.

444
Prusak, Bernard. “Bodily Resurrection in Catholic Perspectives.” Theological Studies 61,
no. 1 (2000): 64-105.
Putnam, Hilary. Reasons, Truth and History. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University
Press, 1981.
Rahner, Karl. On the Theology of Death. Translated by C. H. Henkey. New York, NT:
Herder and Herder, 1961.
______. Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity.
Translated by William V. Dych. New York, NY: The Crossroad Publishing
Company, 1982.
Rainbow, Jonathan H. “Double Grace: John Calvin’s View of the Relationship of
Justification and Sanctification.” Ex Auditu 5 (1989): 99-105.
Rainbow, Paul A. The Way of Salvation: The Role of Christian Obedience in Justification.
Waynesboro, GA: Paternoster, 2005.
Ratzinger, Joseph. Eschatology, Death and Eternal Life. Translated by Michael
Waldstein. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1989.
Reppert, Victor. “Review Essay of Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics
of Human Persons.” Faith and Philosophy 21, no. 3 (July 2004): 393-399.
Roetzel, Calvin J. “‘As Dying, and Behold We Live’: Death and Resurrection in Paul’s
Theology.” Interpretation 46, no. 1 (January 1992): 5-18.
Russell, Robert John. “Bodily Resurrection, Eschatology, and Scientific Cosmology.” In
Resurrection: Theological and Scientific Assessments, edited by Ted Peters,
Robert John Russell, and Michael Welker, 3-30. Grand Rapids, MI: William B.
Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2002.
Schmitt, Keith Randall. Death and After-life in the Theologies of Karl Barth and John
Hick: A Comparative Study. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1985.
Schoberth, Wolfgang. “Death.” In The Encyclopedia of Christianity, edited by Erwin
Fahlbusch and G. W. Bromiley, 783. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans
Pub. Co., 1999.
Schuele, Andreas. “Transformed into the Image of Christ: Identity, Personality, and
Resurrection.” In Resurrection: Theological and Scientific Assessments, edited by
Ted Peters, Robert John Russell, and Michael Welker, 219-235. Grand Rapids,
MI: William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2002.

445
Sheridan, Thomas L. “Newman and Luther on Justification.” Journal of Ecumenical
Studies 38, no. 2-3 (Spring-Summer 2001): 217-245.
Shoemaker, Sydney. Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1963.
Silcock, Jeffery G. “Luther on Justification and Participation in the Divine Life: New
Perspective on an Old Problem.” Lutheran Theological Journal 34, no. 3 (2000):
127-139.
Simpson, Michael. The Theology of Death and Eternal Life. Notre Dame, IN: Fides,
1971.
Snider, Andrew V. “Sanctification and Justification: A Unity of Distinctions.” The
Master’s Seminary Journal 21, no. 2 (Fall 2010): 159-178.
Spence, Alan J. Justification: A Guide for the Perplexed. New York, NY: T & T Clark,
2012.
Spiegel, James S. “The Theological Orthodoxy of Berkeley’s Immaterialism.” Faith and
Philosophy 13, no. 2 (April 1996): 216-235.
Stubbs, David. “The Shape of Soteriology and the pistis Christou Debate.” Scottish
Journal of Theology 61, no. 2 (May 2008): 137-157.
Stump, James B. “Non-reductive Physicalism–A Dissenting Voice.” Christian Scholar’s
Review 36, no. 1 (August 2006): 63-76.
Swetland, Stuart. “Another Response to the Thesis of Sister Mary Timothy Prokes’
‘Encountering the “Really Real”: Realism, Sacraments, and Virtual Reality’.” In
After Forty Years: Vatican Council II’s Diverse Legacy, edited by K. D
Whitehead, 79-90. South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2007.
Taliaferro, Charles. “Human Nature, Personal Identity, and Eschatology.” In The Oxford
Handbook of Eschatology, edited by Jerry L. Walls, 534-547. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press, 2008.
Taliaferro, Charles, and Stewart Goetz. “The Prospect of Christian Materialism.”
Christian Scholar’s Review 37, no. 3 (Spring 2008): 303-321.
Thielicke, Helmut. Death and Life. Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1970.
Thiselton, Anthony C. Life after Death: A New Approach to the Last Things. Grand
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2012.

446
Thornhill, Anthony. “The Resurrection of Jesus and Spiritual (Trans)formation.” Journal
of Spiritual Formation and Soul Care 5, no. 2 (2012): 243-256;
Tracy, David. Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology. Chicago, IL: The
University of Chicago Press, 1975.
Troisfontaines, Roger. I Do Not Die. Translated by Francis E. Albert. New York, NY:
Desclee Co. 1963.
Truemper, David G. “Introduction to the Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of
Justification.” In Rereading Paul Together: Protestant and Catholic Perspectives
on Justification, edited by David E. Aune, 29-42. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker
Academic, 2006.
Vandenberg, Mary L. “Hope-filled Sanctification: A Reformed Appropriation of the
Theological Virtue of Hope.” Journal of Reformed Theology 6 (2012): 99-114.
Van Dyke, Christina. “Human Identity, Immanent Causal Relations, and the Principle of
Non-repeatability: Thomas Aquinas on the Bodily Resurrection.” Religious
Studies 43, no. 4 (December 2007): 373-394.
Van Inwagen, Peter. “I Look for the Resurrection of the Dead and the Life of the World
to Come.” Accessed December 10, 2012.
http://philosophy.nd.edu/people/all/profiles/vaninwagenpeter/documents/Resurrection.doc.
Vasilyev, Vadim V. “‘The Hard Problem of Consciousness’ and Two Arguments for
Interactionism.” Faith and Philosophy 26, no. 5 (Special Issue 2009): 514-526.
Umbaugh, Bruce. On Berkeley. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2000.
Wallace A. J., and R. D. Rusk. Moral Transformation: The Original Christian Paradigm
of Salvation. New Zealand: Bridgehead Publishing, 2011.
Walls, Jerry L. Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy. New York, NY: Oxford University
Press, 2002.
______. Purgatory: The Logic of Total Transformation. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press, 2012.
Welker, Michael. God the Revealed: Christology. Grand Rapids, MI: William B.
Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2013.
Weiner, Jonathan. Long for This World. New York, NY: HaperCollins Publishers, 2010.

447
Wilber, Ken, ed. Quantum Questions: Mystical Writings of the World’s Great Physicists.
Boston, MA: Shamhhala Publications, 1984.
Wilkinson, David. Christian Eschatology and the Physical Universe. New York, NY: T
& T Clark, 2010.
Yates, John C. “Survival as Replication.” Sophia 27, no. 2 (1988): 2-9.
Yust, Karen-Marie, Brendan Hyde, and Cathy Ota. “Cyber Spirituality II: Virtual Reality
and Spiritual Exploration.” (Editorial) International Journal of Children’s
Spirituality 16, no. 1 (February 2011): 1-3.
Zimmerman, Dean. “Rejoinder to Lynne Rudder Baker.” In Contemporary Debates in the
Philosophy of Religion, edited by Michael L. Peterson and Raymond J.
VanArragon, 338-341. Oxford: Blackwell, 2003.
Zweck, Dean. “Union with Christ: Understanding of Justification from the Perspective of
Christ’s Real Presence.” Lutheran Theological Journal 45, no. 3 (2011): 156-166.

VITA
Dr. Hongmei Zhao graduated from Loyola University Chicago in August 2016
with a Ph.D. in Constructive Theology. She also holds a Master’s degree in Divinity
(University of Chicago Divinity School, 2008) and a Master’s degree in Accounting
(Kent State University, 1996). In addition, Dr. Zhao conducted graduate studies in
Economics (Kent State University, 1994-1995) and Ph.D. studies in Accounting
(University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2001-2006). And she practiced as a
Certified Public Accountant (CPA) from 1997 to 2001.
As an Instructor of Record and an Adjunct Faculty, Dr. Zhao has taught
Introduction to Christian Theology, Introduction to Christian Ethics, Understanding the
Christian Life, Search for Faith, World Religions, Introduction to Religious Studies, and
Introduction to Interfaith Studies at four universities in the Chicago metropolitan region.
She is also interested in teaching other courses in theology, such as: constitutive topics in
systematic theology, Christian philosophy, history of Christian thought, Christian
classics, history of Christianity, Christianity in the global context, religious themes in
literature, religious themes in modern cinema, religion and science, faith and reason, etc.
In her research, Dr. Zhao strives to implement methodologies that are ecumenical,
interdisciplinary and integrative. Her areas of scholarly interest include pneumatology,
theological anthropology, soteriology, George Berkeley’s idealism, natural theology, and
public theology.
448

